LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OF 
CALIFORNIA 

SAN  01  EGO 


THE  GREAT  STEEL  STRIKE 
AND  ITS  LESSONS 


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GREAT  STEEL  STRIKE 


AND  1  IS  LESSONS 


BY 

WILLIAM  Z.  FOSTER 


INTRODUCTION  BY 

JOHN  A.   FITCH 


NEW  YORK 

B.  W.  HUEBSCH,  INC. 

MCMXX 


COPYRIGHT,  1920,  BY  B.  W.  HUBBSCH,  IttC. 
PRINTED  IN  U.  S.   A. 


INTRODUCTION 

Half  a  million  men  are  employed  in  the  steel  in- 
dustry of  the  United  States.  At  a  period  in  which 
eight  hours  is  rapidly  coming  to  be  accepted  as  the 
standard  length  of  the  working  day,  the  principal 
mills  in  this  industry  are  operating  on  a  1 2-hour  work 
schedule,  and  many  of  their  workmen  are  employed 
seven  days  in  every  week.  These  half  million  men 
have,  for  the  most  part,  no  opportunity  to  discuss 
with  their  employers  the  conditions  of  their  work. 
Not  only  are  they  denied  the  right  of  bargaining 
collectively  over  the  terms  of  the  labor  contract,  but 
if  grievances  arise  in  the  course  of  their  employment 
they  have  no  right  in  any  effective  manner  to  take  up 
the  matter  with  their  employer  and  secure  an  equit- 
able adjustment.1  The  right  even  of  petition  has 
been  at  times  denied  and,  because  of  the  organized 
strength  of  the  steel  companies  and  the  disorganized 
weakness  of  the  employees,  could  be  denied  at  any 
time. 

The  right  of  workers  in  this  country  to  organize 

1  See  for  example  Judge  Gary's  testimony  before  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee investigating  the  steel  strike  —  October  i,  1919,  pp.  161-162, 
of  committee  hearings.  He  told  of  a  strike  which  occurred  because 
a  grievance  remained  unadjusted  after  a  committee  of  the  workers 
had  tried  to  take  it  up  with  the  management.  The  president  of 
the  company  involved  was  for  crushing  the  strike  without  knowing 
what  the  grievance  was  or  even  of  the  existence  of  the  committee. 

[v] 


and  to  bargain  collectively  is  unquestioned.  On 
every  hand  the  workers  are  exercising  this  right  in 
order  to  protect  and  advance  their  interests.  In 
the  steel  mills  not  only  is  the  right  generally  denied 
but  the  attempt  to  exercise  it  is  punished  by  expulsion 
from  the  industry.  Through  a  system  of  espionage 
that  is  thoroughgoing  and  effective  the  steel  com- 
panies know  which  of  their  employees  are  attending 
union  meetings,  which  of  them  are  talking  with  or- 
ganizers. It  is  their  practice  to  discharge  such  men 
and  thus  they  nip  in  the  bud  any  ordinary  movement 
toward  organization. 

Their  power  to  prevent  their  employees  from  act- 
ing independently  and  in  their  own  interest,  extends 
even  to  the  communities  in  which  they  live.  In 
towns  where  the  mayor's  chair  is  occupied  by  com- 
pany officials  or  their  relatives  —  as  was  the  case 
during  the  1919  strike  in  Bethlehem,  Duquesne, 
Clairton  and  elsewhere  —  orders  may  be  issued  de- 
nying to  the  workers  the  right  to  hold  meetings  for 
organizing  purposes,  or  the  police  may  be  instructed 
to  break  them  up.  Elsewhere  —  as  in  Homestead, 
McKeesport,  Monessen,  Rankin  and  in  Pittsburgh 
itself  —  the  economic  strength  of  the  companies  is  so 
great  as  to  secure  the  willing  cooperation  of  officials 
or  to  compel  owners  of  halls  and  vacant  lots  to  re- 
fuse the  use  of  their  property  for  the  holding  of 
union  meetings. 

One  who  has  not  seen  with  his  own  eyes  the  evi- 
dences of  steel  company  control  in  the  towns  where 
their  plants  are  located  will  have  difficulty  in  com- 
prehending its  scope  and  power.  Social  and  reli- 
gious organizations  are  profoundly  affected  by  it. 

[vi] 


In  many  a  church  during  the  recent  strike,  ministers 
and  priests  denounced  the  "  agitators  "  and  urged 
the  workmen  in  their  congregations  to  go  back  to 
the  mills.  Small  business  men  accepted  deputy  sher- 
iffs' commissions,  put  revolvers  in  their  belts  and 
talked  loudly  about  the  merits  of  a  firing  squad  as 
a  remedy  for  industrial  unrest. 

For  twenty  or  more  years  in  the  mill  towns  along 
the  Monongahela  —  since  1892  in  Homestead  —  the 
working  men  have  lived  in  an  atmosphere  of  espion- 
age and  repression.  The  deadening  influence  of  an 
overwhelming  power,  capable  of  crushing  whatever 
does  not  bend  to  its  will,  has  in  these  towns  stifled 
individual  initiative  and  robbed  citizenship  of  its 
virility. 

The  story  of  the  most  extensive  and  most  coura- 
geous fight  yet  made  to  break  this  power  and  to  set 
free  the  half  million  men  of  the  steel  mills  is  told 
within  the  pages  of  this  book  by  one  who  was  himself 
a  leader  in  the  fight.  It  is  a  story  that  is  worth  the 
telling,  for  it  has  been  told  before  only  in  fragmentary 
bits  and  without  the  authority  that  comes  from  the 
pen  of  one  of  the  chief  actors  in  the  struggle. 

Mr.  Foster  has  performed  a  public  service  in  set- 
ting down  as  he  has  the  essential  facts  attendant  upon 
the  calling  of  the  strike.  The  record  of  correspond- 
ence with  Judge  Gary  and  with  President  Wilson  in- 
dicates clearly  enough  where  responsibility  for  its  oc- 
currence lies.  It  answers  the  question  also  of  who 
it  was  that  flouted  the  President  —  the  strike  com- 
mittee that  refused  to  enter  into  a  one  sided  truce,  or 
Judge  Gary,  who  would  not  accept  Mr.  Wilson's 
suggestion  that  he  confer  with  a  union  committee, 

[vii] 


but  who  was  willing  to  take  advantage  of  the  pro- 
posed truce  to  undermine  and  destroy  the  union. 

This  thoughtful  history,  remarkably  dispassionate 
upon  the  whole,  considering  the  fact  that  the  author 
was  not  only  an  actor  in  the  events  he  describes  but 
the  storm  center  of  a  countrywide  campaign  of  slan- 
derous falsehood,  is  an  effective  answer  to  those 
whose  method  of  opposing  the  strike  was  to  shout 
"  Bolshevism  "  and  "  Revolution."  Not  thus  are 
fomenters  of  revolution  accustomed  to  write.  It  is 
this  very  quality  which  will  make  the  book  of  great 
value  both  to  the  student  and  to  the  labor  organizer. 
Never  before  has  a  leader  in  a  great  organizing  cam- 
paign like  the  one  preceding  the  steel  strike  sat  down 
afterward  to  appraise  so  calmly  the  causes  of  defeat. 
Explanations  of  failure  are  common,  usually  in  the 
form  of  "  alibis."  Mr.  Foster  has  been  willing  to 
look  the  facts  steadily  in  the  face  and  his  analysis 
of  the  causes  of  the  loss  of  the  strike  —  laying  the 
responsibility  for  it  at  the  doors  of  the  unions  them- 
selves —  cannot  fail  to  be  helpful  to  every  union 
leader,  no  matter  what  industry  his  union  may  rep- 
resent. On  the  other  hand  his  account  of  such  a  feat 
as  the  maintenance  of  a  commissary  adequate  to  meet 
the  needs  of  the  strikers  at  a  cost  of  $1.40  per  man 
is  suggestive  and  encouraging  to  the  highest  degree. 
This  achievement  must  stand  as  a  monument  to  the 
integrity  and  practical  ability  of  the  men  who  con- 
ducted the  strike. 

It  is  with  no  purpose  of  underwriting  every  state- 
ment of  fact  or  of  making  his  own  every  theory  ad- 
vanced in  the  book  that  the  writer  expresses  his  con- 
fidence in  it.  It  is  because  the  book  as  a  whole  is  so 

[viii] 


well  done  and  because  the  essential  message  that  it 
conveys  is  so  true,  that  it  is  a  pleasure  to  write  these 
words  of  introduction.  Other  books  have  been  writ- 
ten about  the  steel  industry.  Some  have  concerned 
themselves  with  metallurgy,  others  with  the  com- 
mercial aspects  of  steel  manufacture,  and  still  others 
with  certain  phases  of  the  labor  problem.  This 
book  is  different  from  all  the  others.  It  sets  forth 
aa  no  other  book  has,  and  as  no  other  writer  could, 
the  need  of  the  workers  in  this  great  basic  industry 
for  organization,  and  the  extreme  difficulty  of  achiev- 
ing this  essential  right.  It  shows  also  in  the  sanity, 
good  temper,  and  straightforward  speech  of  the  au- 
thor what  sort  of  leadership  it  is  that  the  steel  com- 
panies have  decreed  their  workers  shall  not  have ! 

JOHN  A.  FITCH. 
New  York,  June  4,  1920. 


[ix] 


INTRODUCTION 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 


CHAPTER 

I.    THE  PRESENT  SITUATION 


The  strike  > — "  Victory  "  of  the  employers  —  Indus- 
trial democracy  abroad,  industrial  serfdom  at  home 
—  What  the  workers  won  —  The  outlook. 


II.    A  GENERATION  OF  DEFEAT 


The  urge  for  mastery  —  Democratic  resistance  — 
The  Homestead  strike  —  The  strikes  of  1901  and 
1909 — The  Steel  Trust  victorious. 

III.  THE  GIANT  LABOR  AWAKES    .     .     .     .     .     16 

A  bleak  prospect  —  Hope  springs  eternal  —  A 
golden  chance  —  Disastrous  delay  —  The  new  plan 
—  A  lost  opportunity  —  The  campaign  begins  — 
Gary  fights  back. 

IV.  FLANK  ATTACKS 28 

A  sea  of  troubles  —  The  policy  of  encirclement  — 
Taking  the  outposts ' —  Organizing  methods  —  Fi- 
nancial systems  —  The  question  of  morale  —  Johns- 


hns- 
town. 

V.    BREAKING  INTO  PITTSBURGH 50 

The  flying  squadron  —  Monessen  —  Donora  —  Mc- 
Keesport — Rankin — 'Braddock — Clairton — Home- 
stead—  Duquesne  —  The  results. 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

VI.    STORM  CLOUDS  GATHER 68 

Relief  demanded  —  The  Amalgamated  Association 
moves  —  A  general  movement  —  The  conference 
committee  —  Gompers'  letter  unanswered  —  The 
strike  vote  —  Gary  defends  steel  autocracy  —  Presi- 
dent Wilson  acts  in  vain  —  The  strike  call. 

VII.    THE  STORM  BREAKS 96 

The  Steel  Trust  Army  —  Corrupt  officialdom  — 
Clairton  —  McKeesport  —  The  strike  —  showing  by 
districts  —  A  treasonable  act  —  Gary  gets  hii  an- 
swer. 

VIII.    GARYISM  RAMPANT no 

The  White  Terror  —  Constitutional  Rights  denied 

—  Unbreakable  solidarity  • —  Father  Kazincy  —  The 
Cossacks  —  Scientific  barbarity  —  Prostituted  courts 

—  Servants  rewarded. 

IX.    EFFORTS  AT  SETTLEMENT 140 

The  National  Industrial  Conference  —  The  Senate 
committee  —  The  red  book  —  The  Margolis  case  — 
The  Interchurch  World  Movement.  < 

X.    THE  COURSE  OF  THE  STRIKE 162 

Pittsburgh  district  —  The  railroad  men  —  Corrupt 
newspapers  —  Chicago  district  —  Federal  troops  at 
Gary  —  Youngstown  district  —  The  Amalgamated 
Association  —  Cleveland  —  The  Rod  and  Wire  Mill 
strike  —  The  Bethlehem  plants  —  Buffalo  and  Lack- 
awanna  —  Wheeling  and  Steubenville  —  Pueblo  — 
Johnstown  —  Mob  rule  —  The  end  of  the  strike. 

XI.     NATIONAL  AND  RACIAL  ELEMENTS      .      .      .194 

A  modern  Babel  —  Americans  as  skilled  workers  — 
Foreigners  as  unskilled  workers  —  Language  diffi- 
culties —  The  Negro  in  the  strike  —  The  race  prob- 
lem. 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

XII.    THE  COMMISSARIAT  —  THE  STRIKE  COST     .  213 

The  Relief  organization  —  Rations  —  System  of  dis- 
tribution —  Cost  of  Commissariat  —  Steel  Strike  Re- 
lief Fund  —  Cost  of  the  strike  to  the  workers,  the 
employers,  the  public,  the  Labor  movement. 

XIII.  PAST  MISTAKES  AND  FUTURE  PROBLEMS  .     .  234 

Labor's  lack  of  confidence  —  Inadequate  efforts  — 
Need  of  alliance  with  miners  and  railroaders  — 
Radical  leadership  as  a  strike  issue  —  Railroad 
shopmen,  Boston  police,  miners,  railroad  brother- 
hood strikes  —  Defection  of  Amalgamated  Associa- 
tion. 

XIV.  IN  CONCLUSION 255 

The  point  of  view  —  Are  trade  unions  revolution- 
ary?—  Camouflage  in  social  wars  —  Ruinous  dual 
unionism  —  Radicals  should  strengthen  trade  unions 
— The  English  renaissance  —  Tom  Mann's  work. 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

Pennsylvania  Law  and  Order      .      .      .      .-.     .Frontispiece 

TACINQ  PAGff 

National  Committee  Delegates    .«.«..      .=  38 

Strike  Ballot .      <     *  1% 

Cossacks  in  Action 122 

Mrs.  Fannie  Sellins,  Trade  Union  Organizer  .      .      .  148 

Steel  Trust  Newspaper  Propaganda 188 

John  Fitzpatrick ,.,    ,.,     .      .216 

A  Group  of  Organizers    .      .,     .      .     ;.i    >•    r.i     .      .  244 


THE  GREAT  STEEL  STRIKE 
AND  ITS  LESSONS 


THE 

GREAT  STEEL  STRIKE 

AND  ITS  LESSONS 

I 
THE  PRESENT  SITUATION 

THE  STRIKE  — "  VICTORY  "  OF  THE  EMPLOYERS  — 
INDUSTRIAL  DEMOCRACY  ABROAD,  INDUSTRIAL 
SERFDOM  AT  HOME  —  WHAT  THE  WORKERS 
WON  —  THE  OUTLOOK 

THE  great  steel  strike  lasted  three  months  and  a 
half.  Begun  on  September  22,  1919,  by  365,600 
men  quitting  their  places  in  the  iron  and  steel  mills 
and  blast  furnaces  in  fifty  cities  of  ten  states,  it 
ended  on  January  8,  1920,  when  the  organizations 
affiliated  in  the  National  Committee  for  Organiz- 
ing Iron  and  Steel  Workers  voted  to  permit  the 
100,000  or  more  men  still  on  strike  to  return  to  work 
upon  the  best  terms  they  could  secure. 

The  steel  manufacturers  "  won  "  the  strike.  By 
forcing  an  unconditional  surrender,  they  drove  their 
men  back  to  the  old  slavery.  This  they  accom- 
plished in  their  wonted  and  time-honored  way  by 
carrying  on  a  reign  of  terror  that  outraged  every 
just  conception  of  civil  and  human  rights.  In  this 


unholy  task  they  were  aided  by  a  crawling,  subservi- 
ent and  lying  press,  which  spewed  forth  its  poison 
propaganda  in  their  behalf;  by  selfish  and  indifferent 
local  church  movements,  which  had  long  since  lost 
their  Christian  principles  in  an  ignominious  scramble 
for  company  favors;  and  by  hordes  of  unscrupulous 
municipal,  county,  state  and  federal  officials,  whose 
eagerness  to  wear  the  steel  collar  was  equalled  only 
by  their  forgetfulness  of  their  oaths  of  office.  No 
suppression  of  free  speech  and  free  assembly,  no 
wholesale  clubbing,  shooting  and  jailing  of  strikers 
and  their  families  was  too  revolting  for  these  Steel 
Trust 1  hangers-on  to  carry  out  with  relish.  With 
the  notable  exception  of  a  few  honorable  and  cour- 
ageous individuals  here  and  there  among  these  hos- 
tile elements,  it  was  an  alignment  of  the  steel  com- 
panies, the  state,  the  courts,  the  local  churches  and 
the  press  against  the  steel  workers. 

Upon  the  ending  of  the  strike  the  steel  workers 
got  no  direct  concessions  from  their  employers. 
Those  who  were  able  to  evade  the  bitter  blacklist 
were  compelled  to  surrender  their  union  cards  and 
to  return  to  work  under  conditions  that  are  a  shame 
and  a  disgrace.  They  were  driven  back  to  the  in- 

1  Throughout  this  book  the  term  "  Steel  Trust "  is  used  to  indi- 
cate the  collectivity  of  the  great  steel  companies.  It  is  true  that 
this  is  in  contradiction  to  the  common  usage,  which  generally  ap- 
plies the  term  to  the  United  States  Steel  Corporation  alone,  but  it 
is  in  harmony  with  the  facts.  All  the  big  steel  companies  act  to- 
gether upon  all  important  matters  confronting  their  industry.  Be- 
yond question  they  are  organized  more  or  less  secretly  into  a  trust. 
This  book  recognizes  this  situation,  hence  the  broad  use  of  the 
term  "  Steel  Trust."  It  is  important  to  remember  this  explanation. 
Where  the  writer  has  in  mind  any  one  company  that  company  is 
named. 

0] 


famous  peonage  system  with  its  twelve  hour  day, 
a  system  which  American  steel  workers,  of  all  those 
in  the  world,  alone  have  to  endure.  In  England, 
France,  Italy  and  Germany,  the  steel  workers  enjoy 
the  right  of  a  voice  in  the  control  of  their  industry; 
they  regularly  barter  and  bargain  with  their  em- 
ployers over  the  questions  of  hours,  wages  and  work- 
ing conditions;  they  also  have  the  eight  hour  day. 
One  must  come  to  America,  the  land  of  freedom, 
to  find  steel  workers  still  economically  disfranchised 
and  compelled  to  work  twelve  hours  a  day.  In  this 
country  alone  the  human  rights  of  the  steel  workers 
are  crushed  under  foot  by  the  triumphant  property 
rights  of  their  employers. 

Who  can  uphold  this  indefensible  position? 
Are  not  our  deposits  of  coal  and  iron  immeasurably 
greater,  our  mills  more  highly  developed,  our  labor 
force  more  numerous  and  more  skilled  than  those 
of  any  other  country?  Who  then  will  venture  to 
assert  that  American  workingmen  are  not  en- 
titled to  exercise  all  the  rights  and  privileges  en- 
joyed by  European  workingmen?  If  the  steel 
workers  of  England,  or  France,  or  Italy,  or 
Germany  can  practice  collective  bargaining,  why 
not  the  steel  workers  of  America?  And  why  should 
the  steel  workers  here  have  to  work  twelve  hours 
daily  when  the  eight  hour  day  obtains  abroad? 

There  are  a  hundred  good  reasons  why  the  prin- 
ciples of  collective  bargaining  and  the  shorter  work- 
day should  prevail  in  the  steel  industry  of  America, 
and  only  one  why  they  should  not.  This  one  reason 
is  that  the  industry  is  hard  and  fast  in  the  grip  of 
absentee  capitalists  who  take  no  part  in  production 

[3] 


and  whose  sole  function  is  to  seize  by  hook  or  crook 
the  product  of  the  industry  and  consume  it.  These 
parasites,  in  their  voracious  quest  of  profits,  know 
neither  pity  nor  responsibility.  Their  reckless 
motto  is  "  After  us  the  deluge."  They  care  less 
than  naught  for  the  rights  and  sufferings  of  the 
workers.  Ignoring  the  inevitable  weakening  of 
patriotism  of  people  living  under  miserable  indus- 
trial conditions,  they  go  their  way,  prostituting, 
strangling  and  dismembering  our  most  cherished  in- 
stitutions. And  the  worst  of  it  is  that  in  the  big 
strike  an  ignorant  public,  miseducated  by  employers' 
propaganda  sheets  masquerading  under  the  guise  of 
newspapers,  applauded  them  in  their  ruthless  course. 
Blindly  this  public,  setting  itself  up  as  the  great 
arbiter  of  what  is  democratic  and  American,  con- 
demned as  bolshevistic  and  ruinous  the  demands  of 
almost  400,000  steel  workers  for  simple,  funda- 
mental reforms,  without  which  hardly  a  pretense  of 
freedom  is  possible,  and  lauded  as  sturdy  American- 
ism the  desperate  autocracy  of  the  Steel  Trust.  All 
its  guns  were  turned  against  the  strikers. 

In  this  great  struggle  the  mill  owners  may  well 
claim  the  material  victory;  but  with  just  as  much 
right  the  workers  can  claim  the  moral  victory.  For 
the  strike  left  in  every  aspiring  breast  a  spark  of 
hope  which  must  burn  on  till  it  finally  bursts  into  a 
flame  of  freedom-bringing  revolt.  For  a  genera- 
tion steel  workers  had  been  hopeless.  Their  slavery 
had  overwhelmed  them.  The  trade-union  move- 
ment seemed  weak,  distant  and  incapable.  The  rot- 
tenness of  steel  districts  precluded  all  thought  of  re- 
lief through  political  channels.  The  employers 

[4] 


seemed  omnipotent.  But  the  strike  has  changed  all 
this.  Like  a  flash  the  unions  appeared  upon  the 
scene.  They  flourished  and  expanded  in  spite  of  all 
opposition.  Then  boldly  they  went  to  a  death  grap- 
ple with  the  erstwhile  unchallenged  employers.  It  is 
true  they  did  not  win,  but  they  put  up  a  fight  which 
has  won  the  steel  workers'  hearts.  Their  earnest 
struggle  and  the  loyal  support,  by  money  and  food, 
which  they  gave  the  strikers,  have  forever  laid  at 
rest  the  employers'  arguments  that  the  unions  are 
cowardly,  grafting  bodies  organized  merely  to  rob 
and  betray  the  workers.  Even  the  densest  of  the 
strikers  could  see  that  the  loss  of  the  strike  was  due 
to  insufficient  preparation;  that  only  a  fraction  of 
the  power  of  unionism  had  been  developed  and  that 
with  better  organization  better  results  would  be  se- 
cured. And  the  outcome  is  that  the  steel  workers 
have  won  a  precious  belief  in  the  power  of  concerted 
action  through  the  unions.  They  have  discovered 
the  Achilles'  heel  of  their  would-be  masters.  They 
now  see  the  way  out  of  their  slavery.  This  is  their 
tremendous  victory. 

No  less  than  the  steel  workers  themselves,  the 
whole  trade-union  movement  won  a  great  moral 
victory  in  the  steel  strike  and  the  campaign  that 
preceded  it.  This  more  than  offsets  the  failure  of 
the  strike  itself.  The  gain  consists  of  a  badly 
needed  addition  to  the  unions'  thin  store  of  self-con- 
fidence. To  trade-union  organizers  the  steel  indus- 
try had  long  symbolized  the  impossible.  Wave 
after  wave  of  organizing  effort  they  had  sent  against 
it;  but  their  work  had  been  as  ineffectual  as  a  summer 
sea  lapping  the  base  of  Gibraltar.  Pessimism  re- 

[5] 


garding  its  conquest  for  trade  unionism  was  abysmal. 
But  now  all  this  is  changed.  The  impossible  has 
been  accomplished.  The  steel  workers  were  organ- 
ized in  the  face  of  all  that  the  steel  companies  could 
do  to  prevent  it.  Thus  a  whole  new  vista  of  possi- 
bilities unfolds  before  the  unions.  Not  only  does 
the  reorganization  of  the  steel  industry  seem  strictly 
feasible,  but  the  whole  conception  that  many  of  the 
basic  industries  are  immune  to  trade  unionism  turns 
out  to  be  an  illusion.  If  the  steel  industry  could  be 
organized,  so  can  any  other  in  the  country;  for  the 
worst  of  them  presents  hardly  a  fraction  of  the 
difficulties  squarely  vanquished  in  the  steel  industry. 
The  mouth  has  been  shut  forever  of  that  insuffer- 
able pest  of  the  labor  movement,  the  large  body  of 
ignorant,  incompetent,  short-sighted,  visionless 
union  men  whose  eternal  song,  when  some  important 
organizing  project  is  afoot,  is  "  It  can't  be  done." 
After  this  experience  in  the  steel  industry  the  prob- 
lem of  unionizing  any  industry  resolves  itself  simply 
into  selecting  a  capable  organizer  and  giving  him 
sufficient  money  and  men  to  do  the  job. 

The  ending  of  the  strike  by  no  means  indicates 
the  abandonment  of  the  steel  workers'  battle  for 
their  rights.  For  a  while,  perhaps,  their  advance 
may  be  checked,  while  they  are  recovering  from 
the  effects  of  their  great  struggle.  But  it  will  not  be 
long  before  they  have  another  big  movement  under 
way.  They  feel  but  little  defeated  by  the  loss  of 
the  strike,  and  the  trade  unions  as  a  whole  feel  even 
less  so.  Both  have  gained  wonderful  confidence  in 
themselves  and  in  each  other  during  the  fight.  The 
unions  will  not  desert  the  field  and  leave  the  workers 

[6] 


a  prey  to  the  demoralizing  propaganda  of  the  em- 
ployers, customary  after  lost  strikes.  On  the  con- 
trary they  are  keeping  a  large  crew  of  organizers  at 
work  in  an  educational  campaign,  devised  to  main- 
tain and  develop  the  confidence  the  steel  workers 
have  in  themselves  and  the  unions.  Then,  when  the 
opportune  time  comes,  which  will  be  but  shortly, 
the  next  big  drive  will  be  on.  Mr.  Gary  and  his 
associates  may  attempt  to  forestall  the  inevitable  by 
the  granting  of  fake  eight  hour  days,  paper  increases 
in  wages  and  hand-picked  company  unions,  but  it  is 
safe  to  say  that  the  steel  workers  will  go  on  building 
up  stronger  and  more  aggressive  combinations 
among  themselves  and  with  allied  trades  until  they 
finally  achieve  industrial  freedom.  So  long  as  any 
men  undertake  to  oppress  the  steel  workers  and  to 
squeeze  returns  from  the  industry  without  render- 
ing adequate  service  therefor,  just  that  long  must 
these  men  expect  to  be  confronted  by  a  progressively 
more  militant  and  rebellious  working  force.  The 
great  steel  strike  of  1919  will  seem  only  a  prelimi- 
nary skirmish  when  compared  with  the  tremendous 
battles  that  are  bound  to  come  unless  the  enslaved 
steel  workers  are  set  free. 


II 

A  GENERATION  OF  DEFEAT  * 

THE  URGE  FOR  MASTERY  —  DEMOCRATIC  RESIST- 
ANCE —  THE  HOMESTEAD  STRIKE  —  THE  STRIKES 
OF  1901  AND  1909  —  THE  STEEL  TRUST  VIC- 
TORIOUS 

THE  recent  upheaval  in  the  steel  industry  was  but 
one  link  in  a  long  chain  of  struggles,  the  latest  battle 
in  an  industrial  war  for  freedom  which  has  raged 
almost  since  the  inception  of  the  industry. 

The  steel  manufacturers  have  always  aggressively 
applied  the  ordinary,  although  unacknowledged, 
American  business  principles  that  our  industries 
exist  primarily  to  create  huge  profits  for  the  for- 
tunate few  who  own  them,  and  that  if  they  have 
any  other  utility  it  is  a  matter  of  secondary  impor- 
tance. The  interests  of  society  in  the  steel  business 
they  scoff  at.  And  as  for  their  own  employees,  they 
have  never  considered  them  better  than  so  much 
necessary  human  machinery,  to  be  bought  in  the 
market  at  the  lowest  possible  price  and  otherwise 
handled  in  a  thoroughly  irresponsible  manner. 
They  clearly  understand  that  if  they  are  to  carry  out 
their  policy  of  raw  exploitation,  the  prime  essential 

1  Students  desiring  a  full  account  of  the  early  struggles  of  the 
steel  unions  are  advised  to  read  Mr.  John  A.  Fitch's  splendid 
book,  "  The  Steel  Workers.* 

[8] 


is  that  they  keep  their  employees  unorganized. 
Then,  without  let  or  hindrance,  wages  may  be  kept 
low,  the  work  day  made  longer,  speeding  systems 
introduced,  safety  devices  neglected,  and  the  human 
side  of  the  industry  generally  robbed  and  repressed 
in  favor  of  its  profit  side;  whereas,  if  the  unions 
were  allowed  to  come  in,  it  would  mean  that  every 
policy  in  the  industry  would  first  have  to  be  con- 
sidered and  judged  with  regard  to  its  effects  upon 
the  men  actually  making  steel  and  iron.  It  would 
mean  that  humanity  must  be  emphasized  at  the  ex- 
pense of  misearned  dividends.  But  this  would  never 
do.  The  mill  owners  are  interested  in  profits,  not 
in  humanity.  Hence,  if  they  can  prevent  it,  they 
will  have  no  unions.  Since  the  pioneer  days  of  steel 
making  their  policy  has  tended  powerfully  on  the  one 
hand  towards  elevating  the  employers  into  a  small 
group  of  enormously  wealthy,  idle,  industrial  auto- 
crats, and  on  the  other  towards  depressing  the 
workers  into  a  huge  army  of  ignorant,  poverty- 
stricken,  industrial  serfs.  The  calamity  of  it  is  that 
this  policy  has  worked  out  so  well. 

Against  this  will-to-power  of  their  employers  the 
steel  workers  have  fought  long  and  valiantly.  In 
the  early  days  of  the  industry,  when  the  combinations 
of  capital  were  weak,  the  working  force  skilled, 
English-speaking  and  independent,  the  latter  easily 
defended  themselves  and  made  substantial  progress 
toward  their  own  inevitable,  even  if  unrecognized 
goal  of  industrial  freedom;  but  in  later  years,  with 
the  growth  of  the  gigantic  United  States  Steel  Cor- 
poration, the  displacement  of  skilled  labor  by  auto- 
matic machinery  and  the  introduction  of  multitudes 

[9] 


of  illiterate  immigrants  into  the  industry,  their 
fight  for  their  rights  became  a  desperate  and  almost 
hopeless  struggle.  For  the  past  thirty  years  they 
have  suffered  an  unbroken  series  of  defeats.  Their 
one-time  growing  freedom  has  been  crushed. 

At  first  the  fight  was  easy,  and  by  the  later  '8o's, 
'grace  to  the  activities  of  many  unions,  notable  among 
which  were  the  old  Sons  of  Vulcan,  the  Knights  of 
Labor  and  the  Amalgamated  Association  of  Iron, 
Steel  and  Tin  Workers,  considerable  organization 
existed  among  the  men  employed  in  the  iron  and 
steel  mills  throughout  the  country.  The  Amalga- 
mated Association,  the  dominating  body,  enjoyed 
great  prestige  in  the  labor  movement  generally.  It 
consisted  almost  entirely  of  highly  skilled  men  and 
paid  little  or  no  attention  to  the  unskilled  workers. 
In  the  heyday  of  its  strength,  in  1891,  it  numbered 
about  24,000  members.  Its  stronghold  was  in  the 
Pittsburgh  district.  Its  citadel  was  Homestead. 
During  the  period  of  its  greatest  activity  some 
measure  of  democracy  prevailed  in  the  industry,  and 
prospects  seemed  bright  for  its  extension. 

But  about  that  time  Andrew  Carnegie,  grown  rich 
and  powerful,  began  to  chafe  uneasily  under  the  re- 
strictions placed  upon  his  rapacity  by  his  organized 
employees.  He  wanted  a  free  hand  and  determined 
to  get  it.  As  the  first  step  towards  enshackling  his 
workers  he  brought  into  his  company  that  inveterate 
enemy  of  democracy  in  all  its  forms,  Henry  C.  Frick. 
Then  the  two,  Carnegie  and  Frick,  neither  of  whom 
gave  his  workers  as  much  consideration  as  the  South- 
ern slave  holder  gave  his  bondmen  —  for  chattel 
slaves  were  at  least  assured  sufficient  food,  warm 

[10] 


clothes,  a  habitable  home  and  medical  attendance  — 
began  to  war  upon  the  union.  They  started  the 
trouble  in  Homestead,  where  the  big  mills  of  the 
Carnegie  Company  are  located.  In  1889  tneY  m~ 
sisted  that  the  men  accept  heavy  reductions  in  wages, 
write  their  agreements  to  expire  in  the  unfavorable 
winter  season  instead  of  in  summer,  and  give  up  their 
union.  The  men  refused,  and  after  a  short  strike, 
got  a  favorable  settlement.  But  Carnegie  and 
Frick  were  not  to  be  lightly  turned  from  their  pur- 
pose. When  the  contract  in  force  expired,  they  re- 
newed their  old  demands,  and  thus  precipitated  the 
great  Homestead  strike. 

This  famous  strike  attracted  world-wide  atten- 
tion, and  well  it  might,  for  it  marked  a  turning  point 
in  the  industrial  history  of  America.  It  began  on 
June  23,  1892,  and  lasted  until  November  20  of  the 
same  year.  Characterized  by  extreme  bitterness 
and  violence,  it  resulted  in  complete  defeat  for  the 
men,  not  only  in  Homestead,  but  also  in  several 
other  big  mills  in  Pittsburgh  and  adjoining  towns 
where  the  steel  workers  had  struck  in  support  of 
their  besieged  brothers  in  Homestead.  This  un- 
successful strike  eliminated  organized  labor  from  the 
mills  of  the  big  Carnegie  Company.  It  also  dealt 
the  Amalgamated  Association  of  Iron,  Steel  and  Tin 
Workers  a  blow  from  which  it  has  not  yet  recovered. 
It  ended  the  period  of  trade-union  expansion  in  the 
steel  industry  and  began  an  era  of  unrestricted  labor 
control  by  the  employers.  At  Homestead  Carnegie 
and  Frick  stuck  a  knife  deep  into  the  vitals  of  the 
young  democracy  of  the  steel  workers. 

Recuperating  somewhat  from  the  staggering  de- 


feat  at  Homestead,  the  Amalgamated  Association 
managed  to  retain  a  firm  hold  in  the  industry  for  a 
few  years  longer.  Its  next  big  setback,  in  1901,  was 
caused  by  the  organization  of  the  United  States 
Steel  Corporation.  Foreseeing  war  from  this  mon- 
ster combination  dominated  by  the  hostile  Carnegie 
interests,  the  union,  presided  over  at  that  time  by 
Theodore  J.  Shaffer,  decided  to  take  time  by  the 
forelock  and  negotiate  an  agreement  that  would  ex- 
tend its  scope  and  give  it  a  chance  to  live.  But  the 
plan  failed;  the  anti-union  tendencies  of  the  employ- 
ers were  too  strong,  and  a  strike  resulted.  At  first 
the  only  companies  affected  were  the  American  Tin 
Plate  Company,  the  American  Sheet  Steel  Company 
and  the  American  Steel  Hoop  Company.  Finally, 
however,  all  the  organized  men  in  all  the  mills  of 
the  United  States  Steel  Corporation  were  called  out, 
but  to  no  avail;  after  a  few  weeks'  struggle  the 
strike  was  utterly  lost. 

The  failure  of  the  1901  strike  broke  the  backbone 
of  the  Amalgamated  Association.  Still,  with  char- 
acteristic trade-union  tenacity,  it  lingered  along  in 
a  few  of  the  Trust  plants  in  the  sheet  and  tin  sec- 
tion of  the  industry.  Its  business  relations  with  the 
companies  at  this  stage  of  its  decline,  according  to 
the  testimony  of  its  present  President,  M.  F.  Tighe, 
before  the  Senate  Committee  investigating  the  1919 
strike,  consisted  of  "  giving  way  to  every  request 
that  was  made  by  the  companies  when  they  insisted 
upon  it."  But  even  this  humble  and  pliant  attitude 
of  the  once  powerful  Amalgamated  Association  was 
intolerable  to  the  haughty  steel  kings.  They  could 
not  brook  even  the  most  shadowy  opposition  to  their 

[12] 


industrial  absolutism.  Accordingly,  early  in  the 
summer  of  1909,  they  served  notice  upon  the 
union  men  to  accept  a  reduction  in  wages  and 
give  up  their  union.  It  was  practically  the  same 
ultimatum  delivered  by  Carnegie  and  Frick  to  the 
Homestead  men  twenty  years  before.  With  a  last 
desperate  rally  the  union  met  this  latest  attack  upon 
its  life.  The  ensuing  strike  lasted  fourteen  months. 
It  was  bitterly  fought,  but  it  went  the  way  of  all 
strikes  in  the  steel  industry  since  1892.  It  was  lost; 
and  in  consequence  every  trace  of  unionism  was 
wiped  out  of  the  mills  not  only  of  the  United  States 
Steel  Corporation,  but  of  the  big  independent  com- 
panies as  well. 

Although  the  union  was  not  finally  crushed  in  the 
mills  until  the  strike  of  1909,  the  steel  mill  owners 
were  for  many  years  previous  to  that  time  in  almost 
undisputed  control  of  the  situation.  During  a  gen- 
eration, practically,  they  have  worked  their  will  un- 
hampered; and  the  results  of  their  policy  of  unlim- 
ited exploitation  are  all  too  apparent.  For  them- 
selves they  have  taken  untold  millions  of  wealth  from 
the  industry;  for  the  workers  they  have  left  barely 
enough  to  eke  out  an  existence  in  the  miserable,  de- 
graded steel  towns. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  World  war  the  steel  work- 
ers generally,  with  the  exception  of  the  laborers, 
who  had  secured  a  cent  or  two  advance  per  hour, 
were  making  less  wages  than  before  the  Home- 
stead strike.  The  constant  increase  in  the  cost  of 
living  in  the  intervening  years  had  still  further 
depressed  their  standards  of  life.  Not  a  shred  of 
benefit  had  they  received  from  the  tremendously 

[13] 


increased  output  of  the  industry.  While  the  em- 
ployers lived  in  gorgeous  palaces,  the  workers 
found  themselves,  for  the  most  part,  crowded 
like  cattle  into  the  filthy  hovels  that  ordinarily  con- 
stitute the  greater  part  of  the  steel  towns.  Tuber- 
culosis ran  riot  among  them;  infant  mortality  was 
far  above  normal.  Though  several  increases  in 
wages  were  granted  after  the  war  began,  these  have 
been  offset  by  the  terrific  rise  in  the  cost  of  living. 
If  the  war  has  brought  any  betterment  in  the  living 
conditions  of  the  steel  workers,  it  cannot  be  seen 
with  the  naked  eye. 

The  twelve  hour  day  prevails  for  half  of  the  men. 
One-fourth  work  seven  days  a  week,  with  a  twenty- 
four  hour  shift  every  two  weeks.  Their  lives  are 
one  constant  round  of  toil.  They  have  no  family 
life,  no  opportunity  for  education  or  even  for  recrea- 
tion; for  their  few  hours  of  liberty  are  spoiled  by 
the  ever-present  fatigue.  Furthermore,  working 
conditions  in  the  mills  are  bad.  The  men  are 
speeded  up  to  such  a  degree  that  only  the  youngest 
and  strongest  can  stand  it.  At  forty  the  average 
steel  worker  is  played  out.  The  work,  in  itself  ex- 
tremely dangerous,  is  made  still  more  so  by  the  em- 
ployers' failure  to  adopt  the  necessary  safety  de- 
vices. Many  a  man  has  gone  to  his  death  through 
the  wanton  neglect  of  the  companies  to  provide  safe- 
guarding appliances  that  they  would  have  been  com- 
pelled to  install  were  the  unions  still  in  the  plants.1 

1  The  practice  of  the  different  steel  companies  varies  with  respect 
to  safety  devices.  Some  of  them  are  still  in  the  dark  ages  that 
all  were  in  a  few  years  ago,  with  reckless  disregard  of  human 
life.  Others  have  made  some  progress.  Of  these  the  U.  S.  Steel 
Corporation  is  undoubtedly  in  the  lead,  for  it  has  installed  many 
safety  appliances  and  has  safety  committees  actively  at  work.  At 

[14] 


Not  a  trace  of  industrial  justice  remains.  The  treat- 
ment of  the  men  depends  altogether  upon  the  arbi- 
trary wills  of  the  foremen  and  superintendents.  A 
man  may  give  faithful  service  in  a  plant  for  thirty 
years  and  then  be  discharged  offhand,  as  many  are, 
for  some  insignificant  cause.  He  has  no  one  to  ap- 
peal to.  His  fellow  workers,  living  in  constant 
terror  of  discharge  and  the  blacklist,  dare  not  even 
listen  to  him,  much  less  defend  his  cause.  He  must 
bow  to  the  inevitable,  even  though  it  means  industrial 
ruin  for  him  and  his  family. 

Such  deplorable  conditions  result  naturally  from  a 
lack  of  unionism.  It  is  expecting  too  much  of  human 
nature  at  this  stage  of  its  development  to  count  on 
employers  treating  their  employees  fairly  without 
some  form  of  compulsion.  Even  in  highly  organ- 
ized industries  the  unions  have  to  be  constantly  on 
guard  to  resist  the  never-ending  encroachments  of 
their  employers,  manifested  at  every  conceivable 
point  of  attack.  For  the  workers,  indeed,  eternal 
vigilance  is  the  price  of  liberty.  Hence  nothing  but 
degradation  for  them  and  autocracy  for  their  em- 
ployers may  be  looked  for  in  industries  where  they 
are  systematically  kept  unorganized  and  thus  in- 
capable of  defending  their  rights,  as  is  the  case  in 
the  steel  industry.  This  system  of  industrial  serf- 
dom has  served  the  steel  barons  well  for  a  genera- 
tion. But  it  is  one  the  steel  workers  will  never  ac- 
cept. Regardless  of  the  cost  they  will  rebel  against 
it  at  every  opportunity  till  they  finally  destroy  it. 

best,  however,  steel  making  is  an  exceedingly  dangerous  industry 
and  the  risk  is  intensified  by  the  great  heat  of  the  mills  and  the 
long  hours  of  work  —  the  twelve  hour  day  and  the  seven  day  week 
—  which  lead  inevitably  to  exhaustion. 

[15] 


Ill 

THE  GIANT  LABOR  AWAKES 

A    BLEAK    PROSPECT  —  HOPE    SPRINGS    ETERNAL  — 

A  GOLDEN   CHA.NCE DISASTROUS  DELAY THE 

NEW  PLAN  —  A  LOST  OPPORTUNITY  —  THE  CAM- 
PAIGN BEGINS  —  GARY   FIGHTS  BACK 

FROM  just  previous  to,  until  some  time  after  the 
beginning  of  the  world  war  the  situation  in  the  steel 
industry,  from  a  trade-union  point  of  view,  was  truly 
discouraging.  It  seemed  impossible  for  the  workers 
to  accomplish  anything  by  organized  effort.  The 
big  steel  companies,  by  driving  the  Amalgamated  As- 
sociation of  Iron,  Steel  and  Tin  Workers  from  the 
mills,  had  built  up  a  terrific  reputation  as  union 
crushers.  This  was  greatly  enhanced  by  their  com- 
plete defeat  of  Labor  in  the  memorable  strikes  of  the 
structural  iron  workers,  the  lake  sailors,  the  iron 
miners,  and  the  steel  workers  at  McKees  Rocks  in 
1909,  Bethlehem  in  1910  and  Youngstown  in 
1915-16.  It  was  still  further  enhanced  by  their 
blocking  every  attempt  of  the  individual  trades  to  re- 
establish themselves,  and  by  the  failure  of  the  A.  F. 
of  L.  steel  campaign,  inaugurated  by  the  convention 
of  1909,  to  achieve  even  the  slightest  tangible  re- 
sults. The  endless  round  of  defeat  had  reduced 
almost  to  zero  the  trade  unions'  confidence  in  their 

[16] 


ability  to  cope  with  the  militant  and  rapacious  steel 
manufacturers. 

But  as  the  war  wore  on  and  the  United  States 
joined  the  general  slaughter,  the  situation  changed 
rapidly  in  favor  of  the  unions.  The  demand  for 
soldiers  and  munitions  had  made  labor  scarce;  the 
Federal  administration  was  friendly;  the  right  to 
organize  was  freely  conceded  by  the  government  and 
even  insisted  upon;  the  steel  industry  was  the  master- 
clock  of  the  whole  war  program  and  had  to  be  kept  in 
operation  at  all  costs;  the  workers  were  taking  new 
heart  and  making  demands  —  already  they  had  en- 
gaged in  big  strike  movements  in  the  mills  in 
Pittsburgh  (Jones  and  Laughlin  Company),  Bethle- 
hem and  Birmingham  (U.  S.  Steel).  The  gods 
were  indeed  fighting  on  the  side  of  Labor.  It  was 
an  opportunity  to  organize  the  industry  such  as  might 
never  again  occur.  That  the  trade  union  movement 
did  not  embrace  it  sooner  was  a  calamity. 

The  writer  was  one  of  those  who  perceived  the 
unparalleled  opportunity.  But  being  at  that  time 
Secretary-Treasurer  of  the  committee  organizing  the 
packing  industry  I  was  unable  to  do  anything  sub- 
stantial in  the  steel  situation  until  the  handing  down 
of  Judge  Alschuler's  decision  giving  the  packing 
house  workers  the  eight  hour  day  and  other  vital 
concessions  enabled  me  to  slacken  my  efforts  in  that 
important  movement.  Immediately  thereafter,  on 
April  7,  1918,  I  presented  a  resolution  to  the  Chi- 
cago Federation  of  Labor  requesting  the  executive 
officers  of  the  American  Federation  of  Labor  to  call 
a  general  labor  conference  and  to  inaugurate  thereat 
a  national  campaign  to  organize  the  steel  workers. 

[17] 


The  resolution  was  endorsed  by  twelve  local  unions 
in  the  steel  industry.  It  was  adopted  unani- 
mously and  forwarded  to  the  A.  F.  of  L.  The  latter 
took  the  matter  up  with  the  rapidly  reviving  Amal- 
gamated Association,  and  the  affair  was  slowly  wind- 
ing along  to  an  eventual  conference,  with  a  loss  of 
much  precious  time,  when  the  resolution  was  re- 
submitted  to  the  Chicago  Federation  of  Labor, 
re-adopted  and  sent  to  the  St.  Paul  convention  of  the 
A.  F.  of  L.,  June  10-20,  1918.  It  follows: 

RESOLUTION  #29 

WHEREAS,  the  organization  of  the  vast  armies  of 
wage-earners  employed  in  the  steel  industries  is  vitally 
necessary  to  the  further  spread  of  industrial  democracy 
in  America,  and 

WHEREAS,  Organized  Labor  can  accomplish  this 
great  task  only  by  putting  forth  a  tremendous  effort; 
therefore,  be  it 

RESOLVED,  that  the  executive  officers  of  the  A.  F.  of 
L.  stand  instructed  to  call  a  conference  during  this  con- 
vention of  delegates  of  all  international  unions  whose 
interests  are  involved  in  the  steel  industries,  and  of  all 
the  State  Federations  and  City  Central  bodies  in  the 
steel  districts,  for  the  purpose  of  uniting  all  these  or- 
ganizations into  one  mighty  drive  to  organize  the  steel 
plants  of  America. 

The  resolution  was  adopted  by  unanimous  vote. 
Accordingly,  a  number  of  conferences  were  held 
during  the  convention,  at  which  the  proposed  cam- 
paign was  discussed  and  endorsed.  The  outcome 
was  that  provisions  were  made  to  have  President 
Gompers  call  another  conference,  in  Chicago  thirty 
days  later,  of  responsible  union  officials  who  would 

[18] 


come  prepared  to  act  in  the  name  of  their  inter- 
national unions.  This  involved  further  waste  of 
probably  the  most  precious  time  for  organizing  work 
that  Labor  will  ever  have. 

From  past  events  in  the  steel  industry  it  was  evi- 
dent that  in  the  proposed  campaign  radical  depart- 
ures would  have  to  be  made  from  the  ordinary  or- 
ganizing tactics.  Without  question  the  steel  work- 
ers' unions  have  always  lacked  efficiency  in  their  or- 
ganizing departments.  This  was  a  cardinal  fail- 
ing of  the  Amalgamated  Association  and  it  contrib- 
uted as  much,  if  not  more  than  anything  else  to  its 
downfall.  If,  when  in  its  prime,  this  organization 
had  shown  sufficient  organizing  activity  in  the  non- 
union mills,  and  especially  by  taking  in  the  unskilled, 
it  would  have  so  intrenched  itself  that  Carnegie  and 
his  henchman,  Frick,  never  could  have  dislodged  it. 
But,  unfortunately,  it  undertook  too  much  of  its  or- 
ganization work  at  the  conference  table  and  not 
enough  at  the  mill  gates.  Consequently,  more  than 
once  it  found  itself  in  deadly  quarrels  with  the  em- 
ployers over  the  unionization  of  certain  mills,  when 
a  live  organizer  working  among  the  non-union  men 
involved  would  have  solved  the  problem  in  a  few 
weeks. 

Nor  had  the  other  unions  claiming  jurisdiction 
over  men  employed  in  the  steel  industry  developed  an 
organizing  policy  equal  to  the  occasion.  Their  sys- 
tem of  nibbling  away,  one  craft  at  a  time  in  individ- 
ual mills,  was  entirely  out  of  place.  Possibly  effec- 
tive in  some  industries,  it  was  worse  than  useless  in 
the  steel  mills.  Its  unvarying  failure  served  only 
to  strengthen  the  mill  owners  and  to  further 

[19] 


discourage  the  mill  workers  and  Organized  Labor. 
It  is  pure  folly  to  organize  one  trade  in  one  mill,  or 
all  trades  in  one  mill,  or  even  all  trades  in  all  the 
mills  in  one  locality,  when,  at  any  time  it  sees  fit  to 
do  so,  the  Steel  Trust  can  defeat  the  movement  by 
merely  shutting  down  its  mills  in  the  affected  dis- 
trict and  transferring  its  work  elsewhere,  as  it  has 
done  time  and  again.  It  was  plain,  therefore,  that 
the  proposed  campaign  would  have  to  affect  all  the 
steel  mills  simultaneously.  It  would  have  to  be 
national  in  scope  and  encompass  every  worker  in 
every  mill,  in  every  steel  district  in  the  United  States. 

The  intention  was  to  use  the  system  so  strikingly 
successful  in  the  organization  of  the  packing  indus- 
try. The  committee  charged  with  organizing  that 
industry,  when  it  assembled,  a  year  before,  to  begin 
the  work,  found  three  possible  methods  of  procedure 
confronting  it,  each  with  its  advocates  present.  It 
could  go  along  on  the  old,  discredited  craft  policy 
of  each  trade  for  itself  and  the  devil  take  the  hind- 
most; it  might  attempt  to  form  an  industrial  union; 
or  it  could  apply  the  principle  of  federating  the 
trades,  then  making  great  headway  on  the  railroads. 
The  latter  system  was  the  one  chosen  as  the  best 
fitted  to  get  results  at  this  stage  in  the  development 
of  the  unions  and  the  packing  industry.  And  the 
outcome  proved  the  wisdom  of  the  decision.  In  the 
steel  campaign  the  unions  were  to  be  similarly  linked 
together  in  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance. 

But  all  this  relates  merely  to  the  shell  of  the 
plan  behind  Resolution  No.  29.  Its  breath  of  life 
was  in  its  strategy;  in  the  way  the  organization 
work  was  to  be  prosecuted.  The  best  plans  are 

[20] 


worthless  unless  properly  executed.  The  idea  was 
to  make  a  hurricane  drive  simultaneously  in  all  the 
steel  centers  that  would  catch  the  workers'  imagina- 
tion and  sweep  them  into  the  unions  en  masse  despite 
all  opposition,  and  thus  to  put  Mr.  Gary  and  his 
associates  into  such  a  predicament  that  they  would 
have  to  grant  the  just  demands  of  their  men.  It 
was  intended  that  after  the  Chicago  conference  a 
dozen  or  more  general  organizers  should  be  dis- 
patched immediately  to  the  most  important  steel 
centers,  to  bring  to  the  steel  workers  the  first  word 
of  the  big  drive  being  made  in  their  behalf,  and  to 
organize  local  committees  to  handle  the  detail  work 
of  organization.  In  the  meantime  the  co-operating 
international  unions  were  to  recruit  numbers  of  or- 
ganizers and  to  send  them  to  join  the  forces  already 
being  developed  everywhere  by  the  general  organ- 
izers. They  should  also  assemble  and  pay  in  as 
quickly  as  possible  their  respective  portions  of  the 
fund  of  at  least  $250,000  to  be  provided  for  the 
work.  The  essence  of  the  plan  was  quick,  energetic 
action. 

At  the  end  of  three  or  four  weeks,  when  the  or- 
ganizing forces  were  in  good  shape  and  the  workers 
in  the  mills  acquainted  with  what  was  afoot,  the 
campaign  would  be  opened  with  a  rush.  Great  mass 
meetings,  built  up  by  extensive  advertising,  would 
be  held  everywhere  at  the  same  time  throughout  the 
steel  industry.  These  were  calculated  to  arouse 
hope  and  enthusiasm  among  the  workers  and  to 
bring  thousands  of  them  into  the  unions,  regardless 
of  any  steps  the  mill  owners  might  take  to  prevent 
it.  After  two  or  three  meetings  in  each  place, 

[21] 


the  heavy  stream  of  men  pouring  into  the  unions 
would  be  turned  into  a  decisive  flood  by  the  election 
of  committees  to  formulate  the  grievances  of  the 
men  and  present  these  to  the  employers.  The  war 
was  on;  the  continued  operation  of  the  steel  industry 
was  imperative;  a  strike  was  therefore  out  of  the 
question;  the  steel  manufacturers  would  have  been 
compelled  to  yield  to  their  workers,  either  directly 
or  through  the  instrumentality  of  the  Government. 
The  trade  unions  would  have  been  re-established  in 
the  steel  industry,  and  along  with  them  fair  dealing 
and  the  beginnings  of  industrial  democracy. 

The  plan  was  not  only  a  bold  one,  but  also  under 
the  circumstances  the  logical  and  practical  one. 
The  course  of  events  proved  its  feasibility.  The 
contention  that  it  involved  taking  unfair  advantage 
of  the  steel  manufacturers  may  be  dismissed  as  incon- 
sequential. These  gentlemen  in  their  dealings  with 
those  who  stand  in  their  way  do  not  even  know  the 
meaning  of  the  word  fairness.  Their  workers  they 
shoot  and  starve  into  submission;  their  competitors 
they  industrially  strangle  without  ceremony;  the 
public  and  the  Government  they  exploit  without 
stint  or  limit.  The  year  before  the  campaign  began, 
1917,  when  the  country  was  straining  every  nerve 
to  develop  and  conserve  its  resources,  the  United 
States  Steel  Corporation  alone,  not  to  mention  the 
many  independents,  after  paying  federal  taxes  and 
leaving  out  of  account  the  vast  sums  that  disap- 
peared in  the  obscure  and  mysterious  company 
funds,  unblushingly  pocketed  the  fabulous  profit  of 
$253,608,200. 

It  now  remained  to  be  seen  how  far  the  unions 

[22] 


would  sustain  such  a  general  and  energetic  campaign. 
The  fateful  conference  met  in  the  New  Morrison 
Hotel,  Chicago,  August  1-2,  1918.  Samuel 
Gompers  presided  over  its  sessions.  Representa- 
tives of  fifteen  international  unions  were  present. 
These  men  showed  their  progressive  spirit  by  meet- 
ing many  difficult  issues  squarely  with  the  proper 
solutions.  They  realized  fully  the  need  of  co-opera- 
tion along  industrial  lines,  from  the  men  who  dig 
the  coal  and  iron  ore  to  those  who  switch  the  finished 
products  onto  the  main  lines  of  the  railroads. 
Plainly  no  trade  felt  able  to  cope  single-handed  with 
the  Steel  Trust;  and  joint  action  was  decided  upon 
almost  without  discussion.  Likewise  the  conference 
saw  the  folly  of  trying  to  organize  the  steel  industry 
with  each  of  the  score  of  unions  demanding  a  differ- 
ent initiation  fee.  Therefore,  after  much  stretch- 
ing of  constitutions,  the  international  unions,  with  the 
exception  of  the  Bricklayers,  Molders  and  Pattern- 
makers (who  charged  respectively  $7.25,  $5.00  and 
$5.00),  agreed  to  a  uniform  initiation  fee  of  three 
dollars,  one  dollar  of  which  was  to  be  used  for  de- 
fraying expenses  of  the  national  organization  work. 
At  the  same  meeting  the  National  Committee  for 
Organizing  Iron  and  Steel  Workers  was  formed. 
It  was  made  to  consist  of  one  representative  from 
each  of  the  co-operating  international  unions.  Its 
given  function  was  to  superintend  the  work  of  organ- 
ization. Its  chairman  had  to  be  a  representative 
of  the  A.  F.  of  L.  Mr.  Gompers  volunteered  to  fill 
this  position;  the  writer  was  elected  Secretary- 
Treasurer.  Including  later  additions,  the  constitu- 
ent unions  were  as  follows : 


International     Brotherhood     of     Blacksmiths,     Drop- 
Forgers  and  Helpers 
Brotherhood  of  Boilermakers  and  Iron  Ship  Builders 

and  Helpers  of  America 
United  Brick  and  Clay  Workers 
Bricklayers',    Masons'    and    Plasterers'    International 

Union  of  America 
International    Association    of    Bridge,    Structural    and 

Ornamental  Iron  Workers 
Coopers'  International  Union  of  North  America 
International  Brotherhood  of  Electrical  Workers 
International  Brotherhood  of  Foundry  Employees 
International  Hod  Carriers',  Building,   and  Common 

Laborers'  Union  of  America 
Amalgamated    Association    of    Iron,    Steel    and    Tin 

Workers 

International  Association  of  Machinists 
International    Union    of    Mine,    Mill    and    Smelter 

Workers 

United  Mine  Workers  of  America 
International  Molders'  Union  of  North  America 
Patternmakers'  League  of  North  America 
United  Association  of  Plumbers  and  Steam  Fitters 
Quarry  Workers'  International  Union  of  North  Amer- 
ica 

Brotherhood  Railway  Carmen  of  America 
International  Seamen's  Union  of  America 
Amalgamated  Sheet  Metal  Workers'  International  Al- 
liance' 
International  Brotherhood  of  Stationary  Firemen  and 

Oilers 

International   Union   of   Steam   and   Operating   Engi- 
neers 

International  Brotherhood  of  Steamshovel  and  Dredge- 
men 
Switchmen's  Union  of  North  America. 

[24] 


This  group  of  unions,  lined  up  to  do  battle  with 
the  Steel  Trust,  represents  the  largest  body  of  work- 
ers ever  engaged  in  a  joint  movement  in  any  coun- 
try. Their  members  number  approximately  2,000,- 
ooo,  and  comprise  about  one-half  of  the  entire 
American  Federation  of  Labor. 

So  far,  so  good.  The  conference  had  removed 
the  barriers  in  the  way  of  the  campaign.  But  when 
it  came  to  providing  the  large  sums  of  money  and 
the  numerous  crews  of  organizers  that  were  immedi- 
ately and  imperatively  needed  to  insure  success,  it 
failed  dismally.  The  internationals  assessed  them- 
selves only  $100  apiece;  they  furnished  only  a  cor- 
poral's guard  of  organizers  to  go  ahead  with  the 
work;  and  future  reinforcements  looked  remote. 

This  was  a  facer.  The  original  plan  of  a  dash- 
ing offensive  went  to  smash  instanter,  and  with  it, 
likewise,  the  opportunity  to  organize  the  steel  in- 
dustry. The  slender  resources  in  hand  at  once 
made  necessary  a  complete  change  of  strategy.  To 
undertake  a  national  movement  was  out  of  the 
question.  The  work  had  to  be  confined  to  the 
Chicago  district.  This  was  admittedly  going  ac- 
cording to  wrong  principles.  The  steel  industry  is 
national  in  scope  and  should  be  handled  as  such.  To 
operate  in  one  district  alone  would  expose  that  dis- 
trict to  attacks,  waste  invaluable  time  and  give  the 
employers  a  chance  to  adopt  counter  measures 
against  the  whole  campaign.  It  meant  playing 
squarely  into  Mr.  Gary's  hands.  But  there  was  no 
other  way  out  of  the  difficulty. 

The  writer  had  hoped  that  the  favorable  indus- 
trial situation  and  the  organization  of  the  packing 

[25] 


industry,  which  had  long  been  considered  hopeless, 
would  have  heartened  the  trade-union  movement 
sufficiently  for  it  to  attack  the  steel  problem  with  the 
required  vigor  and  confidence.  But  such  was  not  the 
case.  The  tradition  of  defeat  in  the  steel  industry 
was  too  strong, —  thirty  years  of  failure  were  not  so 
easily  forgotten.  Lack  of  faith  in  themselves  pre- 
vented the  unions  from  pouring  their  resources  into 
the  campaign  in  its  early,  critical  days.  The  work  in 
the  Chicago  district  was  undertaken,  nevertheless, 
with  a  determination  to  win  the  hearty  support  of 
Labor  by  giving  an  actual  demonstration  of  the  or- 
ganizability  of  the  steel  workers. 

During  the  first  week  of  September  the  drive  for 
members  was  opened  in  the  Chicago  district.  Mon- 
ster meetings  were  held  in  South  Chicago,  Gary, 
Indiana  Harbor  and  Joliet  —  all  the  points  that  the 
few  organizers  could  cover.  The  inevitable  hap- 
pened; eager  for  a  chance  to  right  their  wrongs,  the 
steel  workers  stormed  into  the  unions.  In  Gary 
749  joined  at  the  first  meeting,  Joliet  enrolled  500, 
and  other  places  did  almost  as  well.  It  was  a  stam- 
pede —  exactly  what  was  counted  upon  by  the 
movers  of  Resolution  #29.  And  it  could  just  as 
well  have  been  on  a  national  scale,  had  the  interna- 
tional unions  possessed  sufficient  self-confidence  and 
given  enough  men  and  money  to  put  the  original 
plan  into  execution.  In  a  few  weeks  the  unions 
would  have  been  everywhere  firmly  intrenched;  and 
in  a  few  more  the  entire  steel  industry  would  have 
been  captured  for  trade  unionism  and  justice. 

But  now  the  folly  of  a  one-district  movement  made 
itself  evident.  Up  to  this  time  the  steel  barons, 
like  many  union  leaders,  apparently  had  viewed  the 

[26] 


campaign  with  a  skeptical,  "  It  can't  be  done  "  air. 
But  events  in  Gary  and  elsewhere  quickly  dissipated 
their  optimism.  The  movement  was  clearly  danger- 
ous and  required  heroic  treatment.  The  employers, 
therefore,  applying  Mr.  Gary's  famous  "  Give  them 
an  extra  cup  of  rice  "  policy,  ordered  the  basic  eight 
hour  day  to  go  into  effect  on  the  first  of  October. 
This  meant  that  the  steel  workers  were  to  get  there- 
after time  and  one  half  after  eight  hours,  instead  of 
straight  time.  It  amounted  to  an  increase  of  two 
hours  pay  per  day  but  the  actual  working  hours  were 
not  changed.  It  was  a  counter  stroke  which  the 
national  movement  had  been  designed  to  forestall. 
Although  this  concession  really  spelled  a  great 
moral  victory  for  the  unions  its  practical  effect  was 
bad.  Just  a  few  months  before  the  United  States 
Steel  Corporation  had  publicly  announced  that,  come 
what  might,  there  would  be  no  basic  eight  hour  day  in 
the  steel  industry.  Its  sudden  adoption,  almost 
over  night,  therefore,  was  a  testimonial  to  the  power 
of  the  unions.  But  this  the  steel  workers  as  a  whole 
could  not  realize.  In  the  Chicago  district,  where 
the  campaign  was  on,  they  understood  and  gave  the 
unions  credit  for  the  winning;  but  in  other  districts, 
where  nothing  had  been  done,  naturally  they  believed 
it  a  gift  from  the  companies.  Had  the  work  been 
going  on  everywhere  when  Mr.  Gary  attempted  this 
move,  the  workers  would  have  understood  his  mo- 
tives and  joined  the  unions  en  masse, —  the  unions 
would  have  won  hands  down.  But  with  opera- 
tions confined  to  one  district  he  was  able  to  steal  the 
credit  from  the  unions,  partially  satisfy  his  men,  and 
strip  the  campaign  of  one  of  its  principal  issues.  No 
doubt  he  thought  he  had  dealt  it  a  mortal  blow. 

[27] 


IV 
FLANK  ATTACKS 

A    SEA   OF   TROUBLES  —  THE   POLICY   OF   ENCIRCLE- 
MENT   TAKING    THE    OUTPOSTS ORGANIZING 

METHODS  —  FINANCIAL     SYSTEMS  —  THE     QUES- 
TION OF  MORALE  —  JOHNSTOWN 

PITTSBURGH  is  the  heart  of  America's  steel  industry. 
Its  pre-eminence  derives  from  its  splendid  location 
for  steel  making.  It  is  situated  at  the  point  where 
the  Allegheny  and  Monongahela  rivers  join  their 
murky  waters  to  form  the  Ohio,  this  providing  ex- 
cellent water  transportation.  Immense  deposits  of 
coal  surround  it;  the  Great  Lakes,  the  gateway  to 
Minnesota's  iron  ore,  are  in  easy  reach;  highly  de- 
veloped railway  facilities  make  the  best  markets 
convenient.  In  the  city  itself  there  are  only  a  few 
of  the  larger  steel  mills;  but  at  short  distances  along 
the  banks  of  its  three  rivers,  are  many  big  steel 
producing  centers,  including  Homestead,  Braddock, 
Rankin,  McKeesport,  McKees  Rocks,  Duquesne, 
Clairton,  Woodlawn,  Donora,  Midland,  Vander- 
grift,  Brackenridge,  New  Kensington,  etc.  Within 
a  radius  of  seventy-five  miles  lie  Johnstown,  Youngs- 
town,  Butler,  Farrell,  Sharon,  New  Castle,  Wheel- 
ing, Mingo,  Steubenville,  Bellaire,  Wierton  and 

[28] 


various  other  important  steel  towns.  The  district 
contains  from  seventy  to  eighty  per  cent,  of  the  coun- 
try's steel  industry.  The  whole  territory  is  an 
amazing  and  bewildering  network  of  gigantic  steel 
mills,  blast  furnaces  and  fabricating  shops. 

It  was  into  this  industrial  labyrinth,  the  den  of  the 
Steel  Trust,  that  the  National  Committee  for  Or- 
ganizing Iron  and  Steel  Workers  moved  its  office  on 
October  I,  1918,  preparatory  to  beginning  its  work. 
Success  in  the  Chicago  district  had  made  it  impera- 
tive to  overcome  the  original  tactical  blunder  by  ex- 
tending the  campaign,  just  as  quickly  as  possible,  to 
a  national  scope. 

The  outlook  was  most  unpromising.  Even  under 
the  best  of  circumstances  the  task  of  getting  the 
enormous  army  of  steel  workers  to  thinking  and  act- 
ing together  in  terms  of  trade  unionism  would  be 
tremendous.  But  the  disastrous  mistake  of  not 
starting  the  campaign  soon  enough  and  with  the 
proper  vigor  multiplied  the  difficulties.  Unfavor- 
able winter  weather  was  approaching.  This  was 
complicated  by  the  influenza  epidemic,  which  for 
several  weeks  suspended  all  public ,  gatherings. 
Then  came  the  end  of  the  war.  The  workers  had 
also  just  been  given  the  basic  eight  hour  day.  All 
these  things  tended  to  still  them  somewhat  and  to 
weaken  their  interest  in  organization.  What  was 
left  of  this  interest  was  almost  entirely  wiped  out 
when  the  mills,  dependent  as  they  were  on  war  work, 
began  to  slacken  production.  The  workers  became 
obsessed  with  a  fear  of  hard  times,  a  timidity  which 
was  intensified  by  the  steel  companies'  discharging 
every  one  suspected  of  union  affiliations  or  sympa- 


thies.  And  to  cap  the  climax,  the  resources  of  the 
National  Committee  were  still  pitifully  inadequate 
to  the  great  task  confronting  it. 

But  worst  of  all,  the  steel  companies  were  now  on 
the  qul  vhe.  The  original  plan  had  been  conceived 
to  take  them  by  surprise,  on  the  supposition  that  their 
supreme  contempt  for  Labor  and  their  conceit  in 
their  own  power  would  blind  them  to  the  real  force 
and  extent  of  the  movement  until  it  was  too  late  to 
take  effective  counteraction.  And  it  would  surely 
have  worked  out  this  way,  had  the  program  been 
followed.  But  now  the  advantage  of  surprise, 
vital  in  all  wars,  industrial  or  military,  was  lost  to 
the  unions.  Wide  awake  and  alarmed,  the  Steel 
Trust  was  prepared  to  fight  to  the  last  ditch. 

Things  looked  desperate.  But  there  was  no 
other  course  than  to  go  ahead  regardless  of 
obstacles.  The  word  failure  was  eliminated  from 
the  vocabulary  of  the  National  Committee.  Prep- 
arations were  made  to  begin  operations  in  the  towns 
close  to  Pittsburgh.  But  the  Steel  Trust  was  vigi- 
lant. It  no  longer  placed  any  reliance  upon  its  usual 
methods  —  its  welfare,  old  age  pension,  employees' 
stockholding,  wholesale  discharge,  or  "  extra  cup  of 
rice  "  policies  —  to  hold  its  men  in  line,  when  a  good 
fighting  chance  to  win  their  rights  presented  itself  to 
them.  It  had  gained  a  wholesome  respect  for  the 
movement  and  was  taking  no  chances.  It  would  cut 
off  all  communication  between  the  organizers  and 
the  men.  Consequently,  its  lackey-like  mayors  and 
burgesses  in  the  threatened  towns  immediately  held 
a  meeting  and  decided  that  there  would  be  no  as- 
semblages of  steel  workers  in  the  Monongahela  val- 

[30] 


ley.  In  some  places  these  officials,  who  for  the  most 
part  are  steel  company  employees,  had  the  pliable 
local  councils  hurriedly  adopt  ordinances  making  it 
unlawful  to  hold  public  meetings  without  securing 
sanction;  in  other  places  they  adopted  the  equally 
effective  method  of  simply  notifying  the  landlords 
that  if  they  dared  rent  their  halls  to  the  American 
Federation  of  Labor  they  would  have  their  "  Sun- 
day Club  "  privileges  stopped.  In  both  cases  the 
effect  was  the  same  —  no  meetings  could  be  held. 
In  the  immediate  Pittsburgh  district  there  had  been 
little  enough  free  speech  and  free  assembly  for  the 
trade  unions  before.  Now  it  was  abolished  alto- 
gether. 

At  this  time  the  world  war  was  still  on;  our  sol- 
diers were  fighting  in  Europe  to  "  make  the  world 
safe  for  democracy";  President  Wilson  was  ideal- 
istically  declaiming  about  "  the  new  freedom " ; 
while  right  here  in  our  own  country  the  trade  unions, 
with  500,000  men  in  the  service,  were  not  even  al- 
lowed to  hold  public  meetings.  It  was  a  worse  con- 
dition than  kaiserism  itself  had  ever  set  up.  This 
is  said  advisedly,  for  the  German  workers  were  at 
least  permitted  to  meet  when  and  where  they  pleased. 
The  worst  they  had  to  contend  with  was  a  policeman 
on  their  platform,  who  would  jot  down  "  seditious  " 
remarks  and  require  the  offenders  to  report  next  day 
to  the  police.  I  remember  with  what  scorn  I 
watched  this  system  in  Germany  years  ago,  and  how 
proud  I  felt  to  be  an  American.  I  was  so  sure  that 
freedom  of  speech  and  assembly  were  fundamental 
institutions  with  us  and  that  we  would  never  tolerate 
such  imposition.  But  now  I  have  changed  my 


mind.  In  Pennsylvania,  not  to  speak  of  other  states, 
the  workers  enjoy  few  or  no  more  rights  than  pre- 
vailed under  the  czars.  They  cannot  hold  meetings 
at  all.  So  far  are  they  below  the  status  of  pre-war 
Germans  in  this  respect  that  the  comparative  free- 
dom of  the  latter  seems  almost  like  an  unattainable 
ideal.  And  this  deprival  of  rights  is  done  in  the 
name  of  law  and  patriotism. 

In  the  face  of  such  suppression  of  constitutional 
rights  and  in  the  face  of  all  the  other  staggering  dif- 
ficulties it  was  clearly  impossible  for  our  scanty 
forces  to  capture  Pittsburgh  for  unionism  by  a 
frontal  attack.  Therefore  a  system  of  flank  attacks 
was  decided  upon.  This  resolved  itself  into  a  plan 
literally  to  surround  the  immediate  Pittsburgh  dis- 
trict with  organized  posts  before  attacking  it.  The 
outlying  steel  districts  that  dot  the  counties  and 
states  around  Pittsburgh  like  minor  forts  about  a 
great  stronghold,  were  first  to  be  won.  Then  the 
unions,  with  the  added  strength,  were  to  make  a  big 
drive  on  the  citadel. 

It  was  a  far-fetched  program  when  compared  with 
the  original;  but  circumstances  compelled  it.  An  im- 
portant consideration  in  its  execution  was  that  it 
must  not  seem  that  the  unions  were  abandoning 
Pittsburgh.  That  was  the  center  of  the  battle  line; 
the  unions  had  attacked  there,  and  now  they  must 
at  least  pretend  to  hold  their  ground  until  they  were 
able  to  begin  the  real  attack.  The  morale  of  the 
organizing  force  and  the  steel  workers  demanded 
this.  So,  all  winter  long  mass  meetings  were  held 
in  the  Pittsburgh  Labor  Temple  and  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  leaflets  were  distributed  in  the  neigh- 

[32] 


boring  mills  to  prepare  the  ground  for  unionization 
in  the  spring.  Besides,  a  lot  of  noise  was  made 
over  the  suppression  of  free  speech  and  free  assem- 
blage. Protest  meetings  were  held,  committees  ap- 
pointed, investigations  set  afoot,  politicians  visited, 
and  much  other  more  or  less  useless,  although  spec- 
tacular, running  around  engaged  in.  These  activi- 
ties did  not  cost  much,  and  they  camouflaged  well 
the  union  program. 

But  the  actual  fight  was  elsewhere.  During  the 
next  several  months  the  National  Committee,  with 
gradually  increasing  resources,  set  up  substantial  or- 
ganizations in  steel  towns  all  over  the  country  ex- 
cept close  in  to  Pittsburgh,  including  Youngstown, 
East  Youngstown,  Warren,  Niles,  Canton,  Struthers, 
Hubbard,  Massillon,  Alliance,  New  Philadelphia, 
Sharon,  Farrell,  New  Castle,  Butler,  Ellwood  City, 
New  Kensington,  Leechburg,  Apollo,  Vandergrift, 
Brackenridge,  Johnstown,  Coatesville,  Wheeling, 
Benwood,  Bellaire,  Steubenville,  Mingo,  Cleveland, 
Buffalo,  Lackawanna,  Pueblo,  Birmingham,  etc. 
Operations  in  the  Chicago  district  were  intensified 
and  extended  to  take  in  Milwaukee,  Kenosha, 
Waukegan,  De  Kalb,  Peoria,  Pullman,  Hammond, 
East  Chicago,  etc.,  while  in  Bethlehem  the  National 
Committee  amplified  the  work  started  a  year  before 
by  the  Machinists  and  Electrical  Workers. 

Much  of  the  success  in  these  localities  was  due  to 
the  thoroughly  systematic  way  in  which  the  organiz- 
ing work  was  carried  on.  This  merits  a  brief  de- 
scription. There  were  two  classes  of  organizers  in 
the  campaign,  the  floating  and  the  stationary.  Out- 
side of  a  few  traveling  foreign  speakers,  the  float- 

[33] 


ing  organizers  were  those  sent  in  by  the  various  in- 
ternational unions.  They  usually  went  about  from 
point  to  point  attending  to  their  respective  sections 
of  the  newly  formed  local  unions,  and  giving  such 
assistance  to  the  general  campaign  as  their  other 
duties  permitted.  The  stationary  organizers  con- 
sisted of  A.  F.  of  L.  men,  representatives  of  the 
United  Mine  Workers,  and  men  hired  directly  by 
the  National  Committee.  They  acted  as  local  or- 
ganizing secretaries,  and  were  the  backbone  of  the 
working  force.  The  floating  organizers  were  con- 
trolled mostly  by  their  international  unions;  the 
stationary  organizers  worked  wholly  under  the  di- 
rection of  the  National  Committee. 

Everywhere  the  organizing  system  used  was  the 
same.  The  local  secretary  was  in  full  charge.  He 
had  an  office,  which  served  as  general  headquarters. 
He  circulated  the  National  Committee's  weekly  bul- 
letin, consisting  of  a  short,  trenchant  trade-union 
argument  in  four  languages.  He  built  up  the  mass 
meetings,  and  controlled  all  applications  for  mem- 
bership. At  these  mass  meetings  and  in  the  offices 
all  trades  were  signed  up  indiscriminately  upon  a  uni- 
form blank.  But  there  was  no  "  one  big  union  " 
formed.  The  signed  applications  were  merely 
stacked  away  until  there  was  a  considerable  num- 
ber. Then  the  representatives  of  all  the  trades 
were  assembled  and  the  applications  distributed 
among  them.  Later  these  men  set  up  their  respec- 
tive unions.  Finally,  the  new  unions  were  drawn  up 
locally  into  informal  central  bodies,  known  as  Iron 
and  Steel  Workers'  councils.  These  were  invalu- 
able as  they  knit  the  movement  together  and 

[34] 


strengthened  the  weaker  unions.  They  also  incul- 
cated the  indispensable  conception  of  solidarity  along 
industrial  lines  and  prevented  irresponsible  strike 
action  by  over-zealous  single  trades. 

A  highly  important  feature  was  the  financial  sys- 
tem. The  handling  of  the  funds  is  always  a  danger 
point  in  all  working  class  movements.  More  than 
one  strike  and  organizing  campaign  has  been 
wrecked  by  loose  money  methods.  The  National 
Committee  spared  no  pains  to  avoid  this  menace. 
The  problem  was  an  immense  one,  for  there  were 
from  100  to  125  organizers  (which  was  what  the 
crew  finally  amounted  to)  signing  up  steel  workers 
by  the  thousands  all  over  the  country;  but  it  was 
solved  by  the  strict  application  of  a  few  business 
principles.  In  the  first  place  the  local  secretaries 
were  definitely  recognized  as  the  men  in  charge  and 
placed  under  heavy  bonds.  All  the  application 
blanks  used  by  them  were  numbered  serially.  They 
alone  were  authorized  to  sign  receipts  x  for  initia- 
tion fees  received.  Should  other  organizers  wish  to 
enroll  members,  as  often  happened  at  the  monster 
mass  meetings,  they  were  given  and  charged  with 
so  many  receipts  duly  signed  by  the  secretaries. 
Later  on  they  were  required  to  return  these  receipts 
or  three  dollars  apiece  for  them.  The  effect  of  all 
this  was  to  make  one  man,  and  him  bonded,  re- 
sponsible in  each  locality  for  all  paper  outstanding 
against  the  National  Committee.  This  was  abso- 


a  side  light  on  organizing  methods,  it  may  be  noted  that  the 
temporary  receipts  were  red,  white  and  blue  cards.  The  patriotic 
foreigners  were  proud  to  carry  these  emblematic  cards  pending  the 
time  they  got  their  regular  cards.  More  than  one  man  joined 
merely  on  that  account. 

[35] 


lutely  essential.     No  system  was  possible  without 
this  foundation. 

The  next  step  was  definitely  to  fasten  responsibil- 
ity in  the  transfer  of  initiation  fees  from  the  local 
secretaries  to  the  representatives  of  the  various 
trade  unions.  To  do  so  was  most  important.  It 
was  accomplished  by  requiring  the  local  secretaries 
to  exact  from  these  men  detailed  receipts,  specifying 
not  only  the  amounts  paid  and  the  number  of  applica- 
tions turned  over,  but  also  the  serial  number  of  each 
application.  Bulk  transfer  of  applications  was  pro- 
hibited, there  being  no  way  to  identify  the  paper  so 
handled. 

The  general  effect  of  these  regulations  was  to  en- 
able the  National  Committee  almost  instantly  to 
trace  any  one  of  the  thousands  of  applications  con- 
tinually passing  through  the  hands  of  its  agents. 
For  instance,  a  steel  worker  who  had  joined  at  an 
office  or  a  mass  meeting,  hearing  later  of  the  forma- 
tion of  his  local  union,  would  go  to  its  meeting,  pre- 
sent his  receipt  and  ask  for  his  union  card.  The 
secretary  of  the  union  would  look  up  the  applications 
which  had  been  turned  over  to  him.  If  he  could 
not  find  one  to  correspond  with  the  man's  receipt  he 
would  take  the  matter  up  with  the  National  Com- 
mittee's local  secretary.  The  latter  could  not  deny 
his  own  signature  on  the  receipt;  he  would  have  to 
tell  what  became  of  the  application  and  the  fee.  On 
looking  up  the  matter  he  would  find  that  he  had 
turned  them  over  to  a  certain  representative.  Nor 
could  the  latter  deny  his  signature  on  the  detailed 
receipt.  He  would  have  to  make  good. 

To  facilitate  the  work,  district  offices  were  estab- 
[36] 


lished  in  Chicago  and  Youngstown.  Organizers 
and  secretaries  held  district  meetings  weekly.  Local 
secretaries  at  points  contiguous  to  these  centers  re- 
ported to  their  respective  district  secretaries.  All 
others  dealt  directly  with  the  general  office  of  the 
National  Committee. 

It  will  be  recalled  that  the  co-operating  unions, 
at  the  August  1-2  conference,  agreed  that  the  sum  of 
one  dollar  should  be  deducted  from  each  initiation 
fee  for  organization  purposes.  The  collection  of 
this  money  devolved  upon  the  National  Committee 
and  presented  considerable  difficulty.  It  was  solved 
by  a  system.  The  local  secretaries,  in  turning  over 
to  the  trades  the  applications  signed  up  in  their 
offices  or  at  the  mass  meetings,  held  out  one  dollar 
apiece  on  them.  For  the  applications  secured  at  the 
meetings  of  the  local  unions  they  collected  the  dol- 
lars due  with  the  assistance  of  blank  forms  sent  to 
the  unions.  Each  week  the  local  secretaries  sent  re- 
ports to  the  general  office  of  the  National  Commit- 
tee, specifying  in  detail  the  number  of  members  en- 
rolled and  turned  over  to  the  various  trades,  and 
enclosing  checks  to  cover  the  amounts  on  hand  after 
local  expenses  were  met.  These  reports  were  duly 
certified  by  the  representatives  of  the  organizations 
involved,  who  signed  their  names  on  them  at  the 
points  where  the  reports  referred  to  the  number  of 
members  turned  over  to  their  respective  bodies. 
The  whole  system  worked  well. 

Practical  labor  officials  who  have  handled  mass 
movements  understand  the  great  difficulties  attend- 
ant upon  the  organization  of  large  bodies  of  work- 
ingmen.  In  the  steel  campaign  these  were  more 

[37] 


serious  than  ever  before.  The  tremendous  number 
of  men  involved;  their  unfamiliarity  with  the  Eng- 
lish language  and  total  lack  of  union  experience;  the 
wide  scope  of  the  operations;  the  complications 
created  by  a  score  of  international  unions,  each  with 
its  own  corps  of  organizers,  directly  mainly  from  far- 
distant  headquarters;  the  chronic  lack  of  resources; 
and  the  need  for  quick  action  in  the  face  of  incessant 
attacks  from  the  Steel  Trust  —  all  together  pro- 
duced technical  difficulties  without  precedent.  But 
the  foregoing  systems  went  far  to  solve  them.  And 
into  these  systems  the  organizers  and  secretaries  en- 
tered whole-heartedly.  They  realized  that  modern 
labor  organizations  cannot  depend  wholly  upon 
idealism.  They  bore  in  mind  that  they  were  deal- 
ing with  human  beings  and  had  to  adopt  sound 
principles  of  responsibility,  standardization  and  gen- 
eral efficiency. 

But  another  factor  in  the  success  of  the  campaign 
possibly  even  more  important  than  the  systems  em- 
ployed was  the  splendid  morale  of  the  organizers. 
A  better,  more  loyal  body  of  men  was  never  gathered 
together  upon  this  continent.  They  knew  no  such 
word  as  defeat.  They  pressed  on  with  an  irresist- 
ible assurance  of  victory  born  of  their  faith  in  the 
practicability  of  the  theory  upon  which  the  cam- 
paign was  worked  out. 

The  organization  of  workingmen  into  trade 
unions  is  a  comparatively  simple  matter  when  it  is 
properly  handled.  It  depends  almost  entirely  upon 
the  honesty,  intelligence,  power  and  persistence  of 
the  organizing  forces.  If  these  factors  are  strongly 
present,  employers  can  do  little  to  stop  the  move- 

[38] 


>.>>  s  ->  v. 


O  .£  cS  s  fc  , 

W    .^f        sj  •>!  ' 
W     o    w    *••  cS 


-1  ^s 


O     . 

Pf-S 


*  5  J1    R 

°i£!«tJ 


*-s 


> 


ment  of  their  employees.  This  is  because  the  hard 
industrial  conditions  powerfully  predispose  the 
workers  to  take  up  any  movement  offering  reason- 
able prospects  of  bettering  their  miserable  lot.  All 
that  union  organizers  have  to  do  is  to  place  before 
these  psychologically  ripe  workers,  with  sufficient 
clarity  and  persistence,  the  splendid  achievements 
of  the  trade-union  movement,  and  be  prepared  with 
a  comprehensive  organization  plan  to  take  care  of 
the  members  when  they  come.  If  this  presentation 
of  trade  unionism  is  made  in  even  half-decent 
fashion  the  workers  can  hardly  fail  to  respond.  It 
is  largely  a  mechanical  proposition.  In  view  of  its 
great  wealth  and  latent  power,  it  may  be  truthfully 
said  that  there  isn't  an  industry  in  the  country  which 
the  trade-union  movement  cannot  organize  any  time 
it  sees  fit.  The  problem  in  any  case  is  merely  to  de- 
velop the  proper  organizing  crews  and  systems,  and 
the  freedom-hungry  workers,  skilled  or  unskilled, 
men  or  women,  black  or  white,  will  react  almost  as 
naturally  and  inevitably  as  water  runs  down  hill. 

This  does  not  mean  that  there  should  be  rosy-hued 
hopes  held  out  to  the  workers  and  promises  made  to 
them  of  what  the  unions  will  get  from  the  employers 
once  they  are  established.  On  the  contrary,  one  of 
the  first  principles  of  an  efficient  organizer  is  never, 
under  any  circumstances,  to  make  promises  to  his 
men.  From  experience  he  has  learned  the  extreme 
difficulty  of  making  good  such  promises  and  also  the 
destructive  kick-back  felt  in  case  they  are  not  ful- 
filled. The  most  he  can  do  is  to  tell  his  men  what 
has  been  done  in  other  cases  by  organized  working- 
men  and  assure  them  that  if  they  will  stand  to- 

[39] 


gather  the  union  will  do  its  utmost  to  help  them. 
Beyond  this  he  will  not  venture.  And  this  position 
will  enable  him  to  develop  the  legitimate  hope,  ideal- 
ism and  enthusiasm  which  translates  itself  into  sub- 
stantial trade-union  structure.  The  wild  stories  of 
extravagant  promises  made  to  the  steel  workers  dur- 
ing their  organization  are  pure  tommyrot,  as  every 
experienced  union  man  knows. 

The  practical  effect  of  this  theory  is  to  throw  on 
the  union  men  the  burden  of  responsibility  for  the  un- 
organized condition  of  the  industries.  This  is  as 
it  should  be.  In  consequence,  they  tend  to  blame 
themselves  rather  than  the  unorganized  men.  In- 
stead of  indulging  in  the  customary  futile  lamenta- 
tions about  the  scab-like  nature  of  the  non-union 
man,  "  unorganizable  industries,"  the  irresistible 
power  of  the  employers,  and  similar  illusions  to 
which  unionists  are  too  prone,  they  seek  the  solution 
of  the  problem  in  improvements  of  their  own  primi- 
tive organization  methods. 

This  conception  worked  admirably  in  the  steel 
campaign.  It  filled  the  organizers  with  unlimited 
confidence  in  their  own  power.  They  felt  that  they 
were  the  decisive  factor  in  the  situation.  If  they 
could  but  present  their  case  strongly  enough,  and 
clearly  enough  to  the  steel  workers,  the  latter  would 
have  to  respond,  and  the  steel  barons  would  be  un- 
able to  prevent  it.  A  check  or  a  failure  was  but 
the  signal  for  an  overhauling  of  the  tactics  used,  and 
a  resumption  of  the  attack  with  renewed  vigor.  At 
times  it  was  almost  laughable.  With  hardly  an  ex- 
ception, when  the  organizers  went  into  a  steel  town 
to  begin  work,  they  would  be  met  by  the  local  union 

[40] 


men  and  solemnly  assured  that  it  was  utterly  im- 
possible to  organize  the  steel  mills  in  their  town. 
"  But,"  the  organizers  would  say,  "  we  succeeded  in 
organizing  Gary  and  South  Chicago  and  many 
other  tough  places."  "  Yes,  we  know  that,"  would 
be  the  reply,  "  but  conditions  are  altogether  differ- 
ent here.  These  mills  are  absolutely  impossible. 
We  have  worked  on  them  for  years  and  cannot 
make  the  slightest  impression.  They  are  full  of 
scabs  from  all  over  the  country.  You  will  only 
waste  your  time  by  monkeying  with  them."  This 
happened  not  in  one  place  alone,  but  practically 
everywhere  —  illustrating  the  villainous  reputation 
the  steel  companies  had  built  up  as  union  smashers. 
Side-stepping  these  pessimistic  croakers,  the  or- 
ganizers would  go  on  to  their  task  with  undiminished 
self-confidence  and  energy.  The  result  was  success 
everywhere.  The  National  Committee  can  boast 
the  proud  record  of  never  having  set  up  its  organiz- 
ing machinery  in  a  steel  town  without  ultimately  put- 
ting substantial  unions  among  the  employees.  It 
made  little  difference  what  the  obstacles  were;  the 
chronic  lack  of  funds;  suppression  of  free  speech  and 
free  assembly;  raises  in  wages;  multiplicity  of  races; 
mass  picketing  by  bosses;  wholesale  discharge  of 
union  men;  company  unions;  discouraging  traditions 
of  lost  local  strikes;  or  what  not  —  in  every  case, 
whether  the  employers  were  indifferent  or  bitterly 
hostile,  the  result  was  the  same,  a  healthy  and  rapid 
growth  of  the  unions.  The  National  Committee 
proved  beyond  peradventure  of  a  doubt  that  the  steel 
industry  could  be  organized  in  spite  of  all  the  Steel 
Trust  could  do  to  prevent  it. 

[40 


Each  town  produced  its  own  particular  crop  of 
problems.  A  chapter  apiece  would  hardly  suffice  to 
describe  the  discouraging  obstacles  overcome  in  or- 
ganizing the  many  districts.  But  that  would  far 
outrun  the  limits  of  this  volume.  A  few  details 
about  the  work  in  Johnstown  will  suffice  to  indicate 
the  tactics  of  the  employers  and  the  nature  of  the 
campaign  generally. 

Johnstown  is  situated  on  the  main  line  of  the 
Pennsylvania  railroad,  seventy-five  miles  east  of 
Pittsburgh.  It  is  the  home  of  the  Cambria  Steel 
Company,  which  employs  normally  from  15,000  to 
17,000  men  in  its  enormous  mills  and  mines.  It 
is  one  of  the  most  important  steel  centers  in  America. 

For  sixty-six  years  the  Cambria  Company  had 
reared  its  black  stacks  in  the  Conemaugh  valley  and 
ruled  as  autocratically  as  any  mediaeval  baron.  It 
practically  owned  the  district  and  the  dwellers 
therein.  It  paid  its  workers  less  than  almost  any 
other  steel  company  in  Pennsylvania  and  was  noted 
as  one  of  the  country's  worst  union-hating  concerns. 
According  to  old  residents,  the  only  record  of  union- 
ism in  its  plants,  prior  to  the  National  Committee 
campaign,  was  a  strike  in  1874  of  the  Sons  of  Vul- 
can, and  a  small  movement  a  number  of  years  later, 
in  1885,  when  a  few  men  joined  the  Knights  of  La- 
bor and  were  summarily  discharged.  The  Amalga- 
mated Association,  even  in  its  most  militant  days, 
was  unable  to  get  a  grip  in  Johnstown.  That  town, 
for  years,  bore  the  evil  reputation  of  being  one 
where  union  organizers  were  met  at  the  depot  and 
given  the  alternative  of  leaving  town  or  going  to  the 
lockup. 

[42] 


Into  this  industrial  jail  of  a  city  the  National  Com- 
mittee went  in  the  early  winter  of  1918-19,  at  the 
invitation  of  local  steel  workers  who  had  heard  of 
the  campaign.  A.  F.  of  L.  organizer  Thomas  J. 
Conboy  was  placed  in  charge  of  the  work.  Im- 
mediately a  strong  organization  spirit  manifested  it- 
self —  the  wrongs  of  two-thirds  of  a  century  would 
out.  It  was  interesting  to  watch  the  counter-moves 
of  the  company.  They  were  typical.  At  first  the 
officials  contented  themselves  by  stationing  num- 
bers of  bosses  and  company  detectives  in  front  of  the 
office  and  meeting  halls  to  jot  down  the  names  of 
the  men  attending.  But  when  this  availed  nothing, 
they  took  the  next  step  by  calling  the  live  union 
spirits  to  the  office  and  threatening  them  with  dis- 
missal. This  likewise  failed  to  stem  the  tide  of 
unionism,  and  then  the  company  officials  applied 
their  most  dreaded  weapon,  the  power  of  discharge. 
This  was  a  dangerous  course;  the  reason  they  did  not 
adopt  it  before  was  for  fear  of  its  producing  exactly 
the  revolt  they  were  aiming  to  prevent.  But,  all 
else  unavailing,  they  went  to  this  extreme. 

Never  was  a  policy  of  industrial  frightfulness 
more  diabolically  conceived  or  more  rigorously 
executed  than  that  of  the  Cambria  Steel  Company. 
The  men  sacrificed  were  the  Company's  oldest  and 
best  employees.  Men  who  had  worked  faithfully 
for  ten,  twenty  or  thirty  years  were  discharged 
at  a  moment's  notice.  The  plan  was  to  pick  out  the 
men  economically  most  helpless;  men  who  were  old 
and  crippled,  or  who  had  large  families  dependent 
upon  them,  or  homes  half  paid  for,  and  make  ex- 
amples of  them  to  frighten  the  rest.  The  case  of 

[43] 


Wm.  H.  Seibert  was  typical;  this  man,  a  highly 
skilled  mechanic,  had  worked  for  the  Cambria  Com- 
pany thirty  years.  He  was  deaf  and  dumb,  and 
could  neither  read  nor  write.  He  was  practically 
cut  off  from  all  communication  with  his  fellow 
workers.  Yet  the  company,  with  fiendish  humor, 
discharged  him  for  being  a  union  agitator.  For 
every  worker,  discharge  by  the  Cambria  Company 
meant  leaving  Johnstown,  if  he  would  again  work  at 
his  trade;  for  most  of  them  it  brought  the  severest 
hardships,  but  for  such  as  Seibert  it  spelled  ruin. 
With  their  handicaps  of  age  and  infirmities,  they 
could  never  hope  to  work  in  steel  mills  again. 

For  months  the  Company  continued  these  tactics.1 
Hundreds  of  union  men  were  thus  victimized.  The 
object  was  to  strike  terror  to  the  hearts  of  all  and 
make  them  bow  again  to  the  mastery  of  the  Cam- 
bria Steel  Company.  But  the  terrorists  overshot 
the  mark.  Human  nature  could  not  endure  it. 
They  goaded  their  workers  to  desperation  and 
forced  them  to  fight  back,  however  unfavorable  the 
circumstances.  The  National  Committee  met  in 
Johnstown  and  ordered  a  ballot  among  the  men. 
They  voted  overwhelmingly  to  strike.  A  committee 
went  to  see  Mr.  Slick,  the  head  of  the  Company,  who 
refused  to  meet  it,  stating  that  if  the  men  had  any 
grievances  they  could  take  them  up  through  the 
company  union. 

1  In  its  war  against  unionism  the  Cambria  Steel  Company  held 
nothing  sacred,  not  even  the  church.  During  the  campaign  the 
Reverend  George  Dono  Brooks,  pastor  of  the  First  Baptist  Church 
of  Johnstown,  took  an  active  part,  speaking  at  many  meetings  and 
generally  lending  encouragement  to  the  workers.  For  this  crime 
the  company  punished  him  by  disrupting  his  congregation  and  even- 
tually driving  him  from  the  city,  penniless. 

[44] 


This  company  union  played  a  large  part  in  the 
drama  of  Johnstown.  It  was  organized  late  in 
1918  to  forestall  the  trade  unions.  Such  company 
unions  are  invariably  mere  auxiliaries  to  the  com- 
panies' labor-crushing  systems.  They  serve  to  de- 
lude the  workers  into  believing  they  have  some 
semblance  of  industrial  democracy,  and  thus  deter 
them  from  seeking  the  real  thing.  They  consist 
merely  of  committees,  made  up  for  the  most  part 
of  hand-picked  bosses  and  "  company  suckers." 
There  is  no  real  organization  of  the  workers.  The 
men  have  no  meetings  off  the  property  of  the  com- 
panies; they  lack  the  advice  of  skilled  trade  union- 
ists; they  have  no  funds  or  means  to  strike  effec- 
tively; they  are  out  of  touch  with  the  workers  in 
other  sections  of  the  industry.  Consequently  they 
have  neither  opportunity  to  formulate  their  griev- 
ances, nor  power  to  enforce  their  adjustment.  And 
little  good  would  it  do  them  if  they  had,  for  the 
lickspittle  committees  are  always  careful  to  see  that 
they  handle  no  business  unless  it  relates  to  "  wel- 
fare "  work  or  other  comparatively  insignificant  mat- 
ters. 

Company  unions  are  invariably  contemptible. 
All  of  them  are  cursed  with  company  dictation,  and 
all  of  them  lack  the  vivifying  principles  of  demo- 
cratic control;  but  it  is  doubtful  if  a  more  degraded 
specimen  can  be  found  anywhere  than  that  of  the 
Cambria  Steel  Company.  Without  a  murmur  of 
protest  it  watched  the  company  abolish  the  basic 
eight  hour  day  late  in  1918.  Nor  did  it  raise  a 
finger  to  help  the  multitude  of  unfairly  discharged 
union  men.  It  habitually  pigeonholed  all  real  griev- 

[45] 


ances  submitted  to  it.  But  what  else  could  be  ex- 
pected of  a  committee  from  which  the  company 
boldly  discharged  every  man  who  dared  say  a  word 
for  the  workers? 

By  referring  the  men's  grievances  to  the  despised 
company  union,  Mr.  Slick  only  added  fuel  to  the  fire. 
A  strike  loomed  threateningly,  but  just  as  it  was 
about  to  break,  Mr.  Slick  lost  his  job,  presumably 
because  of  his  unsuccessful  labor  policy.  He  was 
supplanted  by  A.  A.  Corey,  Jr.,  formerly  general 
superintendent  of  the  Homestead  Steel  Works. 
Thinking  perhaps  the  change  in  personnel  might  in- 
volve a  change  in  policy,  the  committee  approached 
Mr.  Corey.  He,  too,  refused  to  meet  with  it,  stat- 
ing publicly  that  the  management  would  not  deal 
with  the  representatives  of  outside  organizations, 
but  would  take  up  the  men's  grievances,  either 
through  the  company  union,  or  "  through  any  other 
accredited  committee  selected  by  the  men  in  any  way 
that  is  agreeable  to  them  from  among  their  own 
number."  The  last  proposition  was  acceptable,  and 
with  joy  the  men  held  big  open  mass  meetings  of 
union  and  non-union  men,  and  elected  their  com- 
mittee. But  their  joy  was  short-lived.  Mr.  Corey, 
unashamed,  wrote  the  committee  that  he  had  acted 
hastily  before,  and  said,  "  I  have  had  no  previous 
experience  with  arrangements  in  the  nature  of  col- 
lective bargaining,  but  a  careful  survey  of  this  plan 
(company  union),  which  I  have  since  had  time  to 
make,  convinces  me  that  it  makes  full  and  complete 
provision  for  every  contingency  which  can  arise  be- 
tween the  company  and  its  employees."  And  then 
to  make  the  men  like  this  bitter  medicine,  the  Com- 

[46] 


pany  discharged  an  active  member  of  the  committee. 
All  these  events  consumed  many  weeks  and  wore 
away  the  late  winter  and  early  spring  months. 

Mr.  Corey's  double-dealing  provoked  a  fresh 
strike  crisis;  but  by  heroic  measures  the  organizers 
repressed  it.  At  all  times  a  strike  in  Johnstown 
alone  against  the  united  steel  companies  was  con- 
sidered a  move  of  desperation,  a  last  resort  to  be 
undertaken  only  because  nothing  else  could  be  done. 
But  now  relief  was  in  sight.  Spring  was  at  hand  and 
the  national  movement  fast  coming  to  a  head.  Its 
committees  were  knocking  at  the  doors  of  the  steel 
companies.  The  exposed  and  invaluable  Johnstown 
position  had  to  be  held  until  this  main  army  could 
come  up  and  relieve  it.  So  the  Johnstown  workers 
were  told  that  they  must  refrain  from  counter-at- 
tacking, that  they  had  to  take  all  the  blows  heaped 
upon  them  and  hold  their  ground  at  all  costs. 

And  right  nobly  they  did  it.  In  spite  of  the  bit- 
terest hardships  they  built  up  and  developed  their 
organizations.  In  this  they  were  unwittingly  but 
powerfully  aided  by  the  company  union.  Several 
weeks  before  the  big  strike  the  officials  took  the 
hated  general  committee  to  Atlantic  City,  wined 
them  and  dined  them  and  flattered  them,  as  usual, 
and  then  had  them  adopt  a  set  of  resolutions  con- 
demning the  national  movement  of  the  steel  workers 
and  endorsing  long  hours,  low  wages  and  heavier 
production  as  the  remedy  for  prevailing  bad  condi- 
tions. This  betrayal  was  the  last  straw.  It  pro- 
voked intense  resentment  among  the  men.  Whole 
battalions  of  them,  the  most  skilled  and  difficult  in 
the  plant  to  organize,  walked  down  and  joined  the 

[47] 


unions  in  protest.  Almost  3000  enrolled  the  week 
after  the  resolutions  were  adopted.  But  it  was  al- 
ways thus.  Every  move  that  the  Cambria  made  the 
unions  turned  to  their  advantage.  They  outgen- 
eraled the  Company  at  every  turn. 

It  was  almost  pitiful  to  watch  the  later  antics  of 
the  haughty  and  hitherto  unchallenged  Cambria 
Company,  humbled  in  its  own  town  by  its  own 
workers.  A  few  weeks  before  Labor  day  the 
unions,  innocently  presuming  the  mills  would  be 
closed  as  usual  on  that  day,  decided  to  have  a  parade. 
Then  the  strategical  experts  of  the  Company  became 
active.  A  warning  was  issued  that  every  man 
marching  in  the  parade  would  be  summarily  dis- 
charged. The  unions  would  not  brook  this  unwar- 
ranted and  cold-blooded  attack.  They  promptly 
sent  word  to  the  Company  that  if  a  single  man  was 
discharged  the  whole  plant  would  be  stopped  the 
next  day.  It  was  a  clear-cut  issue,  and  Johnstown 
held  its  breath.  When  Labor  day  came  the  city 
saw  the  biggest  demonstration  in  its  history.  Fifteen 
thousand  organized  workers  defied  their  would-be 
masters  and  marched.  The  Company  swiftly 
backed  water.  And  the  next  day  not  a  man  was 
discharged.  It  was  a  victory  well  worth  the  heroic 
efforts  and  suffering  of  the  previous  eight  months. 

When  the  great  strike  broke  on  September  22  the 
Johnstown  workers  went  into  the  fight  almost  one 
hundred  per  cent,  organized,  and  with  about  the 
same  percentage  of  grievances.  So  few  men  were 
left  in  the  plant  that  the  Company  had  to  ask  the 
unions  to  give  them  help  to  shut  down  their  fur- 
naces, and  to  keep  the  fire  protection  in  operation, 

[48] 


All  the  power  of  the  great  corporation,  which  had 
made  $30,000,000  the  year  before,  could  not  fore- 
stall the  unions.  It  had  no  arrow  in  its  quiver  that 
could  strike  fear  to  the  hearts  of  its  workers;  no 
trick  in  its  brain  pan  that  could  be  substituted  for 
industrial  democracy. 

And  Johnstown  was  only  one  point  in  the  long 
battle  line.  Its  experiences  were  but  typical.  Each 
steel  town  had  its  own  bitter  story  of  obstacles  en- 
countered and  overcome.  Youngstown,  Chicago, 
Bethlehem,  Cleveland,  Wheeling,  Pueblo,  Buffalo 
and  many  other  districts,  each  put  up  a  hard  fight. 
But  one  by  one,  despite  all  barriers,  steel  towns  all 
over  the  country  were  captured  for  unionism. 


[49] 


V 

BREAKING  INTO  PITTSBURGH 

THE  FLYING  SQUADRON  —  MONESSEN  —  DONORA  — 

MCKEESPORT  RANKIN  BRADDOCK  CLAIR- 

TON   HOMESTEAD   DUQUESNE   THE   RE- 
SULTS 

THE  time  was  now  ripe  for  a  great  drive  on  Pitts- 
burgh, a  district  which  had  been  the  despair  of 
unionism  for  a  generation.  The  new  strategy  of  the 
National  Committee  for  Organizing  Iron  and  Steel 
Workers  was  succeeding.  Pittsburgh  had  been  sur- 
rounded by  organized  posts,  established  during  the 
winter.  The  Chicago  district  had  also  been  held. 
The  committee's  finances  were  improving.  The 
crew  of  organizers  was  larger  and  more  enthusiastic 
than  ever.  The  mills  were  operating  stronger  and 
stronger.  And  spring  was  here.  The  movement 
was  now  ready  for  a  tremendous  effort  to  capture 
Pittsburgh,  and  thus  overcome,  as  far  as  might  be, 
the  original  mistake  of  not  starting  the  campaign 
soon  enough  and  everywhere  at  the  same  time. 
This  done,  it  would  put  the  work  squarely  upon  the 
essential  national  basis.  So  the  assault  was 
ordered  on  the  stronghold  of  the  Steel  Trust. 

First  free  speech  and  free   assembly  had  to  be 
established;  for  the  towns  about  Pittsburgh  were 

[50] 


still  closed  tight  against  the  unions.  During  the 
winter  incessant  attempts  had  been  made  to  break 
the  embargo  by  political  methods,  but  without  avail. 
In  vain  a  special  convention  of  all  the  unions  in 
Western  Pennsylvania  had  appealed  to  the  Governor 
for  assistance.  For  a  moment  the  federal  Depart- 
ment of  Labor  displayed  a  languid  interest  and  sent 
a  dozen  men  to  investigate  conditions.  But  until 
this  day  their  report  has  never  appeared.  In  an- 
swer to  inquiries,  the  Secretary  of  Labor  is  reported 
to  have  said  that  "  its  publication  at  this  time  would 
be  inadvisable."  That  may  be  one  reason,  and  an- 
other may  be  that  the  Department,  in  its  eager  co- 
operation with  Attorney  General  Palmer,  in  deport- 
ing hundreds  of  workingmen  without  trials,  is  so 
busy  that  it  hasn't  time  to  attend  to  such  trifles  as 
the  wholesale  suppression  of  constitutional  rights  in 
Pennsylvania. 

But  in  seeking  relief  no  appeal  was  made  to  the 
courts  to  set  up  the  rights  of  the  unions.  This 
was  for  two  reasons.  First,  it  would  involve  such 
a  loss  of  time  that  the  chance  to  organize  the  steel 
workers  would  have  passed  long  before  any  de- 
cision could  be  secured.  Then,  again,  there  was 
no  faith  that  the  courts  of  Pennsylvania  would  be 
just,  and  the  National  Committee  had  no  money  to 
carry  the  fight  higher.  The  unions  conceived  their 
rights  to  speak  and  assemble  freely  too  well  estab- 
lished to  necessitate  court  sanction  at  this  late  date. 
Hence,  they  determined  to  exercise  them,  peacefully 
and  lawfully,  and  to  take  the  consequences.  At 
Atlantic  City,  where  the  A.  F.  of  L.  was  in  conven- 
tion, a  dozen  presidents  of  international  unions  in 

[Si] 


the  steel  campaign  expressed  their  willingness  to 
enter  the  steel  districts,  to  speak  on  the  streets,  and 
to  go  to  jail  if  necessary. 

To  carry  on  the  difficult  and  dangerous  free  speech 
fight,  and  to  oversee  generally  the  organization  of 
the  immediate  Pittsburgh  district,  a  special  crew  of 
organizers  was  formed.  This  was  known  as  "  The 
Flying  Squadron,"  and  was  headed  by  J.  L.  Beaghen, 
A.  F.  of  L.  organizer  and  President  of  the  Pitts- 
burgh Bricklayers'  Union.  The  following  brief  ref- 
erences to  the  fights  in  the  various  towns  will  illus- 
trate the  forces  at  play  and  the  methods  employed. 

Monessen,  forty  miles  from  Pittsburgh  on  the 
Monongahela  river,  the  home  of  the  Pittsburgh 
Steel  Company  and  several  other  large  concerns,  and 
notorious  as  the  place  where  organizer  Jeff.  Pierce 
got  his  death  blow  in  a  previous  campaign,  was  the 
first  point  of  attack.  Wm.  Feeney,  United  Mine 
Workers'  organizer  and  local  secretary  in  charge  of 
the  district  for  the  National  Committee,  superin- 
tended operations.  Several  months  previously  the 
Burgess  of  Monessen  had  flatly  refused  to  allow 
him  to  hold  any  meetings  in  that  town.  So  he  was 
compelled  to  operate  from  Charleroi,  several  miles 
away.  But  as  soon  as  spring  peeped  the  question 
was  opened  again.  He  called  a  meeting  to  take 
place  square  in  the  streets  of  Monessen  on  April  ist. 
The  Burgess  forbade  it  with  flaming  pronuncia- 
mentos  and  threatened  dire  consequences  if  it  were 
held.  But  Feeney  went  ahead,  and  on  the  date  set 
marched  10,000  union  miners  from  the  surrounding 
country  into  Monessen  to  protest  the  suppression  of 

[52] 


free  speech  and  free  assembly.  Mother  Jones,1 
James  Maurer,  President  of  the  Pennsylvania  Fed- 
eration of  Labor,  Philip  Murray,  President  of 
District  No.  5,  U.  M.  W.  A.,  Mr.  Feeney,  the 
writer  and  others  spoke.  The  demonstration  was  a 
huge  success.  Public  opinion  was  clearly  on  the  side 
of  the  steel  workers,  and  the  Burgess  had  to  recede 
from  his  dictatorial  attitude  and  allow  them  to  exer- 
cise their  constitutional  rights.  This  they  hastened 
to  do  with  gusto.  The  affair  established  the  unions 
in  the  big  mills  of  Monessen. 

In  Donora,  an  important  steel  town  a  few  miles 
down  the  river  from  Monessen,  and  part  of  organ- 
izer Feeney's  district,  the  fight  was  not  so  easily  won. 
The  United  States  Constitution  provides  that  not 
even  Congress  may  pass  laws  abridging  the  rights 
of  free  speech  and  free  assembly ;  but  in  Pennsylvania 
the  Constitution  is  considered  a  sort  of  humorous 
essay;  hence  the  lickspittle  Donora  council,  right  in 
the  face  of  the  steel  campaign,  passed  an  ordinance 
forbidding  public  meetings  without  the  sanction  of 
the  Burgess,  which  sanction,  of  course,  the  unions 
could  not  get.  But  nothing  deterred,  the  indomit- 
able Feeney  hired  a  couple  of  lots  on  the  edge  of  the 
town  and  held  meetings  there.  The  company  of- 
ficials left  nothing  undone  to  break  up  these  gather- 
ings. They  held  band  concerts  and  ball  games  at 

1  Throughout  the  latter  part  of  the  organizing  campaign  and  the 
first  two  months  of  the  strike,  Mother  Jones  lent  great  assistance  to 
the  steel  workers.  This  veteran  organizer  (she  testified  in  court 
to  being  89  years  old)  of  the  United  Mine  Workers  labored  daunt- 
lessly,  going  to  jail  and  meeting  the  hardships  and  dangers  of  the 
•work  in  a  manner  that  would  do  credit  to  one  half  her  age. 

[53] 


the  same  hour,  and  set  dozens  of  their  bosses  and 
police  to  picket  the  meetings.  But  it  was  no  use; 
the  workers  attended  and  joined  the  unions  in  droves. 

This  lasted  a  couple  of  months.  And  all  the 
while  a  local  paper  was  villainously  assailing  Feeney. 
Finally,  the  steel  company  agents  got  the  business 
men  to  sign  an  ultimatum  to  Feeney,  demanding  that 
he  leave  the  district  at  once.  Feeney  took  this  mat- 
ter up  with  his  miners,  and  they  decided  that  not 
he,  but  they,  would  quit  Donora.  Organized 
solidly,  they  easily  put  a  strict  boycott  on  the  town, 
and  it  was  not  long  before  the  same  business  men, 
with  their  trade  almost  ruined,  made  a  public  apol- 
ogy to  Feeney,  and  ousted  their  own  officials  who  had 
been  responsible  for  the  attack. 

Naturally  these  events  heartened  the  steel  work- 
ers. They  organized  very  rapidly,  and  soon  had 
a  majority  of  the  men  in  the  mills  —  a  large  plant 
of  the  American  Steel  and  Wire  Company.  They 
also  became  a  big  factor  in  the  local  fraternal  as- 
sociations, which  controlled  all  the  halls;  and  sud- 
denly the  Lithuanian  Society  deposed  its  President, 
who  was  friendly  to  the  steel  company,  and  voted 
to  give  its  hall  to  the  unions,  permits  or  no  permits. 
In  the  face  of  this  situation  the  Burgess  reluctantly 
granted  sanction  for  union  meetings.  And  thus 
free  speech  and  free  assembly  were  established  in 
the  benighted  town  of  Donora,  and  with  them,  al- 
most complete  organization  of  the  steel  workers. 

But  the  heart  of  the  conspiracy  against  free 
speech  and  free  assembly  was  in  McKeesport, 
twenty  miles  from  Pittsburgh.  When  the  organ- 
izers tried  to  hold  meetings  in  that  city  they  could 

[54] 


hire  no  halls  without  the  Mayor's  permission,  and 
this  the  latter,  George  H.  Lysle,  stubbornly  refused 
to  give.  He  feared  a  revolution  if  the  staid  A.  F. 
of  L.  unions  were  permitted  to  meet;  but  the  Social- 
ist party  and  other  radical  organizations  went  ahead 
with  their  gatherings  without  opposition.  The 
truth  was  that  he  knew  the  unions  would  organize 
the  workers  if  they  could  but  get  their  ear,  and  this 
he  determined  to  prevent.  Nor  would  he  shift  from 
his  autocratic  position.  Appeals  by  the  organizers 
to  the  Federal  government,  the  Governor  and  the 
local  city  council  were  alike  fruitless.  No  meetings 
could  be  held  in  McKeesport.  And  the  officials  of 
all  the  steel  towns  along  the  Monogahela  river, 
drawing  inspiration  from  the  little  despot,  Lysle, 
took  the  same  stand.  Free  speech  and  free  assem- 
bly were  stifled  in  the  whole  district. 

The  Federal  authorities  being  so  active  setting 
the  outside  world  aright  that  they  could  find  no 
time  or  occasion  to  correct  the  most  glaring  abuses 
at  home,  the  unions  resolved  to  attend  to  the  free 
speech  and  free  assembly  matter  themselves. 
Knowing  that  Lysle  could  knife  the  workers' 
rights  only  so  long  as  he  was  allowed  to  work  in 
the  dark,  they  determined  to  drag  him  into  the  day- 
light and  let  the  public  judge  of  his  deeds.  They 
would  hold  meetings  on  the  streets  of  McKeesport 
in  spite  of  him;  give  him  a  few  hundred  test  court 
cases  to  handle,  and  finally  find  out  whether  the 
A.  F.  of  L.  is  entitled  to  the  same  rights  as  other 
organizations. 

The  fight  opened  as  soon  as  the  weather  per- 
mitted. May  1 8  was  the  date  set  for  the  first  meet- 

[55] 


ing.  The  Mayor  stormed  and  threatened  all  con- 
cerned with  instant  arrest;  but  the  preparations 
went  on  just  the  same.  When  the  fated  day  ar- 
rived thousands  turned  out  to  hear  the  speakers. 
But  the  Mayor,  failing  to  defend  his  course,  dared 
not  molest  the  meeting.  After  this,  meetings 
were  held  on  the  streets  each  Sunday  afternoon, 
always  in  the  face  of  the  Mayor's  threats,  until 
eventually  the  latter,  seeing  that  he  was  the  laugh- 
ing stock  of  the  city  and  that  the  street  meetings 
were  organizing  hundreds  of  the  workers,  shame- 
facedly granted  the  following  niggardly  permit  for 
meetings : 

CITY  OF  McKEESPORT. 

Department  of  Police. 

McKeesport,  Pa.,  July  7,  1919. 
Mr.  Reddington, 
Chief  of  Police, 
McKeesport,  Pa., 
Dear  Sir: 

This  is  to  certify  that  the  McKeesport  Council 
of  Labor  has  permission  to  hold  a  mass  meeting  in 
Slavish  Hall  on  White  Street  on  July  8,  1919. 

Permission  is  granted  subject  to  the  following  con- 
ditions, and  also  subject  to  police  regulation. 

(ist)  That  no  speaker  shall  talk  in  any  other 
languages,  except  the  English  language. 

(2nd)   That  a  list  of  the  speakers  be  submitted 
to  the  Mayor  before  the  meeting  is  held. 
.Very  truly  yours, 
( Signed)      Geo.  H.  Lysle 

Mayor 
[56] 


Disregarding  the  three  provisions  of  this  con- 
temptible document,  the  unions  held  their  meetings 
under  the  auspices  of  the  A.  F.  of  L.  (not  of  the 
McKeesport  Council  of  Labor),  had  their  speakers 
talk  in  whatever  languages  their  hearers  best  under- 
stood, and  submitted  no  list  to  Lysle.  Then  the 
big  steel  companies  rushed  to  the  aid  of  the  hard- 
pressed  Mayor.  All  the  while  they  had  discharged 
every  man  they  could  locate  who  had  either  joined 
the  unions  or  expressed  sympathy  with  them,  but 
now  they  became  more  active.  As  each  meeting 
was  held  they  stationed  about  the  hall  doors 
(under  the  captaincy  of  Mr.  William  A.  Cornelius, 
Manager  of  the  National  Tube  Company's  works) 
at  least  five  hundred  of  their  bosses,  detectives,  of- 
fice help,  and  "  loyal "  workers  to  intimidate  the 
men  who  were  entering.  About  three  hundred  more 
would  be  sent  into  the  hall  to  disrupt  the  meetings. 
And  woe  to  the  man  they  recognized,  for  he  was 
discharged  the  next  morning.  The  organizers,  run- 
ning the  gauntlet  of  these  Steel  Trust  gunmen,  car- 
ried their  very  lives  in  their  hands. 

Under  these  hard  circumstances  few  steel  work- 
ers dared  to  go  to  the  meetings  or  to  the  union 
headquarters.  But  the  organizations  grew  rapidly 
nevertheless.  Every  discharged  man  became  a  vol- 
unteer organizer  and  busied  himself  getting  his 
friends  to  enroll.  A  favorite  trick  to  escape  the 
espionage  was  to  get  a  group  of  men,  from  a  dozen 
to  fifty,  to  meet  quietly  in  one  of  the  homes,  fill  out 
their  applications,  and  send  them  by  a  sister  or  wife 
to  the  union  headquarters  —  the  detectives  stationed 
outside  naturally  not  knowing  the  women.  Condi- 

[57] 


tions  in  the  local  mills  were  so  bad  that  not  even  the 
most  desperate  employers'  tactics  could  stop  the 
progress  of  the  unions.  McKeesport  quickly  be- 
came one  of  the  strong  organization  points  on  the 
river. 

Sweeping  onward  through  the  Pittsburgh  dis- 
trict, the  unions  gained  great  headway  by  the  col- 
lapse of  the  petty  Czar  of  McKeesport,  for  all  the 
little  nabobs  in  the  adjoining  steel  towns  felt  the 
effects  of  his  defeat.  Rankin  fell  without  a  blow. 
A  few  months  before  the  hall  had  been  closed  there 
by  the  local  board  of  health,  when  the  Burgess  re- 
fused to  act  against  the  unions.  But  now  no  ob- 
jections were  made  to  the  meetings.  Braddock  also 
capitulated  easily.  At  a  street  meeting  held  in  the 
middle  of  town  against  the  Burgess'  orders,  organ- 
izers J.  L.  Beaghen,  R.  L.  Hall,  J.  C.  Boyle,  J.  B. 
Gent  and  the  writer  were  arrested.  The  Burgess, 
however,  not  wishing  to  meet  the  issue,  found  it 
convenient  to  leave  town,  and  the  Acting  Burgess, 
declaring  in  open  court  that  he  would  not  "  do  the 
dirty  work  of  the  Burgess,"  postponed  the  hearings 
indefinitely.  That  settled  Braddock. 

Burgess  Williams  of  North  Clairton,  chief  of  the 
Carnegie  mill  police  at  that  point,  swore  dire  ven- 
geance against  the  free  speech  fighters  should  they 
come  to  his  town.  But  the  National  Committee, 
choosing  a  lot  owned  by  its  local  secretary  on  the 
main  street  of  North  Clairton,  called  a  meeting  there 
one  bright  Sunday  afternoon.  But  hardly  had 
it  started  when,  with  a  great  flourish  of  clubs,  the 
police  broke  up  the  gathering  and  arrested  organ- 
izers J.  G.  Brown,  J.  Manley,  A.  A.  Lassich,  P.  H. 

[58] 


Brogan,  J.  L.  Beaghen,  R.  L.  Hall,  and  the  writer. 
Later  all  were  fined  for  holding  a  meeting  on  their 
own  property.  But  the  Burgess,  learning  that  the 
speaker  for  the  following  Sunday  was  Mother  Jones 
of  the  Miners'  Union,  and  that  public  sentiment  was 
overwhelmingly  against  him,  decided  not  to  fight. 
Instead  he  provided  a  place  on  the  public  commons 
for  open  air  meetings.  The  contest  resulted  in  al- 
most all  of  the  local  steel  workers  joining  the  unions 
immediately. 

In  Homestead,  however,  that  sacred  shrine  of 
Labor,  the  unions  had  to  put  up  a  harder  fight. 
The  Burgess  there,  one  P.  H.  McGuire,  is  a  veteran 
of  the  great  Homestead  strike,  and  for  many  years 
afterwards  led  the  local  fight  against  the  Carnegie 
Steel  Company.  But  he  has  now  fully  recovered 
from  his  unionism.  He  has  made  peace  with  the 
enemy.  It  was  in  the  early  winter  of  1918  that  the 
unions  first  tried  to  hold  meetings  in  his  town.  But 
they  were  careful  to  make  tentative  arrangements 
for  a  hall  before  asking  a  permit  from  McGuire. 
The  latter  stated  flatly  that  there  would  be  no 
union  meetings  in  Homestead,  saying  no  halls  could 
be  secured.  "  But,"  said  the  organizers,  "  we  have 
already  engaged  a  hall."  The  next  day  the  rent 
money  was  returned  with  the  explanation  that  a  mis- 
take had  been  made.  Later  the  unions  managed  to 
sneak  by  the  guard  of  the  ex-union  man  Burgess  and 
hold  a  meeting  or  two  —  said  to  be  the  first  since 
the  Homestead  strike,  twenty-six  years  before  —  but 
nothing  substantial  could  be  done,  and  the  fight  was 
called  off  for  the  winter. 

During  the  big  spring  drive  on  Pittsburgh  the 

[59] 


Flying  Squadron  turned  its  attention  to  Homestead 
as  soon  as  the  McKeesport  and  many  other  pressing 
situations  permitted.  Mass  meetings  were  held  on 
the  main  streets.  At  first  the  Burgess,  with  a 
weather  eye  on  McKeesport,  did  not  molest  these; 
but  when  he  saw  the  tremendous  interest  the  steel 
workers  showed  and  the  rapidity  with  which  they 
were  joining  the  unions,  he  attempted  to  break  up 
the  meetings  by  arresting  two  of  the  organizers, 
J.  L.  Beaghen  and  myself.  At  the  trial  McGuire, 
as  magistrate,  was  shown  that  his  ordinance  did  not 
cover  street  meetings.  "  But,"  said  he,  u  it's  the 
best  we've  got,  and  it  will  have  to  do."  He  fined 
the  defendants,  and  a  day  or  two  later  had  an  ordi- 
nance adopted  to  his  liking.  Such  trifles  don't  worry 
the  executives  in  steel  towns. 

But  such  an  enormous  crowd  assembled  to  witness 
the  next  street  meeting  that  McGuire  had  to  agree 
to  permit  hall  meetings.  No  sooner  were  they  at- 
tempted however,  than  he  broke  his  agreement. 
He  would  allow  no  languages  other  than  English 
to  be  spoken  —  the  object  being  to  prevent  the  for- 
eign workers  from  understanding  what  was  going  on. 
Of  course  all  other  organizations  in  Homestead 
could  use  what  tongues  they  pleased.  The  unions 
balked,  with  the  result  that  more  street  meetings 
were  held  and  Mother  Jones,  J.  G.  Brown,  R.  W. 
Reilly  and  J.  L.  Beaghen  were  arrested.  Public 
indignation  was  intense;  thousands  marched  the 
streets  in  protest;  the  unions  grew  like  beanstalks. 
And  so  the  affair  went  on  till  the  great  strike  broke 
on  September  22. 

That  curse  of  the  campaign  since  its  inception, 
[60] 


the  lack  of  resources,  bore  down  heavily  on  the  work 
in  the  crucial  summer  months  just  before  the  strike. 
At  least  one  hundred  more  men  should  have  been  put 
in  the  field  to  take  advantage  of  the  unparalleled 
opportunity.  But  the  National  Committee  could 
not  beg,  borrow  or  steal  them.  The  organizers  in 
the  various  localities  fairly  shrieked  for  help,  but 
in  vain.  Especially  was  the  need  keenly  felt  in  the 
big  drive  on  Pittsburgh.  Instead  of  eight  or  ten 
men,  which  was  all  that  the  Flying  Squadron  could 
muster,  there  ought  to  have  been  at  least  fifty  men 
delegated  to  the  huge  task  of  capturing  the  score 
of  hard-baked  steel  towns  on  Pittsburgh's  three 
rivers.  The  consequence  was  that  the  work  every- 
where had  to  be  skimped,  with  disastrous  effects 
later  on  in  the  strike.  In  those  towns  where  the 
unions  did  get  started  lack  of  help  prevented  their 
taking  full  advantage  of  the  situation.  And  then 
some  towns  had  to  be  passed  up  altogether,  although 
the  men  were  infected  with  the  general  fever  for 
organization  and  were  calling  for  organizers.  It 
was  impossible  to  send  any  one  to  either  Woodlawn 
or  Midland,  both  very  important  steel  towns.  Even 
the  strategic  city  of  Duquesne,  with  its  enormous 
mills  and  blast  furnaces,  could  not  be  started  until 
three  weeks  before  the  strike. 

Duquesne  is  just  across  the  river  from  McKees- 
port  and  only  four  miles  from  Homestead.  It  gave 
the  organizers  a  hot  reception.  Its  Mayor,  James 
S.  Crawford,  is  President  of  the  First  National 
Bank.  His  brother  is  President  of  the  Port  Vue 
Tinplate  Company.  Besides  being  Mayor,  Mr. 
Crawford  is  city  Commissioner,  President  of  the  city 

[61] 


council,  Director  of  Public  Safety,  and  Magistrate. 
He  makes  the  laws,  executes  them  and  punishes  the 
violators.  He  is  a  true  type  of  Pennsylvania  steel 
town  petty  Kaiser  and  exercises  his  manifold  powers 
accordingly. 

So  eager  was  the  Mayor,  popularly  known  as 
'  Toad  "  Crawford,  to  give  the  world  a  demonstra- 
tion of  Steel  Trust  Americanism  that  he  challenged 
the  organizers  to  come  to  his  town.  He  even  of- 
fered to  meet  in  personal  combat  one  of  the  men 
in  charge  of  the  campaign.  Of  course  he  insultingly 
refused  to  grant  permits  for  meetings.  The  organ- 
izers, who  could  not  hire  an  office  in  the  place,  so 
completely  were  the  property  owners  dominated  by 
the  steel  companies,  managed  to  lease  a  couple  of 
lots  in  an  obscure  part  of  town.  But  when  they  at- 
tempted to  hold  a  meeting  there  Mr.  Crawford 
jailed  three  of  them,  J.  L.  Beaghen,  J.  McCaig,  and 
J.  G.  Sause.  The  next  day  he  fined  them  each  $100 
and  costs. 

Rabbi  Wise  of  New  York  was  the  speaker  billed 
for  the  following  Sunday.  But  the  Steel  Trust 
Mayor  forbade  his  meeting.  And  when  it  was  pro- 
posed to  have  Frank  Morrison,  with  whom  Craw- 
ford boasted  a  slight  acquaintance,  confer  with  him 
about  the  situation,  he  declared,  "  It  won't  do  you 
any  good.  Jesus  Christ  himself  could  not  speak 
in  Duquesne  for  the  A.  F.  of  L!  "  It  so  happened 
that  Rabbi  Wise  was  unable  to  come  to  Pennsyl- 
vania for  his  scheduled  lectures  on  behalf  of  the  steel 
workers,  and  the  organizers  held  the  Duquesne  meet- 
ing themselves.  Crawford  had  his  whole  police 
force  on  hand  and  immediately  arrested  the  speak- 

[62] 


ers,  Mother  Jones,  J.  L.  Beaghen  and  the  writer. 
Forty-four  steel  workers,  all  the  jail  would  hold, 
were  arrested  also,  foi  no  other  reason  than  attend- 
ing the  meeting.  Organizer  J.  M.  Patterson,  who 
had  notking  to  do  with  the  gathering,  was  thrown 
into  jail  merely  for  trying  to  find  out  what  bail  we 
were  held  for.  The  next  day  the  organizers  were 
each  fined  $100  and  costs,  and  the  rest  from  $25 
to  $50  apiece.1  In  sentencing  Mr.  Beaghen,  Mayor 
Crawford  declared  that  nothing  would  be  more 
pleasurable  than  to  give  him  99  years,  and  then  be 
on  hand  when  he  got  out  to  give  him  99  more. 

The  Mayor  was  going  it  strong;  but  he  was  rid- 
ing fast  to  a  hard  fall.  The  unions  were  planning 
to  bring  to  Duquesne  some  of  the  most  prominent 
men  in  the  United  States  and  to  give  Crawford  the 
fight  of  his  life,  when  the  outbreak  of  the  great 
strike  swamped  them  with  work  and  compelled  them 
to  turn  their  attention  elsewhere.2 

Whatever  its  general  disadvantages,  in  some  re- 

1  Relative  to  this  meeting  there  occurs  the  following  dialogue  on 
page  508  of  the  report  on  the  Senate  Committee's  Hearings  on  the 
Steel  Strike: 

Senator  Sterling.     "Was  Mr.  Foster  here  prior  to  the  strike?" 

Mr.  Diehl  (Gen.  Manager  Duquesne  Works,  Carnegie  Steel  Co.). 
"Yes;  he  was  here  trying  to  hold  a  meeting,  but  the  meeting  was 
not  held." 

The  Chairman.     "What  happened  to  the  meeting?" 

Mr.  Diehl.     "  Well,  we  simply  prohibited  it." 

And  naturally  so.  Mr.  Diehl  and  other  company  officials  shut  off 
meetings  in  the  halls  and  on  the  lots  of  their  towns  just  as  readily 
as  they  would  have  done  had  attempts  been  made  to  hold  them  in 
the  mill  yards. 

2  Now  that  the  strike  is  over  and  spring  is  again  at  hand,  the 
unions  have  resumed  the  battle  for  free  speech   and   assembly  in 
Duquesne  and  promise  to  fight  it  to  a  conclusion. 

[63] 


spects,  at  least,  the  free  speech  fight  was  very  good 
for  the  unions.  For  one  thing,  it  served  wonder- 
fully well  to  infuse  the  necessary  hope  and  confidence 
into  the  steel  workers.  So  tremendous  had  been  the 
manifestations  of  the  Steel  Trust  —  its  long  record 
of  victory  over  the  trade  unions,  its  vast  wealth  and 
undisputed  political  supremacy,  its  enormous  mills 
and  furnaces  —  so  tremendous  had  been  all  these 
influences  that  they  had  overcome  the  individual 
workers  with  a  profound  sense  of  insignificance 
and  helplessness,  and  practically  destroyed  all  capac- 
ity for  spontaneous  action.  What  the  steel  men 
needed  to  rouse  them  from  their  lethargy  was  a  dem- 
onstration of  power  from  outside,  a  tangible  sign 
that  there  was  some  institution  through  which  they 
could  help  themselves.  Throughout  the  campaign 
this  consideration  was  borne  in  mind,  and  bands  and 
other  spectacular  methods  of  advertising  were  used 
to  develop  among  the  steel  workers  a  feeling  of  the 
greatness  and  power  of  the  unions.  Nor  were  these 
methods  unsuccessful.  Most  effective  of  all,  how- 
ever, was  the  free  speech  fight  in  Pennsylvania. 
That  gave  the  unions  a  golden  opportunity  to  de- 
feat the  Steel  Trust  so  easily  and  spectacularly  that 
the  steel  workers  couldn't  help  but  be  encouraged 
thereby.  They  simply  had  to  cast  in  their  lot  with 
a  movement  able  to  defeat  so  handily  their  auto- 
cratic masters.  And  once  they  came  in  they  felt  the 
utmost  confidence  in  their  leaders,  the  men  they  had 
seen  jailed  time  and  again  for  fighting  their  battle. 
In  consequence  of  The  Flying  Squadron's  heroic 
battles  in  the  immediate  Pittsburgh  district  the  whole 
campaign  was  put  practically  upon  a  national  basis, 

[64] 


where  it  should  have  been  at  the  start.  Almost 
every  steel  centre  in  America  was  being  organized 
simultaneously.  Members  were  streaming  into  the 
co-operating  unions  by  thousands.  The  entire 
steel  industry  was  on  the  move.  Perhaps  it  may  be 
fitting  to  introduce  at  this  point  an  official  digest  of 
the  general  report  of  the  number  of  men  organized 
by  the  National  Committee  during  the  whole  cam- 
paign. The  report  covers  the  period  up  to  Janu- 
ary 31,  1920,  but  almost  all  of  the  men  were  enrolled 
before  the  strike  started  on  September  22. 

GENERAL  REPORT 

on 

250,000  members  enrolled  by  the  National  Committee  for 

Organizing    Iron    and    Steel    Workers    during    the 

American    Federation   of    Labor   Organizing 

Campaign  in  the  Steel  Industry,  from 

August  i,  1918,  until  January 

31,   1920. 
By  Localities  By  Trades 

South  Chicago   6,616    Blacksmiths   5,699 

Chicago  Heights   569    Boilermakers   2,097 

Misc.  Chicago  Dist 3,871    Brick  &  Clay  Workers..        187 

Pittsburgh   8,970   Bricklayers    581 

Johnstown    11,846    Coopers    138 

Butler   2,519    Electrical  Workers 8,481 

Monessen  &  Donora  ....     8,665    Foundry  Employees 2,406 

New   Castle    2,710   Hod  Carriers 2,335 

Homestead    3,571    Iron,  Steel  &  Tin  Wkrs. .   70,026 

Braddock  &  Rankin   ....     4,044    Iron  Workers  5,829 

Clairton    2,970    Machinists   12,406 

McKeesport    3,963    Metal  Polishers 349 

Gary   7,092    M.  M.  &  Smelter  Wkrs.   15,223 

Indiana  Harbor 4,654   Mine  Workers   1,538 

Joliet 3,497   Moulders   1,382 

Milwaukee    68r   Pattern  Makers 

Waukegan    1,212  Plumbers  irffy 

[65] 


By  Localities  By  Trades 

DeKalb    332  Quarry  Workers  725 

Aurora   242   Railway  Carmen   5*045 

Pullman   4,073   Seamen    

Kenosha    585   Sheet  Metal  Workers  ...        377 

Hammond   1,102   Stationary  Engineers   ...     2,194 

Wheeling  Dist 5.028   Stationary   Firemen    ....     5,321 

Farrell  &  Sharon 3,794  Steam  Shovelmen   2 

Cleveland    17.305   Switchmen   440 

Sparrows  Point  93   Unclassified    12,552 

Brackenridge   &   Natrona  2,110 

East  Pittsburgh   146 

East  Liverpool   50 

Warren  &  Niles 474 

Minnesota  Dist 185 

Pueblo    3>"3 

Coatesville    828 

Steubenville  Dist 4,*o8 

Birmingham  Dist i>47° 

Canton  &  Massillon  .....  5,705 

Vandergrift  1,986 

Buffalo  &  Lackawanna.  .  6,179 

Youngstown    19,040 

Peoria 984 

Decatur   320 


Total  by  Localities. .  .156,702       Total  by  Trades 156,702 

This  report  includes  only  those  members  actually 
signed  up  by  the  National  Committee  for  Organizing 
Iron  and  Steel  Workers,  and  from  whose  initiation 
fees  $1.00  apiece  was  deducted  and  forwarded  to  the 
general  office  of  the  National  Committee.  It  repre- 
sents approximately  50  to  60  per  cent,  of  the  total  num- 
ber of  steel  workers  organized  during  the  campaign, 
and  is  minimum  in  every  respect. 

The  report  does  not  include  any  of  the  many  thou- 
sands of  men  signed  up  at  Bethlehem,  Steelton,  Read- 
ing, Apollo,  New  Kensington,  Leechburg  and  many 
minor  points  which  felt  the  force  of  the  drive  but  where 
[66] 


the  National  Committee  made  no  deductions  upon  initi- 
ation fees.  In  Gary,  Joliet,  Indiana  Harbor,  South 
Chicago  and  other  Chicago  District  points  the  National 
Committee  ceased  collecting  on  initiation  fees  early  in 
1919,  hence  this  report  makes  no  showing  of  the  thou- 
sands of  men  signed  up  in  that  territory  during  the  last 
few  months  of  the  campaign.  Likewise,  at  Coatesville 
and  Sparrows'  Point,  during  only  a  short  space  of  the 
campaign  were  deductions  made  for  the  National  Com- 
mittee. Many  thousands  more  men  were  signed  up 
directly  by  the  multitude  of  local  unions  in  the  steel  in- 
dustry, that  were  not  reported  to  the  National  Com- 
mittee. These  do  not  show  in  this  calculation.  Nor 
do  the  great  number  of  ex-soldiers  who  were  taken  into 
the  unions  free  of  initiation  fees  —  in  Johnstown  alone 
1300  ex-soldier  steel  workers  joined  the  unions  under 
this  arrangement.  Of  course  no  accounting  is  here  in- 
cluded for  the  army  of  workers  in  outside  industries 
who  became  organized  as  a  result  of  the  tremendous 
impulse  given  by  the  steel  campaign. 

In  view  of  these  exceptions  it  may  be  conservatively 
estimated  that  well  over  250,000  steel  workers  joined 
the  unions  notwithstanding  the  opposition  of  the  Steel 
Trust,  which  discharged  thousands  of  its  workers, 
completely  suppressed  free  speech  and  free  assembly  in 
Pennsylvania  and  used  every  known  tactic  to  prevent 
the  organization  of  its  employees. 

WM.  Z.  FOSTER, 
Secretary-Treasurer 
National  Committee  for  Organizing 
Certified  by  Iron  &  Steel  Workers. 

Enoch    Martin 
Auditor,   District   No.    12 

.United  Mine  Workers  of  America. 


[67] 


VI 
STORM  CLOUDS  GATHER 

RELIEF  DEMANDED THE  AMALGAMATED  ASSOCIA- 
TION    MOVES A     GENERAL     MOVEMENT THE 

CONFERENCE      COMMITTEE GOMPERS'      LETTER 

UNANSWERED THE    STRIKE    VOTE GARY    DE- 
FENDS   STEEL    AUTOCRACY PRESIDENT    WILSON 

ACTS  IN  VAIN THE  STRIKE  CALL 

SURGING  forward  to  the  accomplishment  of  the  "  im- 
possible," the  organization  of  the  steel  industry,  the 
twenty-four  co-operating  international  unions  found 
themselves  in  grips  with  the  employers  long  before 
they  were  strong  enough  to  sustain  such  a  contest. 
It  is  almost  always  so  with  new  unions.  In  their 
infancy,  when  their  members  are  weak,  undisciplined 
and  inexperienced,  and  the  employers  are  bitterly 
hostile  and  aggressive,  is  exactly  the  time  when  they 
must  establish  principles  and  adjust  grievances  that 
would  test  the  strength  of  the  most  powerful  unions. 
Inability  to  do  so  means  dissolution,  either  through 
a  lost  strike  or  by  disintegration.  Following  in  the 
wake  of  the  newly  formed  steel  workers'  unions 
came  a  mass  of  such  difficulties  requiring  immediate 
settlement.  The  demand  for  relief  from  the  evils 

[68] 


of  long  hours,  low  wages  and  miserable  working  con- 
ditions was  bad  enough;  but  infinitely  more  serious 
was  the  need  to  take  care  of  the  army  of  men  dis- 
charged for  union  membership.  Thousands  of  these 
walked  the  streets  in  the  various  steel  towns  clam- 
oring for  protection.  And  the  men  on  the  job  de- 
manded it  for  them.  Nor  could  these  appeals  be 
ignored.  Whether  they  deemed  the  occasion  pro- 
pitious or  not,  the  steel  workers'  unions,  on  pain  of 
extinction,  had  to  act  in  defence  of  their  harassed 
membership. 

So  bad  was  the  situation  by  early  spring  that, 
lacking  other  means  of  relief,  local  strikes  were 
threatening  all  over  the  country.  To  allow  these 
forlorn-hope  walkouts  to  occur  would  have  meant 
disintegration  and  disaster  to  the  whole  campaign. 
They  had  to  be  checked  at  all  costs  and  the  move- 
ment kept  upon  a  national  basis.  Therefore,  the 
National  Committee  for  Organizing  Iron  and  Steel 
Workers  called  a  general  conference  of  delegates  of 
steelworkers'  unions  of  all  trades  through  the  entire 
industry,  to  take  place  in  Pittsburgh,  May  25,  1919. 
The  object  was  to  demonstrate  to  the  rank  and  file 
how  fast  the  national  movement  was  developing,  to 
turn  their  attention  to  it  strongly,  and  thus  hearten 
them  to  bear  their  hardships  until  it  could  come  to 
their  assistance. 

Right  in  the  face  of  this  general  movement  of  all 
the  trades  the  Amalgamated  Association  made  a  bid 
for  separate  consideration  by  the  steel  companies. 
By  instruction  of  its  convention,  President  Tighe 
wrote  the  following  letter  to  Mr.  Gary: 

[69] 


Convention  Hall,  Louisville,  Ky.,  May  15,  1919 
Honorable  Elbert  H.  Gary,  Chairman, 
Executive  Officers,  United  States  Steel  Corporation, 
Hoboken,  N.  J. 
Dear  Sir: 

The  Amalgamated  Association  of  Iron,  Steel  and  Tin 
Workers  of  North  America,  in  National  Convention 
assembled,  have  by  resolution,  instructed  the  under- 
signed to  address  you  as  Chairman  of  the  Executive 
Officers  of  the  United  States  Steel  Corporation  on  a 
matter  which  in  the  opinion  of  the  representatives  of 
the  Amalgamated  Association  of  Iron,  Steel  and  Tin 
Workers,  is  of  vital  importance  to  the  Corporation  you 
have  the  honor  to  represent  and  to  the  Amalgamated 
Association. 

As  you  no  doubt  are  aware,  there  is  a  serious  dis- 
turbing element  in  the  industrial  world  at  the  present 
time,  a  great  spirit  of  unrest  has  spread  over  our  com- 
mon country.  It  is  becoming  more  and  more  acute, 
and  there  is  no  telling  when  or  where  the  storm  clouds 
will  break.  It  is  the  judgment  of  the  representatives 
of  the  Amalgamated  Association  that  it  is  the  patriotic 
duty  of  all  good  citizens  to  use  their  every  effort  to 
stem  the  tide  of  unrest,  if  possible. 

The  Amalgamated  Association  of  Iron,  Steel  and 
Tin  Workers  have  admitted  many  thousands  of  the 
employees  of  the  United  States  Steel  Corporation  into 
their  organization;  these  members  are  asking  that  they 
be  given  consideration  by  the  Corporation  you  are  the 
Honorable  Chairman  of,  in  their  respective  crafts  and 
callings,  and  also  that  as  law-abiding  citizens  who  de- 
sire the  privilege  of  having  their  representatives  meet 
with  the  chosen  representatives  of  the  Corporation  you 
represent,  to  jointly  confer  on  questions  that  mutually 
concern  both. 

Sincerely  believing  that  the  granting  of  their  request 

[70] 


on  your  part  will  not  only  be  the  means  of  allaying  that 
unrest,  but  will  also  promote  and  insure  that  harmony 
and  co-operation  that  should  at  all  times  exist  between 
employer  and  employee  to  the  end  that  all  will  share 
in  the  glorious  triumphs  so  lately  achieved  in  the  war 
and  thereby  add  still  more  to  the  lustre  and  glory  of 
our  common  country. 

Trusting  that  you  will  give  this  request  on  the  part 
of  the  aforesaid  employees  of  your  Corporation  your 
most  earnest  consideration,  I  await  your  pleasure. 

M.  F.  TIGHE,  International  President 
Hotel  Tyler,  Louisville,  Ky. 

To  this  letter  Mr.  Gary  replied  as  follows : 

UNITED  STATES  STEEL  CORPORATION 

Chairman's   Office, 
New  York,  May  2Oth,  1919 
Mr.  M.  F.  Tighe, 
International  President, 
Amalgamated  Association  of 
Iron,  Steel  and  Tin  Workers, 
Pittsburgh,  Pa. 
Dear  Sir: 

I  have  read  with  interest  your  letter  of  May  I5th 
inst.  I  agree  that  it  is  the  patriotic  duty  of  all  good 
citizens  to  use  their  efforts  in  stemming  the  tide  of  un- 
rest in  the  industrial  world  whenever  and  wherever  it 
exists. 

As  you  know,  we  do  not  confer,  negotiate  with,  or 
combat  labor  unions  as  such.  We  stand  for  the  open 
shop,  which  permits  a  man  to  engage  in  the  different 
lines  of  employment,  whether  he  belongs  to  a  labor  union 
or  not.  We  think  this  attitude  secures  the  best  results 
to  the  employees  generally  and  to  the  employers. 

In  our  own  way,  and  in  accordance  with  our  best 


judgment,  we  are  rendering  efficient  patriotic  service 
in  the  direction  indicated  by  you. 
With  kind  regards,  I  am, 

Yours  respectfully, 
E.  H.  GARY,  Chairman 

The  Amalgamated  Association's  action  threatened 
the  existence  of  the  general  movement,  but  Mr. 
Gary's  refusal  to  deal  with  its  officials  kept  them  in 
the  fold.  Where  the  principle  of  solidarity  was 
lacking  outside  pressure  served  the  same  end.  It 
would  be  interesting  to  hear  the  Amalgamated  Asso- 
ciation officials  explain  this  attempt  at  desertion. 

At  the  conference  of  May  25  there  assembled  583 
delegates,  representing  twenty-eight  international 
unions  in  eighty  steel  centers,  the  largest  gathering  of 
steel  worker  delegates  in  the  history  of  the  indus- 
try. The  reports  of  the  men  present  made  it 
clearly  evident  that  action  had  to  be  taken  to  de- 
fend the  interests  of  their  constituents.  Conse- 
quently, disregarding  the  rebuff  given  the  Amalga- 
mated Association  by  Mr.  Gary,  the  conference, 
which  was  only  advisory  in  character,  adopted  the 
following  resolution: 

RESOLUTION 

WHEREAS,  We  have  now  arrived  at  a  point  in  our 
nation-wide  campaign  where  our  organizations  control 
great  numbers  of  the  workers  in  many  of  the  most  im- 
portant steel  plants  in  America,  and 

WHEREAS,  Various  officials  of  the  iron  and  steel  in- 
dustry, including  Judge  Gary,  Charles  Schwab,  and 
other  heads  of  these  gigantic  corporations  have  expressed 

[72] 


their  solicitude  for  the  welfare  of  the  workers  in  this 
industry,  and 

WHEREAS,  They  have  been  continuously  quoted  as 
defenders  of  the  rights  of  the  workers  in  industry,  and 

WHEREAS,  The  corporations,  to  block  our  progress, 
are  organizing  company  unions,  discharging  union  men 
wholesale  and  otherwise  trying  to  break  up  our  organ- 
ization, thus  compelling  us  to  take  action  to  escape  des- 
truction, therefore  be  it 

RESOLVED,  That  it  be  the  will  of  this  conference  that 
a  joint  effort  be  made  by  all  unions  affiliated  with  the 
National  Committee  for  Organizing  Iron  and  Steel 
Workers  to  enter  into  negotiations  with  the  various 
steel  companies  to  the  end  that  better  wages,  shorter 
hours,  improved  working  conditions  and  the  trade-union 
system  of  collective  bargaining  be  established  in  the  steel 
industry ;  and  be  it  further 

RESOLVED,  That  this  resolution  be  submitted  for  ac- 
tion to  the  National  Committee  for  Organizing  Iron 
and  Steel  Workers  at  its  next  meeting  in  Washington, 
D.  C,  May  27. 

Two  days  later  the  National  Committee  met  in 
Washington  and  adopted  this  resolution.  The  fol- 
lowing were  appointed  as  a  conference  committee  to 
have  charge  of  the  preliminary  negotiations  with  the 
steel  companies:  Samuel  Gompers,  Chairman  of  the 
National  Committee;  John  Fitzpatrick,  Acting 
Chairman;  D.  J.  Davis,  Amalgamated  Association; 
Edw.  J.  Evans,  Electrical  Workers,  Wm.  Hannon, 
Machinists;  Wm.  Z.  Foster,  Railway  Carmen.  As 
the  first  approach,  Mr.  Gompers  addressed  the  fol- 
lowing letter  to  Mr.  Gary,  requesting  a  conference : 

[73] 


AMERICAN  FEDERATION  OF  LABOR 

The  Alamac  Hotel, 
Atlantic  City,  N.  J.,  June  20,  1919 
Mr.  Elbert  H.  Gary,  Chairman, 

Board  of  Directors,  U.  S.  Steel  Corporation, 

New  York,  N.  Y. 
Dear  Sir: 

Of  course  you  are  aware  that  upon  the  request  of 
a  number  of  men  in  the  employ  of  the  United  States 
Steel  Corporation,  and  realizing  the  need  of  it,  the 
convention  of  the  American  Federation  of  Labor  de- 
cided to  respond  and  give  such  assistance  as  is  possible 
in  order  to  bring  about  more  thorough  organization  of 
the  workers  in  the  iron  and  steel  industry,  particularly 
those  employed  by  your  Corporation. 

A  campaign  of  organization  was  begun  in  June,  1918, 
and  within  that  period  we  have  secured  the  organization 
of  more  than  100,000  of  the  employees  in  the  iron  and 
steel  industry.  The  prospects  for  the  complete  organ- 
ization are,  I  am  informed,  exceedingly  bright. 

Of  course,  knowing  the  policy  of  the  Organized  La- 
bor movement  I  have  the  honor  in  part  to  represent,  we 
aim  to  accomplish  the  purposes  of  our  labor  movement; 
that  is,  better  conditions  for  the  toilers,  by  American 
methods,  and  American  understandings,  not  by  revo- 
lutionary methods  or  the  inauguration  of  a  cataclysm. 

We  believe  in  the  effort  of  employer  and  employees 
to  sit  down  around  a  table  and,  meeting  thus,  face  to 
face,  and  having  a  better  understanding  of  each  other's 
position  in  regard  to  conditions  of  labor,  to  hours, 
standards,  etc.,  and  after  reaching  an  amicable  under- 
standing to  enter  into  an  agreement  for  collective  bar- 
gaining that  is  to  cover  wages,  hours  of  labor,  condi- 
tions of  employment,  etc. 

At  the  Atlantic  City  convention  of  the  American 
Federation  of  Labor  just  closed,  the  committee  re- 

[74] 


ported  upon  the  progress  made,  and  I  am  instructed 
and  authorized  to  suggest  to  you  whether  you  will  con- 
sent to  hold  a  conference  with  a  committee  represent- 
ing not  only  the  iron  and  steel  workers  who  are  organ- 
ized, but  representing  the  best  interests  of  the  unorgan- 
ized men  in  the  employ  of  your  Corporation.  The 
names  of  the  committee  I  am  asking  you  to  meet  are: 

Assistant  President  Davis,  Amalgamated  Iron  and 
Steel  and  Tin  Workers. 

William  Hannon,  member  executive  board,  Inter- 
national Association  of  Machinists. 

Edward  Evans,  representing  International  Brother- 
hood of  Electrical  Workers. 

Wm.  Z.  Foster,  secretary  of  the  National  Committee 
for  Organizing  Iron  and  Steel  Workers  and  represent- 
ing the  Brotherhood  of  Carmen  of  America. 

John  Fitzpatrick,  president  Chicago  Federation  of 
Labor. 

If  you  can  advise  me  at  your  early  convenience  that 
the  request  contained  in  this  letter  meets  with  your  ap- 
proval and  that  a  conference  can  be  held,  I  am  sure 
I  shall  be  additionally  appreciative. 

Kindly  address  your  reply,  which  I  trust  may  be 
favorable,  to  the  American  Federation  of  Labor  Build- 
ing, Washington,  D.  C. 

Respectfully  yours, 

SAMUEL  GOMPERS, 
President  American  Federation  of  Labor 

This  letter  was  sent  during  the  A.  F.  of  L.  con- 
vention at  Atlantic  City.  About  the  same  time  Mr. 
Gompers  resigned  the  chairmanship  of  the  National 
Committee  and  appointed  in  his  stead  John  Fitz- 
patrick, hitherto  Acting  Chairman.  Mr.  Fitzpat- 
rick has  been  President  of  the  Chicago  Federation 
of  Labor  for  many  years.  He  is  a  horseshoer  by 

[75] 


trade  and  one  of  America's  sterling  union  men. 
Possessed  of  a  broad  idealism,  unquestioned  integ- 
rity, a  magnetic  personality  and  a  wide  knowledge 
of  trade-union  practice,  his  services  were  beyond 
value  as  Chairman  of  the  committees  that  carried  on 
the  organization  work  in  the  steel  and  packing  in- 
dustries. He  is  now  taking  an  active  part  in  the 
launching  of  the  new  Labor  party. 

To  Mr.  Gompers'  courteous  letter  Czar  Gary  did 
not  deign  to  reply.  This  was  bad.  It  looked  like 
war.  But  the  unions  had  no  alternative;  they  had 
to  go  ahead.  Conditions  in  the  steel  industry  were 
so  unbearable  that  they  had  to  exert  their  utmost 
powef  to  right  them,  come  what  might.  There- 
fore, after  waiting  several  weeks  for  word  from  Mr. 
Gary,  the  National  Committee  met,  gave  the  situa- 
tion profound  consideration,  and  adopted  the  fol- 
lowing resolution : 

RESOLUTION 

WHEREAS,  Working  conditions  in  the  steel  industry 
are  so  intolerable  and  the  unrest  arising  therefrom  so 
intense  that  they  can  only  be  remedied  by  the  applica- 
tion of  the  principles  of  collective  bargaining;  and, 

WHEREAS,  All  efforts  have  failed  to  bring  about  a 
conference  between  the  heads  of  the  great  steel  corpora- 
tions and  the  trade  unions,  representing  many  thousands 
of  organized  steel  workers,  for  the  purpose  of  establish- 
ing trade  union  conditions  in  the  steel  industry;  there- 
fore, be  it 

RESOLVED,  That  the  National  Committee  for  Organ- 
izing Iron  and  Steel  Workers  recommends  to  its  24  af- 
filiated unions  that  they  take  a  strike  vote  of  their  local 
unions  throughout  the  steel  industry;  and,  be  it  further 

RESOLVED,  That  a  special  meeting  be  held  in  the 

.[76] 


Pittsburgh  Labor  Temple,  July  aoth,  at  10  A.  M.,  of 
representatives  of  all  the  co-operating  international 
unions  for  the  purpose  of  taking  action  on  this  matter. 

The  National  Committee  meeting  of  July  2Oth, 
called  in  accordance  with  the  above  resolution,  ap- 
proached the  situation  from  every  possible  angle 
and  with  the  keenest  sense  of  responsibility.  But  it 
had  to  recognize  that  the  matter  was  wholly  in  the 
hands  of  Mr.  Gary  and  his  associates.  The  resolu- 
tion to  take  a  strike  vote  of  the  men  was  re-adopted. 
Also  the  following  general  demands,  based  on  ac- 
curate surveys  of  the  situation,  and  subject  to  revi- 
sion over  the  conference  table,  were  formulated: 

1.  Right  of  collective  bargaining 

2.  Reinstatement  of  all  men  discharged  for  union  ac- 
tivities with  pay  for  time  lost 

3.  Eight  hour  day 

4.  One  day's  rest  in  seven 

5.  Abolition  of  24-hour  shift 

6.  Increases  in  wages  sufficient  to  guarantee  American 
standard  of  living 

7.  Standard  scales  of  wages  in  all  trades  and  classifica- 
tions of  workers 

8.  Double  rates  of  pay  for  all  overtime  after  8  hours, 
holiday  and  Sunday  work 

9.  Check-off    system  of    collecting    union    dues    and 
assessments 

10.  Principles  of  seniority  to  apply  in  the  maintenance, 
reduction  and  increase  of  working  forces 

11.  Abolition  of  company  unions 

12.  Abolition  of  physical  examination  of  applicants  for 
employment 

So  plain,  fair  and  equitable  are  these  demands  that 

[77] 


to  reasonable  people  they  require  no  defence.  The 
only  explanation  they  might  need  relates  to  #9  and 
#12.  The  check-off  was  to  apply  only  to  the  min- 
ing end  of  the  steel  industry,  and  the  abolition  of  the 
physical  examination  was  to  put  a  stop  to  the  rank 
discrimination  practiced  by  the  companies  through 
their  medical  departments. 

A  month  was  allowed  in  which  to  take  the  vote. 
Each  trade  looked  after  its  own  members,  with  the 
National  Committee  voting  those  men  who  were  en- 
rolled but  not  yet  turned  over  to  their  respective 
unions,  and  in  some  cases  the  unorganized  also.  En- 
thusiasm was  intense.  The  steel  workers  saw  a 
glimmer  of  hope  and  welcomed  with  open  arms  the 
opportunity  to  right  their  crying  wrongs.  When  the 
vote  was  tabulated  in  Youngstown,  Ohio,  on  August 
20,  it  was  found  that  every  trade  had  voted  over- 
whelmingly for  a  strike  in  case  no  settlement  could 
be  reached.  Whole  districts  voted  to  a  man  in  the 
affirmative.  Of  all  the  thousands  of  ballots  cast  in 
Homestead,  Braddock,  Rankin,  McKeesport,  Van- 
dergrift,  Pittsburgh  and  Monessen  not  one  was  in 
the  negative.  Donora  produced  one  "  no  "  vote, 
with  the  great  Youngstown,  Chicago  and  Cleveland 
districts  about  the  same.  Everywhere  the  senti- 
ment was  practically  unanimous  to  make  a  stand. 
The  vote  was  calculated  conservatively  at  98  per 
cent,  for  a  strike.  The  Conference  Committee  was 
accordingly  instructed  to  request  a  conference  with 
the  heads  of  the  United  States  Steel  Corporation  and 
the  big  independent  companies,  and  if  at  the  end  of 
ten  days  no  such  meeting  had  been  arranged,  to  set 
the  strike  date. 


BALLOT 

IRON  &  STEEL   WORKERS 

The  Union  Committees  are  now  seeking  to  get  higher  wages, 
shorter  hours  and  better  working  conditions  from  the,  steel  com- 
panies. Are  you  willing  to  back  them  up  to  the  extent  of  stopping 
work  should  the  companies  refuse  to  concede  these  demands  ? 

TAJNO  GLASANJE 

Odbor  junije  sada  trait  da  se  dobije  bolja  placa,  kraci  radni  satovi  i  bolji  uvjeti 
za  rad  od  kompanija  celika.  Dali  stc  voljni  isti  do  skrajnosti  podupreti  da  se 
prestane  sa  radom  ako  bi  kompanija  odbila  da  udovolji  zahtevima  ? 

SZAVAZZON! 

Az  Union  Bizottsaga,  az  Acel  Tarsasagoktol  valo —  magasabb  fizetes, 
rovidebb  munka  ido  es  jobb  munka  fehetelek — elnyerese  ulan  tdrekszik. 
Akar  ezek  utan  torekedni?  s  a  v£gsokig  kitarta — ni?  6s  ha  a  tarsasagck 
ezen  kivanalmaknak  nem  te'sznek  eleget  a  muhkat  beszlintetni  ? 

VOTAZIONE. 

I  comitati  dell'Unione  stanno  cercando  di  ottenere  paghe  piu'  alte,  ore 
di  lavoio  piu'  brevi,  e  migliori  condizioni  di  lavoro.  Desiderate  voi  asaecondarli, 
am  he  quando  dovesse  essere  neceisario  di  fermare  il  lavoro  8e  le  Compagnir 
rifiutassero  di  accettare  le  doraande? 

HLASOVACI  LlSTOK 

Vybor  uniovy  chce  dosiahnuf  podvysenie  mzdy,  menej  hodin 
robit  a  lepsie  robotnicke  polozenie  od  oceliarskych  sp>olocnoati.  Ste 
vy  ochotni  ich  podporovaf  do  krajnosti,  ai  do  zastavenia  pracc,  v  pade 
by  spolocnosf  odoprela  /iadostucinif  tym  poiiadavkam. 

BALOT 

Komitet  Unii  stara  si;  obecnie  o  uzyskanie  od  Stalowych  Kompanij  wiekszej 
placy,  krotszych  godzin  i  lepszych  warunk6w  pracy.  Czy  jestes  got6w  poprzcc 
nas  az  do  mozliwosci  wstrzymania  pracy  na  wypadek,  gdyby  Kompanie 
odmowily  naszym  z^daniom  ? 

VOTE  YES  OR  NO.  Mark  X  in  square  indicating  how  you  vote 


National  Committee  for  Organizing  Iron  and  Steel  Workers 
WM.  Z.  FOSTER,  Secy-Treas.       303  Magee  Bldg.,  Pittsburgh,  Pa. 


STRIKE  BALLOT 


Taking  no  further  chances  on  unanswered  letters, 
the  Committee  bearded  Mr.  Gary  in  his  lair  at  71 
Broadway.  He  was  in  but  refused  to  meet  the  Com- 
mittee, requesting  that  its  proposition  be  submitted 
in  writing.  The  Committee  thereupon  sent  him  the 
following  request  for  a  conference : 

New  York,  August  26,  1919 
Hon.  Elbert  H.  Gary,  Chairman  Finance  Committee, 

United  States  Steel  Corporation, 
71  Broadway,  New  York  City 
Dear  Sir: 

During  a  general  campaign  of  organization  and  edu- 
cation conducted  under  the  auspices  of  the  American 
Federation  of  Labor,  many  thousands  of  men  employed 
in  the  iron  and  steel  industry  made  application  and 
were  enrolled  as  members  of  the  various  organizations 
to  which  they  were  assigned. 

This  work  has  been  carried  on  to  a  point  where  we 
feel  justified  in  stating  to  you  that  we  represent  the 
sentiment  of  the  vast  majority  of  the  employees  in  this 
industry,  and,  acting  in  behalf  of  them,  we  solicit  of 
you  that  a  hearing  be  given  to  the  undersigned  Com- 
mittee, who  have  been  selected  by  the  duly  accredited 
representatives  of  the  employees,  to  place  before  you 
matters  that  are  of  vital  concern  to  them,  and  con- 
cerning hours  of  labor,  wages,  working  conditions  and 
the  right  of  collective  bargaining. 

The  committee  called  at  your  office  at  3  P.  M., 
Tuesday,  August  26,  and  requested  a  conference.  We 
were  advised  by  your  messenger  that  you  wished  to  be 
excused  from  a  personal  interview  at  this  time  and  re- 
quested us  to  have  our  business  in  writing  and  what- 
ever matters  we  wished  to  submit  would  be  taken  up  by 
yourself  and  your  colleagues  and  given  consideration. 

Therefore  we  are  submitting  in  brief  the  principal 

[79] 


subjects  that  we  desired  to  have  a  conference  on.  The 
committee  has  an  important  meeting  in  another  city  on 
Thursday  next  and  will  leave  New  York  at  5  o'clock 
on  August  27,  1919.  May  we  respectfully  request  that 
your  answer  be  sent  before  that  time  to  Mr.  John  Fitz- 
patrick,  Continental  Hotel,  Broadway  and  Forty-first 
Street,  New  York  City. 

Very  truly  yours, 

John  Fitzpatrick 
D.  J.  Davis 
Wm.   Hannon 
Edw.  J.  Evans 
Wm.  Z.   Foster 

Committee 

To  this  letter  Mr.  Gary  replied  as  follows : 


Office  of  the  Chairman, 

New  York,  August  27,  1919 

Messrs.  John  Fitzpatrick,  David  J.  Davis,  William 
Hannon,  Wm.  Z.  Foster,  Edw.  J.  Evans,  Committee 
Gentlemen : 

Receipt  of  your  communication  of  August  26  instant 
is  acknowledged. 

We  do  not  think  you  are  authorized  to  represent  the 
sentiment  of  a  majority  of  the  employees  of  the  United 
States  Steel  Corporation  and  its  subsidiaries.  We  ex- 
press no  opinion  concerning  any  other  members  of  the 
iron  and  steel  industry. 

As  heretofore  publicly  stated  and  repeated,  our  Cor- 
poration and  subsidiaries,  although  they  do  not  combat 
labor  unions  as  such,  decline  to  discuss  business  with 
them.  The  Corporation  and  subsidiaries  are  opposed  to 
the  "  closed  shop."  They  stand  for  the  "  open  shop," 
which  permits  one  to  engage  in  any  line  of  employment 
[80] 


whether  one  does  or  does  not  belong  to  a  labor  union. 
This  best  promotes  the  welfare  of  both  employees  and 
employers.  In  view  of  the  well-known  attitude  as 
above  expressed,  the  officers  of  the  Corporation  respect- 
fully decline  to  discuss  with  you,  as  representatives  of 
a  labor  union,  any  matter  relating  to  employees.  In 
doing  so  no  personal  discourtesy  is  intended. 

In  all  decisions  and  acts  of  the  Corporation  and  sub- 
sidiaries pertaining  to  employees  and  employment  their 
interests  are  of  highest  importance.  In  wage  rates, 
living  and  working  conditions,  conservation  of  life  and 
health,  care  and  comfort  in  times  of  sickness  or  old  age, 
and  providing  facilities  for  the  general  welfare  and  hap- 
piness of  employees  and  their  families,  the  Corporation 
and  subsidiaries  have  endeavored  to  occupy  a  leading 
and  advanced  position  among  employers. 

It  will  be  the  object  of  the  Corporation  and  subsid- 
iaries to  give  such  consideration  to  employees  as  to 
show  them  their  loyal  and  efficient  service  in  the  past 
is  appreciated,  and  that  they  may  expect  in  the  future 
fair  treatment. 

Respectfully  yours, 

E.  H.  GARY,  Chairman 

In  a  last  effort  to  prevail  upon  Mr.  Gary  to  yield 
his  tyrannical  position,  the  committee  addressed  him 
this  further  communication: 

New  York  City,  Aug.  27,  1919- 
Hon.  Elbert  H.  Gary,  Chairman 

Finance  Committee,  United  States  Steel  Corporation, 

71  Broadway,  New  York,  N.  Y. 
Dear  Sir: 

We  have  received  your  answer  to  our  request  for  a 
conference  on  behalf  of  the  employees  of  your  Corpora- 
tion,  and  we  understand  the  first  paragraph  of  your 
answer  to  be  an  absolute  refusal  on  the  part  of  your 
[81] 


corporation  to  concede  to  your  employees  the  right  of 
collective  bargaining. 

You  question  the  authority  of  our  committee  to  repre- 
sent the  majority  of  your  employees.  The  only  way  by 
which  we  can  prove  our  authority  is  to  put  the  strike 
vote  into  effect  and  we  sincerely  hope  that  you  will  not 
force  a  strike  to  prove  this  point. 

We  asked  for  a  conference  for  the  purpose  of  ar- 
ranging a  meeting  where  the  questions  of  wages,  hours, 
conditions  of  employment,  and  collective  bargaining 
might  be  discussed.  Your  answer  is  a  flat  refusal  for 
such  conference,  which  raises  the  question,  if  the  ac- 
credited representatives  of  your  employees  and  the  in- 
ternational unions  affiliated  with  the  American  Federa- 
tion of  Labor  and  the  Federation  itself  are  denied  a 
conference,  what  chance  have  the  employees  as  such  to 
secure  any  consideration  of  the  views  they  entertain  or 
the  complaints  they  are  justified  in  making. 

We  noted  particularly  your  definition  of  the  attitude 
of  your  Corporation  on  the  question  of  the  open  and 
closed  shop,  and  the  positive  declaration  in  refusing  to 
meet  representatives  of  union  labor.  These  subjects 
are  matters  that  might  well  be  discussed  in  conference. 
There  has  not  anything  arisen  between  your  Corpora- 
tion and  the  employees  whom  we  represent  in  which  the 
question  of  "  the  closed  shop  "  has  been  even  mooted. 

We  read  with  great  care  your  statement  as  to  the 
interest  the  Corporation  takes  in  the  lives  and  welfare 
of  the  employees  and  their  families,  and  if  that  were 
true  even  in  a  minor  degree,  we  would  not  be  pressing 
consideration,  through  a  conference,  of  the  terrible  con- 
ditions that  exist.  The  conditions  of  employment,  the 
home  life,  the  misery  in  the  hovels  of  the  steel  workers 
is  beyond  description.  You  may  not  be  aware  that  the 
standard  of  life  of  the  average  steel  worker  is  below 
the  pauper  line,  which  means  that  charitable  institu- 
[82] 


tions  furnish  to  the  pauper  a  better  home,  more  food, 
clothing,  light  and  heat  than  many  steel  workers  can 
bring  into  their  lives  upon  the  compensation  received 
for  putting  forth  their  very  best  efforts  in  the  steel  in- 
dustry. Surely  this  is  a  matter  which  might  well  be  dis- 
cussed in  conference. 

You  also  made  reference  to  the  attitude  of  your  Cor- 
poration in  not  opposing  or  preventing  your  employees 
from  joining  labor  organizations.  It  is  a  matter  of 
common  knowledge  that  the  tactics  employed  by  your 
Corporation  and  subsidiaries  have  for  years  most  effec- 
tively prevented  any  attempt  at  organization  by  your 
employees.  We  feel  that  a  conference  would  be  valu- 
able to  your  Corporation  for  the  purpose  of  getting  facts 
of  which,  judging  from  your  letter,  you  seem  to  be  mis- 
informed. 

Some  few  days  are  still  at  the  disposal  of  our  commit- 
tee before  the  time  limit  will  have  expired  when  there 
will  be  no  discretion  left  to  the  committee  but  to  en- 
force the  decree  of  your  employees  whom  we  have  the 
honor  to  represent. 

We  submit  that  reason  and  fairness  should  obtain 
rather  than  that  the  alternative  shall  be  compulsory 
upon  us. 

Surely  reasonable  men  can  find  a  common  ground 
upon  which  we  can  all  stand  and  prosper. 

If  you  will  communicate  with  us  further  upon  this 
entire  matter,  please  address  your  communication  to  the 
National  Hotel,  Washington,  D.  C.,  where  we  will  be 
Thursday  and  Friday,  August  28  and  29. 
Very  truly  yours, 

JOHN    FITZ PATRICK 
D.    J.    DAVIS 
WM.  HANNON 
EDW.  J.  EVANS 
WM.  Z.  FOSTER 
[83]  Committee 


No  reply  came  to  the  last  letter.  Mr.  Gary,  be- 
hind the  smoke  screen  of  his  hypocrisies  about  the 
"  open  shop,"  was  determined  to  have  the  strike  go 
on.  But  the  committee,  fully  conscious  of  the  tre- 
mendous responsibility  resting  upon  it,  was  equally 
decided  to  exhaust  every  possible  means  of  adjust- 
ment before  things  came  to  a  rupture.  The  com- 
mitteemen  went  to  Washington,  appeared  before  the 
Executive  Council  of  the  A.  F.  of  L.,  and  received 
its  endorsement  and  praise  for  the  manner  in  which 
the  campaign  had  been  conducted. 

Mr.  Gompers  was  delegated  by  the  Council  to  go 
with  the  committee  to  present  the  matter  to  Presi- 
dent Wilson,  and  to  request  him  to  arrange  a  con- 
ference with  the  steel  people. 

When  President  Wilson  was  informed  of  the  true 
situation  in  the  steel  industry,  that  all  the  men  were 
asking  for  was  a  conference  at  which  to  present 
their  grievances  —  absolutely  no  other  demand  hav- 
ing been  made  upon  Mr.  Gary  —  he  immediately  ad- 
mitted the  justice  of  the  committee's  position.  He 
stated  frankly  that  he  was  entirely  out  of  sympathy 
with  employers  who  refused  to  meet  with  representa- 
tives of  their  workers  for  the  purpose  of  bargaining 
collectively  on  labor  conditions,  and  he  definitely 
agreed  to  use  all  his  influence  privately  to  have  Mr. 
Gary  alter  his  decision  and  to  arrange  the  confer- 
ence. In  order  to  give  him  a  chance  to  work  the 
unions  withheld  the  setting  of  the  strike  date. 

A  week  passed,  with  no  word  from  the  President. 
Conditions  in  the  steel  industry  were  frightful.  The 
companies,  realizing  the  importance  of  striking  the 
first  blow,  were  discharging  men  by  the  thousands. 

[84] 


The  unions  could  wait  no  longer.  They  had  to 
move  or  be  annihilated.  On  September  4,  the  Na- 
tional Committee  met  and  sent  to  President  Wil- 
son, who  was  on  his  ill-starred  trip  through  the  West 
advocating  the  League  of  Nations,  the  following 
telegram,  in  the  meantime  calling  a  meeting  of  the 
Presidents  of  all  the  international  unions  co-operat- 
ing in  the  steel  campaign  to  consider  the  critical  situ- 
ation : 

Washington,  September  4,  1919 
Honorable  Woodrow  Wilson, 
President  of  the  United  States, 
Indianapolis,  Ind.,  en  route 

The  Executive  Committee  representing  the  various 
international  unions  in  the  iron  and  steel  industry  met 
today  to  consider  the  awful  situation  which  exists  in 
many  of  the  iron  and  steel  industry  centres.  The 
coercion,  the  brutality  employed  to  prevent  men  and 
unions  from  meeting  in  halls  engaged,  upon  private 
property,  in  the  open  air,  the  thuggery  of  the  Corpora- 
tions' emissaries,  the  wholesale  discharge  of  numbers 
of  men  for  no  other  reason  than  the  one  assigned,  that 
they  have  become  members  of  the  unions,  have  brought 
about  a  situation  such  that  it  is  exceedingly  difficult  to 
withhold  or  restrain  the  indignation  of  the  men  and  the 
resistance  they  declare  it  is  their  purpose  to  present. 
The  Executive  Committee,  relying  upon  the  case  as  pre- 
sented to  you  last  week  and  your  earnest  declaration  to 
endeavor  to  bring  about  a  conference  for  the  honorable 
and  peaceful  adjustment  of  the  matters  in  controversy, 
have  thus  far  been  enabled  to  prevail  upon  the  men  not 
to  engage  in  a  general  strike.  We  cannot  now  affirm 
how  much  longer  we  will  be  able  to  exert  that  influence ; 
but  we  urge  you,  in  the  great  work  in  which  you  are 
engaged,  to  give  prompt  attention  to  this  most  vital  of 

[85] 


issues;  for  if  the  men  can  no  longer  be  restrained  it  is 
impossible  to  foretell  what  the  future  may  hold  in  store 
for  an  industrial  crisis  which  may  ensue  and  frustrate 
the  project  which  you  have  worked  at  for  a  peaceful 
and  honorable  adjustment  of  industrial  affairs  in  our 
country.  A  meeting  of  all  the  Presidents  of  the  twenty- 
four  international  unions  in  the  steel  industry  has  been 
called  to  take  place  on  Tuesday,  September  gth  in 
Washington,  D.  C.  to  take  such  action  as  they  deem 
necessary.  May  we  not  have  your  reply  on  or  before 
that  time  as  to  whether  or  not  a  conference  with  the 
Steel  Corporation  is  possible. 

SAMUEL  GOMPERS 
JOHN    FITZ PATRICK 
D.   J.    DAVIS 
WM.  HANNON 
EDW.  J.  EVANS 
WM.  Z.  FOSTER 

The  international  presidents  met  on  September  9. 
A  telegram  from  Secretary  Tumulty  was  laid  before 
them,  to  the  effect  that  President  Wilson  had  not 
yet  been  successful  in  arranging  the  requested  con- 
ference; that  he  was  somewhat  discouraged,  but 
was  continuing  his  efforts.  The  general  opinion 
took  this  to  be  final,  that  Mr.  Gary  had  definitely 
refused  the  President's  request.  But  in  order  to 
make  assurance  doubly  sure  and  to  convine  all  in- 
volved that  everything  possible  had  been  done  to 
avert  a  break,  the  following  further  telegram  was 
sent  to  Mr.  Wilson,  over  the  objections  of  some  who 
felt  it  was  practically  asking  him  to  declare  the 
strike : 


[86] 


Washington,  September  9,  1919 
Honorable  Woodrow  Wilson, 
President  of  the  United  States, 
St.  Paul  Hotel, 

St.  Paul,  Minnesota 

Secretary  Tumulty's  telegram  of  September  fifth  to 
Samuel  Gompers  was  read  today  at  the  meeting  of  the 
presidents  of  the  twenty-four  international  unions  in  the 
steel  industry,  and  given  the  most  careful  consideration. 
After  a  long  and  earnest  discussion  of  it  the  undersigned 
were  instructed  to  wire  you  requesting  a  more  definite 
statement  as  to  the  possibility  of  an  early  conference 
being  arranged  by  your  efforts  between  the  heads  of  the 
United  States  Steel  Corporation  and  of  the  unions  in- 
volved. Large  numbers  of  men  are  being  discharged  and 
otherwise  discriminated  against  and  abused,  and  it  will 
be  impossible  to  hold  our  men  much  longer  from  de- 
fending themselves  by  striking  unless  some  genuine  re- 
lief is  vouchsafed  them.  Our  meeting  will  remain  in 
session  here  for  forty-eight  hours  awaiting  your  reply 
before  taking  final  action.  Please  send  answer  to  John 
Fitzpatrick,  Chairman  of  National  Committee,  Ameri- 
can Federation  of  Labor  Building,  Washington,  D.  C. 

JOHN  FITZPATRICK 
M.  F.  TIGHE 
WM.  HANNON 
WM.  Z.  FOSTER 

On  the  day  following  Secretary  Tumulty's  answer 
was  laid  on  the  table  before  the  meeting,  practically 
repeating  what  his  first  telegram  had  said.  It  held 
out  no  definite  hope  for  a  conference,  neither  did  it 
suggest  any  alternative.1  Clearly  the  unions  had  to 

1  Out  of  courtesy  to  the  President  the  National  Committee  has 
never  made  public  these  telegrams. 

[8?] 


act.  President  Gompers  and  others  had  warned  of 
the  great  power  of  the  Steel  Trust  and  the  eager- 
ness with  which  the  employing  class  would  unite  to 
give  Organized  Labor  a  heavy  blow  in  the  steel  in- 
dustry. The  union  representatives  keenly  realized 
the  gravity  of  the  situation  and  their  heavy  respon- 
sibilities. It  was  in  this  frame  of  mind  that  they 
could  see  no  honorable  way  out  of  the  difficulty  ex- 
cept to  strike.  Accordingly  President  Tighe  of  the 
Amalgamated  Association  moved  that  the  strike  be 
set  for  September  22.  His  motion  was  unanimously 
adopted.  The  die  was  cast.  After  telegraphing 
the  strike  order  broadcast,  the  union  men  scattered 
to  their  respective  posts  to  organize  the  walkout. 

Then  came  a  bolt  from  the  blue.  Next  morning 
the  newspapers  carried  a  telegram  from  Secretary 
Tumulty  to  President  Gompers  requesting  that  the 
strike  be  held  off  until  after  the  Industrial  confer- 
ence, beginning  October  6.  The  committeemen 
could  hardly  believe  their  eyes,  because  the  telegram 
they  had  received  from  Mr.  Tumulty  had  said  abso- 
lutely nothing  about  postponing  the  strike.  Besides, 
since  the  President  had  asked  Mr.  Gary  privately  to 
grant  his  workers  the  conference  they  were  seek- 
ing, and  so  gave  him  an  opportunity  to  decline  with- 
out publicity,  it  was  incredible  that  he  would  pub- 
licly make  a  request  upon  the  unions  which  involved 
their  destruction,  and  which  they  would  have  openly 
to  refuse,  thus  putting  them  in  a  bad  light  and  giving 
their  opponents  a  powerful  weapon.  But  all  doubts 
were  set  at  rest  by  this  communication  from  Mr. 
Gompers : 

[88] 


AMERICAN  FEDERATION  OF  LABOR 

Washington,  D.  C.,  Sept.  n,  1919 
Mr.  John  Fitzpatrick,  Chairman, 

National  Committee  For  Organizing  Iron 

and  Steel  Workers, 
Washington,  D.  C., 
Dear  Mr.  Fitzpatrick: 

This  morning  I  received  a  telegram  as  follows: 

Dickinson,  N.  Dak.,  Sept.  10,  1919 
Hon.  Samuel  Gompers, 

President  American  Federation  of  Labor, 
Washington,  D.  C. 

In  view  of  the  difficulty  of  arranging  any  present 
satisfactory  mediation  with  regard  to  the  steel  situation, 
the  President  desires  to  urge  upon  the  steel  men,  through 
you,  the  wisdom  and  desirability  of  postponing  actiort 
of  any  kind  until  after  the  forthcoming  Industrial  con- 
ference at  Washington.  J.  P.  TUMULTY. 

You  are  aware  of  the  reason  which  prevented  my 
participating  further,  the  past  few  days,  in  the  confer- 
ences with  the  representatives  of  the  various  national 
and  international  unions  involved  in  this  question. 

In  transmitting  the  above  to  you  (which  I  am  doing 
by  long  distance  telephone  from  New  York)  I  want  to 
express  the  hope  that  something  can  be  done  without 
injury  to  the  workers  and  their  cause  to  endeavor  to 
conform  to  the  wish  expressed  by  the  President ;  that 
even  though  the  corporations  may  endeavor  to  provoke 
the  men  to  action,  that  they  may  hold  themselves  in 
leash  and  under  self-control,  consciously  demonstrating 
their  stamina  and  willingness  to  abide  by  the  justice  of 
their  cause  and  that  their  rights  will  be  finally  pro- 
tected. Fraternally  yours, 

SAMUEL  GOMPERS, 

President 
American  Federation  of  Labor 

[89] 


Upon  the  receipt  of  this  letter  a  meeting  of  the 
National  Committee  was  at  once  called  to  consider 
the  situation.  And  a  serious  one  it  was  indeed. 
Before  the  Committee  lay  two  requests  to  postpone 
the  strike;  one  from  President  Wilson,  clear  and 
categoric;  the  other  from  Mr.  Gompers,  qualified 
by  the  hope  that  it  could  be  done  "  without  injury 
to  the  workers  and  their  cause."  To  deny  these 
powerful  requests  meant  to  be  accused,  in  the  first 
instance,  of  hasty  and  disloyal  action,  and  in  the 
second,  of  practical  revolt  against  the  officials  of 
the  A.  F.  of  L.  It  would  be  to  start  the  strike  under 
the  handicap  of  an  unduly  hostile  public  opinion. 
Yet  to  grant  them  meant  ruin  complete. 

Conditions  in  the  steel  industry  were  desperate. 
Everywhere  the  employers  were  making  vigorous  at- 
tacks on  the  unions.  From  Chicago,  Youngstown, 
Newcastle,  Steubenville,  Wheeling,  Buffalo,  Pitts- 
burgh, and  many  other  points  large  numbers  of  men 
were  being  thrown  out  of  work  because  of  their 
union  membership.  Johnstown  was  a  bleeding 
wound.  In  the  towns  along  the  Monongahela  river 
thousands  of  discharged  men  walked  the  streets,  and 
their  number  was  daily  being  heavily  increased. 

In  the  face  of  this  situation  it  would  have  been 
folly  to  have  the  steel  workers  abandon  their  strike 
preparations,  even  if  it  could  have  been  done.  It 
was  like  asking  one  belligerent  to  ground  arms  in  the 
face  of  its  onrushing  antagonist.  The  employers 
gave  not  the  slightest  sign  of  a  truce.  Long  before 
anything  could  be  hoped  for  from  the  Industrial 
conference,  they  would  have  cut  the  unions  to  pieces, 

[90] 


had  the  workers  been  foolish  enough  to  give  them 
the  opportunity. 

This  the  steel  workers  were  determined  not  to  do. 
Immediately  after  the  story  got  abroad  that  the 
strike  might  be  postponed,  they  met  in  their  unions 
and  notified  the  National  Committee  that  they  were 
going  to  strike  on  September  22,  regardless  of  any- 
thing that  body  might  do  short  of  getting  them  defi- 
nite concessions  and  protection.  Many  long  weary 
months  they  had  waited  patiently,  under  the  urgings 
of  the  organizers,  for  a  chance  to  redress  their  griev- 
ances. And  now  when  they  had  built  their  organi- 
zations; taken  their  strike  vote;  received  their  strike 
call  and  were  ready  to  deliver  a  blow  at  their  op- 
pressors, the  opportunity  of  a  generation  was  at 
hand,  and  they  were  not  going  to  see  it  lost.  They 
would  not  postpone  indefinitely,  and  in  all  likelihood 
break  up  altogether,  the  movement  they  had  suf- 
fered so  much  to  build,  in  the  vague  hope  that  the 
Industrial  conference,  which  they  had  no  guarantee 
would  even  consider  their  case,  and  which  was  domi- 
nated by  their  arch  enemies,  Gary  and  Rockefeller, 
would  in  some  distant  day  do  something  for  them. 
Their  determination  to  have  the  strike  go  on  was 
intensified  by  the  constant  ding-donging  of  the  Steel 
Trust  propaganda  in  the  mills  to  the  effect  that  the 
A.  F.  of  L.  unions  were  cowardly  and  corrupt;  that 
they  would  make  no  fight  for  the  steel  workers,  and 
that  a  postponement  of  the  strike  would  be  proof 
positive  that  they  had  sold  out.  Under  such  circum- 
stances the  workers  could  not  consent  to  the  with- 
holding of  the  strike.  Practically  all  the  steel  dis- 


tricts  in  the  country  solemnly  warned  the  National 
Committee  that  they  would  strike  on  September  22, 
in  spite  of  any  postponement  that  was  not  based  on 
positive  assurances  that  justice  would  be  done.  The 
control  of  the  situation  was  in  the  hands  of  the  rank 
and  file. 

The  field  secretaries  and  organizers  present  at  the 
National  Committee  meeting,  men  intimately  ac- 
quainted with  actual  conditions,  emphasized  the  im- 
possibility of  postponement.  Many  of  them,  among 
whom  were  some  of  the  best  and  most  conservative 
men  in  the  whole  campaign,  declared  that  an  at- 
tempt to  delay  the  strike,  merely  upon  the  strength 
of  possible  action  by  the  Industrial  conference,  would 
result  in  the  swift  destruction  of  the  movement  under 
the  worst  of  circumstances.  The  workers  would  be 
bound  to  consider  it  a  gigantic  sell-out  and  to  act 
acordingly.  As  for  themselves,  they  declared  they 
would  have  nothing  to  do  with  it,  and  would  be  com- 
pelled to  present  their  resignations  the  minute  a 
motion  to  postpone  prevailed.  Dozens  of  them 
took  this  stand. 

To  the  National  Committee  two  courses  were 
open :  ( i )  It  could  postpone  the  strike  with  the  ab- 
solute certainty  that  it  would  break  the  steel  move- 
ment by  so  doing,  because  the  strike  would  have  gone 
ahead  anyway  in  a  series  of  wild,  uncontrolled, 
leaderless  revolts,  waged  in  an  atmosphere  fatally 
charged  with  accusations  of  cowardice  and  graft. 
In  all  probability  the  A.  F.  of  L.  would  suffer  one 
of  the  worst  defeats  in  its  history,  and  gain  such  an 
evil  reputation  among  the  steel  workers  that  it  could 

[92] 


not  approach  them  for  many  years,  if  ever,  with  an 
organization  project.  Or  (2)  it  could  go  ahead 
with  the  strike,  with  a  fighting  chance  to  win.  In 
any  event,  even  if  the  strike  were  lost,  it  would  be 
through  a  clean  fight  and  the  honor  of  the  move- 
ment would  be  preserved.  The  steel  workers  would 
be  convinced  that  everything  possible  had  been  done 
for  them.  Thus  the  unions  would  retain  their  con- 
fidence and  be  enabled  to  re-organize  them  at  an 
early  date. 

Between  certain,  ignominious  defeat  and  possible 
victory,  or  at  the  worst  honorable  failure,  the  Na- 
tional Committee  had  only  one  choice.  Practically 
all  the  delegates  present  were  of  the  opinion  that  the 
strike  had  to  go  on.  But  some  had  to  wire  their 
international  offices  to  cancel  their  instructions  to 
vote  for  postponement.  On  September  18,  D.  J. 
Davis,  Assistant  President  of  the  Amalgamated  As- 
sociation moved  that  September  22  be  reaffirmed  as 
the  strike  date.  This  was  carried.1  Then  the  Con- 
ference Committee  addressed  a  long  letter  to  Presi- 
dent Wilson,  explaining  in  detail  the  situation  as  the 
union  men  saw  it  and  outlining  the  reasons  for  not 

1  After  he  had  been  made  fully  acquainted  with  the  situation  Mr. 
Gompers  said  before  the  Senate  Committee  on  Education  and 
Labor,  investigating  the  steel  strike:  (Hearings,  page  109)  "Not- 
withstanding what  any  of  the  officials  of  the  trade  unions  would 
have  done,  regardless  of  what  the  Committee  would  have  done,  the 
strike  would  have  occurred  anyway,  a  haphazard,  loose,  disjointed, 
unorganized  strike,  without  leadership,  without  consultation,  with- 
out advice.  It  was  simply  a  choice  whether  the  strike  would  take 
place  under  the  guidance  and  leadership  of  men  who  have  proven 
their  worth,  or  under  the  leadership  of  some  one  who  might  spring 
up  for  the  moment." 

[93] 


postponing  the  strike.     The  letter  closed  as  follows : 

Mr.  President,  delay  is  no  longer  possible.  We  have 
tried  to  find  a  way  but  cannot.  We  regret  that  for  the 
first  time  your  call  upon  Organized  Labor  cannot  meet 
with  favorable  response.  Believe  us  the  fault  is  not 
ours.  If  delay  were  no  more  than  delay,  even  at  the 
cost  of  loss  of  membership  in  our  organizations,  we 
would  urge  the  same  to  the  fullest  of  our  ability,  not- 
withstanding the  men  are  set  for  an  immediate  strike. 
But  delay  here  means  the  surrender  of  all  hope.  This 
strike  is  not  at  the  call  of  the  leaders,  but  that  of  the 
men  involved.  Win  or  lose,  the  strike  is  inevitable  and 
will  continue  until  industrial  despotism  will  recede  from 
the  untenable  position  now  occupied  by  Mr.  Gary. 
We  have  faith  in  your  desire  to  bring  about  a  confer- 
ence and  hope  you  will  succeed  therein.  We  fully 
understand  the  hardships  that  meanwhile  will  follow 
and  the  reign  of  terror  that  unfair  employers  will  insti- 
tute. The  burden  falls  upon  the  men,  but  the  great 
responsibility  therefor  rests  upon  the  other  side. 

After  agreeing  that  all  settlements  made  with  the 
employers  should  cover  all  trades,  and  sending  a  let- 
ter to  the  independent  steel  companies  inviting  con- 
ferences with  them,  the  meeting  adjourned  and  the 
organizers  and  delegates  left  to  make  good  the  fol- 
lowing strike  call,  of  which  200,000  copies,  in  seven 
languages,  had  been  scattered  broadcast  throughout 
the  entire  steel  industry : 

STRIKE  SEPTEMBER  22,  1919 

The  workers  in  the  iron  and  steel  mills  and  blast 
furnaces,  not  working  under  union  agreements,  are  re- 
quested not  to  go  to  work  on  September  22,  and  to  re- 

[94] 


fuse  to  resume  their  employment  until  such  time  as  the 
demands  of  the  organizations  have  been  conceded  by  the 
steel  corporations. 

The  union  committees  have  tried  to  arrange  confer- 
ences with  the  heads  of  the  steel  companies  in  order  that 
they  might  present  our  legitimate  demands  for  the  right 
of  collective  bargaining,  higher  wages,  shorter  hours 
and  better  working  conditions.  But  the  employers  have 
steadfastly  refused  to  meet  them.  It  therefore  becomes 
our  duty  to  support  the  committees'  claims,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  practically  unanimous  strike  vote,  by  re- 
fusing to  work  in  the  mills  on  or  after  September  22, 
until  such  time  as  our  just  demands  have  been  granted. 
And  in  our  stoppage  of  work  let  there  be  no  violence. 
The  American  Federation  of  Labor  has  won  all  its 
great  progress  by  peaceful  and  legal  methods. 

IRON  AND  STEEL  WORKERS !  A  historic  de- 
cision confronts  us.  If  we  will  but  stand  together  now 
like  men  our  demands  will  soon  be  granted  and  a  golden 
era  of  prosperity  will  open  for  us  in  the  steel  industry. 
But  if  we  falter  and  fail  to  act  this  great  effort  will 
be  lost,  and  we  will  sink  back  into  a  miserable  and  hope- 
less serfdom.  The  welfare  of  our  wives  and  children 
is  at  stake.  Now  is  the  time  to  insist  upon  our  rights  as 
human  beings. 

STOP  WORK  SEPTEMBER  22 

NATIONAL  COMMITTEE 
FOR  ORGANIZING  IRON  AND  STEEL  WORKERS. 


[95] 


VII 
THE  STORM  BREAKS 

THE   STEEL   TRUST  ARMY  —  CORRUPT   OFFICIALDOM 

CLAIRTON MCKEESPORT THE       STRIKE 

SHOWING    BY    DISTRICTS  —  A    TREASONABLE    ACT 
—  GARY  GETS  HIS  ANSWER 

As  the  memorable  twenty-second  of  September  ap- 
proached a  lurid  and  dramatic  setting  developed  for 
the  beginning  of  the  great  steel  strike.  Everywhere 
the  steel  companies  made  gigantic  preparations  to 
crush  their  aspiring  workers  back  to  slavery.  The 
newspapers  shrieked  revolution.  The  whole  coun- 
try was  a-tremble  with  anxiety  and  apprehension. 

Pittsburgh  was  the  storm  center.  There,  in  its 
stronghold,  the  Steel  Trust  went  ahead  with  strike- 
breaking measures  unprecedented  in  industrial  his- 
tory. It  provisioned  and  fortified  its  great  mills 
and  furnaces,  surrounding  them  with  stockades 
topped  off  with  heavily  charged  electric  wires,  and 
bristling  with  machine  guns.  It  assembled  whole 
armies  of  gunmen.  Brute  force  was  to  be  used 
in  breaking  the  solidarity  of  the  workers.  Said 
the  New  York  World  editorially  September  22: 
"  In  anticipation  of  the  steel  strike,  what  do  we 
see?  In  the  Pittsburgh  district  thousands  of  deputy 
sheriffs  have  been  recruited  at  several  of  the 

[96] 


larger  plants.  The  Pennsylvania  State  Constabu- 
lary has  been  concentrated  at  commanding  points. 
At  other  places  the  authorities  have  organized  bodies 
of  war  veterans  as  special  officers.  At  McKeesport 
alone  3,000  citizens  have  been  sworn  in  as  special 
police  deputies  subject  to  instant  call.  It  is  as 
though  preparations  were  made  for  actual  war." 

Along  the  Monongahela  river  from  Pittsburgh  to 
Clairton,  a  distance  of  twenty  miles,  there  were  not 
less  than  25,000  armed  men  in  the  service  of  the 
Steel  Trust.  In  the  entire  Pittsburgh  district,  prac- 
tically all  the  petty  parasites  who  prey  upon  the  steel 
workers  —  the  professional  and  small  business  men 
—  had  been  sworn  in  as  deputies  and  furnished  fire- 
arms to  defend  their  great  overlord,  to  whom  they 
all  do  unquestioning  service  no  matter  how  dirty  the 
job.  During  the  strike  Sheriff  Haddock  of  Alle- 
gheny county  stated  to  the  Senate  Committee  investi- 
gating the  strike  that  there  were  5,000  deputy  sher- 
iffs and  5,000  strikers  in  his  jurisdiction,  or  one  dep- 
uty for  each  striker.  His  totals  should  have  been 
multiplied  by  at  least  ten  in  each  case;  50,000  depu- 
ties and  50,000  strikers  would  have  been  well  below 
the  mark.  It  is  noteworthy  that  although  the  dan- 
ger of  an  uprising  in  the  Pittsburgh  district  was 
widely  advertised  no  appeal  was  made  for  troops,  nor 
was  there  even  any  talk  of  an  appeal.  The  reason 
was  that  the  Steel  Trust  had  a  vast  army  of  its  own, 
officered  by  its  own  officials,  and  it  needed  no  out- 
side help. 

Western  Pennsylvania  is  controlled  body  and  soul 
by  the  Steel  Trust.  The  whole  district  has  the  psy- 
chology of  a  company-owned  town.  All  authority 

[97] 


centers  in  the  steel  industry.  From  there  practi- 
cally every  institution  takes  its  orders.  Local  gov- 
ernmental agencies  are  hardly  more  than  public 
service  departments  of  the  Steel  Trust.  Their  of- 
ficials, city,  county,  state  and  federal,  obey  the 
mandates  of  the  steel  magnates  just  about  as  readily 
and  naturally  as  do  the  superintendents  and  mill 
bosses.  No  less  than  the  latter  they  felt  it  to  be 
their  duty  to  break  the  strike  by  whatever  means 
their  masters  told  them  to  use. 

With  the  approach  of  the  strike  these  lackey  of- 
ficials hastened  en  masse  to  the  aid  of  the  Steel  Trust. 
Sheriff  Haddock,  besides  swearing  in  an  army  of 
guards  and  turning  them  ove-r  to  the  steel  companies 
to  carry  out  their  plan  of  terrorism,  issued  a  flaming 
proclamation  practically  setting  up  martial  law  and 
making  it  a  riotous  assembly  for  three  steel  workers 
to  meet  together.  Next  day,  September  21,  the 
organizers  tried  to  hold  a  meeting  in  North  Clairton 
—  with  the  Burgess'  permission,  and  at  a  place  on 
the  public  commons  especially  set  aside  by  the  au- 
thorities for  union  meetings.  About  3,000  steel 
workers  gathered  to  hear  the  speakers.  Everything 
was  going  as  peacefully  as  a  Sunday  school  picnic, 
when  suddenly  a  troop  of  State  Constabulary  ap- 
peared upon  the  scene,  and  without  a  word  of  warn- 
ing, rode  full  tilt  into  the  crowd,  clubbing  and 
trampling  men  and  women  indiscriminately.  They 
tore  down  and  threw  in  the  mud  the  American  flag 
floating  above  the  speakers'  stand.  Scores  were  ar- 
rested (including  organizers  J.  B.  Etchison  and  P. 
H.  Brogan)  and  held  for  heavy  bonds  on  charges  of 

[98] 


rioting.1  Many  were  seriously  injured,  but  fearing 
to  report  their  cases  to  the  doctors  and  thus  court 
arrest,  as  the  latter  were  nearly  all  deputies,  they 
cured  themselves  as  best  they  could.  This  crying 
outrage  was  perpetrated  under  the  authority  of  the 
Sheriff's  proclamation.  It  was  endorsed  and  lauded 
by  Governor  Sproul,  than  whom  the  Steel  Trust  has 
no  more  willing  champion. 

At  the  same  hour  as  the  Clairton  outrage  a  similar 
attack  was  made  on  the  workers  at  Glassport,  ad- 
joining McKeesport.  Not  being  allowed  to  meet  at 
the  latter  city  the  organizers  had  leased  a  plot  of 
ground  in  Glassport  and  had  been  holding  regular 
meetings  there,  with  the  full  sanction  of  the  local 
authorities.  For  the  meeting  in  question  they  had 
an  official  permit.  But  just  as  it  was  about  to  begin 
the  State  Constabulary  broke  it  up  in  true  Cossack 
fashion,  almost  riding  down  the  Burgess  in  so  doing. 
They  arrested  all  they  could  seize.  These  were  held 
as  rioters  under  bail  of  from  $1,000  to  $3,000  each. 
The  venal  Pittsburgh  papers  screamed  about  the  out- 
breaks that  had  been  crushed  by  the  gallant  State 
police,  and  praised  them  for  their  bravery  in  fac- 
ing the  "  rioting  mobs." 

Despite   all   these   terroristic  methods   the   Steel 

1  In  this  connection  occurred  one  of  the  finest  incidents  in  the 
strike:  Wm.  J.  Brennan,  an  able,  conscientious  attorney  of  Pitts- 
burgh, and  one  of  the  counsel  who  defended  the  Homestead  strikers 
in  1892,  went  to  Clairton  to  get  the  "rioters"  released  on  bonds. 
But  such  a  state  of  terror  existed  that  no  one  dared  to  go  their  bail. 
Thereupon,  Mr.  Brennan  himself,  without  knowing  a  single  one  of 
the  defendants,  but  smarting  under  the  injustice  of  it  all,  pledged 
his  entire  property  holdings,  amounting  to  $88,000,  to  get  them  set 
free. 

[99] 


Trust  could  not  break  the  will  of  its  workers.  On 
September  22  they  struck  throughout  the  entire  indus- 
try with  a  discipline  and  universality  that  will  be  re- 
membered so  long  as  steel  is  made  in  America.  On 
Tuesday,  the  twenty-third,  304,000  had  quit  their 
posts  in  the  mills  and  furnaces.  All  week  their 
ranks  were  augmented  until  by  September  30,  there 
were  365,600  on  strike.  It  was  a  magnificent  effort 
for  freedom,  and  twice  as  big  a  strike  as  this  coun- 
try had  ever  known.  By  cities  and  districts,  the 
numbers  of  strikers  were  as  follows : 

Pittsburgh    25,000 

Homestead    9,000 

Braddock   10,000 

Rankin     5,ooo 

Clairton   4,000 

Duquesne  &  McKeesport 12,000 

Vandergrift   4,000 

Brackenridge   5,ooo 

New  Kensington    1,100 

Apollo 1,500 

Leechburg    3,000 

Donora  &  Monessen    12,000 

Johnstown    1 8,000 

Coatesville   4,000 

Youngstown  district, 

including  Youngstown,  E.  Youngstown, 
Struthers,  Hubbard,  Niles,  Canton,  Al- 
liance, Massillon,  Warren,  Farrell,  New- 
castle, Sharon,  Butler,  etc 70,000 

Wheeling  district   15,000 

Cleveland     25,000 

Steubenville  district    , ,    ?2,OQO 

[100] 


Chicago  district, 

including  Gary,  Joilet,  DeKalb,  South 
Chicago,  Indiana  Harbor,  East  Chicago, 
Hammond,  Evanston,  Sterling,  Peoria, 

Milwaukee,  etc 90,000 

Buffalo  district   12,000 

Pueblo    6,000 

Birmingham     2,000 

5  Bethlehem  Plants  20,000 


Total 365,600 

The  shutdown  was  almost  complete.  Through- 
out the  country  the  industry  was  stricken  with 
paralysis.  On  an  average  the  strike  was  at  least 
90  per  cent,  effective.  In  the  great  Chicago  dis- 
trict practically  all  the  men  struck,  hamstringing  the 
big  plants  in  the  various  steel  towns  of  that  section, 
Gary,  Joliet,  Indiana  Harbor,  South  Chicago,  etc. 
The  holding  of  the  organizations  in  this  district  for 
a  year,  in  the  face  of  Steel  Trust  opposition,  by  the 
organizers  under  Secretary  Evans,  and  later,  De 
Young,  was  one  of  the  most  notable  achievements  of 
the  whole  campaign.  When  the  pent-up  force  was 
finally  released  it  swept  the  district  like  a  flood, 
leaving  hardly  a  wheel  turning  anywhere. 

Youngstown  is  another  place  where  great  difficul- 
ties had  been  encountered  in  the  organizing  work, 
the  workers  being  deeply  discouraged  by  recently 
lost  local  strikes,  and  the  authorities  at  some  points 
so  hostile  that  it  was  impossible  to  hold  meetings  in 
the  strategic  places.  But  so  widespread  was  the  dis- 
content at  the  miserable  working  conditions,  and  so 
well  had  the  district  crew  of  organizers  under  Secre- 

[101] 


taries  McCadden  and  Hammersmark  done  their 
work  that  when  the  strike  clarion  sounded,  the 
masses  of  steel  workers  responded  almost  to  a  man. 
Trust  plants  and  "  independents  "  alike  had  to  shut 
down.  The  steel  working  population  of  the  entire 
Mahoning  Valley  went  on  holiday.  It  was  a  clean 
walkout.  In  the  outer  Youngstown  district,  as 
established  by  the  National  Committee  system,  the 
companies,  by  the  use  of  desperate  tactics,  succeeded 
in  keeping  some  of  their  men  at  work;  in  Sharon, 
Farrell  and  Newcastle  probably  twenty  per  cent  re- 
fused to  obey  the  strike  call.  But  in  Canton  and 
Massillon,  John  Olchon  and  the  other  organizers 
brought  all  the  important  mills  to  a  dead  stop. 

Without  exception,  the  enormous  Cleveland  mills 
and  furnaces  shut  down  tight.  In  Johnstown  the 
Cambria  Company  was  so  hard  hit  that,  swallowing 
its  pride,  it  had  to  ask  the  hated  unions  for  a  de- 
tachment of  workers  to  protect  its  plants.  The  Buf- 
falo district  men  struck  almost  100  per  cent.,  after 
a  bitter  organizing  campaign  and  an  eight  months' 
free  speech  fight.  The  Wheeling  and  Steubenville 
districts'  steel  mills  and  blast  furnaces  were  aban- 
doned altogether  by  their  crews.  In  Coatesville 
and  Birmingham,  the  response  was  poor,  in  the  first 
locality  because  of  insufficient  organization;  and  in 
the  second  because  of  discouragement  due  to  a  lost 
local  strike  the  year  before.  But  in  far  away  Col- 
orado, the  steel  workers,  hearkening  to  the  voice  of 
freedom  abroad  in  the  land,  expressed  their  contempt 
for  the  company-union  slavery  of  John  D.  Rocke- 
feller, Jr.,  by  tieing  up  every  department  in  his  big 
Pueblo  mills. 

[102] 


In  the  immediate  Pittsburgh  district,  though 
here  more  strenuously  opposed  by  the  Steel  Trust, 
the  strike  ranged  from  75  to  85  per  cent,  effective. 
That  it  did  not  go  as  strong  as  other  districts  was 
purely  because  of  the  denial,  by  the  companies  and 
the  authorities,  of  the  workers'  rights  to  meet  and  to 
organize.  In  the  "  Black  Valley  "  section  of  the  dis- 
trict, comprising  the  towns  lying  along  the  Allegheny 
river,  Apollo,  Vandergrift,  Leechburg,  Bracken- 
bridge,  Natrona  and  New  Kensington,  and  notorious 
as  the  scene  of  the  brutal  murder  of  organizer  Mrs. 
Fannie  Sellins,  the  strike  went  90  per  cent,  or  better; 
but  in  the  Monongahela  river  section  it  was  not  so 
good.  Of  the  steel  towns  in  that  district,  Donora 
and  Monessen  took  the  lead  with  a  100  per  cent, 
strike.  Due  to  the  terrorism  prevailing  exact  figures 
were  almost  impossible  to  get  for  the  other  towns, 
but  according  to  the  best  information  procurable  they 
averaged  about  as  follows;  Clairton  95,  Braddock 
90,  Homestead  80,  Rankin  85,  McKeesport  70,  and 
Duquesne  50  per  cent.  In  Pittsburgh  itself  all  the 
larger  mills  and  furnaces,  except  those  of  the  Jones 
and  Laughlin  Company,  either  suspended  operations 
altogether  or  lost  heavily  of  their  employees  during 
the  first  two  days  of  the  strike.  The  Jones  and 
Laughlin  men  had  been  profoundly  discouraged  by  a 
lost  strike  two  years  previously,  and  had  responded 
poorly  to  the  organizers'  efforts.  But  when  they 
saw  the  magnitude  of  the  strike  they  took  heart  some- 
what, and  by  strenuous  efforts  in  a  rapid  fire  cam- 
paign, the  organizers  had  at  least  60  per  cent,  of 
them  on  strike  by  the  end  of  the  first  week. 

In  the  plants  of  the  Bethlehem  Steel  Company 


the  strike  did  not  become  effective  until  September 
29.  The  cause  was  to  be  found  in  local  conditions. 
In  the  early  spring  of  1918,  before  the  National 
Committee  began  its  campaign,  ruthless  exploita- 
tion by  the  company  had  resulted  in  a  strike  of  ma- 
chine shop  employees.  The  National  War  Labor 
Board  settled  the  strike,  erecting  a  shop  organiza- 
tion to  handle  grievances.  In  the  meantime  the  Na- 
tional Committee  came  into  the  field  and  began  ac- 
tive operations.  Up  till  this  time  the  organized 
movement,  led  by  David  Williams  and  Patrick 
Duffy,  had  been  confined  principally  to  the  Machin- 
ists, Electrical  workers  and  a  few  other  skilled 
trades;  but  now  it  spread  to  the  main  body  of  the 
employees.  To  head  it  off  the  company  proposed 
to  the  National  Committee  that  a  Rockefeller  union 
be  set  up  in  the  plants.  Naturally  this  was  unaccept- 
able. Then  they  offered  to  sign  an  agreement  cover- 
ing all  their  shipyard  employees  if  the  organization 
of  their  steel  plants  was  given  up,  feeling  no  doubt 
that  the  shipyard  boom  was  only  temporary.  For 
the  National  Committee,  John  Fitzpatrick  spurned 
this  shameful  trade,  and  the  organization  campaign 
went  on  —  with  the  shipyard  men  getting  their 
agreement  later  on  just  the  same. 

Technically  the  employees  of  the  Bethlehem  Com- 
pany should  have  struck  under  the  first  strike  call, 
as  they  had  no  union  agreement;  but  being  tied  up 
with  futile  negotiations  under  their  "  collective  bar- 
gaining "  arrangement,  they  did  not  get  out  until  the 
twenty-ninth.  When  they  did  strike  the  response 
was  not  so  good.  A  fair  average  for  the  plants  in 
South  Bethlehem,  Steelton,  Reading,  Lebanon  and 

[104] 


Sparrows'   Point  would  be   a   50  per  cent,   strike. 

On  the  whole  the  strike  affected  practically  the 
entire  industry,  seventy  important  steel  centres  be- 
ing involved.  About  the  only  mills  of  consequence 
to  escape  it  were  those  located  at  Midland,  Wood- 
lawn,  Lorain  and  Duluth.  And  the  only  reason  for 
this  was  lack  of  sufficient  organizers  to  cover  them. 
It  is  noteworthy  that  the  strike  followed  strictly  the 
lines  of  organization.  In  hardly  a  single  instance 
did  the  unorganized  go  out  spontaneously,  even 
though  they  had  previously  been  clamoring  for  the 
unions  to  help  them.  This  tends  to  show  how  com- 
pletely the  steel  companies  dominated  their  unor- 
ganized workers  and  how  hard  it  was  for  the  latter 
to  act  in  concert. 

For  the  most  part  the  great  walkout  was  concen- 
trated on  the  smelting  and  rolling  branches  of  the 
steel  industry.  It  had  been  the  original  intention  to 
make  the  movement  thoroughly  industrial,  taking  in 
all  the  workers  from  those  who  mine  the  coal  and 
iron  to  those  who  transfer  the  finished  products  to 
the  railroad  lines.  But  insufficient  resources  com- 
pelled the  modification  of  this  program,  and  forced 
the  unions  to  confine  their  work  principally  to  the 
blast  furnaces  and  rolling  mills.  However,  where 
the  company  mines  or  fabricating  works  lay  close  to 
the  general  plants,  or  were  part  of  them,  the  essen- 
tially industrial  character  of  the  campaign  mani- 
fested itself  and  these  departments  were  organized 
along  with  the  rest.  In  various  places,  including 
Gary,  Chicago,  Homestead,  etc.,  bridge,  car,  and 
other  fabricating  shops  were  an  integral  part  of  the 
drive.  The  iron  miners  working  close  in  to  Birm- 

[105] 


ingham  responded  to  some  extent,  but  a  big  defeat 
of  the  local  metal  trades  in  the  mills  a  couple  of 
years  previously  held  them  back  from  making  a 
strong  demonstration.  The  coal  miners  struck  in 
several  places.  In  Johnstown,  2,000  of  them  work- 
ing in  the  Cambria  Steel  Company's  mines  organized 
during  the  campaign,  became  affiliated  with  the  local 
mill  workers'  council,  and  walked  out  100  per  cent, 
on  the  historic  twenty-second  of  September. 

Although  the  United  States  Steel  Corporation 
was  recognized  as  the  arch  enemy  of  the  unions,  the 
strike  was  not  directed  against  it  alone.  Every  iron 
and  steel  mill  and  furnace  in  the  country  not  work- 
ing under  union  agreements  was  included.  This 
meant  at  least  95  per  cent,  of  the  industry,  because 
the  only  agreements  of  any  consequence  were  be- 
tween some  of  the  smaller  companies  and  the  Amal- 
gamated Association.  A  number  of  these  concerns 
were  affected  also,  their  agreements  relating  only  to 
skilled  workers,  and  the  plants  having  to  close  when 
the  laborers  struck.  This  occurred  quite  extensively 
in  the  Cleveland,  Youngstown  and  Pittsburgh  dis- 
tricts. 

Considering  the  large  number  of  them  involved 
and  their  traditions  of  isolated  action,  the  unions 
displayed  reasonably  good  solidarity  in  going  "  over 
the  top  "  against  the  Steel  Trust.  The  battle  line 
was  far  from  perfect,  however.  Much  harm  was 
done  the  morale  of  the  strikers  by  local  unions  here 
and  there  that  were  under  the  sway  of  ignorant 
blockheads  or  designing  tools  of  the  bosses,  refusing 
to  recognize  the  National  Committee's  strike  call 
and  insisting  upon  getting  instructions  from  their 

[106] 


own  headquarters,  meanwhile  scabbing  it  in  the  mills. 
And  the  worst  of  it  was  that  sometimes  it  was  diffi- 
cult, or  even  impossible  to  have  the  necessary  instruc- 
tions issued. 

Far  more  serious  than  this,  however,  was  the 
action  of  the  executive  officers  of  the  International 
Union  of  Steam  and  Operating  Engineers.  Just 
as  the  strike  was  about  to  begin  President  Snellings 
and  Secretary  Comerford  sharply  condemned  it 
by  letter  and  through  the  press,  urging  their  men 
to  stay  at  work  upon  the  flimsy  pretext  that  the 
President's  industrial  conference  would  attend  to 
their  interests.  Roused  to  indignation  by  this  cold- 
blooded course,  the  local  unions  of  engineers,  al- 
most without  exception,  repudiated  their  inter- 
national misleaders  and  struck  with  the  rest  of  the 
steel  workers.  After  President  Gompers  had  been 
quoted  in  the  newspapers  as  pledging  the  support  of 
the  A.  F.  of  L.  to  the  strike  (two  days  after  it 
started)  and  Labor  generally  had  shown  its  deter- 
mination to  stick  by  the  steel  workers,  the  officers 
of  the  Engineers'  international  were  compelled  to 
publicly  endorse  the  strike.  But  throughout  its 
duration  they  nevertheless  privately  encouraged 
their  strategically  situated  tradesmen  to  return  to 
work,  thus  doing  incalculable  harm  when  the  strikers 
had  begun  to  weaken  a  little.  This  plain  case  of 
official  scabbery  was  inspired  by  a  jurisdictional  dis- 
pute between  the  engineers  and  the  electrical  workers 
over  the  disposition  to  be  made  of  electrical  crane- 
men  signed  up  in  the  campaign.  Because  they 
could  not  have  their  unreasonable  way  in  the  mat- 
ter, the  officials  of  the  engineers  deliberately  knifed 

[107] 


the  strike  and  lent  aid  and  comfort  to  the  bitterest 
opponents  of  Organized  Labor  on  this  planet.  To 
such  extremes  will  union  men  go  in  internecine  wars 
over  trade  demarcations. 

But  in  spite  of  opposition,  blundering  and 
treachery,  the  steel  workers  had  spoken.  Mr.  Gary 
was  answered.  Previous  to  the  strike,  he  declared 
that  the  unions  represented  only  an  insignificant 
minority  of  his  men,  the  great  bulk  of  his  working 
force  being  satisfied.  He  compelled  the  Committee 
to  show  its  credentials.  Result:  365,600  steel 
workers  laid  down  their  tools.  This  estimated  total 
has  never  been  disputed  by  the  steel  companies. 
Here  and  there,  in  some  individual  town  or  district, 
they  pointed  out  a  figure  occasionally  as  being  ex- 
cessive ;  but  although  importuned  by  newspaper  men 
to  do  so,  they  never  ventured  to  issue  a  statement  of 
the  number  on  strike  at  all  points.  The  reason  was 
that  they  feared  to  print  the  grand  total  which  even 
their  lying  press  bureau  would  have  to  admit. 
Word  came  to  the  Committee  from  reliable  sources 
that  the  steel  manufacturers  considered  the  union 
figure  well  within  the  real  total. 

While  not  accurately  ascertainable,  the  number  of 
Mr.  Gary's  employees  actually  taking  part  in  the 
strike  may  be  closely  approximated.  Mr.  Gary 
stated  to  the  Senate  Committee  that  the  total  num- 
ber employed  by  the  United  States  Steel  Corpora- 
tion in  the  departments  affected  by  the  strike  was 
201,065.  Against  this  number  should  be  checked 
off  about  half  of  the  total  number  of  strikers,  or 
182,500.  This  is  based  upon  the  theory  that  the  of- 
ficial U.  S.  Steel  Corporation  plants  form  approxi- 

[108] 


mately  50  per  cent,  of  the  industry,  and  that  the 
strike  was  just  as  effective  against  them  as  against 
those  of  any  other  company.  It  is  not  asserted  that 
these  figures  are  absolutely  accurate;  but  they  will 
serve  to  indicate  that  the  claim  of  a  90  per  cent, 
strike  in  the  plants  of  the  Steel  Corporation  is  a  fair 
one.  It  is  exceedingly  doubtful  if  as  many  as  10 
per  cent,  of  Mr.  Gary's  employees  remained  at  their 
posts  and  failed  to  heed  the  strike  call.  Fully  125,- 
ooo  of  them  were  members  of  the  unions  before  the 
strike  started,  and  most  of  the  rest  would  have  been 
also,  had  they  dared  brave  the  anger  of  their  bosses. 
The  great  steel  strike  thoroughly  exposed  the 
hypocrisies  of  Mr.  Gary  and  his  «ilk  that  in  some 
mysterious  way  labor  policies  and  conditions  in  the 
steel  industry  depend  upon  the  wishes  of  the  body  of 
the  workers.  It  made  plain  that  in  the  autocratic 
system  now  prevailing  the  democratic  principles  of 
majority  and  minority  do  not  enter.  It  is  a  case 
pure  and  simple  of  the  absolute  sway  of  property 
rights  over  human  rights.  A  handful  of  social  para- 
sites hidden  away  in  Wall  street,  with  no  other  in- 
terest in  the  steel  industry  than  to  exploit  it,  settle 
arbitrarily  the  vital  questions  of  wages,  hours  and 
working  conditions,  while  the  enormous  mass  of  the 
workers,  actual  producers  whose  very  lives  are  in- 
volved, have  no  say  whatsoever.  No  matter  how 
bitter  their  grievances,  when  they  raise  their  voice  to 
ask  redress,  they  are  discharged,  blacklisted,  starved, 
beaten,  jailed  and  even  shot,  until  they  bend  the 
knee  again  and  yield  to  the  will'  of  their  industrial 
masters. 


VIII 
GARYISM  RAMPANT 

THE     WHITE     TERROR  —  CONSTITUTIONAL     RIGHTS 

DENIED UNBREAKABLE    SOLIDARITY FATHER 

KAZINCY THE  COSSACKS SCIENTIFIC  BAR- 
BARITY —  PROSTITUTED  COURTS  —  SERVANTS  RE- 
WARDED 

IT  was  the  misfortune  of  the  steel  strike  to  occur  in 
the  midst  of  the  post-war  reaction,  which  still  persists 
unabated,  and  which  constitutes  the  most  shameful 
page  in  American  history.  Ours  are  days  when  the 
organized  employers,  inspired  by  a  horrible  fear  of 
the  onward  sweep  of  revolution  in  Europe  and  the 
irresistible  advance  of  the  labor  movement  in  this 
country,  are  robbing  the  people  over-night  of  their 
most  precious  rights,  the  fruits  of  a  thousand  years 
of  struggle.  And  the  people,  not  yet  recovered 
from  war  hysteria  and  misled  by  a  corrupt  press,  can- 
not perceive  the  outrage.  They  even  glory  in  their 
degradation.  Free  speech,  free  press,  free  as- 
sembly, as  we  once  knew  these  rights,  are  now  things 
of  the  past.  What  poor  rudiments  of  them  re- 
main depend  upon  the  whims  of  a  Burleson,  or 
the  rowdy  element  of  the  American  Legion.  Hun- 
dreds of  idealists,  guilty  of  nothing  more  than 
a  temperate  expression  of  their  honest  views,  lan- 
guish in  prison  serving  sentences  so  atrocious  as  to 

[no] 


shock  the  world  —  although  Europe  has  long  since 
released  its  war  and  political  prisoners.  Working 
class  newspapers  are  raided,  denied  the  use  of  the 
mails  and  suppressed.  Meetings  are  broken  up  by 
Chamber  of  Commerce  mobs  or  thugs  in  public  of- 
fice. The  right  of  asylum  is  gone  —  the  infamous 
Palmer  is  deporting  hundreds  who  dare  to  hold 
views  different  from  his.  The  right  of  the  workers 
to  organize  is  being  systematically  curtailed;  and 
crowning  shame  of  all,  workingmen  can  no  longer 
have  legislative  representatives  of  their  own  choos- 
ing. In  a  word,  America,  from  being  the  most  for- 
ward-looking, liberty-loving  country  in  the  world, 
has  in  two  short  years  become  one  of  the  most  re- 
actionary. We  in  this  country  are  patiently  en- 
during tyranny  that  would  not  be  tolerated  in  Eng- 
land, France,  Italy,  Russia  or  Germany.  Our  great 
war  leaders  promised  us  the  New  Freedom;  they 
have  given  us  the  White  Terror. 

Realizing  full  well  the  reactionary  spirit  of  the 
times,  the  steel  companies  proceeded  safely  to  ex- 
tremes to  crush  the  steel  strike,  dubbed  by  them  an 
attempt  at  violent  revolution.  To  accomplish  their 
end  they  stuck  at  nothing.  One  of  their  most  per- 
sistent and  determined  efforts  was  to  deprive  the 
steel  workers  of  their  supposedly  inalienable  right 
to  meet  and  talk  together.  Throughout  the  strike, 
whenever  and  wherever  they  could  find  municipal  or 
court  officials  willing  to  do  their  bidding,  the  steel 
barons  abolished  the  rights  of  free  speech  and  free 
assembly,  so  precious  to  strikers.  Few  districts 
escaped  this  evil,  but  as  usual,  Pennsylvania  felt  the 
blow  earliest  and  heaviest.  Hardly  had  the  strike 

[in] 


started  when  the  oily  Schwab  prohibited  meetings  in 
Bethlehem ;  the  Allegheny  and  West  Penn  Steel  Com- 
panies did  the  same  at  Natrona,  jailing  organizer  J. 
McCaig  for  "  inciting  to  riot  " ;  in  the  Sharon-Farrell 
district  the  steel  workers,  denied  their  constitutional 
rights  in  their  home  towns,  had  to  march  several 
miles  over  into  Ohio  (America  they  called  it)  in 
order  to  hold  their  meetings. 

Along  the  Monongahela  river  the  shut-down  was 
complete.  Following  Sheriff  Haddock's  proclama- 
tion and  the  "  riots  "  at  Clairton  and  Glassport,  it 
was  only  a  few  days  until  the  city  and  borough 
officials  had  completely  banned  strike  meetings  in 
all  the  territory  from  Charleroi  to  Pittsburgh. 
The  unions'  free-speech,  free-assembly  victory  of  the 
past  summer  was  instantly  cancelled.  For  forty- 
one  miles  through  the  heart  of  America's  steel  in- 
dustry, including  the  important  centers  of  Mones- 
sen,  Donora,  Clairton,  Wilson,  Glassport,  McKees- 
port,  Duquesne,  Homestead,  Braddock,  Rankin,  etc., 
not  a  meeting  of  the  steel  workers  could  be  held. 
Even  in  Pittsburgh  itself  meetings  were  prohibited 
everywhere  except  in  Labor  Temple.  The  steel- 
collared  city  officials  never  could  quite  muster  the 
gall  to  close  Labor's  own  building  —  or  perhaps  be- 
cause it  is  so  far  from  the  mills  and  so  poorly  situ- 
ated for  meetings  they  felt  it  to  be  of  no  use  to  the 
strikers.  Thus  the  Steel  Trust  gave  its  workers  a 
practical  demonstration  of  what  is  meant  by  the 
phrase,  "  making  the  world  safe  for  democracy." 

Not  only  were  mass  meetings  forbidden,  but  so 
also  were  regular  business  meetings  under  the  char- 
ters of  the  local  unions.  To  test  out  this  particular 

[112] 


usurpation,  Attorney  W.  H.  Rubin,  then  in  charge  of 
the  strike's  legal  department  and  possessed  of  a 
keener  faith  in  Pennsylvania  justice  than  the  Strike 
committee  had,  keener  probably  than  he  himself 
now  has,  prayed  the  Allegheny  County  Court  of 
Common  Pleas  to  enjoin  Mayor  Babcock  and  other 
city  officials  from  interfering  with  a  local  union  of 
the  Amalgamated  Association  holding  its  business 
meetings  on  the  south  side  of  the  city  where  its  mem- 
bers lived  and  where  several  large  mills  are  located. 
At  the  hearing  the  Mayor  and  Chief  of  Police  freely 
admitted  that  there  had  been  no  violence  in  the 
strike,  and  even  complimented  the  men  on  their  be- 
havior, but  they  feared  there  might  be  trouble  and  so 
forbade  the  meetings.  The  honorable  Judges  Ford 
and  Shafer  agreed  with  them  and  denied  the  writ, 
saying  among  other  things: 

It  is  the  duty  of  the  Mayor  and  Police  Department 
to  preserve  the  peace,  and  it  must  be  sometimes  necessary 
for  that  purpose  to  prevent  the  congregating  in  one  place 
of  large  numbers  of  people  such  as  might  get  beyond  the 
control  of  the  Police  Department,  and  it  must  be  left 
to  the  reasonable  discretion  of  the  officers  charged  with 
keeping  the  peace  when  such  intervention  is  made. 

In  other  words,  the  sacred  right  of  the  workers  to 
meet  together  depends  upon  the  arbitrary  will  of 
any  politician  who  may  get  into  the  office  control- 
ling the  permits.  Shortly  before  Judges  Ford 
and  Shafer  handed  down  this  noble  conception  of 
free  assembly,  Judge  Kennedy  of  the  Allegheny 
County  Court,  ruling  on  the  appeal  of  Mother 
Jones,  J.  L.  Beaghen,  J.  M.  Patterson  and  Wm.  Z. 


Foster  in  the  Duquesne  free  speech  cases  of  several 
weeks  prior  to  the  strike,  had  this  to  say: 

It  cannot  be  questioned  that  the  object  of  these  meet- 
ings —  increasing  the  membership  in  the  American 
Federation  of  Labor  —  is  a  perfectly  lawful  one,  but 
the  location  of  the  meetings  in  the  Monongahela  valley, 
built  up  as  it  is  for  mile  after  mile  of  an  unbroken  suc- 
cession of  iron  and  steel  mills,  and  thickly  populated 
with  iron  workers,  many  of  whom  obviously  are  not 
members  of  this  association,  and  among  whom,  on  both 
sides,  there  are,  in  all  probability,  some  who  upon  the 
occasion  of  meetings  such  as  these  purported  to  be, 
might  through  excitement  precipitate  serious  actions  of 
which  the  consequences  could  not  be  foreseen  and  might 
be  disastrous,  presents  questions  which  are  sufficient  to 
cause  the  court  to  hesitate  before  interfering  with  the 
exercise  of  discretion  on  the  part  of  the  Mayor  in  refus- 
ing to  permit  such  meetings  at  this  time. 

The  Court  is  still  hesitating  to  interfere  with 
Mayor  Crawford's  tyranny,  and  the  defendants  had 
to  pay  $100  and  costs  each  for  trying  to  hold  a  meet- 
ing on  ground  they  had  leased.  One  would  think 
that  the  remedy  in  the  case  conjured  out  of  thin  air 
by  the  learned  judge  (for  in  the  thousands  of 
meetings  held  in  the  steel  campaign  he  cannot  point 
to  one  incident  of  violence)  would  be  for  the  local 
authorities  to  provide  ample  police  protection  to 
insure  order.  But  no,  in  Pennsylvania  the  thing  to 
do  is  to  set  aside  the  constitutional  rights  of  the 
workers.  Would  such  action  be  taken  in  the  case  of 
members  of  a  Chamber  of  commerce?  Wouldn't 
the  governor,  rather,  order  out  the  state  troops,  if 
necessary,  to  uphold  their  right  of  assembly? 

[H4] 


In  the  hope  of  getting  some  relief,  or  at  the  least 
some  publicity  about  the  unbearable  situation,  a  com- 
mittee of  1 8  local  labor  men,  representing  the  largest 
trade  unions  in  Western  Pennsylvania,  went  to 
Washington  and  presented  to  the  Allegheny  County 
congressional  delegation  a  petition  expressing  con- 
tempt for  the  judges  and  other  officials  in  their  part 
of  the  State  and  asking  Congress  to  give  them  the 
justice  these  men  refused  to  mete  out.  Surely,  the 
Allegheny  County  congressmen  were  exactly  the 
ones  to  bring  the  Steel  Trust  to  time.  With  a  grand 
flourish  they  introduced  a  resolution  into  the  House 
calling  for  an  investigation  —  then  they  forgot  all 
about  it. 

The  official  tyranny  and  outlawry  along  the 
Monongahela  was  so  bad  that  the  Pennsylvania 
Federation  of  Labor  had  to  voice  its  protest.  On 
November  1-2  it  held  a  special  convention  in  Pitts- 
burgh, attended  by  several  hundred  delegates.  A 
resolution  was  adopted  demanding  that  protection  be 
given  the  rights  of  the  workers,  and  that  if  the 
authorities  failed  to  extend  this  protection,  "  the 
Executive  Council  of  the  Pennsylvania  Federation  of 
Labor  shall  issue  a  call  for  a  State-wide  strike,  when 
in  its  judgment  it  is  necessary  to  compel  respect  for 
law  and  the  restoration  of  liberty  as  guaranteed  by 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  and  of  the 
State  of  Pennsylvania."  For  this  action  President 
Jas.  H.  Maurer  of  the  Federation  was  hotly  as- 
sailed and  even  menaced  with  lynching  by  the  law- 
less business  interests. 

By  some  inexplicable  mental  twist  the  ex-union 
man  Burgess  of  Homestead  eventually  allowed  the 

[US] 


unions  to  hold  one  mass  meeting  each  week  —  to 
this  day  the  only  ones  permitted  in  the  forty-one 
miles  of  Monongahela  steel  towns.  They  were 
under  the  supervision  of  the  State  police.  At  each 
meeting  a  half  dozen  of  these  Cossacks,  in  full  uni- 
form, would  sit  upon  the  platform  as  censors.  Only 
English  could  be  spoken.  As  the  saying  was,  all  the 
organizers  were  permitted  to  talk  about  was  the 
weather.  When  one  touched  on  a  vital  strike  phase 
a  Cossack  would  yell  at  him,  "  Hey,  cut  that  out! 
You're  through,  you  —  1  Don't  ever  come  back 
here  any  more."  And  he  never  could  speak  there 
again. 

Judging  from  past  experiences  the  strike  in  the 
Pittsburgh  district  should  have  been  impossible 
under  such  hard  circumstances.  With  little  or  no 
opportunity  to  meet  for  mutual  encouragement  and 
enlightenment,  the  strikers,  theoretically,  should 
have  been  soon  discouraged  and  driven  back  to  work. 
But  they  were  saved  by  their  matchless  solidarity, 
bred  of  a  deep  faith  in  the  justice  of  their  cause. 
In  the  black,  Cossack-ridden  Monongahela  towns 
there  were  thousands  of  strikers  who  were  virtually 
isolated,  who  never  attended  a  meeting  during  the 
entire  strike  and  seldom  if  ever  saw  an  organizer  or 
read  a  strike  bulletin,  yet  they  fought  on  doggedly 
for  three  and  one-half  months,  buoyed  up  by  a  bound- 
less belief  in  the  ultimate  success  of  their  supreme 
effort.  Each  felt  himself  bound  to  stay  away  from 
the  mills,  come  weal  or  come  woe,  regardless  of 
what  the  rest  did.  These  were  mainly  the  despised 
foreigners,  of  course,  but  their  splendid  fighting 

[116] 


qualities  were  a  never-ending  revelation  and  inspira- 
tion to  all  connected  with  the  strike. 

Through  the  dark  night  of  oppression  a  bright 
beacon  of  liberty  gleamed  from  Braddock.  There 
the  heroic  Slavish  priest,  Reverend  Adelbert  Ka- 
zincy,  pastor  of  St.  Michel's  Roman  Catholic  church, 
bade  defiance  to  the  Steel  Trust  and  all  its  minions. 
He  threw  open  his  church  to  the  strikers,  turned  his 
services  into  strike  meetings,  and  left  nothing  un- 
done to  make  the  men  hold  fast.  The  striking  steel 
workers  came  to  his  church  from  miles  around, 
Protestants  as  well  as  Catholics.  The  neighboring 
clergymen  who  ventured  to  oppose  the  strike  lost 
their  congregations, —  men,  women  and  children 
flocked  to  Father  Kazincy's,  and  all  of  them  stood 
together,  as  solid  as  a  brick  wall. 

Reverend  Kazincy's  attitude  aroused  the  bitterest 
hostility  of  the  steel  companies.  They  did  not  dare 
to  do  him  bodily  violence,  nor  to  close  his  church  by 
their  customary  "legal"  methods;  but  they  tried 
everything  else.  Unable  to  get  the  local  bishop  to 
silence  him,  they  threatened  finally  to  strangle  his 
church.  To  this  the  doughty  priest  replied  that  if 
they  succeeded  he  would  put  a  monster  sign  high  up 
on  his  steeple:  "  This  church  destroyed  by  the  Steel 
Trust,"  and  he  would  see  that  it  stayed  there. 
When  they  tried  to  foreclose  on  the  church  mort- 
gage, he  promptly  laid  the  matter  before  his  hetero- 
geneous congregation  of  strikers,  who  raised  the 
necessary  $1200  before  leaving  the  building  and  next 
day  brought  in  several  hundred  dollars  more.  Then 
the  companies  informed  him  that  after  the  strike  no 


more  Slovaks  could  get  work  in  the  mills.  He  told 
them  that  if  they  tried  this,  he  would  do  his  level 
best  to  pull  all  the  Slovaks  out  of  the  district  (they 
are  the  bulk  of  the  mill  forces)  and  colonize  them 
in  the  West.  The  promised  blacklist  has  not  yet 
materialized. 

Father  Kazincy  and  the  clergymen  who  worked 
with  him,  notable  among  whom  was  the  Reverend 
Molnar,  a  local  Slavish  Lutheran  minister,  consti- 
tuted one  of  the  great  mainstays  of  the  strike  in  their 
district.  They  are  men  who  have  caught  the  true 
spirit  of  the  lowly  Nazarene.  The  memory  of  their 
loyal  co-operation  will  long  live  green  in  the  hearts 
of  the  Pittsburgh  district  steel  strikers. 

A  description  of  the  repressive  measures  taken 
by  the  Steel  Trust  against  its  workers  during  the 
early  period  of  the  strikes  necessarily  relates  almost 
entirely  to  Western  Pennsylvania.  With  few  ex- 
ceptions, the  other  districts  were  in  a  deadlock.  So 
tightly  were  the  mills  shut  down  that  the  companies 
could  hardly  stir.  It  took  them  several  weeks  to 
get  their  stricken  fighting  machinery  in  motion  again. 
But  it  was  different  in  Western  Pennsylvania,  in 
what  we  call  the  greater  Pittsburgh  district;  that  has 
always  been  the  key  to  the  whole  industry,  and  there, 
from  the  very  first,  the  steel  companies  made  a  bit- 
ter fight  to  control  the  situation  and  to  break  the 
strike.  The  tactics  used  there  are  typical  in  that 
they  came  to  be  universally  applied  as  the  strike  grew 
older,  the  degree  of  their  application  depending 
upon  the  amount  of  control  exercised  by  the  Steel 
Trust  in  the  several  localities. 

To  carry  on  the  terror  so  well  begun  by  the  sup- 
[118] 


pression  of  free  speech  and  free  assembly,  the  Steel 
Trust  turned  loose  upon  the  devoted  strikers  in 
Western  Pennsylvania  the  great  masses  of  armed 
thugs  it  had  been  recruiting  since  long  before  the 
strike.  These  consisted  of  every  imaginable  type 
of  armed  guard,  official  and  unofficial,  except  uni- 
formed troops.  There  were  State  Constabulary, 
deputy  sheriffs,  city  police,  city  detectives,  company 
police,  company  detectives,  private  detectives,  coal 
and  iron  police,  ordinary  gunmen,  armed  strike- 
breakers, vigilantes,  and  God  knows  how  many 
others.  These  legions  of  reaction,  all  tarred  with 
the  same  brush  —  a  servile,  mercenary  allegiance  to 
the  ruthless  program  of  the  Steel  Trust  —  vied  with 
each  other  in  working  hardships  upon  the  steel 
workers.  In  this  shameful  competition  the  State 
Constabulary  stood  first;  for  downright  villainy  and 
disregard  of  civil  and  human  rights,  these  so-called 
upholders  of  law  and  order  easily  outdistanced  all 
the  other  plug-uglies  assembled  by  the  Steel  Trust. 
They  merit  our  special  attention. 

The  Pennsylvania  State  Constabulary  dates  from 
1905,  when  a  law  was  enacted  creating  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  Police.  The  force  is  modelled  some- 
what along  the  lines  of  the  Royal  Irish  Constabulary 
and  the  Canadian  Northwest  Mounted  Police.  The 
men  are  uniformed,  mounted,  heavily  armed  and 
regularly  enlisted.  For  the  most  part  they  consist 
of  ex-United  States  army  men.  At  present  they 
number  somewhat  less  than  the  amount  set  by  law, 
415  officers  and  men.  Their  ostensible  duty  is  to 
patrol  the  poorly  policed  rural  sections  of  the  state, 
and  this  they  do  when  they  have  nothing  else  to 


take  up  their  time.  But  their  real  function  is  to 
break  strikes.  They  were  organized  as  a  result  of 
the  failure  of  the  militia  to  crush  the  anthracite 
strike  of  1902.  Since  their  inception  they  have 
taken  an  active  part  in  all  important  industrial  dis- 
turbances within  their  jurisdiction.  They  are  the 
heart's  darlings  of  Pennsylvania's  great  corporations. 
Labor  regards  them  with  an  abiding  hatred.  Says 
Mr.  Jas.  H.  Maurer  ( The  Cossack,  page  3)  : 

The  "  English  Square  "  is  the  only  open-field  mili- 
tary formation  of  human  beings  that  has  ever  been 
known  to  repulse  cavalry.  All  other  formations  go 
down  before  the  resistless  rush  of  plunging  beasts 
mounted  by  armed  men,  mad  in  the  fierce  excitement 
induced  by  the  thundering  gallop  of  charging  horses. 
A  charge  by  cavalry  is  a  storm  from  hell  —  for  men 
on  foot.  A  cavalry-man's  power,  courage  and  daring 
are  strangely  multiplied  by  the  knowledge  that  he  sits 
astride  a  swift,  strong  beast,  willing  and  able  to  knock 
down  a  dozen  men  in  one  leap  of  this  terrible  rush. 
Hence,  the  Cossacks,  the  mounted  militiamen  —  for 
crushing  unarmed,  unmounted  groups  of  men  on  strike. 

But  the  State  Police  do  not  confine  themselves 
merely  to  the  crude  business  of  breaking  up  so-called 
strike  riots.  Their  forte  is  prevention,  rather  than 
cure.  They  aim  to  so  terrorize  the  people  that  they 
will  cower  in  their  homes,  afraid  to  go  upon  the 
streets  to  transact  necessary  business,  much  less  to 
congregate  in  crowds.  They  play  unmercifully 
upon  every  fear  and  human  weakness.  They  are 
skilled,  scientific  terrorists,  such  as  Czarist  Russia 
never  had. 

[120] 


On  a  thousand  occasions  they  beat,  shot,  jailed 
or  trampled  steel  workers  under  their  horses'  hoofs 
in  the  manner  and  under  the  circumstances  best  cal- 
culated to  strike  terror  to  their  hearts.  In  Brad- 
dock,  for  instance,  a  striker  having  died  of  natural 
causes,  about  two  hundred  of  his  fellows  assembled 
to  accompany  the  body  to  the  cemetery.  To  stop 
this  harmless  demonstration  all  the  State  Police 
needed  to  do  was  to  send  a  word  to  the  union.  But 
such  orderly,  reasonable  methods  do  not  serve  their 
studied  policy  of  frightfulness.  Therefore,  with- 
out previously  informing  the  strikers  in  any  way  that 
their  funeral  party  was  obnoxious,  the  Cossacks  laid 
in  wait  for  the  procession,  and  when  it  reached  the 
heart  of  town,  where  all  Braddock  could  get  the 
benefit  of  the  lesson  in  "  Americanism,"  they 
swooped  down  upon  it  at  full  gallop,  clubbing  the 
participants  and  scattering  them  to  the  four  winds. 

Similar  outrageous  attacks  occurred  not  once,  but 
dozens  of  times.  Let  Father  Kazincy  speak  of  his 
experiences : 

Braddock,  Pa.,  Sept.  27,  1919 
W.  Z.  Foster, 

Pittsburgh,  Pa., 
Dear  Sir: 

The  pyramidal  impudence  of  the  State  Constabulary 
in  denying  charges  of  brutal  assaults  perpetrated  by 
them  upon  the  peaceful  citizens  of  the  borough  of  Brad- 
dock  prompts  me  to  send  a  telegram  to  the  Governor 
of  Pennsylvania,  in  which  I  have  offered  to  bring  forth 
two  specific  cases  of  bestial  transgression  of  their  "  call- 
ing." 

On  Monday  last  at  10  A.  M.  my  congregation,  leav- 
ing church,  was  suddenly,  without  any  cause  whatever, 
[121] 


attacked  on  the  very  steps  of  the  Temple  of  God,  by 
the  Constables,  and  dispersed  by  the  iron-hoofed  Huns. 
Whilst  dispersing  indignation  and  a  blood  frenzy 
swayed  them,  a  frenzy  augmented  by  that  invisible 
magnetic  force,  the  murmuring,  raging  force  of  3,000 
strong  men.  One  could  feel  that  helpless  feeling  of 
being  lifted  up  by  some  invisible  force,  forced,  thrown 
against  the  flux  of  raging,  elemental  passion  of  resent- 
ment, against  the  Kozaks  of  this  State. 

Nevertheless,  it  was  the  most  magnificent  display  of 
self-control  manifested  by  the  attacked  ever  shown  any- 
where. They  moved  on,  with  heads  lowered  and  jaws 
firmly  set,  to  submit.  Oh,  it  was  great ;  it  was  magnif- 
icent. They,  these  husky,  muscle-bound  Titans  of  raw 
force  walked  home  .  .  .  only  thinking,  thinking  hard. 
Oh,  only  for  one  wink  from  some  one,  would  there  be 
a  puddle  of  red  horseblood  mixed  with  the  human  kind. 

But  no.  We  want  to  win  the  strike.  We  want  to 
win  the  confidence  of  the  public. 

Tuesday  afternoon  the  little  babies  of  No.  I  were  go- 
ing to  the  school.  They  loitered  for  the  school  bell  to 
summon  them.  And  here  come  Kozaks.  They  see  the 
little  innocents  standing  on  the  steps  of  the  school- 
house,  their  parents  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  street. 
What  a  splendid  occasion  to  start  the  "  Hunkey's  "  ire. 
Let  us  charge  their  babies  —  that  will  fetch  them  to  an 
attack  upon  us. 

They  did.  But  the  "  Hunkey  "  even  at  the  supreme 
test  of  his  cool-headedness,  refused  to  flash  his  knife 
to  save  his  babies  from  the  onrush  of  the  cruel  horses' 
hoofs. 

I  am  relating  to  you,  Mr.  Foster,  things  as  they  hap- 
pened. You  may  use  my  name  in  connection  with  your 
charges  against  the  Constabulary. 

Sincerely  yours,     REV.  A.  KAZINCY, 

416  Frazier  St.,  Braddock,  Pa. 
[122] 


O       3 

U    j- 
"3 

i 


Governor  Sproul  paid  no  attention  to  Father 
Kazincy's  protest,  nor  did  he  to  a  long  letter  from 
Jas.  H.  Maurer,  reciting  shocking  brutalities  fully 
authenticated  by  affidavits  —  unless  it  was  to  multi- 
ply his  public  endorsements  and  praises  of  the  State 
Police. 

A  favorite  method  of  the  Constables  was  to  go 
tearing  through  the  streets  (foreign  quarter),  forc- 
ing pedestrians  into  whatever  houses  they  happened 
to  be  passing,  regardless  of  whether  or  not  they 
lived  there.  Read  these  two  typical  affidavits,  por- 
traying a  double  outrage: 

STATE  OF  PENNSYLVANIA  1  ( 
COUNTY  OF  ALLEGHENY   J  * 

Before  me,  the  undersigned  authority,  personally  ap- 
peared John  Bodnar,  who  being  duly  sworn  according  to 
law  deposes  and  says  that  he  lives  at  542  Gold  Way, 
Homestead,  Pa.,  that  on  Tuesday,  Sept.  23,  1919,  at 
about  2  P.  M.  he  went  to  visit  his  cousin  on  Fifth 
Avenue,  Homestead,  Pa.:  that  he  did  in  fact  visit  his 
cousin  and  after  leaving  the  house  of  his  cousin  was 
accosted  on  the  street  by  a  member  of  the  State  Police 
who  commanded  him,  the  deponent,  to  enter  a  certain 
house,  which  house  was  not  known  to  the  deponent ;  that 
deponent  informed  said  State  Policeman  that  he,  de- 
ponent, did  not  live  in  the  house  indicated  by  the  State 
Policeman;  nevertheless,  the  said  State  Policeman  said, 
"  It  makes  no  difference  whether  you  live  in  there  or 
not,  you  go  in  there  anyhow " ;  thereupon  in  fear  of 
violence  deponent  did  enter  the  said  house,  which  house 
was  two  doors  away  from  the  house  of  the  cousin  of 
deponent;  that  after  a  time  deponent  came  out  of  the 
house  into  which  he  had  been  ordered,  thereupon  the 
[123] 


same  State  Policeman  returned  and  ordered  deponent 
to  re-enter  the  house  aforesaid  and  upon  again  being  in- 
formed by  deponent  that  he,  the  deponent,  did  not  live 
in  said  house,  the  said  State  Policeman  forthwith  ar- 
rested the  deponent  and  brought  him  to  Homestead 
police  station,  and  at  a  hearing  at  said  station  before 
the  burgess  was  fined  the  sum  of  nine  dollars  and  sixty- 
five  cents,  which  amount  was  paid  by  deponent. 

JOHN  BODNAR 

Sworn  to  and  subscribed  before  me 
this  first  day  of  October,  1919. 
A.  F.  Kaufman,  Notary  Public. 

Here  is  what  happened  in  the  house  into  which 
Bodnar  was  driven: 

STATE  OF  PENNSYLVANIA  j 
COUNTY  OF  ALLEGHENY    fss- 

Before  me,  the  undersigned  authority,  personally  ap- 
peared Steve  Dudash,  who  being  duly  sworn  according 
to  law  deposes  and  says  that  he  resides  at  541  E.  5th 
Ave.,  Homestead,  Pa.;  that  on  Tuesday  September  23, 
1919,  in  the  afternoon  of  said  day,  his  wife,  Mary  Du- 
dash, was  severely  scalded,  burned,  and  injured  by  rea- 
son of  a  sudden  fright  sustained  when  a  State  Police- 
man forced  John  Bodnar  into  the  home  of  the  depon- 
ent and  his  wife,  Mary  Dudash;  that  said  Mary  Du- 
dash, the  wife  of  the  deponent,  was  in  a  very  delicate 
condition  at  the  time  of  the  fright  and  injury  com- 
plained of,  caused  by  the  State  Police  and  that  on  Sun- 
day, Sept.  28,  1919,  following  the  date  in  question, 
namely  the  23rd,  the  said  Mary  Dudash,  wife  of  de- 
ponent, gave  birth  to  a  child;  that  on  account  of  the 
action  of  the  State  Police  in  forcing  John  Bodnar  with 
terror  into  the  home  of  deponent  and  his  wife,  Mary 

[124] 


Dudash,  she,  the  said  Mary  Dudash,  wife  of  the  de- 
pendent, has  been  rendered  very  sick  and  has  suffered 
a  nervous  collapse  and  is  still  suffering  from  the  nerv- 
ous shock  sustained,  on  account  of  the  action  of  the 
State  Police,  above  referred  to. 

STEVE  DUDASH 

Sworn  to  and  subscribed  before  me 
this  first  day  of  October,  1919 
A.  F.  Kaufman,  Notary  Public 

When  on  a  mission  of  terrorism  the  first  thing 
the  State  Troopers  do  is  to  get  their  horses  onto 
the  sidewalks,  the  better  to  ride  down  the  pedes- 
trians. Unbelievable  though  it  may  seem,  they  ac- 
tually ride  into  stores  and  inner  rooms.  Picture  the 
horror  a  foreign  worker  and  his  family,  already 
badly  frightened,  at  seeing  a  mounted  policeman 
crashing  into  their  kitchen.  The  horses  are  highly 
trained.  Said  an  N.  E.  A.  news  dispatch,  Sept. 
26th,  1919: 

Horses  of  the  Pennsylvania  State  Constabulary  are 
trained  not  to  turn  aside,  as  a  horse  naturally  will  do, 
when  a  person  stands  in  its  way,  but  to  ride  straight 
over  any  one  against  whom  they  are  directed.  Lizzie, 
a  splendid  black  mare  ridden  by  Trooper  John  A. 
Thorp,  on  duty  at  Homestead,  uses  her  teeth  as  well 
as  her  heels  when  in  action.  Her  master  will  some- 
times dismount,  leaving  Lizzie  to  hold  a  striker  with 
her  strong  jaws,  while  he  takes  up  the  pursuit  of  others 
on  foot. 

If  this  is  thought  to  be  an  overdrawn  statement, 
read  the  following  affidavit: 

[125] 


Butler,  Pa.,  October  3,  1919 
I,  Jacob  Sazuta, 

21  Bessemer  Ave., 
Lyndora,  Pa. 

Commenced  work  for  the  Standard  Steel  Car  Com- 
pany in  September,  1913,  as  laborer.  About  October 
1916  was  promoted  to  car  fitter  in  the  erection  depart- 
ment; in  February,  1919,  was  then  taken  and  placed  as 
a  wheel  roller,  and  I  worked  in  this  capacity  until 
August  6th,  1919  [the  date  the  steel  strike  began  there]. 

On  August  25,  after  receiving  my  pay,  I  was  stand- 
ing looking  in  a  store  window,  when  State  Trooper  No. 
52  rode  his  horse  upon  me,  THE  HORSE  STEP- 
PING ON  MY  LEFT  FOOT.  Trooper  No.  52 
ordered  me  to  move  on,  BUT  AS  THE  HORSE  WAS 
STANDING  ON  MY  FOOT  I  COULD  NOT 
MOVE.  He  then  struck  me  across  the  head  with  his 
club,  cutting  a  gash  in  the  left  side  of  my  head  that 
took  the  doctor  three  stitches  to  close  up  the  wound. 
After  hitting  me  with  his  club,  he  kept  chasing  me  with 
his  horse. 

JACOB  SAZUTA 

Sworn  and  subscribed  before  me 
this  third  day  of  October,  1919. 

E.  L.  Cefferi,  Notary  Public. 

A  few  affidavits,  and  extracts  from  affidavits, 
taken  at  random  from  among  the  hundreds  in  pos- 
session of  the  National  Committee,  will  indicate  the 
general  conditions  prevailing  in  the  several  districts : 

Clairton,  Pa. 

John  Doban,  Andy  Niski  and  Mike  Hudak  were  walk- 
ing home  along  the  street  when  the  State  Police  came 
and   arrested    the   three,   making   ten   holes   in   Mike 
[126] 


Hudak's  head.     Were  under  arrest  three  days.     Union 
bailed  them  out,  $1,00000  each. 


Butler,  Pa.,  Oct.  3,  1919. 
I,  James  Torok, 

Storekeeper, 

103  Standard  Ave., 
Lyndora,  Pa., 

On  about  August  15,  1919,  I  saw  State  Troopers 
chase  a  crippled  man  who  could  not  run  as  fast  as  his 
horse,  and  run  him  down,  the  horse  bumping  him  in  the 
back  with  his  head,  knocked  him  down.  Later  three 
men  were  coming  to  my  store  to  buy  some  things;  the 
State  Troopers  ran  their  horses  right  on  them  and 
chased  them  home.  One  of  the  men  stopped  and  said: 
"I  have  to  go  to  the  store,"  and  the  Trooper  said: 

"  Get  to  hell  out  of  here,  you  sons ,  or  I  will 

kill  you,"  and  started  after  them  again,  and  the  people 
ran  home  and  stayed  away  from  the  store. 

JAMES  TOROK 

Sworn  to  and  subscribed  before  me  this 
3rd  day  of  October,  1919. 

E.  L.  Peffer,  Notary  Public. 


Homestead,  Pa. 

.  .  .  two  State  Policemen  made  a  forcible  entry  into 
the  home  of  deponent,  Trachn  Yenchenke,  at  327 
Third  Ave,  Homestead,  Pa.,  and  came  to  the  place 
where  deponent  was  asleep,  kicked  him  and  punched 
him,  and  handled  him  with  extreme  violence  and  took 
deponent  without  any  explanation,  without  permitting 
deponent  to  dress,  dragged  him  half  naked  from  his 
home  to  waiting  automobile  and  conveyed  him  against 
his  will  to  the  Homestead  Police  Station.  .  .  .  Fined 
$15.10. 

TRACHN  YENCHENKE. 
[127] 


Monessen,  Pa. 

.  .  .  Concetta  Cocchiara,  8  months  advanced  in  a  state 
of  pregnancy,  was  out  shopping  with  her  sister.  Two 
State  Policemen  brusquely  ordered  them  home  and  when 
they  did  not  move  fast  enough  to  suit,  followed  them 
home,  forced  himself  into  the  house  and  struck  affiant 
with  a  stick  on  the  head  and  grabbed  her  by  the  hair 
and  pulled  her  from  the  kitchen  and  forced  her  into 
a  patrol  wagon  and  took  her  to  the  borough  jail.  .  .  . 
Sworn  to  before  Henry  Fusarini,  Notary  Public, 
October  n,  1919. 


Newcastle,  Pa. 
John  Simpel, 

1711  Morris  Ave., 
Newcastle. 

On  Sept.  22,  about  5.30  P.  M.  he  was  walking  along 
towards  his  home  on  Moravia  Street.  Hearing  shots 
fired  he  stopped  in  the  middle  of  the  street  and  was  in- 
stantly struck  by  bullets  three  times,  one  bullet  going 
through  his  leg,  one  through  his  finger,  while  the  third 
entered  his  back  and  went  through  his  body,  coming 
out  through  his  abdomen.  The  shots  were  fired  from 
inside  the  gates  of  the  Carnegie  Steel  Company's  plant. 
Mr.  Simpel  believes  the  shots  were  fired  from  a  machine 
gun,  because  of  their  rapid  succession.  He  fell  on  the 
ground  and  lay  there  for  about  ten  minutes,  until  he 
was  picked  up  by  a  young  boy.  .  .  .  He  is  now  totally 
disabled.  He  has  a  wife  and  a  child  and  is  48  years 
of  age.  .  .  . 

JAS.  A.  NORRINGTON,  Secretary. 


Farrell,  Pa. 

.  .  .  There  were  four  men  killed  here,  one  in  a  quarrel 
in  a  boarding  house  and  three  by  the  Cossacks.     Half 
a  dozen  were  wounded,  one  of  them  a  woman.     She 
[128] 


was  shot  in  the  back  by  a  Cossack,  while  on  her  way  to 
the  butcher  shop.  .  .  . 

S.  COATES,  Secretary. 

Many  hundreds  of  similar  cases  could  be  cited. 
In  the  steel  strike  a  score  were  killed,  almost  all  on 
the  workers'  side;  hundreds  were  seriously  injured, 
and  thousands  unjustly  jailed.  To  the  State  Con- 
stabulary attaches  the  blame  for  a  large  share  of 
this  tyranny.  The  effect  of  their  activities  was  to 
create  a  condition  in  Western  Pennsylvania,  border- 
ing on  a  reign  of  terror.  Yet  it  is  extremely  diffi- 
cult to  definitely  fasten  their  crimes  upon  them. 
No  matter  how  dastardly  the  outrage,  when  the  Steel 
Trust  cracks  its  whip  the  local  authorities  and  lead- 
ing citizens  come  forth  with  a  mass  of  affidavits, 
"  white-washing "  the  thuggery  in  question,  and 
usually  sufficing  to  cast  serious  doubts  on  the  state- 
ments of  the  few  worker  witnesses  courageous 
enough  to  raise  their  voices.  What  is  to  be 
thought  of  the  following  incident? 

Testifying  before  the  Senate  Committee  investi- 
gating the  strike,  Mr.  Gompers  related  how,  in  an 
organizing  campaign  in  Monessen,  Pa.  several  years 
ago,  A.  F.  of  L.  organizer  Jefferson  D.  Pierce  was 
bludgeoned  by  Steel  Trust  thugs,  receiving  injuries 
that  resulted  in  his  death.  Mr.  Gompers  had  his 
facts  straight.  Yet  the  very  next  day,  Mr.  Gary, 
testifying  before  the  same  Committee,  produced  a 
sworn  statement  from  the  son  of  Mr.  Pierce  contain- 
ing the  following  assertions : 

I  was  with  my  father  the  night  he  received  his  injuries 
in  Monessen,  Pa.,  and  wish  to  state  very  emphatically 
[129] 


that  his  injury  was  not  caused  by  any  one  connected  with 
the  United  States  Steel  Corporation.  On  the  contrary, 
it  was  caused  by  a  member  of  the  I.  W.  W.  organization 
from  out  of  town,  who  was  sent  there  at  the  time  to 
create  trouble,  as  the  I.  W.  W.  organization  was  then 
trying  to  gain  control  of  the  organizing  situation.  I 
wish  again  most  emphatically  to  refute  Mr.  Gompers' 
statement  that  this  injury  was  caused  by  some  one  con- 
nected with  the  United  States  Steel  Corporation. 

Upon  being  questioned,  Mr.  Gary  "  thought " 
that  Mr.  Pierce  is  employed  at  Worcester,  Mass, 
by  the  American  Steel  and  Wire  Company,  a  subsidi- 
ary of  the  U.  S.  Steel  Corporation. 

Fortunately,  however,  in  the  steel  strike  the 
photographer  secured  a  proof  of  State  Police  bru- 
tality which  the  most  skilled  Steel  Trust  apologists 
cannot  explain  away  —  a  picture  of  the  typically 
vicious  assault  upon  Mr.  R.  Dressel,  a  hotel  keeper 
of  532  Dickson  St.  (foreign  quarter),  Homestead, 
Pa.  I  quote  from  the  latter's  statement  in  connec- 
tion therewith: 

I,  Rudolph  Dressel,  of  the  aforesaid  address,  do  hereby 
make  this  statement  of  my  own  volition  and  without 
solicitation  from  any  one.  That  on  the  23rd  day  of 
September  I  was  standing  in  front  of  my  place  of  busi- 
ness at  the  aforesaid  address  and  a  friend  of  mine, 
namely,  Adolph  Kuehnemund,  came  to  visit  and  consult 
me  regarding  personal  matters.  As  I  stood  as  shown  in 
the  picture  above  mentioned  with  my  friend,  the  State 
Constabulary  on  duty  in  Homestead  came  down  Dick- 
son  St.  They  had  occasion  to  ride  up  and  down  the 
street  several  times  and  finally  stopped  directly  in  front 
pf  me  and  demanded  that  I  move  on.  Before  I  had 


time  to  comply  I  was  struck  by  the  State  Policeman. 
(The  attitude  of  said  Policeman  is  plainly  shown  in  the 
aforesaid  picture,  and  his  threatening  club  is  plainly 
seen  descending  towards  me.) 

My  friend  and  I  then  entered  my  place  of  business 
and  my  friend  a  few  minutes  afterwards  looked  out  on 
the  street  over  the  summer  doors.  The  policeman  im- 
mediately charged  him  and  being  unable  to  enter  my 
place  of  business  on  horseback,  dismounted  and  entered 
into  my  place  of  business  on  foot. 

My  friend  being  frightened  at  what  had  happened  to 
me  retired  to  a  room  in  the  rear  of  my  place  of  busi- 
ness. The  Policeman  entered  this  room,  accompanied 
by  another  State  Police,  and  without  cause,  reason  or 
excuse,  struck  my  friend  and  immediately  thereafter  ar- 
rested him.  I  was  personally  present  at  his  hearing  be- 
fore Burgess  P.  H.  McGuire  of  the  above  city,  at  which 
none  of  the  aforesaid  policemen  were  heard  or  even  pre- 
sent. Burgess  asked  my  friend  what  he  was  arrested 
for,  and  my  friend  referred  to  me  inasmuch  as  he  him- 
self did  not  know.  The  Burgess  immediately  replied, 
"  We  have  no  time  to  hear  your  witnesses,"  and  there- 
upon levied  a  fine  of  $10.00  and  costs  upon  him.  My 
friend  having  posted  a  forfeit  of  $25.00,  the  sum  of 
$15.45  was  deducted  therefrom. 

The  State  Constabulary  were  sent,  unasked  for, 
into  the  quiet  steel  towns  for  the  sole  purpose  of  in- 
timidating the  strikers.  The  following  took  place 
at  the  meeting  of  the  Braddock  Borough  Council, 
October  6 : 

Mr.  Verosky:  (County  detective  and  council  member) 
"  Mr.  Chairman,  the  citizens  of  the  borough  wish  to 
know  by  whose  authority  the  State  Constabulary  was 
called  into  Braddock  to  take  up  their  quarters  here  and 


to  practically  relieve  the  police  of  their  duties,  by  patrol- 
ling the  streets  on  foot,  mounted,  and  always  under 
arms." 

Mr.  Holtzman:  (President  of  Council)  "I  surely  do 
not  know  who  called  them  into  town,  but  were  I  the 
Burgess,  I  would  make  it  my  business  to  find  out,  in 
view  of  the  fact  that  the  Constabulary  is  neither  wanted 
nor  needed  here." 

Mr.  Verosky:  "Well,  in  that  case,  the  Burgess  may 
throw  some  light  on  the  subject." 
Mr.  Callahan:   (Burgess)  "The  question  comes  to  me 
as  a  surprise  and  I  am  sure  that  I  don't  know  by  whose 
authority  the  Constabulary  was  called  in." 

Everything  was  calm  in  Braddock  until  the  State 
Police  came  in.  Then  the  trouble  began.  It  was 
the  same  nearly  everywhere.  The  arrival  of  these 
men  was  always  the  signal  for  so-called  riots,  and 
wholesale  clubbing,  shooting  and  jailing  of  strikers. 

Great  praise  has  been  poured  upon  the  State  Con- 
stabulary for  their  supposedly  wonderful  bravery 
and  efficiency,  because  a  few  hundred  of  them,  scat- 
tered thinly  through  a  score  of  towns,  have  been 
able  apparently  to  overawe  many  thousands  of  strik- 
ers. But  the  credit  is  undeserved.  In  strikes  they 
always  form,  in  point  of  actual  weight,  an  insignifi- 
cant part  of  the  armed  forces  arrayed  against  the 
strikers.  For  instance,  in  a  steel  town,  during  the 
strike,  there  would  usually  be  a  dozen  or  so  State 
Police  and  from  3,000  to  4,000  deputy  sheriffs,  com- 
pany police,  etc.  The  latter  classes  of  gunmen  make 
up  the  body  of  the  real  repressive  force;  the  State 
Police  are  merely  raiders.  It  is  their  particularly 
dirty  job  to  harass  the  enemy;  to  break  the  strike 


by  scientifically  bulldozing  the  strikers  in  their  homes 
and  on  the  streets.  Thus  they  are  thrown  into  the 
limelight,  while  the  company  thugs  remain  in  com- 
parative obscurity. 

The  State  Police  feel  reasonably  sure  of  their 
skins  when  carrying  on  their  calculated  campaigns 
of  terrorism,  for  behind  them  are  large  numbers  of 
armed  guards  of  various  sorts  ready  to  spring  to 
their  support  at  an  instant's  notice,  should  the  work- 
ers dare  to  resist  them.  Besides,  they  know  they 
have  carte  blanche  to  commit  the  greatest  excesses, 
since  the  highest  state  officials,  not  to  speak  of  local 
courts  and  other  authorities,  give  them  undivided 
support.  They  are  above  the  law,  when  the  rights 
of  the  workers  are  concerned.  Moreover,  they  re- 
alize fully  that  they  can  depend  upon  trade-union 
leaders  to  hold  the  strikers  in  check  from  adopting 
measures  of  retaliation.  Few  of  them  are  hurt  dur- 
ing their  depredations.  Once  in  a  while,  however, 
they  drive  tneir  victims  to  desperation  and  get  them- 
selves into  trouble. 

For  example,  a  few  days  after  a  fight  in  Farrell, 
Pa.,  that  cost  the  strikers  two  dead  and  a  dozen 
seriously  wounded,  the  local  secretary  there,  S. 
Coates,  was  on  his  way  to  Ohio  to  hold  a  meeting, 
when  the  delivery  truck  upon  which  he  was  riding 
overturned,  rendering  him  unconscious.  He  woke 
up  in  a  Sharon  hospital.  The  six  beds  adjoining 
his  were  occupied  by  Cossacks,  injured  in  the  riot 
started  by  themselves  in  Farrell.  The  public  knew 
nothing  of  their  injuries,  it  being  the  regular  thing 
to  suppress  such  facts,  in  order  to  surround  the 
dreaded  Cossacks  with  a  reputation  for  invulner- 

[133] 


ability.  The  way  the  latter  "  get  even  "  for  their 
casualties  is  to  victimize  and  outrage  as  many 
workers  as  they  think  necessary  to  balance  the  score. 
But  such  methods  cannot  go  on  indefinitely.  It  will 
be  marvellous,  indeed,  if  some  day  the  State  Constab- 
ulary, with  their  policy  of  deliberate  intimidation, 
are  not  the  means  of  causing  riots  such  as  this  country 
has  not  yet  experienced  in  labor  disputes.  Not  al- 
ways will  the  unions  be  able  to  hold  their  men  as 
steady  in  the  face  of  brutal  provocation  as  they  did 
in  the  recent  sfeel  strike. 

Hand  in  glove  with  the  Cossacks  in  their  work 
of  terrorizing  Pennsylvania's  steel  towns  went  the 
less  skilful  but  equally  vicious  company  police,  gun- 
men, deputy  sheriffs,  etc.,  many  of  whom,  ex-service 
men,  disgraced  their  uniforms  by  wearing  them  on 
strike  duty.  Nor  were  the  city  police,  save  for  a 
few  honorable  exceptions  here  and  there,  appreciably 
better.  As  for  the  police  magistrates,  almost  to  a 
man  they  seconded  unquestioningly  the  work  of  the 
sluggers.  In  fact,  all  the  forces  of  "  law  and  order  " 
in  western  Pennsylvania,  official  and  unofficial, 
worked  together  like  so  many  machines  —  in 
the  interest  of  their  powerful  master,  the  Steel 
Trust. 

Many  of  the  armed  guards  were  murderous 
criminals;  penitentiary  birds  scraped  together  from 
the  slums  of  the  great  cities  to  uphold  Garyism  by 
crushing  real  Americanism.  They  took  advantage 
of  the  strike  situation  and  the  authority  vested  in 
them  to  indulge  in  an  orgy  of  robbery  and  thievery. 
Dressed  in  United  States  army  uniforms  and  wear- 
ing deputies'  badges,  they  even  robbed  strikers  in 


broad  daylight  on  the  main  streets.  And  if  the  lat- 
ter- dared  to  protest  they  were  lucky  not  to  be  beaten 
ifp,  jailed  and  fined  for  disorderly  conduct.  The 
strike  committees  have  records  of  many  such  cases. 
And  worse  yet,  more  than  one  striker  was  robbed 
while  he  was  in  jail.  Liberty  bonds  and  cash  disap- 
peared frequently.  To  lose  watches,  knives,  etc., 
was  a  common  occurrence. 

Picketing  was  out  of  the  question,  although,  like 
many  other  liberties  denied  the  steel  strikers,  it  is 
theoretically  permitted  under  the  laws  and  court  rul- 
ings of  Pennsylvania.  Strikers  foolhardy  enough 
to  attempt  it  were  usually  slugged  and  arrested. 
Even  the  right  to  strike  was  virtually  overthrown. 
The  practice  was  for  several  company  and  city  police, 
without  warrants,  to  seek  a  man  in  his  home,  crowd 
in  and  demand  his  return  to  work.  Upon  refusal  he 
would  be  arrested  and  fined  from  $25  to  $100  for 
disorderly  conduct.  Then  he  would  be  offered  his 
money  back,  if  he  would  agree  to  be  a  scab.  This 
happened  not  once,  but  scores,  if  not  hundreds  of 
times.  Like  practices  were  engaged  in  almost  every- 
where. In  Monessen  State  Police  and  other  "  peace 
officers "  would  regularly  round  up  batches  of 
strikers  before  the  mill  gates.  Those  that  agreed 
to  go  to  work  were  set  free;  the  rest  were  jailed. 
Many  were  kept  overnight  in  an  old,  unlighted 
building  and  threatened  from  time  to  time  with 
hanging  in  the  morning,  if  they  would  not  become 
scabs.  This  was  particularly  terrifying,  as  the 
strikers,  mainly  foreigners  knowing  little  of  their 
supposed  legal  rights,  had  very  good  reason  to  think 
that  State  Police,  as  well  as  armed  thugs,  would 

[135] 


go  to  any  extreme  against  them.  In  Pittsburgh  it- 
self, the  decisive  question  asked  petty  prisoners  in 
the  police  courts  was,  "  Are  you  working?  "  Those 
who  could  show  that  they  were  strike-breakers  were 
released  forthwith;  while  those  who  admitted  be- 
ing on  strike  were  usually  found  guilty  without 
further  questioning.  Throughout  the  whole  dis- 
trict, to  be  a  scab  was  to  be  a  peaceable,  law  abid- 
ing citizen;  to  be  a  striker  was  criminal. 

The  courts  put  every  obstacle  in  the  way  of  the 
strikers  getting  justice.  In  those  towns  where  it 
was  possible  to  get  lawyers  at  all  no  courtesies  were 
extended  the  representatives  of  the  men.  They 
were  denied  the  right  of  cross-examination;  could 
not  get  the  necessary  papers  for  appeals,  and  in  some 
cases  were  actually  ordered  out  of  court.  Attorney 
Roe  was  arrested  in  McKeesport  for  attempting  to 
confer  with  a  dozen  of  his  clients  in  a  private  hall. 
The  strikers  were  held  under  excessive  bail  and  fined 
shamefully  for  trivial  charges,  to  disprove  which 
they  were  often  denied  the  right  to  produce  wit- 
nesses. The  following  quotations  from  a  report  by 
J.  G.  Brown,  formerly  president  of  the  International 
Union  of  Timber  Workers,  who  was  a  general  or- 
ganizer in  the  Pittsburgh  district  and  later  director 
of  the  legal  department  of  the  National  Committee, 
will  give  an  indication  of  the  situation  and  some  of 
the  reasons  therefor: 

.  .  .  The  next  day  came  the  strike.  The  jails  swarmed 
with  arrested  strikers.  This  was  especially  true  in  the 
Soho  district  of  Pittsburgh,  where  are  located  the  main 
entrances  of  the  National  Tube  Works,  and  the  Jones 
and  Laughlin  Company's  plants.  In  the  afternoon  two 

[136] 


organ-izers  who  were  walking  down  the  street  in  this 
section  were  taken  to  jail,  held  without  bail  on  charges 
of  being  "suspicious  persons."  Information  was  given 
to  us  that  only  the  Supt.  of  Police  had  authority  to  fix 
bail.  He  could  not  be  located.  Indeed,  that  these  men 
were  arrested  at  all  was  learned  only  through  the 
newspapers.  They  were  not  allowed  to  communicate 
with  their  friends  or  attorneys.  Attorney  Brennon 
eventually  found  the  Chief  of  Police  and  went  bail 
for  the  men. 

Deciding  to  utilize  the  right  of  picketing,  which  the 
laws  of  the  state  permit,  a  group  of  men  were  chosen 
for  this  work,  captains  assigned  and  stationed  at  the 
entrances  of  the  mills  in  Soho.  No  sooner  had  they 
arrived  there  than  they  were  hustled  right  on  to  jail, 
which  was  already  filled  to  overflowing.  Many  were 
convicted  on  disorderly  conduct  charges;  others  were 
warned  of  dire  things  in  store  for  them,  and  all  were 
advised  to  return  to  their  work  in  the  mills. 

Many  women  and  young  girls  were  among  the  vic- 
tims of  police  brutalities  in  the  Soho  district.  Lo- 
cated in  this  section  were  only  city  policemen;  the 
State  Constabulary  did  not  "  work  "  much  within  the 
city  limits.  Much  wonder  was  created  by  the  undimin- 
ishing  brutality  of  the  Soho  police.  The  Central  Labor 
Council  of  Pittsburgh  tried  to  have  the  City  Council  in- 
augurate an  investigation  of  the  shameful  state  of  af- 
fairs, but  nothing  could  be  done. 

Shortly  after  the  strike  was  called  off  the  Pittsburgh 
papers  carried  a  story  to  the  effect  that  the  city  police- 
men working  in  the  Soho  district  had  been  "  paid " 
$150  each  by  the  National  Tube  Co.  It  was  stated 
also  that  the  same  men  were  paid  a  like  amount  by  the 
Jones  and  Laughlin  Company.  This  explains,  perhaps, 
why  justice  was  so  blind  in  this  section. 

On  the  opposite  side  of  the  Monongahela  river,  where 

[137] 


the  Jones  and  Laughlin  Company  has  other  immense 
works  the  police  were  equally  bad,  the  police  magistrate 
even  worse.  The  Police  Commissioner  was  boss  of  the 
situation.  And  now  come  the  Pittsburgh  papers  with 
the  story  that  this  very  Commissioner,  Peter  P.  Walsh, 
has  made  application  to  be  retired  from  the  Pittsburgh 
police  force  on  half  pay  in  order  that  he  might  accept 
the  appointment  as  chief  of  the  mill  police  of  the  Jones 
and  Laughlin  Company.  The  half  pay  allowance  gives, 
according  to  reports,  $1800  per  year.  The  new  posi- 
tion Mr.  Walsh  is  to  fill  is  popularly  understood  to 
carry  with  it  a  salary  of  $5000  per  year.  .  .  .  The 
Central  Labor  Council  is  making  an  effort  to  have  this 
matter  investigated,  but  without  serious  hope  of  success. 

When  a  labor  committee  demanded  that  Mayor 
Babcock  of  Pittsburgh  investigate  the  situation,  the 
honorable  gentleman  refused.  He  admitted  that 
the  action  of  the  steel  companies  was  ill-advised; 
the  money  should  have  been  given  to  the  pension 
fund,  instead  of  to  a  few  men;  however,  the  matter 
was  now  past  history,  and  there  was  nothing  to  be 
added  to  the  fair  name  of  Pittsburgh  by  airing  it  in 
public.  The  Mayor  admitted,  though,  that  he 
would  object  to  having  labor  unions  raise  funds  to 
pay  policemen  to  favor  them  during  strikes.  So 
reason  public  officials  in  the  steel  districts. 

Suppression  of  the  rights  of  free  speech  and  free 
assembly;  gigantic  organized  campaigns  of  out- 
lawry by  the  State  Police  and  armies  of  selected 
plug-uglies;  subornation  and  intimidation  of  city, 
county,  state  and  federal  officials  and  police;  prosti- 
tution of  the  courts  —  these  are  some  of  the  means 

[138] 


used  to  crush  the  strike  of  the  steel  workers,  and  to 
force  these  over-worked,  under-paid  toilers  still 
deeper  into  the  mire  of  slavery.  And  the  whole 
monstrous  crime  was  hypocritically  committed  in  the 
name  of  a  militant,  100  per  cent.  Americanism. 


[139] 


IX 
EFFORTS  AT  SETTLEMENT 

THE     NATIONAL     INDUSTRIAL     CONFERENCE THE 

SENATE      COMMITTEE THE     RED     BOOK THE 

MARGOLIS      CASE THE      INTERCHURCH      WORLD 

MOVEMENT 

UPON  October  6  the  National  Industrial  Conference 
opened  its  sessions  in  Washington,  D.  C.  This  body 
was  called  together  by  President  Wilson  to  make  an 
effort  to  solve  the  pressing  labor  difficulties  confront- 
ing the  country,  and  was  the  one,  pending  whose 
deliberations  the  steel  workers  had  been  asked  to 
postpone  their  strike.  It  was  a  three-party  arrange- 
ment, Capital,  Labor  and  the  Public  being  repre- 
sented. Naturally  it  was  only  advisory  in  character; 
and  under  the  rules  adopted  all  action  taken,  not 
relating  merely  to  methods  of  procedure,  had  to  have 
the  endorsement  of  all  three  sections,  each  of  which 
voted  as  a  unit  in  accordance  with  the  majority  senti- 
ment of  its  members. 

The  Conference  met  in  the  midst  of  a  tense  situa- 
tion. The  steel  industry  was  almost  completely 
paralysed;  the  miners  were  just  about  to  launch 
their  national  general  strike;  the  railroaders  were 
in  a  foment  of  discontent,  and  many  other  large  and 
important  sections  of  workers  were  demanding 

[140] 


better  conditions.  Capital  and  Labor  were  arrayed 
against  each  other  as  never  before.  Both  appeared 
determined  to  fight;  Capital  in  a  bitter,  revengeful 
spirit  to  oust  Labor  from  the  favorable  position  won 
during  the  war,  and  Labor  in  a  decided  effort  to  hold 
what  it  had  and  to  make  more  winnings  to  offset 
the  rapidly  mounting  cost  of  living.  The  United 
States  seemed  upon  the  brink  of  an  industrial  war. 
From  the  beginning  the  touchstone  of  the  Con- 
ference, the  measure  by  which  all  its  activities  were 
gauged,  was  the  steel  strike.  It  was  clear  that  its 
attitude  towards  this  great  issue  would  settle  its 
general  policy.  This  was  felt  by  all  parties  to  the 
Conference,  even  though  some  hated  the  thought. 
The  labor  delegation,  headed  by  Samuel  Gompers, 
precipitated  matters  by  introducing,  by  previous  ar- 
rangement with  the  National  Committee  for  Organ- 
izing Iron  and  Steel  Workers,  the  following  resolu- 
tion: 

WHEREAS,  The  Nation-wide  strike  now  in  progress 
in  the  steel  industry  of  America  affects  not  only  the 
men  and  women  directly  concerned,  but  tends  to  disturb 
the  relations  between  employers  and  workers  through- 
out our  industrial  life;  and 

WHEREAS,  This  conference  is  called  for  the  purpose 
of  stabilizing  industries  and  bringing  into  being  a  better 
relation  between  employers  and  employees;  and 

WHEREAS,  Organized  Labor  wishes  to  manifest  its 
sincere  and  fair  desire  to  prove  helpful  in  immediately 
adjusting  this  pending  grave  industrial  conflict;  there- 
fore, be  it, 

RESOLVED,  That  each  group  comprising  this  confer- 
ence select  two  of  its  number  and  these  six  so  selected 
to  constitute  a  committee  to  which  shall  be  referred 

[HI] 


existing  differences  between  the  workers  and  employers 
in  the  steel  industry  for  adjudication  and  settlement. 
Pending  the  findings  of  this  committee,  this  conference 
requests  the  workers  involved  to  return  to  work  and 
the  employers  to  re-instate  them  in  their  former  posi- 
tions. 

This  resolution  provoked  a  storm  of  opposition 
from  the  reactionary  employers,  who,  headed  by  Mr. 
Gary  (ironically  seated  with  John  D.  Rockefeller, 
Jr.,  as  a  representative  of  the  Public)  insisted  that 
the  Conference  ignore  the  steel  strike  situation  al- 
together, its  purpose  being,  according  to  them,  not 
the  settlement  of  existing  disputes,  but  the  formula- 
tion of  principles  and  plans  which  would  provide  for 
the  prevention  of  such  disputes  in  the  future.  Fin- 
ally, seeing  that  if  they  insisted  upon  their  resolution 
it  would  wreck  the  Conference,  the  workers  held  it 
in  abeyance  temporarily  and  submitted  the  follow- 
ing: 

The  right  of  wage  earners  to  organize  without  dis- 
crimination, to  bargain  collectively,  to  be  represented 
by  representatives  of  their  own  choosing  in  negotiations 
and  adjustments  with  employers  in  respect  to  wages, 
hours  of  labor  and  relations  and  conditions  of  employ- 
ment, is  recognized. 

Such  a  mild  proposition  as  this  would  hardly  meet 
with  serious  opposition  in  a  similar  conference  in  any 
other  important  country  than  ours.  All  over 
Europe  it  would  be  far  too  conservative  to  fit  the 
situation.  In  England,  for  example,  the  British 
Industrial  Conference  recently  adopted  the  follow- 
ing: 

[142] 


The  basis  of  negotiation  between  employers  and 
work  people  should,  as  is  presently  the  case  in  the  chief 
industries  of  the  country,  be  the  full,  frank  acceptance 
of  the  employers'  organizations  on  the  one  hand,  and 
trade  unions  on  the  other  as  the  recognized  organiza- 
tions to  speak  and  act  on  behalf  of  their  members. 

And  just  across  our  border,  in  Canada,  this  ad- 
vanced conception  was  formulated  but  a  few  months 
before : 

On  the  whole  we  believe  the  day  has  passed  when 
any  employer  should  deny  his  employees  the  right  to 
organize.  Employers  claim  that  right  for  themselves 
and  it  is  not  denied  by  the  workers.  There  seems  to 
be  no  reason  why  the  employer  should  deny  like  rights 
to  those  who  are  employed  by  him.  Not  only  should 
employees  be  accorded  the  right  of  organizing,  but  the 
prudent  employer  will  recognize  such  organization  and 
will  deal  with  the  duly  accredited  representatives 
thereof  in  all  matters  relating  to  the  interests  of  the  em- 
ployees when  it  is  fairly  established  to  be  representative 
of  them  all. 

But  Mr.  Gary  and  his  associates  care  nothing 
about  the  reputation  of  America  as  a  progressive, 
liberty-loving  country.  They  have  their  preroga- 
tives, and  they  intend  to  exercise  them,  cost  what 
it  may.  They  organize  as  they  see  fit  and  pick 
out  such  representatives  as  they  will;  but  by  virtue 
of  their  economic  strength  they  deny  to  their  work- 
ers these  same  rights.  So  they  voted  down  Labor's 
collective  bargaining  resolution,  and  at  the  same 
time  the  one  providing  for  a  settlement  of  the  steel 
strike.  The  employers  insisted  upon  absolute  rule 
by  themselves. 

[I43l 


This  action  discredited  the  Conference,  and  sen- 
tenced it  to  dissolution.  By  its  refusal  to  meet  the 
great  steel  strike  issue  the  Conference  showed  that 
it  had  neither  the  will  nor  the  power  to  settle  indus- 
trial disputes.  Labor,  openly  denied  the  funda- 
mental right  of  organization,  could  no  longer  sit 
with  it.  The  workers'  representatives,  therefore, 
took  the  only  honorable  course  left  to  them;  they 
withdrew,  allowing  the  whole  worthless  structure 
to  collapse.  Said  Mr.  Gompers  in  his  final  speech : 

Gentlemen,  I  have  sung  my  swan  song  in  this  con- 
ference. You  have,  by  your  action  —  the  action  of  the 
employers'  group  —  legislated  us  out  of  this  conference. 
We  have  nothing  further  to  submit;  and  with  a  feel- 
ing of  regret  we  have  not  been  enabled  with  a  clear 
conscience  to  remain  here  longer.  We  have  responsi- 
bilities to  employees  and  workers  and  those  dependent 
upon  them.  We  must  fulfill  these  obligations. 

Thus  ingloriously  ended  the  Conference  upon 
which  the  steel  workers  had  been  asked  to  hang  all 
their  hopes.  Even  with  powerful  organizations  in- 
tact and  with  their  industry  almost  entirely  at  a 
standstill,  the  latter  could  get  no  consideration  from 
it.  What,  then,  would  have  been  their  fate  if  they 
had  postponed  the  strike?  With  their  forces  shat- 
tered, half  of  their  men  being  on  strike  and  the 
rest  at  work  thoroughly  disgusted,  they  would  have 
been  helpless  and  unable  to  strike  in  any  event. 
They  would  have  been  absolutely  at  the  mercy  of 
the  employers.  And  any  one  who  may  imagine  that 
the  latter  would  have  done  anything  short  of  giving 
the  steel  workers  their  coup  de  grace  at  the  Confer- 

[144] 


ence  is  an  optimist  indeed.  The  steel  strike  was  a 
clean  fight  and  an  honorable  defeat  for  Labor.  Its 
bad  effects  will  soon  wear  off.  But  it  would  have 
been  a  ruinous  calamity,  with  ineradicable  harm, 
had  the  strike  been  postponed  for  the  sake  of  the  ill- 
fated  Industrial  Conference. 

Pursuant  to  a  resolution  adopted  by  the  Senate 
on  September  23,  in  the  white  heat  of  the  strike  ex- 
citement, the  Committee  on  Education  and  Labor 
was  instructed  to  investigate  the  steel  strike  and  to 
report  back  to  the  Senate  as  soon  as  possible.  Ac- 
cordingly this  Committee  held  sittings  in  Washing- 
ton and  Pittsburgh,  hearing  about  one  hundred  wit- 
nesses all  told.  Its  active  members  were  Senators 
Kenyon  (Chairman),  McKellar,  Walsh  (Mass.), 
Sterling  and  Phipps. 

For  the  workers  Samuel  Gompers,  John  Fitz- 
patrick,  M.  F.  Tighe  and  many  organizers  and 
strikers  testified,  setting  forth  in  detail  the  griev- 
ances and  demands  of  the  men.  For  the  steel  com- 
panies came  the  usual  crop  of  strike-breakers  and 
company  officials,  pliable  city  authorities  and  business 
men  from  the  steel  towns.  The  star  witness  was 
Judge  Gary,  who  presented  practically  the  entire  case 
for  the  whole  steel  industry.  It  is  noteworthy  that 
with  the  exception  of  one  minor  hothead,  the  so- 
called  "  independents  "  made  no  defense  before  the 
committee.  They  left  it  all  to  their  master,  the 
United  States  Steel  Corporation. 

Mr.  Gary  was  a  good  witness.  Not  for  him  were 
the  antiquated  blusterings  of  a  "  divine-right  "  Baer 
or  a  "  public-be-damned  "  Vanderbilt.  He  used  the 

[145] 


modern  method, —  a  mass  of  silky  hypocrisies  and 
misrepresentations  for  the  public,  to  cover  up  the 
mailed  fist  he  has  for  his  workers.  He  was  suave, 
oily,  humble,  obliging,  persuasive,  patriotic.  He 
pictured  the  steel  industry  as  a  sort  of  industrial 
heaven  and  the  U.  S.  Steel  Corporation  as  a  benef- 
icent institution,  leading  even  the  trade-union  move- 
ment in  reform  work. 

Inasmuch  as  Mr.  Gary's  peculiar  notions  of  the 
"  open  shop,"  minority  rule  by  the  unions,  etc.,  set 
forth  afresh  by  him  at  the  strike  hearings,  are  dis- 
cussed quite  generally  throughout  this  book,  there 
is  no  need  to  review  them  again  here.  We  will  note 
his  testimony  no  more  than  to  give  the  facts  of  the 
death  of  Mrs.  Fannie  Sellins,  of  whose  murder  he 
was  so  anxious  to  clear  the  Steel  Trust. 

Mrs.  Fannie  Sellins  was  an  organizer  for  the 
United  Mine  Workers  of  America,  stationed  in  the 
notorious,  anti-union  Black  Valley  district  along  the 
Allegheny  river.  An  able  speaker,  and  possessed 
of  boundless  courage,  energy,  enthusiasm  and  ideal- 
ism, she  was  a  most  effective  worker.  Due  largely 
to  her  efforts  many  thousands  of  miners  and  miscel- 
laneous workers  in  this  hard  district  were  organized. 
She  was  the  very  heart  of  the  local  labor  movement, 
which  ranked  second  to  none  in  Pennsylvania  for 
spirit  and  progress.  When  the  steel  campaign  be- 
gan, Mrs.  Sellins  threw  herself  wholeheartedly  into 
it.  She  worked  indefatigably.  More  than  any 
other  individual  she  was  responsible  for  the  union- 
ization of  the  big  United  States  Steel  Corpora- 
tion mills  at  Vandergrift,  Leechburgh  and  New 
Kensington,  as  well  as  those  of  the  so-called  inde- 

[146] 


pendent  Allegheny  and  West  Penn  Steel  Companies 
at  Brackenridge.  The  results  secured  by  her  will 
compare  favorably  with  those  of  any  other  organizer 
in  the  whole  campaign. 

By  her  splendid  work  in  behalf  of  the  toilers 
Mrs.  Sellins  gained  the  undying  hatred  of  the  un- 
tamed employers  in  the  benighted  Black  Valley  dis- 
trict. Open  threats  were  made  to  "  get "  her. 
The  opportunity  came  on  August  26,  1919,  when 
she  was  deliberately  murdered  under  the  most  brutal 
circumstances. 

The  miners  of  the  Allegheny  Coal  and  Coke  Com- 
pany were  on  strike  at  West  Natrona.  The  mine 
is  situated  in  the  mill  yard  of  the  Allegheny  Steel 
Company  and  furnishes  fuel  for  that  concern.  All 
was  going  peacefully  when  a  dozen  drunken  deputy 
sheriffs  on  strike  duty,  led  by  a  mine  official,  suddenly 
rushed  the  pickets,  shooting  as  they  came.  Joseph 
Strzelecki  fell,  mortally  wounded.  Mrs.  Sellins, 
standing  close  by,  rushed  first  to  get  some  children  out 
of  danger.  Then  she  came  back  to  plead  with  the 
deputies,  who  were  still  clubbing  the  prostrate  Strze- 
lecki, not  to  kill  him.  What  happened  then  is  told 
in  the  New  Majority  (Chicago)  of  September  20: 

,  the  mine  official,  snatched  a  club  and 

felled  the  woman  to  the  ground. 

This  was  not  on  company  ground,  but  just  outside 
the  fence  of  a  friend  of  Mrs.  Sellins. 

She  rose  and  tried  to  drag  herself  toward  the  gate. 

shouted :     "  Kill  that !  " 

Three  shots  were  fired,  each  taking  effect. 

She  fell  to  the  ground,  and cried :  "  Give  her 

another !  " 

[I47l 


One  of  the  deputies,  standing  over  the  motionless  and 
silent  body,  held  his  gun  down  and,  without  averting 
his  face,  fired  into  the  body  that  did  not  move. 

An  auto  truck,  in  waiting,  was  hurried  to  the  scene 
and  the  body  of  the  old  miner  thrown  in;  then  Mrs. 
Sellins  was  dragged  by  the  heels  to  the  back  of  the  car. 
Before  she  was  placed  in  the  truck,  a  deputy  took  a 
cudgel  and  crushed  in  her  skull  before  the  eyes  of  the 
throng  of  men,  women  and  children,  who  stood  in 

powerless  silence  before  the  armed  men.  Deputy 

picked  up  the  woman's  hat,  placed  it  on  his  head,  danced 
a  step,  and  said  to  the  crowd:  "I'm  Mrs.  Sellins 
now." 

Thus  perished  noble  Fannie  Sellins:  shot  in  the 
back  by  so-called  peace  officers.  And  she  49  years 
old,  a  grandmother,  and  mother  of  a  boy  killed  in 
France,  fighting  to  make  the  world  safe  for  de- 
mocracy. 

Many  people  witnessed  this  -horrible  murder. 
The  guilty  men  were  named  openly  in  the  newspapers 
and  from  a  hundred  platforms.  Yet  no  one  was 
ever  punished  for  the  crime.  Witnesses  were 
spirited  away  or  intimidated,  and  the  whole  matter 
hushed  up  in  true  Steel  Trust  fashion.  A  couple 
of  deputies  were  arrested;  but  they  were  speedily 
released  on  smaller  bonds  than  those  often  set  for 
strikers  arrested  for  picketing.  Eventually  they 
were  freed  altogether. 

The  killing  of  Mrs.  Sellins,  right  in  the  teeth  of 
the  strike  as  it  was,  lent  much  bitterness  to  the  gen- 
eral situation.  Rightly  or  wrongly,  the  steel  work- 
ers, almost  to  a  man,  felt  that  this  devoted  woman 
was  a  martyr  to  their  cause. 

[148] 


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Upon  November  8,  the  Senate, Committee,  having 
completed  its  hearings,  made  public  its  report. 
This  document  is  a  strange  mixture  of  progressive 
and  reactionary  principles.  In  some  respects,  es- 
pecially where  it  grants,  however  confusedly,  the 
right  of  collective  bargaining  and  the  eight  hour 
day,  it  is  just  and  meets  the  situation;  but  in  other 
respects  it  is  so  unfair  to  the  workers'  cause  as  to 
be  grotesque.  For  one  thing  it  shoulders  upon  the 
unions  the  entire  responsibility  for  the  failure  to 
postpone  the  strike,  choosing  to  disregard  com- 
pletely the  clearly  established  fact  that  the  steel 
companies  were  discharging  men  so  fast  that  for  the 
unions  it  was  a  case  of  strike  or  perish.  In  fact, 
the  report  ignores  altogether  the  bitter  grievance  of 
men  being  discharged  for  union  membership.  Mr. 
Gary  had  said  that  this  practice  was  not  engaged  in, 
and  that  apparently  settled  it  so  far  as  the  Committee 
was  concerned, —  the  testimony  of  dozens  of  victim- 
ized workers  (with  thousands  more  available)  to  the 
contrary  notwithstanding.  Other  sins  of  the  Steel 
Trust,  the  suppression  of  free  speech  and  free  as- 
sembly, etc.,  were  passed  over  lightly;  but  the  alleged 
virtues  of  its  housing  and  welfare  plans  were  very 
highly  lauded. 

Nowhere  are  the  workers  more  ruthlessly  robbed 
and  exploited  by  their  employers  than  in  the  steel 
industry.  Speaking  recently  in  Brooklyn  on  the  sub- 
ject of  profiteering,  Mr.  Basil  Manly,  formerly 
Joint  Chairman  of  the  National  War  Labor  Board, 
cited  Page  367  of  the  Treasury  report  as  showing 
one  steel  company  "earning"  $14,549,952  in  1917 
on  a  capital  of  $5,000,  or  a  profit  of  290,999  per 

[149] 


cent.  As  the  department  conveniently  suppresses 
all  details,  it  is  impossible  to  learn  the  name  of  this 
company  or  how  it  made  such  fabulous  profits.  On 
the  same  page  appeared  another  steel  company  with 
a  profit  rate  of  20,180  per  cent.  Speaking  of  the 
United  States  Steel  Corporation's  returns,  which  of 
course  were  garbled  so  that  no  outsider  could  under- 
stand them,  Mr.  Manly  said : 

For  this  reason  I  am  unable  to  tell  you,  on  the  basis 
of  the  Treasury  Department's  figures,  what  the  net  in- 
come of  the  Steel  Corporation  is,  but  on  the  basis  of  its 
own  published  report  I  can  tell  you  that  in  two  years, 
1916  and  1917,  the  net  profits  of  the  Steel  Corporation, 
after  payment  of  interest  on  bonds  and  after  making  al- 
lowance for  all  charges  growing  out  of  the  installation  of 
special  war  facilities,  amounted  to  $888,931,511.  This 
is  more  by  $20,000,000  than  the  total  capital  stock  of 
the  Steel  Corporation  (which  is  $868,583,600).  In 
other  words,  in  1916  and  1917  every  dollar  of  the 
capital  stock  of  the  Steel  Corporation  was  paid  for  in 
net  profits.  In  this  connection  it  should  be  remembered 
that  when  the  Steel  Corporation  was  formed  its  entire 
$500,000,000  worth  of  common  stock  represented  noth- 
ing but  water. 

The  other  steel  companies  did  as  well  or  better, 
proportionately.  W.  Jett  Lauck,  acting  on  behalf 
of  the  railroad  workers,  submitted  figures  to  the 
United  States  Railroad  Labor  Board  (A.  P.  dis- 
patches May  19,  1920)  showing  that  during  the 
years  1916-18  the  Bethlehem  Steel  Corporation 
"  earned  "  average  annual  profits  of  $29,000,000,  or 
six  times  its  pre-war  average.  In  1916  its  profits 
amounted  to  146  per  cent,  on  its  capital  stock.  Our 

[150] 


Johnstown  friend,  the  Cambria  Steel  Company,  in 
1916-17  cleaned  up  $50,000,000  on  $45,000,000 
capital  stock;  while  the  Lackawanna,  Republic,  Col- 
orado Fuel  and  Iron,  Jones  and  Laughlin,  Crucible, 
etc.,  companies  made  similar  killings. 

As  against  useless,  non-producing  drones  getting 
these  millions,  the  great  mass  of  workers  actually 
operating  the  industry  were  receiving  the  beggarly 
wages  of  from  42  to  48  cents  per  hour.  They  had 
received  no  increase  for  a  year  before  the  strike,  not- 
withstanding the  skyrocketing  cost  of  living.  Yet 
the  Senate  Committee  could  discover  no  discontent  at 
this  condition  nor  see  any  injustice  in  it.  Upon  page 
10  of  its  report  appears  the  startling  statement  that 
"  The  question  of  wages  is  not  involved  in  this  con- 
troversy." Forty-two  cents  per  hour  would  hardly 
buy  cigars  for  these  smug,  well-fed  gentlemen;  still 
they  would  have  us  conclude  that  it  is  enough  for  a 
steel  worker  to  raise  a  family  upon. 

The  fact  is,  of  course,  that  an  increase  in  wages 
was  a  cardinal  demand  of  the  strikers,  even  though 
the  Senate  Committee  did  not  get  to  learn  of  it.1 
And  so  great  was  the  steel  workers'  need  for  more 

1  There  seemed  to  be  many  important  things  of  which  this  com- 
mittee had  never  heard.  For  instance,  when  in  my  testimony  I 
referred  to  Lester  F.  Ward,  Senator  Sterling  innocently  inquired 
who  he  was.  He  had  apparently  never  even  heard  of  this  emi- 
nent American  sociologist,  who  was  perhaps  the  greatest  scholar 
ever  born  in  the  western  hemisphere,  and  whose  name  is  honored 
by  scientific  minds  the  world  over.  And  what  makes  Senator 
Sterling's  ignorance  the  more  inexcusable  is  that  he  was  actually 
holding  office  in  Washington  at  the  same  time  that  Professor 
Ward  was  carrying  on  his  brilliant  studies  in  that  very  city.  For 
one  who  stresses  so  much  his  100  per  cent.  Americanism  as  does 
the  Senator  it  is  indeed  a  sad  showing  not  to  be  familiar  with 
this  great  native  product. 

[151] 


money  that  the  strike  had  scarcely  ended  when  the 
United  States  Steel  Corporation,  followed  soon 
after  by  the  "  independents,"  granted  .its  lesser 
skilled  help  10  per  cent,  increase  in  wages,  and 
promised  "  an  equitable  adjustment "  to  the  widely 
advertised  small  minority  of  highly  paid  men. 

Part  of  the  strike-breaking  strategy  of  the  Steel 
Trust  was  to  alienate  public  sympathy  from  the 
strike  by  denouncing  it  as  an  incipient  revolution 
which  had  to  be  put  down  at  all  costs.  Public  opin- 
ion was  already  violently  inflamed  against  everything 
savoring  no  matter  how  slightly  of  radicalism,  and 
it  was  not  difficult  for  the  re-actionary  newspapers 
to  make  the  steel  strike  unpopular,  even  as  they  had, 
under  various  pretexts,  the  movements  of  the  miners 
and  railroad  men  of  the  period.  One  weapon  they 
used  extensively  against  the  steel  strike  was  an  al- 
most forgotten  pamphlet,  "  Syndicalism,"  written  by 
Earl  C.  Ford  and  myself  eight  years  ago. 

Throughout  the  hearings  the  investigating  sen- 
ators went  along  with  this  Steel  Trust  propaganda, 
which  was  not  so  surprising  considering  the  fact 
that  of  the  five  active  committee  men,  one  was  a 
steel  magnate,  and  three  others  typical  Bourbons. 
By  playing  up  the  "  little  red  book "  they  syste- 
matically fed  the  newspapers  with  the  sensation- 
alism they  wanted  and  which  the  steel  companies  de- 
sired them  to  get.  I  was  called  before  the  Com- 
mittee and  gruffly  ordered  to  express  my  opinion  on 
the  doctrines  in  the  booklet.  In  reply,  I  stated  that 
the  steel  movement  had  been  carried  on  according 
to  the  strictest  trade-union  principles.  It  was  over- 
seen by  the  National  Committee,  consisting  of 


twenty-four  presidents  of  large  international  unions. 
As  secretary  of  this  committee  I  had  necessarily 
worked  under  the  close  scrutiny  of  these  men  and 
dozens  of  their  organizers  —  not  to  speak  of  the 
highest  officials  in  the  American  Federation  of 
Labor.  Yet  none  of  these  trade  unionists,  keen 
though  they  be  to  detect  and  condemn  unusual  prac- 
tices and  heresy  in  the  ranks,  had  found  fault  with 
the  character  of  my  work.  Nor  could  the  crew  of 
detectives  and  stool  pigeons  of  the  steel  companies 
and  Department  of  Justice,  who  had  dogged  my 
footsteps  for  a  year  past,  cite  a  single  word  said,  a 
thing  done,  or  a  line  written  by  me  in  the  entire  cam- 
paign which  would  not  measure  up  to  most  rigid 
trade-union  standards.  I  contended  that  my  private 
opinions  were  immaterial  as  they  did  not  and  could 
not  enter  into  the  organizing  work  or  the  strike. 
But  the  nation-wide  head  hunt  of  the  radicals  was 
on  in  full  cry,  and  the  Senators  had  a  good  blood 
scent.  They  would  follow  it  to  the  end.  They  in- 
sisted that  I  express  my  opinion  upon  the  wage  sys- 
tem, the  state,  morality,  patriotism,  marriage,  etc. 
Finally,  in  a  last  effort  to  protect  the  interests  of  the 
2,000,000  men;  women  and  childen  affected  by  the 
strike,  I  stated  that  if  the  vulture  press,  which  was 
bound  to  misrepresent  what  I  said,  was  removed 
from  the  room,  I  would  be  glad  to  oblige  the  Sena- 
tors with  a  frank  expression  of  my  views  upon  any 
subject.  But  this  simple  fairness  to  the  steel  work- 
ers and  their  families  they  denied.  The  newspapers 
were  clamoring  for  red  meat,  and  the  Senators 
seemed  determined  they  should  have  it.  Having 
made  my  protest  and  my  prediction,  I  was  compelled 

[153] 


to  yield;  but  the  first  newspapers  on  the  streets 
proved  the  soundness  of  my  fears.  My  answers 
were  garbled  and  twisted  against  both  the  steel  move- 
ment and  me. 

Then  there  was  the  Margolis  case.  I  charge  that 
to  be  a  deliberate  frameup  against  the  steel  strike. 
To  prove  the  Steel  Trust's  contention  that  the  strike 
was  a  desperate  revolutionary  coup,  engineered  by 
men  seeking  to  destroy  our  civilization  generally, 
somewhat  more  was  required  than  merely  an  eight 
year  old  booklet.  The  thing  had  to  be  brought 
down  to  date  and  a  far-reaching  plot  constructed. 
Hence  the  Senate  Committee  dragged  in  Mr. 
Margolis  and  made  him  a  scapegoat.  Mr.  Margolis 
is  a  well  known  Anarchist  attorney  of  Pittsburgh. 
He  has  the  reputation  of  having  served  ably  as 
counsel  for  several  trade-union  organizations,  and 
has  a  wide  circle  of  acquaintances  among  labor  men. 
The  Senate  Committee  selected  him  as  the  man  who 
had  organized,  with  my  hearty  support  and  co-opera- 
tion, the  real  force  behind  the  strike,  the  I.  W.  W.'s, 
Anarchists  and  Bolshevists. 

Now  the  fact  is  that  Mr.  Margolis  had  nothing 
whatever  to  do,  officially  or  unofficially,  with  the 
policies  or  management  of  either  the  organizing  cam- 
paign or  the  strike.  He  had  no  connection  with  the 
Strike  committee;  nor  did  he  ever  even  speak  at  a 
union  meeting  of  steel  workers  during  the  whole 
movement  in  question.  If  he  wrote  an  article  in 
some  radical  paper,  or  spoke  to  a  meeting  of  Russian 
workmen  in  Youngstown,  endorsing  the  strike,  as  is 
said,  he  did  it  purely  as  an  individual  sympathizer 
acting  upon  his  own  initiative.  Mr.  Margolis  freely 

[154] 


stated  this  on  the  stand,  and  every  union  official  in 
Pittsburgh  knew  it  to  be  the  case.  So  did  the  in- 
vestigating Senators;  but  it  the  better  served  their 
purpose  to  enlarge  upon  Mr.  Margolis'  activities, 
in  the  hope  that  his  radical  reputation  would  lend 
color  to  the  plot  theory  which  they  were  laboring 
so  hard  to  establish,  and  which  was  so  advantageous 
to  the  Steel  Trust. 

In  their  final  report  the  Senators  continued  their 
plot  "  evidence  "  and  insinuations,  so  persistently 
worked  up  all  through  their  hearings.  They  ig- 
nored highly  important  testimony  tending  to  put 
the  movement  in  its  right  light  as  a  strictly  trade- 
union  affair,  and  gave  prominence  to  everything  to 
the  contrary.  They  elevated  unheard-of  I.  W.  W.'s 
into  powerful  strike  leaders  and  surrounded  the  most 
ordinary  comings  and  goings  with  revolutionary 
mystery.  Where  they  lacked  facts  they  cast  sus- 
picion, leaving  a  vicious  daily  press  to  draw  its  own 
conclusions. 

Although  they  expressed  great  concern  for  the 
sufferings  of  the  public  in  strikes,  and  advocated  the 
establishment  of  an  industrial  tribunal  to  prevent 
them  in  the  future,  the  worthy  Senators,  nevertheless, 
recommended  no  means  to  end  the  steel  strike.  So 
far  as  they  were  concerned,  apparently  they  were 
willing  to  have  the  steel  strike  fought  to  a  conclu- 
sion. At  one  of  the  Senate  Committee  hearings, 
John  Fitzpatrick,  Chairman  of  the  National  Com- 
mittee, agreed  to  arbitration.  But  later  Mr.  Gary 
gave  an  emphatic  "  No  "  to  this  proposition.  Mr. 
Gary's  wishes  usually  had  decisive  weight  with  the 
Senators,  so  the  matter  was  settled. 

[155] 


On  October  1—3,  1919,  a  national  conference 
called  by  the  Industrial  Relations  Department  of 
the  Interchurch  World  Movement  met  at  the  Hotel 
Pennsylvania  in  New  York  and  adopted  a  resolution 
providing  for  a  full  investigation  of  the  steel  strike, 
then  a  burning  public  question.  Under  the  terms 
of  this  resolution  the  Industrial  Relations  Depart- 
ment set  up  an  independent  Commission  of  In- 
quiry, composed  of  representative  churchmen  from 
all  over  the  country  who  should  be  responsible  for 
carrying  out  the  investigation.  This  Commission 
consisted  of  Bishop  Francis  J.  McConnell  (Meth- 
odist), Chairman,  Dr.  Daniel  A.  Poling  (Evangel- 
ical), vice-Chairman,  Dr.  John  McDowell  (Presby- 
terian), Mrs.  Fred  Bennett  (Board  of  Foreign  Mis- 
sions), Dr.  Nicholas  Van  Der  Pyl  (Congrega- 
tional), Dr.  Alva  W.  Taylor  (Disciples),  and  Mr. 
Geo.  W.  Coleman  (Baptist). 

In  order  to  commit  the  investigation  of  technical 
data  to  the  hands  of  trained  men,  the  Industrial 
Relations  Department  obtained  the  services  of  the 
Bureau  of  Industrial  Research,  New  York,  which, 
besides  its  own  researches,  obtained  the  co-operation 
of  various  other  scientific  agencies  and  organized  a 
staff  of  field  workers  whose  principal  members  were : 
Mr.  George  Soule,  Mr.  David  J.  Saposs,  Miss 
Marian  D.  Savage,  Mr.  Marion  K.  Wisehart  and 
Mr.  Robert  Littell.  A  member  of  the  Bureau  of  In- 
dustrial Research,  Mr.  Heber  Blankenhorn,  had 
charge  of  the  field  work  and  later  acted  as  Secretary 
to  the  Commission  of  Inquiry,  which  held  hearings  in 
Pittsburgh,  Chicago,  and  other  steel  centres. 

The  Interchurch  World  Movement,  representing 
[156] 


as  it  does  the  organized  Protestant  millions  of 
America,  is  a  conservative  and  respectable  body,  if 
there  is  such  in  this  country.  Yet  when  it  stepped 
upon  the  toes  of  the  Steel  Trust  by  starting  the  in- 
vestigation it  found  itself  soon  classed  among  the 
revolutionaries.  Persistent  rumors  were  sent  broad- 
cast, and  even  newspaper  stories,  to  the  effect  that 
the  Commission's  investigators  were  "  Bolsheviks  " 
and  that  the  Interchurch  World  Movement  was  per- 
meated with  "  anarchists."  This  hampered  the 
work  greatly,  especially  among  employers.  Finally 
a  threat  of  legal  action  was  necessary  against  a 
large  commercial  organization  which  had  circulated 
the  rumors  officially.  It  eventually  retracted  in  full. 
As  for  the  workers,  they  gave  the  fullest  co-opera- 
tion to  the  investigation. 

Impressed  by  the  scientific  methods  and  apparent 
desire  to  get  at  the  truth  of  the  strike  situation  mani- 
fested in  the  Interchurch  investigation  —  which 
stood  in  striking  contrast  to  the  slipshod,  haphazard 
system,  "  red  "  mania,  and  violent  partiality  towards 
the  steel  companies  shown  by  the  Senate  Committee, 
—  the  strike  leaders  decided  to  ask  the  Commission 
to  undertake  a  settlement  of  the  strike  by  mediation, 
which  the  Commission  had  the  power  to  do  under 
the  resolution  creating  it.  The  workers'  representa- 
tives felt  that  no  stone  should  be  left  unturned  to 
get  a  settlement,  and  that  if  the  powerful  Interchurch 
movement  stirred  in  their  behalf  possibly  Mr.  Gary 
would  be  dislodged  from  his  position. 

Consequently,  John  Fitzpatrick,  Chairman  of  the 
National  Committee,  put  before  Mr.  Blankenhorn  a 
plan  for  the  settlement  of  the  strike  by  mediation. 

[157] 


Mr.  Blankenhorn  felt,  however,  that  it  might  be 
better  to  recommend  that  the  Commission  move  inde- 
pendently, rather  than  as  merely  representing  the 
strikers,  and  submitted  the  following  plan,  which 
was  adopted  by  the  Commission: 

1.  To  mediate  in  behalf  of  all  the  steel  workers,  both 
those  on  strike  and  those  who  had  gone  back  to  work. 

2.  That  the  purpose  of  the  mediation  should  be  to 
establish  a  new  deal  in  the  steel  industry  rather  than 
merely  to  end  the  strike. 

3.  That  the  ending  of  the  strike  should  be  arranged 
solely  with  a  view  to  giving  the  new  deal  the  best  pos- 
sible chance. 

On  December  I,  the  National  Committee  for  Or- 
ganizing Iron  and  Steel  Workers  met  and  formally 
accepted  this  proposition  of  mediation.  What  hap- 
pened next  is  told  in  an  official  statement  to  the  writer 
of  this  book: 

On  December  5  a  committee  from  the  Commission, 
consisting  of  Bishop  McConnell,  Dr.  Poling  and  Dr. 
•  McDowell,  called  on  Mr.  Gary  with  the  purpose  of, 
first,  ascertaining  if  he  would  accept  their  office  as 
mediators;  next,  of  proposing  their  plan  of  mediation 
and  pressing  the  acceptance  of  it  by  the  employers;  and, 
finally,  of  ordering  the  men  back  to  work,  the  strike 
leaders  to  step  out  of  the  situation,  and  the  Commis- 
sion to  set  up  a  permanent  mediation  body  to  bring 
about  a  conference  between  employers  and  employees 
in  the  steel  industry.  There  was  the  feeling  in  the 
Commission  that  extraordinary  concessions  had  been 
made  by  the  leaders  of  the  strike  and  that  any  reasons 
advocated  by  the  employers  for  not  accepting  the 
mediation  plan  would  have  to  be  weighty. 
[158] 


Mr.  Gary  received  the  Commission  courteously  and 
after  minutely  cross-examining  them  concerning  the 
"  anonymous  "  report  of  the  presence  of  "  Bolsheviks  " 
among  them,  he  heard  the  Commission  to  the  extent  of 
learning  the  first  step  in  their  proposal.  He  made  his 
reply  immediately,  an  absolute  refusal  of  arbitration  or 
mediation.  The  Commission  therefore  never  had  any 
opportunity  to  present  the  authorized  acceptance  of  the 
mediation  plan  by  the  other  side  and  in  no  sense  con- 
veyed to  Mr.  Gary  the  extent  of  the  concessions  which 
the  strikers  were  then  willing  to  make.  Mr.  Gary, 
however,  clearly  understood  that  acceptance  of  the 
mediation  plan  would  mean  that  the  men  would  all 
return  to  work  at  once. 

Mr.  Gary  based  his  refusal  on  the  grounds  that  any 
dealings  which  in  any  way  involved  representatives  of 
the  men  then  on  strike  would  be  an  acceptance  of  the 
closed  shop,  sovietism,  and  the  forcible  distribution  of 
property.  Mr.  Gary  said  that  if  the  Commission  rep- 
resented the  men  who  had  gone  back  to  work,  those 
men  were  content;  if  the  Commission  represented  the 
men  who  had  not  gone  back  to  work,  those  men  are 
nothing  but  red  radicals  whom  the  plants  did  not 
want  anyway.  He  said  that  there  was  absolutely  no 
issue  for  discussion  with  the  U.  S.  Steel  Corporation. 

The  Commission  presented  its  view-point  on  the  ad- 
visability of  mediation  at  great  length  and  with  insist- 
ence. Mr.  Gary  did  not  in  any  respect  modify  his 
immediate  decision. 

The  Commission  felt  it  necessary  therefore  to  drop 
the  plan  and  trancmitted  the  following  to  the  National 
Committee : 

December  6,  1919 
Memorandum  for  Mr.   Fitzpatrick: 

The  independent  Commission  of  Inquiry,  instituted 
by  the  Interchurch  World  Movement  to  investigate  the 

[159] 


steel  strike,  received  on  December  2  a  communication 
marked  "  confidential,"  dealing  with  an  official  action 
taken  by  the  National  Committee  for  Organizing  Iron 
and  Steel  Workers,  signed  by  Mr.  Fitzpatrick  and  Mr. 
Foster. 

On  December  5,  members  of  the  Commission  in- 
formally conversed  with  Mr.  Gary  for  two  hours,  pro- 
posing to  plan  a  new  basis  of  relations  in  the  steel  in- 
dustry, with  an  ending  of  the  strike  best  calculated 
to  further  better  relations.  They  offered  to  act  as 
mediators  both  on  behalf  of  the  men  still  on  strike, 
whose  leaders  were  to  order  them  back  and  then  step  out 
of  the  situation,  and  on  behalf  of  still  dissatisfied  men 
who  had  nevertheless  returned  to  work. 

Mr.  Gary  refused  to  confer  with  these  representa- 
tives of  the  churches  as  mediators  in  behalf  of  any 
interests  represented  by  you  in  the  strike,  on  the  ground 
that  the  men  still  out  were  Bolshevist  radicals  who  were 
not  wanted  in  the  mills  and  who  would  not  be  taken 
back. 

And  as  to  mediating  in  behalf  of  any  other  interests, 
Mr.  Gary  said  that  the  men  were  contented  and  that 
"  there  is  no  issue." 

I  am  requested  to  communicate  the  above  information 
to  you  by  the  Chairman  of  the  Commission  of  Inquiry. 

Very  truly  yours, 
H.  BLANKENHORN. 

At  the  time  this  book  goes  to  press  the  findings 
and  recommendations  of  the  Commission  have  not 
yet  been  made  public. 

This  made  the  sixth  attempt  of  the  National 
Committee  to  settle  the  steel  controversy  —  not  to 
mention  the  individual  effort  of  the  Amalgamated 
Association.  They  were :  ( i )  The  letter  from  Mr. 

[i  60] 


Gompers  to  Mr.  Gary  requesting  a  conference; 
(2)  the  visit  to  his  office  of  the  National  Committee 
conference  committee,  equipped  with  the  power  to 
set  a  strike  date;  (3)  the  appeal  to  President  Wilson 
to  arrange  a  conference;  (4)  Organized  Labor's 
resolution  in  the  National  Industrial  Conference  to 
have  that  body  select  an  arbitration  board;  (5)  The 
offer  of  arbitration  by  John  Fitzpatrick  while  testify- 
ing before  the  Senate  Committee;  and,  (6)  the 
Interchurch  mediation  incident. 

But  they  were  all  futile.  Mr.  Gary's  policy  is 
the  time-honored  one  of  all  tyrants,  rule  or  ruin. 
The  unions  had  no  option  but  to  fight,  and  this  they 
did  to  the  best  of  their  ability. 


[161] 


X 

THE  COURSE  OF  THE  STRIKE 

PITTSBURGH     DISTRICT  —  THE     RAILROAD     MEN  — 

CORRUPT     NEWSPAPERS CHICAGO     DISTRICT 

FEDERAL  TROOPS  AT  GARY YOUNGSTOWN  DIS- 
TRICT —  THE  AMALGAMATED  ASSOCIATION  — 

CLEVELAND THE   ROD  A.ND   WIRE  MILL   STRIKE 

THE     BETHLEHEM     PLANTS BUFFALO     AND 

LACKA WANNA  —  WHEELING  AND  STEUBENVILLE 
—  PUEBLO  —  JOHNSTOWN  —  MOB  RULE  —  THE 
END  OF  THE  STRIKE. 

ALTHOUGH  the  Steel  strike  was  national  in  scope 
and  manifested  the  same  general,  basic  tendencies 
everywhere,  nevertheless  it  differed  enough  from 
place  to  place  to  render  necessary  some  indication  of 
particular  events  in  the  various  districts  in  order  to 
convey  a  clear  conception  of  the  movement  as  a 
whole.  It  is  the  purpose  of  this  chapter  to  point  out 
a  few  of  these  salient  features  in  the  several  locali- 
ties and  to  draw  some  lessons  therefrom. 

In  the  immediate  Pittsburgh  district,  due  to  the 
extreme  difficulties  under  which  the  organizing  work 
was  carried  on  and  the  strike  inaugurated,  the  shut- 
down was  not  so  thorough  as  elsewhere.  Consider- 
able numbers  of  men,  notably  in  the  skilled  trades, 
remained  at  work,  and  the  mills  limped  along,  at 


least  pretending  to  operate.  This  was  exceedingly 
bad,  Pittsburgh  being  the  strategic  centre  of  the 
strike,  as  it  is  of  the  industry,  and  the  companies 
were  making  tremendous  capital  of  the  fact  that  the 
mills  there  were  still  producing  steel.  Accordingly, 
the  National  Committee  left  no  stone  unturned  to 
complete  the  tie-up,  already  75  per  cent,  effective. 
But  under  the  circumstances,  with  meetings  banned 
and  picketing  prohibited,  it  was  out  of  the  question 
to  reach  directly  the  men  who  had  stayed  at  work. 
The  key  to  the  situation  was  in  the  hands  of  the 
railroad  men. 

Operating  between  the  various  steel  plants  and 
connecting  them  up  with  the  main  lines,  there  are 
several  switching  roads,  such  as  the  Union  Railroad 
and  the  McKeesport  and  Monongahela  Connecting 
Lines.  They  are  the  nerve  centers  of  the  local  steel 
industry.  If  they  could  be  struck  the  mills  would 
have  to  come  to  a  stand-still.  The  National  Com- 
mittee immediately  delegated  organizers  to  investi- 
gate the  situation.  These  reported  that  the  body  of 
the  men  in  the  operating  departments  were  organ- 
ized; that  they  had  no  contracts  with  the  steel  com- 
panies, and  that  they  were  ready  for  action,  but 
awaiting  co-operation  from  their  respective  national 
headquarters. 

Consequently,  the  National  Committee  arranged 
a  conference  in  Washington  with  responsible  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Brotherhoods  and  laid  the  situation 
before  them.  In  reply  they  stated  that  their  policy 
was  strictly  to  observe  their  contracts  wherever 
they  had  such,  and  that  their  men  would  be 
forbidden  to  dg  work  around  the  mills  not  done 

[163] 


by  them  prior  to  the  strike.  It  was  up  to  the 
men  on  the  non-contract  roads  and  yards  to  decide 
for  themselves  about  joining  the  strike.  We  in- 
formed them  then  that  the  situation  was  such,  with 
the  men  scattered  through  many  locals,  that  merely 
leaving  it  up  to  them  was  insufficient;  it  would  be 
impossible  for  them  to  act  together  without  direct 
aid  and  encouragement  from  their  higher  officials. 
We  made  the  specific  request  that  each  of  the  or- 
ganizations send  a  man  into  Pittsburgh  to  take  a 
strike  vote  of  the  men  in  question,  who  are  all  em- 
ployees of  the  steel  companies.  They  took  the  mat- 
ter under  advisement;  but  nothing  came  of  it,  al- 
though long  afterwards,  when  the  opportune  moment 
had  passed,  organizer  J.  M.  Patterson  of  the  Rail- 
way Carmen  (also  of  the  Trainmen)  was  authorized 
to  take  a  strike  vote.  Thus  was  lost  the  chance  to 
close  down  these  strategic  switching  lines  and  with 
them,  in  all  likelihood,  several  big  mills  in  the  most 
vital  district  in  the  entire  steel  industry. 

Throughout  the  strike  zone  general  disappoint- 
ment was  expressed  by  the  steel  workers  at  the  ap- 
parent lack  of  sympathy  with  their  cause  shown  by 
the  officials  of  the  Brotherhoods.  The  steel 
workers,  bitterly  oppressed  for  a  generation  and 
fighting  desperately  towards  the  light  in  the  face  of 
unheard-of  opposition,  turned  instinctively  for  aid 
to  their  closely  related,  powerfully  organized  fellow 
workers,  the  railroad  men.  And  the  latter  could 
easily  have  lent  them  effective,  if  not  decisive  assist- 
ance without  violating  a  contract  or  in  any  way  en- 
dangering their  standing.  It  was  not  to  be  expected 
that  the  trunk  line  men,  working  as  they  were  under 

[164] 


government  agreements,  would  refuse  to  haul  the 
scab  steel;  but  there  were  many  other  ways,  perfectly 
legitimate  under  current  trade-union  practice  and 
ethics,  in  which  help  could  have  been  given;  yet  it 
was  not.  From  Youngstown  and  elsewhere  the  rail- 
road men  who  did  go  on  strike  in  the  mill 
yards  complained  with  bitterness  that  they  were 
neglected  and  denied  strike  benefits,  and  that  the 
rule  that  no  road  man  should  do  work  around  the 
mills  not  customary  before  the  strike  was  flagrantly 
violated.  Usually  the  rank  and  file  were  strongly 
disposed  to  assist  the  hard-pressed  steel  workers,  and 
they  could  have  everywhere  wonderfully  stiffened 
the  strike,  but  the  necessary  encouragement  and  co- 
operation from  the  several  headquarters  was  lack- 
ing. Truth  demands  that  these  unpleasant  things 
be  set  down. »  Labor  can  learn  and  progress  only 
through  a  frank  acknowledgment  and  discussion  of 
its  weaknesses,  mistakes  and  failures. 

In  addition  to  all  their  other  handicaps  the  Pitts- 
burgh district  strikers  had  to  contend  with  a  par- 
ticularly treacherous  local  press.  Everywhere  our 
daily  papers  are  newspapers  only  by  courtesy  of  a 
misapplied  term.  They  are  sailing  under  false 
colors.  Pretending  to  be  purveyors  of  unbiased  ac- 
counts of  current  happenings,  they  are  in  reality 
merely  propaganda  organs,  twisting,  garbling  and 
suppressing  facts  and  information  in  the  manner  best 
calculated  to  further  the  interests  of  the  employing 
class.  The  whole  newsgathering  and  distributing 
system  is  a  gigantic  mental  prostitution.  Conse- 
quently, considering  the  issues  involved,  it  was  not 
surprising  to  see  the  big  daily  papers  take  such  a  de- 

[165] 


cided  stand  against  the  steel  workers.  Everywhere 
in  steel  districts  the  papers  were  bad  enough,  but 
those  in  the  Pittsburgh  district  outstripped  all  the 
rest.  They  gave  themselves  over  body  and  soul  to 
the  service  of  the  Steel  Trust. 

From  the  first  these  Pittsburgh  papers  were 
violently  antagonistic  to  the  steel  workers.  Every 
sophistry  uttered  by  Mr.  Gary  to  the  effect  that  the 
strike  was  an  effort  to  establish  the  "  closed  shop,"  a 
bid  for  power,  or  an  attempt  at  revolution,  the 
papers  echoed  and  re-echoed  ad  nauseum.  They 
played  up  the  race  issue,  virtually  advising  the  Amer- 
icans to  stand  together  against  the  foreigners  who 
were  about  to  overwhelm  them.  They  painted  the 
interests  of  the  country  as  being  synonymous  with 
those  of  the  steel  companies  and  tried  to  make 
Americanism  identical  with  scabbery.  For  them  no 
further  proof  of  one's  patriotism  was  needed  than 
to  go  back  to  the  mills.  Every  clubbing  of  strikers 
was  the  heroic  work  of  the  law-abiding  against  reck- 
less mobs.  Strike  "  riots  "  were  manufactured  out 
of  whole  cloth.  For  instance,  when  the  senators  in- 
vestigating the  strike  were  visiting  the  Homestead 
mills,  a  couple  of  strike-breakers  quarreling  with 
each  other,  several  blocks  away,  fired  a  shot.  An 
hour  later  screaming  headlines  told  the  startled  popu- 
lace of  Pittsburgh  that  "  STRIKERS  SHOOT  AT 
SENATORS  "  and  "  MOB  ATTACKS  SENATE 
COMMITTEE."  Even  the  stand-pat  senators  had 
to  protest  that  this  was  going  it  too  strong. 

In  revenge  for  an  alleged  dynamiting  in  Donora, 
Pa.,  the  authorities  swooped  down  upon  the  union 
headquarters,  arrested  101  strikers  present,  including 

[166] 


organizer  Walter  Hodges,  and  charged  them  with 
the  crime.  Since  there  was  not  a  shred  of  evidence 
against  the  accused,  they  were  all  eventually  dis- 
charged. Then  the  Donora  Herald,  which  forever 
yelped  that  the  organizers  advocated  violence,  had 
this  to  say : 

One  of  the  reasons  we  have  sedition  preached  in 
America  is  because  we  have  grand  juries  like  that  at 
Washington  (Pa.)  this  week  which  ignored  the  dyna- 
miting cases.  Possibly  the  biggest  mistake  of  all  was 
made  in  not  using  rifles  at  the  time  instead  of  turn- 
ing the  guilty  parties  over  to  the  very  sensitive  mercies 
of  the  grand  jury. 

But  the  journalistic  strike-breaking  master-stroke 
was  an  organized  effort  to  stampede  the  men  back 
to  work  by  minimizing  the  .strike's  effectiveness. 
First  the  papers  declared  that  only  a  few  thousands 
of  Pittsburgh's  steel  workers  went  out.  Then  they 
followed  this  for  weeks  with  stories  of  thousands  of 
men  flocking  back  to  the  mills.  Full  page  advertise- 
ments begged  the  men  to  go  back;  while  flaming 
headlines  told  us  that  "MEN  GO  BACK  TO 
MILLS,"  "STEEL  STRIKE  WANING," 
"  MILLS  OPERATING  STRONGER,"  "  MORE 
MEN  GO  BACK  TO  WORK,"  etc.  It  became  a 
joke,  but  the  patient  Pittsburgh  people  couldn't  see 
it.  Said  Wm.  Hard  in  the  Metropolitan  for  Feb- 
ruary, 1920: 

"  Mr.  Foster,"  I  said,  "  I  am  going  to  be  perfectly 
frank   with   you.     I    know   your   strike's    a   fizzle    of 
course,  but  I  know  more.     I  not  only  take  pains  to 
[167] 


read  the  telegraphic  dispatches  of  the  news  from  the 
managers  of  the  steel  mills,  but  I  keep  the  clippings. 
I  have  the  history  of  your  strike  in  cold  print.  Hardly 
anybody  struck  anyhow,  in  most  places,  except  some 
foreigners;  and  then  they  began  at  once  to  go  back  in 
thousands  and  thousands  and  new  thousands  every  day 
for  months.  If  you  claim  there  were  300,000  strikers, 
I  don't  care.  I've  counted  up  the  fellows  that  went 
back  to  work,  and  I've  totalled  them  up  day  by  day. 
They're  a  little  over  4,800,000.  So  you're  pretty  far 
behind." 

But  despite  everything  —  the  suppression  of  free 
speech  and  free  assembly,  Cossack  terrorism,  official 
tyranny,  prostitution  of  the  courts,  attacks  from  the 
lying  press,  and  all  the  rest  of  it  —  the  steel  workers 
in  the  immediate  Pittsburgh  district  (comprising  the 
towns  along  the  Allegheny  and  Monongahela  rivers 
from  Apollo  to  Monessen)  made  a  splendid  fight. 
The  very  pressure  seemed  to  hold  them  the  better  to- 
gether. Their  ranks  were  never  really  broken,  the 
strike  being  weakened  only  by  a  long,  costly  wearing- 
away  process.  The  stampede  back  to  work,  so 
eagerly  striven  for  by  the  employers,  did  not  ma- 
terialize. In  the  beginning  of  the  strike  the  Pitts- 
burgh district  was  the  weakest  point  in  the  battle 
line ;  at  the  end  it  was  one  of  the  very  strongest. 


The  Chicago  district  struck  very  well,  but  it 
weakened  earlier  than  others.  This  was  because  the 
employers  scored  a  break-through  at  Indiana  Harbor 
and  Gary,  particularly  the  latter  place,  which  shat- 
tered the  whole  line. 

Gary,  the  great  western  stronghold  of  the  United 
[168] 


States  Steel  Corporation,  was  the  storm  center  of  the 
Chicago  district  at  all  times.  Hardly  had  the  or- 
ganization campaign  begun  in  1918,  when  the  Gary 
Tribune  bitterly  assailed  the  unions,  accusing  them  of 
advocating  evasion  of  the  draft,  discouragement  of 
liberty  bond  sales,  and  general  opposition  to  the  war 
program.  These  lies  were  run  in  a  full  page  edi- 
torial in  English,  and  repeated  in  a  special  eight  page 
supplement  containing  sixteen  languages,  a  half  page 
to  each.  Many  thousands  of  copies  were  scattered 
broadcast.  Other  attacks  in  a  similar  vein  followed. 
It  was  a  foul  blast  straight  from  the  maw  of  the 
Steel  Trust.  Incidentally  it  created  a  situation 
which  shows  how  the  steel  men  control  public  opin- 
ion. 

The  new  unions  immediately  boycotted  the  Tri- 
bune. Result :  the  Gary  Post,  somewhat  friendly  in- 
clined, doubled  its  circulation  at  once.  The  Post 
then  became  more  friendly;  whereupon,  it  is  alleged, 
a  leading  banker  called  the  editor  to  his  office  and 
told  him  that  if  he  did  not  take  a  stand  against  the 
unions  his  credit  would  be  stopped,  which  would  have 
meant  suspension  within  the  week.  That  very  day 
the  Post  joined  the  Tribune's  campaign  of  abuse. 
Apparently  the  Post's  youthful  editor  had  learned  a 
new  wrinkle  in  journalism. 

The  Steel  Trust  did  all  it  could  to  hold  Gary  from 
unionizing;  but  when  the  strike  came  the  walkout 
was  estimated  to  be  97  per  cent.  At  first  everything 
went  peacefully,  but  the  Steel  Corporation  was 
watching  for  an  opportunity  to  get  its  strategic  Gary 
mills  into  operation.  The  occasion  presented  itself 
on  October  4,  when  strikers  coming  from  a  meeting 

[169] 


fell  foul  of  some  homeward  bound  scabs.  Local  la- 
bor men  declare  the  resultant  scrimmage  "  did  not 
make  as  much  disturbance  as  ordinarily  would  occur 
in  a  saloon  when  two  or  three  men  were  fighting." 
It  was  a  trivial  incident  —  a  matter  for  the  police. 
Only  one  man  was  injured,  and  he  very  slightly. 
But  the  inspired  press  yelled  red  murder  and  pic- 
tured the  hospitals  as  full  of  wounded.  The  militia 
were  ordered  in.  The  unions  offered  to  furnish  700 
ex-service  men  to  enforce  law  and  order;  but  this 
was  rejected.  Later  the  militia  were  transferred  to 
Indiana  Harbor;  on  October  6,  a  provisional  regi- 
ment of  regular  troops,  under  command  of  General 
Leonard  Wood,  came  to  Gary  from  nearby  Fort 
Sheridan,  and  martial  law  was  at  once  proclaimed. 
The  Steel  Corporation  now  had  the  situation  in 
hand;  and  the  Gary  strike  was  doomed. 

Grave  charges  were  voiced  against  the  misuse 
made  of  the  Federal  troops  in  Gary.  John  Fitz- 
patrick  writes  me  as  follows,  basing  his  statements 
upon  reliable  witnesses: 

Now  we  have  military  control,  the  city  of  Gary 
being  placed  under  martial  law.  The  strike  leaders  and 
pickets  were  arrested  by  the  soldiers  and  put  to  work 
splitting  wood  and  sweeping  the  streets.  This  was  most 
humiliating,  because  the  camp  was  across  the  street 
from  the  city  hall  and  in  the  most  frequented  part  of 
the  city. 

When  street-sweeping  here  did  not  break  their  spirits, 
these  men  were  taken  to  the  back  streets,  where  they 
had  their  homes  and  where  their  own  and  the  neighbor's 
children  watched  them  through  the  windows. 

The  so-called  foreigners  have  great  respect  for  law 
[170] 


and  authority,  especially  military  authority,  which 
plays  such  a  big  part  in  their  native  environments.  The 
U.  S.  Steel  Corporation  did  not  fail  to  take  advantage 
of  this.  In  the  first  place  they  gave  out  the  impression 
that  the  letters  "  U.  S."  in  the  corporation's  name  indi- 
cated that  it  was  owned  by  the  U.  S.  Government,  and 
that  the  Government  soldiers  being  in  town  meant  that 
any  one  interfering  with  the  steel  company's  affairs 
would  be  deported  or  sent  to  Fort  Leavenworth. 

Then  a  mill  superintendent  would  take  a  squad  of 
soldiers  and  go  to  the  home  of  a  striker.  The  soldiers 
would  be  lined  up  in  front  of  the  house;  the  superin- 
tendent would  go  in.  He  would  tell  John  that  he 
came  to  give  him  his  last  chance  to  return  to  work, 
saying  that  if  he  refused  he  would  either  go  to  jail 
or  be  deported.  Then  he  would  take  John  to  the 
window  and  show  him  the  row  of  soldiers.  John  would 
look  at  the  wife  and  kids  and  make  up  his  mind  that 
his  first  duty  was  to  them ;  that  was  what  the  strike  was 
for  anyway.  So  he  would  put  on  his  coat  and  go  back 
to  the  mills.  Then  the  superintendent  would  go  to  the 
next  house  and  repeat  the  performance. 

Such  tactics,  coupled  with  spectacular  midnight 
raids  to  "  unearth  "  the  widely  advertised  "red" 
plotters, —  conveniently  ignored  until  the  strike, — 
the  suppression  of  meetings,  limitations  on  picket- 
ing, and  the  hundred  forms  of  studied  intimidation 
practiced  by  the  soldiery,  in  a  few  weeks  broke  the 
backbone  of  the  strike.  And  while  the  regular 
troops  operated  so  successfully  and  systematically 
against  the  workers  in  Gary,  the  militia  did  almost 
as  well  in  Indiana  Harbor,  where  the  strike  also 
cracked. 

The  great  re-actionary  interests  which  backed  Gen- 


eral  Wood  for  the  Republican  presidential  nomina- 
tion, including  the  Steel  Trust,  are  giving  him 
boundless  credit  for  breaking  the  steel  strike  in  Gary. 
Consequently  there  are  many  workers  who  believe 
the  whole  affair  was  staged  to  further  his  political 
fortunes.  If  not,  how  did  it  happen  that  the  militia, 
who  could  have  handled  the  situation  easily,  were 
sent  out  of  Gary  to  make  room  for  his  regulars? 
And  why  was  it  that  before  there  was  a  sign  of 
trouble  General  Wood  had  formed  his  provisional 
regiment,  shipped  it  from  Fort  Dodge  to  Fort 
Sheridan,  and  made  other  active  preparations  to  in- 
vade Gary?  And  then,  how  did  it  come  that  he 
took  charge  of  the  situation  in  person,  when  at  best 
it  was  only  a  colonel's  job?  In  fact,  how  about  the 
whole  wretched  business?  Was  it  merely  a  politi- 
cal stunt  to  give  General  Wood  the  publicity  that 
came  to  him  for  it? 

The  collapse  at  Gary  and  Indiana  Harbor  affected 
adversely  South  Chicago  and  almost  the  whole 
Chicago  district.  Worse  still,  it  weakened  the  mo- 
rale everywhere;  and  thus  undermined,  the  strike 
rapidly  disintegrated.  By  the  middle  of  Novem- 
ber, district  secretary  De  Young  reported  that  all 
the  mills  in  the  district,  except  those  in  Joliet  and 
Waukegan,  were  working  crews  from  50  to  85  per 
cent,  of  normal,  although,  due  to  green  hands  and 
demoralized  working  forces,  production  averaged 
considerably  lower.  And  the  situation  gradually 
grew  worse.  Joliet  and  Waukegan,  however,  held 
fast  to  the  end,  making  a  fight  comparable  with  that 
of  the  men  in  Peoria  and  Hammond,  who  had  gone 
out  several  weeks  before  September  22.  It  was  at 

[172] 


the  latter  place  that  police  and  company  guards  brut- 
ally shot  down  and  killed  four  strikers  on  Septem- 
ber 9. 


In  the  immediate  Youngstown  district  the  strike 
was  highly  effective,  hardly  a  ton  of  steel  being  pro- 
duced anywhere  for  several  weeks.  This  was  due 
largely  to  the  walkout  of  the  railroad  men  employed 
in  the  mill  yards,  who  acted  on  their  own  volition. 
Many  of  these  belonged  to  the  Brotherhoods,  and 
others  to  the  Switchmen's  Union,  while  some  were 
unorganized;  but  all  struck  together.  Then  they 
held  joint  mass  meetings,  got  an  agreement  from 
the  A.  F.  of  L.  unions  that  they  would  be  protected 
and  represented  in  any  settlement  made,  and  stuck 
loyally  to  the  finish.  They  were  a  strong  mainstay 
of  the  strike. 

The  weakening  of  the  strike  began  about  Novem- 
ber 15.  In  a  number  of  plants,  notably  those  of 
the  Trumbull  Steel  Company  and  the  Sharon  Steel 
Hoop  Company,  the  Amalgamated  Association  of 
Iron,  Steel  and  Tin  Workers  had  agreements  cover- 
ing the  skilled  steel  making  trades,  but  when  the 
laborers  struck  these  skilled  men  had  to  quit  also. 
The  break  in  the  district  came  when  the  Amalga- 
mated Association  virtually  forced  the  laborers  back 
to  work  in  these  shops  in  order  to  get  them  in  opera- 
tion. This  action  its  officials  justified  by  the  follow- 
ing clause  in  their  agreements: 

It  was  agreed  that  when  a  scale  or  scales  are  signed 
in  general  or  local  conferences,  said  scales  or  contracts 
shall  be  considered  inviolate  for  that  scale  year,  and 
should  the  employees  of  any  departments  (who  do  not 

[173] 


come  under  the  above  named  scales  or  contracts)  be- 
come members  of  the  Amalgamated  Association  during 
the  said  scale  year,  the  Amalgamated  Association  may 
present  a  scale  of  wages  covering  said  employees,  but 
in  case  men  and  management  cannot  come  to  an  agree- 
ment on  said  scale,  same  shall  be  held  over  until  the 
next  general  or  local  conference,  and  all  men  shall 
continue  work  until  the  expiration  of  the  scale  year. 

Relying  upon  their  rights  under  this  clause,  the 
companies  naturally  refused  to  give  the  laborers  any 
consideration  whatever  until  the  end  of  the  scale 
year.  This  meant  that  the  latter  were  told  to  work 
and  wait  until  the  following  June,  when  their  griev- 
ances would  be  taken  up.  The  result  was  disas- 
trous; the  laborers  generally  lost  faith  in  the  Amal- 
gamated Association,  feeling  that  they  had  been 
sacrificed  for  the  skilled  workers.  They  began  to 
flock  back  to  work  in  all  the  plants.  Then  men  in 
other  trades  took  the  position  that  it  was  foolish 
for  them  to  fight  on,  seeing  that  the  Amalgamated 
Association  was  forcing  its  men  back  into  the  mills. 
A  general  movement  millward  set  in.  By  December 
10  the  strike  was  in  bad  shape.  In  passing  it  may 
be  noted  that  in  Pittsburgh  and  other  places  where 
it  had  contracts,  the  Amalgamated  Association  took 
the  same  action,  with  the  same  general  results,  al- 
though not  so  extensive  and  harmful  as  in  the 
Youngstown  district.  In  Cleveland  the  charters 
were  taken  from  local  unions  that  refused  to  abide 
by  this  clause. 

The  other  trades  affiliated  with  the  National 
Committee  protested  against  the  enforcement  of  the 
clause.  They  declared  it  to  be  invalid,  because  it 

[174] 


violated  trade-union  principles  and  fundamental  hu- 
man rights.  Seeing  that  no  consideration  was  given 
the  laborers  under  the  agreement,  their  right  to 
strike  should  have  been  preserved  inviolate.  It 
verged  upon  peonage  to  tie  them  up  with  an  agree- 
ment that  gave  them  no  protection  yet  deprived  them 
of  the  right  to  defend  themselves.  These  trades 
freely  predicted  that  to  enforce  the  clause  would 
break  the  strike  in  the  Youngstown  district,  as  it  was 
altogether  out  of  the  question  to  ask  men  who  had 
been  on  strike  two  months  (especially  men  inexperi- 
enced in  unionism)  to  resume  work  upon  such 
conditions.  But  all  arguments  were  vain;  the 
Amalgamated  Association  officials  were  as  adamant. 
They  held  their  agreements  with  the  employers  to 
be  sacred  and  to  rank  above  any  covenants  they  had 
entered  into  with  the  co-operating  trades.  They 
would  enforce  them  to  the  letter  —  the  interests  of 
the  laborers,  the  mechanical  trades,  and  even  the 
strike  itself,  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding.  Be- 
ing a  federated  body,  the  National  Committee  had 
to  bow  to  this  decision  and  stand  by,  helpless,  while 
its  effects  worked  havoc  with  the  strike. 

Into  Youngstown,  in  common  with  all  the  other 
districts,  armies  of  scabs  were  poured.  It  was  the 
policy  of  the  United  States  Steel  Corporation  to 
operate,  or  at  least  to  pretend  to  operate  its  mills, 
regardless  of  cost.  So  all  the  "  independents  "  had 
to  do  likewise.  Word  came  to  the  National  Com- 
mittee of  several  companies  which,  rather  than  try 
to  run  with  the  high-priced,  worthless  strikebreakers, 
would  have  been  glad  either  to  settle  with  the  unions 
or  to  close  their  plants.  But  they  were  afraid  to  do 

[175] 


cither;  Gary  had  said  "  Operate,"  and  it  was  a  case 
of  do  that  or  risk  going  out  of  business. 

The  demand  for  scabs  .was  tremendous.  Prob- 
ably half  the  strike-breaking  agencies  in  the  country 
were  engaged  in  recruiting  them.  Thousands  of 
negroes  were  brought  from  the  South,  and  thousands 
of  guttersnipe  whites  from  the  big  northern  cities. 
But  worst  of  all  were  the  skilled  steel  workers  from 
outlying  sections.  There  were  many  of  such  men 
who  went  on  strike  in  their  own  home  towns,  sneaked 
away  to  other  steel  centres  and  worked  there  until 
the  strike  was  over.  Then  they  would  return  to 
their  old  jobs  with  cock-and-bull  stories  (for  the 
workers  only)  of  having  worked  in  other  industries, 
thus  seeking  to  escape  the  dreaded  odium  of  being 
known  as  scabs.  These  contemptible  cowards,  being 
competent  workers,  wrought  incalculable  injury  to 
the  strike  everywhere,  especially  in  the  Youngstown 
district. 

The  Youngstown  authorities,  to  begin  with,  were 
reasonably  fair  towards  the  strikers ;  but  as  the  strike 
wore  on  and  the  steel  companies  and  business  men 
became  desperate  at  the  determined  resistance  of  the 
workers,  they  began  to  apply  "  Pennsylvania  tactics." 
In  Youngstown  and  East  Youngstown,  Mayors 
Graver  and  McVey  prohibited  meetings,  "  the  ob- 
ject of  which  is  discussion  of  matters  pertaining  to 
prolonging  the  strike."  l  On  November  22,  dis- 
trict secretary  McCadden,  and  organizers  John 
Klinsky  and  Frank  Kurowsky  were  arrested  in  East 
Youngstown,  charged  with  criminal  syndicalism  and 
held  for  $3,000  bonds  each.  Later  a  whole  local 

1  Youngstown  Vindicator,  November  24,  1919. 
[I76] 


union,  No.  104  Amalgamated  Association,  was  ar- 
rested in  the  same  town  for  holding  a  business  meet- 
ing. "  Citizens'  committees "  were  formed,  and 
open  threats  made  to  tar  and  feather  all  the  or- 
ganizers and  drive  them  out  of  town.  But  the  steel 
companies  were  unable  to  inflame  public  opinion  suf- 
ficiently for  them  to  venture  this  outrage. 

Afterward  the  organizers  were  discharged;  and 
in  releasing  the  men  arrested  for  holding  a  business 
meeting,  Judge  David  G.  Jenkins  said: 

I  regard  the  ordinance  (E.  Youngstown  anti-free 
assembly)  as  a  form  of  hysteria  which  has  been  sweep- 
ing the  country,  whereby  well-meaning  people,  in  the 
guise  of  patriots,  have  sought  to  preserve  America  even 
though  going  to  the  extent  of  denying  the  fundamental 
principles  upon  which  Americanism  is  based,  and  free 
assemblage  is  one  of  those  fundamentals. 

In  the  principal  outlying  towns  of  the  Youngstown 
district,  namely  Butler,  Farrell,  Sharon,  Newcastle 
and  Canton,  the  strikers  were  given  the  worst  of  it. 
The  first  four  being  Pennsylvania  towns,  no  specific 
description  of  them  is  necessary.  Suffice  it  to  say 
that  typical  Cossack  conditions  prevailed.  In  Can- 
ton it  was  not  much  better.  The  companies  turned 
loose  many  vicious  gunmen  on  the  strikers.  The 
mayor  was  removed  from  office  and  his  place  given 
to  a  company  man ;  and  a  sweeping  injunction  was  is- 
sued against  the  strikers,  denying  them  many  funda- 
mental rights.1  The  district,  nevertheless,  held  re- 
markably well. 

Cleveland  from  the  first  to  the  last  was  one  of  the 

1  No  history  of  the  movement  in  the  Youngstown  district  could  be 
complete  without  some  mention  of  the  assistance  rendered  the  work- 
ers by  Bishop  John  Podea  of  the  Roumanian  Greek  Catholic  church, 

[177] 


strong  points  in  the  battle  line.  On  September  22 
the  men  struck  almost  100  per  cent,  in  all  the  big 
plants,  and  until  the  very  end  preserved  a  wonderful 
solidarity.  Under  the  excellent  control  of  the  or- 
ganizers working  with  Secretary  Raisse  there  was 
at  no  time  a  serious  break  in  the  ranks,  and  when  the 
strike  was  called  off  on  January  8,  at  least  50  per 
cent,  of  the  men  were  still  out,  with  production  not 
over  30  per  cent,  of  normal.  Thousands  of  the  men 
refused  to  go  back  to  the  mills  at  all,  leaving  them 
badly  crippled. 

The  backbone  of  the  Cleveland  strike  was  the 
enormous  mills  of  the  American  Steel  and  Wire  Co. 
This  calls  attention  to  the  fact  that,  as  a  whole,  the 
employees  of  this  subsidiary  of  the  U.  S.  Steel  Cor- 
poration made  incomparably  a  better  fight  than  did 
the  workers  in  any  other  considerable  branch  of  the 
steel  industry.  Long  after  the  strike  had  been 
cracked  in  all  other  sections  of  the  industry,  the  rod 
and  wire  mill  men  of  Cleveland,  Donora,  Braddock, 
Rankin,  Joliet  and  Waukegan  stood  practically  solid. 
Even  as  late  as  December  27,  only  twelve  days  be- 
fore the  end,  the  companies  were  forced  to  the  ex- 
pedient of  assembling  a  rump  meeting  in  Cleveland 
of  delegates  from  many  centres,  for  the  purpose  of 

Youngstown,  and  Rev.  E.  A.  Kirby,  pastor  of  St.  Rose  Roman  Cath- 
olic church  of  Girard,  Ohio.  Usually  the  churchmen  (of  all  faiths) 
in  the  various  steel  towns  were  careful  not  to  jeopardize  the  fat 
company  contributions  by  helping  the  unions.  But  not  these  men. 
They  realized  that  all  true  followers  of  the  Carpenter  of  Nazareth 
had  to  be  on  the  side  of  the  oppressed  steel  workers ;  and  throughout 
the  entire  campaign  they  distinguished  themselves  by  unstinted  co- 
operation with  the  unions.  The  service  was  never  too  great  nor  the 
call  too  often  for  them  to  respond  willingly. 


calling  off  the  strike.  But  the  men  voted  unani- 
mously for  continuation  under  the  leadership  of  the 
National  Committee.  When  the  strike  was  finally 
ended,  however,  they  accepted  the  decision  with  good 
grace,  because  they  were  penetrated  with  the  general 
strike  idea  and  realized  the  folly  of  trying  alone  to 
whip  the  united  steel  companies. 

The  remarkable  fight  of  the  rod  and  wire  mill 
men.  was  due  in  large  measure  to  the  peculiar  circum- 
stances surrounding  their  organization.  These  are 
highly  important  and  require  explanation:  The 
•regular  system  used  by  the  National  Committee  re- 
sulted usually  in  organization  from  the  bottom  up- 
ward; that  is,  in  response  to  the  general  appeals 
made  to  the  men  in  the  great  mass  meetings,  ordi- 
narily the  first  to  join  the  unions  were  the  unskilled, 
who  are  the  workers  with  the  least  to  lose,  the  most 
to  gain,  and  consequently  those  most  likely  to  take  a 
chance.  Gradually,  as  the  confidence  of  the  men 
developed,  the  movement  would  extend  on  up 
through  the  plants  until  it  included  the  highest 
skilled  men.  Given  time  and  a  reasonable  opportun- 
ity, it  was  an  infallible  system.  It  was  far  superior 
to  the  old  trade-union  plan  of  working  solely  from 
the  top  down,  because  the  latter  always  stopped  be- 
fore it  got  to  the  main  body  of  the  men,  the  unskilled 
workers. 

The  "  bottom  upward  "  system  was  used  with  the 
rod  and  wire  mills,  the  same  as  with  all  others. 
But  while  it  was  operating  the  skilled  men  who  had 
been  attracted  to  the  movement  in  Joliet,  Donora 
and  Cleveland  started  a  "  top  downward "  move- 
ment of  their  own.  They  sent  committees  to  all  the 

[179] 


large  rod  and  wire  mills  in  the  country,  appealing  to 
the  skilled  men  to  organize.  These  committeemen, 
actual  workers  and  acquainted  with  all  the  old  timers 
in  the  business,  could  do  more  real  organizing  in  a 
day  with  their  tradesmen  than  regular  organizers 
could  in  a  month.  Hardly  would  they  go  into  a 
locality,  no  matter  how  difficult,  than  they  would  at 
once  inspire  that  confidence  in  the  movement  which 
is  so  indispensible,  and  which  takes  organizers  so 
long  to  develop.  The  result  was  a  "  top  down- 
ward "  movement  working  simultaneously  with  the 
"  bottom  upward  "  drive,  which  produced  a  high  de- 
gree of  organization  for  the  rod  and  wire  mill  men. 
A  great  weakness  of  the  strike  was  the  failure  of 
many  skilled  workers  to  participate  therein.  This 
tended  directly  to  aid  the  employers,  and  also  to 
discourage  the  unskilled  workers,  who  looked  for 
their  more  expert  brothers  to  take  the  lead  in  the 
strike  as  well  as  in  the  regular  shop  experiences. 
The  explanation  has  been  offered  that  this  aloof- 
ness was  because  the  skilled  men  are  "  unorganiz- 
able."  But  this  is  a  dream.  In  the  mills  controlled 
by  it,  the  Amalgamated  Association  (which  is  really 
a  skilled  workers'  union)  has  thousands  of  them  in 
its  ranks,  most  of  whom  earn  higher  wages  than  em- 
ployees of  similar  classes  in  the  Trust  mills.  If  the 
proper  means  to  organize  them  could  have  been  ap- 
plied, the  skilled  workers  would  have  been  the 
leaders  in  the  late  strike,  instead  of  generally  the 
scabs.  The  same  thing  done  in  the  rod  and  wire 
mills  should  have  been  done  in  all  the  important  sec- 
tions of  the  industry,  blast  furnaces,  open  hearths, 
sheet,  tin,  rail,  plate,  tube  mills,  etc.  Committees 

[180] 


of  well-known  skilled  workers  in  these  departments 
should  have  been  sent  forth  everywhere  to  start 
movements  from  the  top  to  meet  the  great  surge 
coming  up  from  the  bottom.  Had  this  been  done, 
then  Gary  with  all  his  millions  could  not  have  broken 
the  strike.  The  tie-up  would  have  been  so  complete 
and  enduring  that  a  settlement  would  have  been  com- 
pulsory. 

But  it  was  impossible;  the  chronic  lack  of  resources 
prevented  it.  With  the  pitifully  inadequate  funds 
and  men  at  its  disposal,  all  the  National  Committee 
could  do  was  to  go  ahead  with  its  general  campaign, 
leaving  the  detail  and  special  work  undone.  It  is 
certainly  to  be  hoped  that  in  the  next  big  drive  this 
committee  system  will  be  extensively  followed.  It 
is  the  solution  of  the  skilled  worker  problem,  and 
when  applied  intelligently  in  connection  with  the 
fundamental  "  bottom  upward  "  movement,  it  must 
result  in  the  organization  of  the  industry. 


In  the  Bethlehem  Steel  Company's  plants  the 
strike  was  not  very  effective.  This  was  due  prin- 
cipally to  the  failure  of  previous  strikes  and  to  gen- 
eral lack  of  organization.  In  Reading  and  in 
Lebanon  there  had  been  strikes  on  for  many  weeks 
before  the  big  walkout.  The  workers'  ranks  there 
were  already  broken.  In  Sparrows'  Point  likewise 
several  departments  had  been  on  strike  since  May 
3.  Not  more  than  500  men,  principally  laborers 
and  tin  mill  workers,  responded  to  the  general  strike 
call;  but  they  made  a  hard  fight  of  it.  In  Steelton 
the  men  had  been  very  strongly  organized  during  the 
war ;  but  the  error  was  made  of  putting  all  the  trades 

[181] 


into  one  federal  union.  Then  when  the  craft  unions 
insisted  later  that  their  men  be  turned  over  to  them, 
the  resultant  resistance  of  the  members,  and  espe- 
cially of  the  paid  officers,  virtually  destroyed  the  or- 
ganization. When  the  strike  came  only  a  small 
percentage  struck,  nor  did  they  stick  long. 

Speaking  of  the  strike  in  the  main  plant  at  Beth- 
lehem, Secretary  Hendricks  says: 

The  strike  was  called  September  29,  and  about  75 
per  cent,  of  the  men  responded.  These  were  largely 
American  workers.  The  Machinists,  which  comprise 
about  40  per  cent,  of  the  total  workers,  were  the  craft 
most  involved.  In  the  mill  and  blast  furnace  depart- 
ments, the  response  was  among  the  rollers,  heaters, 
and  highly  skilled  men  generally,  which  led  to  the  com- 
plete shut-down  of  these  departments.  The  molders 
practically  shut  the  foundries  down.  Electrical  work- 
ers, steamfitters,  millwrights,  and  general  repairmen 
responded  well.  The  patternmakers  did  not  go  out. 

The  first  break  came  a  week  later.  It  was 
charged  largely  to  the  steam  engineers,  who  heeded 
the  strike-breaking  advice  of  their  international  of- 
ficials and  returned  to  work.  Another  factor  was 
the  failure  of  support  from  the  railroad  men  on  the 
inter-plant  system.  Had  these  two  bodies  of  men 
been  held  in  line  by  their  officers,  the  Bethlehem 
strike  would  have  been  a  success. 

In  the  Bethlehem  situation  too  much  reliance  was 
placed  in  the  skilled  trades;  more  attention  should 
have  been  given  to  the  organization  of  the  real  fight- 
ing force,  the  unskilled  workers.  Another  mistake 
was  to  have  allowed  the  strikes  to  take  place  in 
Reading,  Lebanon  and  Sparrows'  Point.  Even  a 


tyro  could  see  that  they  had  no  hope  of  success. 
Those  men  could  easily  have  been  held  in  line  until 
the  big  strike,  to  the  enormous  strengthening  of  the 
latter.  The  National  Committee  had  little  to  do 
with  the  Bethlehem  situation  before  the  strike,  the 
movement  developing  to  a  great  extent  indepen- 
dently. 

Nowhere  in  the  strike  zone  was  there  a  more  bit- 
ter fight  than  in  the  Buffalo  district,  which  was  di- 
rected by  organizers  Thompson  and  Streifler.  All 
the  important  plants  were  affected,  but  the  storm  cen- 
tered around  the  Lackawanna  Steel  Company.  This 
concern  left  nothing  undone  to  defeat  its  workers. 
For  eight  months  it  had  prevented  any  meetings 
from  being  held  in  Lackawanna,  and  then,  when 
the  workers  broke  through  this  obstruction  and 
crowded  into  the  unions,  it  discharged  hundreds  of 
them.  This  put  the  iron  into  the  workers'  hearts, 
and  they  made  an  heroic  struggle.  So  firm  were 
their  ranks  that  when  the  general  strike  was  called 
off  on  January  8,  they  voted  to  continue  the  fight  in 
Lackawanna.  But  this  was  soon  seen  to  be  hope- 
less. 

Much  company  violence  was  used  in  the  Lacka- 
wanna strike.  The  New  York  State  Constabulary 
and  the  company  guards,  of  a  cut  with  their  odious 
Pennsylvania  brethren,  slugged,  shot  and  jailed  men 
and  women  in  real  Steel  Trust  style.  Many  strikers 
were  injured,  and  two  killed  outright.  One  of  these, 
Joseph  Mazurek,  a  native-born  American,  was 
freshly  back  from  the  fighting  in  France.  Lacka- 
wanna was  just  a  little  bit  of  an  industrial  hell.1 

1  In   connection   with   this   matter   it   is   interesting   to  note   that 


As  a  strike  measure  the  Lackawanna  Steel  Com- 
pany evicted  many  strikers  from  the  company  houses. 
In  Braddock,  Rankin,  Homestead,  Butler,  Wierton, 
Natrona,  Bethlehem  and  many  other  places,  the 
companies  put  similar  pressure  upon  their  men, 
either  evicting  them  or  foreclosing  the  mortgages 
on  their  half-paid-for  houses.  Threats  of  such  ac- 
tion drove  thousands  back  to  work,  it  being  pecu- 
liarly terrifying  to  workers  to  find  themselves  de- 
prived of  their  homes  in  winter  time.  Where  evic- 
tions actually  occurred  the  victims  usually  had  to 
leave  town  or  find  crowded  quarters  with  other 
strikers.  The  much-lauded  housing  schemes  of  the 
steel  companies  are  merely  one  of  a  whole  arsenal  of 
weapons  to  crush  the  independence  of  their  workers. 
No  employer  should  be  permitted  to  own  or  control 
the  houses  in  which  his  men  live. 


The  Wheeling  district  is  noted  as  strong  union 
country.  The  "  independent "  mills  therein  had 
provided  the  main  strength  of  the  Amalgamated 
Association  for  several  years  prior  to  this  move- 
ment; but  the  Trust  mills  were  still  unorganized. 
Under  the  guidance  of  National  Committee  local 
secretary  J.  M.  Peters,  however,  these  men,  in 
the  mills  of  Wheeling,  Bellaire,  Benwood  and 
Martin's  Ferry,  were  brought  into  the  unions.  On 
September  22  they  struck  100  per  cent.,  completely 
closing  all  the  plants.  They  held  practically  solid 

after  the  strike  had  ended  the  union  men  entered  suits  against  the 
steel  companies  for  heavy  damages.  Up  to  the  present  writing 
the  Lackawanna  Steel  Company,  realizing  the  indefensibility  of 
the  outrages,  has  made  out-of-court  settlements  to  the  extent  of 
$32,500. 

[I84] 


until  the  first  week  in  December,  when  they  broke 
heavily. 

The  immediate  cause  of  this  break  merits  explana- 
tion. The  National  Committee,  at  the  outset 
of  the  strike,  organized  a  publicity  department, 
headed  by  Mr.  Edwin  Newdick,  formerly  of  the  Na- 
tional War  Labor  Board.  In  addition  to  getting 
out  strike  stories  for  the  press,  many  of  which  were 
written  by  the  well-known  novelist,  Mary  Heaton 
Vorse,  this  department  assembled  and  issued  in 
printed  bulletin  form  statistical  information  relative 
to  the  progress  and  effectiveness  of  the  strike.  The 
steel  companies,  through  spies  in  the  unions,  news- 
papers, etc.,  disputed  this  information,  telling  the 
strikers  that  they  were  being  victimized  as  the  mills 
in  all  districts  except  their  own  were  in  full  operation, 
and  advising  them  to  send  out  committees  to  investi- 
gate the  situation. 

It  was  a  seductive  argument  and  many  were  de- 
ceived by  it.  Consequently,  quite  generally,  such 
committees  (usually  financed  and  chaperoned  by  the 
local  Chambers  of  Commerce)  went  forth  from 
various  localities.  Of  course,  they  returned  the  sort 
of  reports  the  companies  wished.  Much  harm  was 
done  thereby.  The  Steubenville  district  suffered 
from  the  lying  statement  of  such  a  committee,  the 
strikers  having  made  a  winning  fight  up  till  the  time 
it  was  made  public,  the  middle  of  November.  But 
nowhere  was  the  effect  so  serious  as  in  the  Wheeling 
district. 

The  Wheeling  committee  was  headed  by  one 
Robert  Edwards,  widely  known  for  years  as  an  ex- 
treme radical.  It  visited  many  points  in  the  steel 

[185] 


industry,  taking  its  figures  on  steel  production  and 
strike  conditions  from  employers'  sources,  and  com- 
pletely ignoring  national  and  local  strike  officials 
everywhere.  The  ensuing  report  pictured  the  steel 
industry  as  virtually  normal.  Although  he  had  been 
recently  expelled  from  the  Amalgamated  Association 
Edwards  still  had  great  influence  with  the  men,  and 
his  report  broke  their  ranks.  In  future  general 
strikes  drastic  disciplinary  measures  should  be  taken 
to  forestall  the  activities  of  such  committees. 


Of  the  6500  men  employed  by  the  Colorado  Fuel 
and  Iron  Co.  in  its  Pueblo  mills,  95  per  cent,  walked 
out  on  September  22.  When  the  strike  was  called 
off  three  and  one-half  months  later  not  over  1500  of 
these  had  returned  to  their  jobs.  Production  was 
below  20  per  cent,  of  normal.  Locally  the  tie-up 
was  so  effective  that  on  January  9,  at  the  biggest 
labor  meeting  in  Pueblo's  history,  National  Com- 
mittee local  secretary  W.  H.  Young  and  the  other 
organizers  had  to  beg  the  men  for  hours  to  go  back 
to  work.  These  officials  knew  that  the  great 
struggle  had  been  decided  in  the  enormous  steel 
centers  of  the  East  (Pueblo  being  credited  with  pro- 
ducing only  two  per  cent,  of  the  nation's  steel)  and 
that  it  would  be  madness  for  them  to  try  to  win  the 
fight  alone. 

The  heart  of  the  Pueblo  strike  was  opposition  to 
the  Rockefeller  Industrial  Plan,  in  force  in  the  mills. 
This  worthless,  tyrannical  arrangement  the  men 
could  not  tolerate  and  were  determined  to  contest  to 
the  end.  Realizing  the  minor  importance  of  the 
Pueblo  mills  in  the  national  strike,  the  men  offered 

[186] 


at  the  outset  to  waive  all  their  demands  pending  its 
settlement,  provided  the  company  would  agree  to 
meet  with  their  representatives  later  to  take  up  these 
matters.  But  this  was  flatly  refused;  it  was  either 
accept  the  Rockefeller  Plan  or  fight,  even  though  98 
per  cent,  of  the  men  had  voted  to  abolish  it. 

Shortly  after  this  incident  John  D.  Rockefeller, 
Jr.,  gained  much  favorable  comment  and  pleas- 
ing publicity  by  his  glowing  speech  about  in- 
dustrial democracy  and  the  right  of  collective  bar- 
gaining, delivered  at  the  National  Industrial  Con- 
ference at  Washington,  D.  C.  He  was  hailed  as 
one  of  the  country's  progressive  employers.  But 
when  the  striking  Pueblo  workers  wired  him,  request- 
ing that  he  grant  them  these  rights,  he  referred  them 
to  Mr.  Welborn,  President  of  the  C.  F.  and  I.  Com- 
pany, well  knowing  that  this  gentleman  would  deny 
their  plea. 

The  strike  was  markedly  peaceful  throughout,  no 
one  being  hurt  and  hardly  any  one  arrested.  But  on 
December  28,  the  state  militia  were  suddenly 
brought  in,  ostensibly  because  of  an  attack  supposed 
to  have  been  made  two  days  previously  upon  Mr.  F. 
E.  Parks,  manager  of  the  Minnequa  works.  The 
public  never  learned  the  details  of  this  mysterious  af- 
fair which  served  so  well  to  bring  in  the  troops. 
Nor  was  the  "  culprit  "  ever  located,  although  large 
rewards  were  offered  for  his  capture. 


The  Johnstown  strike  was  so  complete  that  for 
eight  weeks  the  great  Cambria  Steel  Co.,  despite 
strenuous  efforts,  could  not  put  a  single  department 


of  its  enormous  mills  into  operation.  Every  trick 
was  used  to  break  the  strike.  The  Back-To-Work 
organization  1  labored  ceaselessly,  holding  meetings 
and  writing  and  telephoning  the  workers  to  coax  or 
intimidate  them  back  to  their  jobs.  Droves  of  scabs 
were  brought  in  from  outside  points.  But  to  no 
effect;  the  workers  held  fast.  Then  the  company 
embarked  upon  the  usual  Pennsylvania  policy  of  ter- 
rorism. 

I,  personally,  was  the  first  to  feel  its  weight.  I 
was  billed  to  speak  in  Johnstown  on  November  7. 
Upon  alighting  from  the  train  I  was  met  by  two 
newspaper  men  who  advised  me  to  quit  the  town  at 
once,  stating  that  the  business  men  and  company  of- 
ficials had  held  a  meeting  the  night  before  and  or- 
ganized a  "  Citizens'  Committee,"  which  was  to 
break  the  strike  by  applying  "  Duquesne  tactics." 
Beginning  with  myself,  all  the  organizers  were  to 
be  driven  from  the  city.  Disregarding  this  warn- 
ing, I  started  for  the  Labor  Temple ;  but  was  again 
warned  by  the  newspapermen,  and  finally  stopped  on 
the  street  by  city  detectives,  who  told  me  that  it 
would  be  at  the  risk  of  my  life  to  take  a  step  nearer 
the  meeting  place.  I  demanded  protection,  but  it 
was  not  forthcoming.  I  was  told  to  leave. 

In  the  meantime,  Secretary  Conboy  arriving  upon 
the  scene,  the  two  of  us  started  to  the  Mayor's  of- 
fice to  protest,  when  suddenly,  in  broad  daylight,  at 
a  main  street  corner  in  the  heart  of  the  city,  a  mob 

1  These  Back-To-Work  organizations  were  formed  in  many  steel 
towns;  their  purpose  was  to  recruit  scabs.  They  were  composed  of 
company  officials,  business  men  and  "  loyal "  workers.  The  com- 
panies furnished  the  wherewithal  to  finance  them. 

[188] 


The  Strike  Has  Failed 


J»rt.  ..    .    .1 

pojoiMi*n  p*. 

B63apAui«micb 


Uvufe  tbs  Anerfa! 


Awohate  il  onsiiln  Jeff 

AIHMV^ 

srSyssiSJZjrri 

'tt'  ™  ^i*-"j^^'.-- 
4"*«~  '.TL*™*"  "_~*  *. 


Uvozokit*  ant  nnfcim 
Am«*os. 


tsE^ 
="s7i;- 


Tj-j.-^iit 


(lite  UK  tart?. 


Halloa  Ajnii 
i»"'>ci. 


A^L^J^CTk  ^?t]tjMfrt<l  «•. 


Go  Back  To  Work 


STEEL   TRUST    NEWSPAPER    PROPAGANDA 
Pittsburgh  Chronicle  Telegraph,  October  6,   1919. 


of  about  forty  men  rushed  us.  Shouldering  me  away 
from  Mr.  Conboy,  they  stuck  guns  against  my  ribs 
and  took  me  to  the  depot.  While  there  they  made 
a  cowardly  attempt  to  force  me  to  sign  a  Back-To- 
Work  card,  which  meant  to  write  myself  down  a 
scab.  Later  I  was  put  aboard  an  eastbound  train. 
Several  of  the  mob  accompanied  me  to  Conemaugh, 
a  few  miles  out.  The  same  night  this  "  Citizens' 
Committee,"  with  several  hundred  more,  surrounded 
the  organizers  in  their  hotel  and  gave  them  twenty- 
four  hours  time  to  leave  town.  The  city  authorities 
refused  to  stir  to  defend  them,  and  the  following 
day  organizers  T.  J.  Conboy,  Frank  Hall,  Frank 
Butterworth,  and  Frank  Kurowsky  were  compelled  to 
go.  Domenick  Gelotte,  a  local  organizer  of  the 
miners,  refused  to  depart  and  was  promptly  arrested. 
Up  to  this  time  the  strike  had  been  perfectly  peace- 
ful. The  shut-down  was  so  thorough  that  not  even  a 
picket  line  was  necessary. 

The  mob  perpetrating  these  outrages  (duly 
praised  by  the  newspapers  as  examples  of  100  per 
cent.  Americanism)  was  led  by  W.  R.  Lunk,  secre- 
tary of  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.,  and  H.  L.  Tredennick, 
president  of  the  chamber  of  commerce.  This  pair 
freely  stated  that  the  strike  could  never  be  broken 
by  peaceful  means,  and  that  they  were  prepared  to 
apply  the  necessary  violence,  which  they  did.  Of 
course,  they  were  never  arrested.  Had  they  been 
workers  and  engaged  in  a  similar  escapade  against 
business  men,  they  would  have  been  lucky  to  get  off 
with  twenty  years  imprisonment  apiece. 

After  a  couple  of  weeks  the  organizers  returned 
to  Johnstown.  Their  efforts  at  holding  the  men 


together  were  so  fruitful  that  the  Cambria  Company, 
in  its  own  offices,  organized  a  new  mob  to  drive  them 
out  again.  But  this  time,  better  prepared,  they 
stood  firm.  On  November  29,  when  the  fresh  depor- 
tation was  to  take  place,  Secretary  Conboy  demanded 
that  Mayor  Francke  give  him  and  the  others  protec- 
tion. He  offered  to  furnish  the  city  a  force  of  1000 
union  ex-service  men  to  preserve  law  and  order. 
This  offer  was  refused,  and  the  Mayor  and  Sheriff 
reluctantly  agreed  to  see  that  peace  was  kept.  They 
informed  the  business  men's  mob  that  there  was 
nothing  doing.  It  was  a  tense  situation.  Had  the 
threatened  deportation  been  attempted,  most  seri- 
ous trouble  would  surely  have  resulted. 

In  the  meantime  numbers  of  the  State  Constabu- 
lary had  been  sent  into  town  (the  city  and  county 
authorities  denying  responsibility  for  their  presence) 
and  they  terrorized  the  workers  in  their  customary, 
brutal  way.  Eventually  the  result  sought  by  all  this 
outlawry  developed;  a  break  occurred  in  the  ranks 
of  the  highly-paid,  skilled  steel  workers.  Although 
small  at  first,  the  defection  gradually  spread  as  the 
weeks  rolled  on,  until,  by  January  8,  about  two- 
thirds  of  the  men  had  returned  to  work. 


Considered  nationally,  strike  sentiment  continued 
strong  until  about  the  middle  of  the  third  month, 
when  a  feeling  of  pessimism  regarding  the  outcome 
began  to  manifest  itself  among  the  various  interna- 
tional organizations.  Consequently,  a  meeting  of 
the  National  Committee  was  held  in  Washington  on 
December  13  and  14,  to  take  stock  of  the  situation. 
At  this  meeting  I  submitted  the  following  figures : 

[190] 


Men  on  Strike 

District  Sept.  29 

Pittsburgh 25,000 

Homestead   9,000 

Braddock-Rankin    15,000 

Clairton    4,000 

Duquesne-McKeesport    12,000 

Vandergrif t    4,000 

Natrona-Brackenridge    5,000 

New  Kensington   1,100 

Apollo    1,500 

Leechburg    Z>°°° 

Donora-Monessen    12,000 

Johnstown    18,000 

Coatesville 4,000 

Youngstown  district    70,000 

Wheeling  district    15,000 

Cleveland    25,000 

Steubenville  district    12,000 

Chicago  district   90,000 

Buffalo   12,000 

Pueblo    6,000 

Birmingham    2,000 

Bethlehem  Plants   ( 5 )    20,000 


Men  on  Strike 
Dec.  to 
8,000 
5,500 
8,000 
1,500 
1,000 
1,800 
1,500 

200 

200 

3OO 

10,000 

7,000 

500 

12,800 

3,000 
15,000 

2,000 
l8,OOO 

5,000 
5,000 

500 

2,500 


365,600  109,300 

Estimated  production  of  steel,  50  to  60  per  cent,  of  normal 
capacity. 

Owing  to  the  chaotic  conditions  in  many  steel  dis- 
tricts, it  was  exceedingly  difficult  at  all  times  to  get 
accurate  statistics  upon  the  actual  state  of  affairs. 
Those  above  represented  the  very  best  that  the  Na- 
tional Committee's  whole  organizing  force  could  as- 
semble. The  officials  of  the  Amalgamated  Associa- 
tion strongly  favored  calling  off  the  strike,  but 
agreed  that  the  figures  cited  on  the  number  of  men 
still  out  were  conservative  and  within  the  mark. 
The  opinion  prevailed  that  the  strike  was  still  effec- 
tive and  that  it  should  be  vigorously  continued. 

[190 


On  January  3  and  4,  the  National  Committee  met 
in  Pittsburgh.  At  this  gathering  it  soon  became 
evident  that  the  strike  was  deemed  hopeless,  sa, 
according  to  its  custom  when  important  decisions  had 
to  be  made,  the  National  Committee  called  a  spe- 
cial meeting  for  January  8,  all  the  international  or- 
ganizations being  notified.  The  situation  was  bad. 
Reliable  reports  on  January  8  showed  the  steel  com- 
panies generally  to  have  working  forces  of  from  70 
to  80  per  cent.,  and  steel  production  of  from  60  to 
70  per  cent,  of  normal.  Possibly  100,000  men  still 
held  out;  but  it  seemed  merely  punishing  these  game 
fighters  to  continue  the  strike.  They  were  being  in- 
jured by  it  far  more  than  was  the  Steel  Trust. 
There  was  no  hope  of  a  settlement,  the  steel  com- 
panies being  plainly  determined  now  to  fight  on  in- 
definitely. Therefore,  in  justice  to  the  loyal  strikers 
and  to  enable  them  to  go  back  to  the  mills  with 
clear  records,  the  meeting  adopted,  by  a  vote  of  ten 
unions  to  five,  a  sub-committee's  report  providing 
that  the  strike  be  called  off;  that  the  commissaries 
be  closed  as  fast  as  conditions  in  the  various  locali- 
ties would  permit,  and  that  the  campaign  of  educa- 
tion and  organization  of  the  steel  workers  be  con- 
tinued with  undiminished  vigor. 

At  this  point,  wishing  to  have  the  new  phase  of 
the  work  go  ahead  with  a  clean  slate,  I  resigned  my 
office  as  Secretary-Treasurer  of  the  National  Com- 
mittee. Mr.  J.  G.  Brown  was  elected  to  fill  the 
vacancy.  The  following  telegram  was  sent  to  all 
the  strike  centers,  and  given  to  the  press: 

The  Steel  Corporations,  with  the  active  assistance  of 
[192] 


the  press,  the  courts,  the  federal  troops,  state  police,  and 
many  public  officials,  have  denied  steel  workers  their 
rights  of  free  speech,  free  assembly  and  the  right  to 
organize,  and  by  this  arbitrary  and  ruthless  misuse  of 
power  have  brought  about  a  condition  which  has  com- 
pelled the  National  Committee  for  Organizing  Iron 
and  Steel  Workers  to  vote  today  that  the  active  strike 
phase  of  the  steel  campaign  is  now  at  an  end.  A  vigor- 
ous campaign  of  education  and  re-organization  will  be 
immediately  begun  and  will  not  cease  until  industrial 
justice  has  been  achieved  in  the  steel  industry.  All 
steel  strikers  are  now  at  liberty  to  return  to  work  pend- 
ing preparations  for  the  next  big  organization  move- 
ment. 

John   Fitzpatrick, 
D.  J.  Davis, 
Edw.    J.    Evans, 
Wm.  Hannon, 
Wm.  Z.  Foster. 

The  great  steel  strike  was  ended. 


XI 
NATIONAL  AND  RACIAL  ELEMENTS 

A       MODERN       BABEL  —  AMERICANS       AS       SKILLED 

WORKERS       FOREIGNERS        AS        UNSKILLED 

WORKERS   LANGUAGE      DIFFICULTIES   THE 

NEGRO  IN  THE  STRIKE  —  THE  RACE  PROBLEM 

IN  order  to  prove  its  charge  that  the  purpose  of  the 
steel  strike  was  contrary  to  the  spirit  of  our  institu- 
tions, the  Steel  Trust's  great  propaganda  organiza- 
tion never  ceased  asserting,  ( i )  that  the  strike  was 
a  movement  of  foreigners,  (2)  that  the  Americans 
in  the  mills  were  opposed  to  it  for  patriotic  reasons 
and  were  taking  no  part  therein.  The  vicious  press 
made  much  capital  of  these  allegations,  using  them 
heavily  against  the  strike.  Now  let  us  see  how 
much  truth  there  was  in  them: 

i.  Unquestionably  the  foreign-born  were  in  the 
majority  among  the  strikers;  but  how  could  it  be 
otherwise  in  view  of  the  fact  that  they  make  up  the 
bulk  of  the  working  force  in  the  industry?  The  fol- 
lowing table,  submitted  to  the  Senate  Committee  by 
Mr.  A.  F.  Diehl,  General  Manager  of  the  Du- 
quesne  Works  of  the  Carnegie  Steel  Co.,  illustrates 
this  fact :  l 

1  Senate  Committee  Steel  Strike  Hearings,  page  532. 
[194] 


RECAPITULATION    OF    NATIONALITIES,  AS    OF    AUG. 
1ST,  1919,  FOR  TOTAL  PLANT,  DUQUESNE  WORKS 

Nationality  Total    Per  cent. 

American   2,097  34-6 

American   (colored)    344  5.7 

English    147  2.4 

Scotch   41  .7 

Welsh   28  .5 

Irish    58  .9 

Canadian    4  .1 

German    » 104  1.8 

French    6  .1 

Swedish    79  1.3 

Italian    128  2.1 

Greek    23  .4 

Swiss    5  .1 

Norwegian    4  .1 

Danish    i  .o 

Hollander    i  .o 

Russian   185  3.0 

Lithuanian   201  3.3 

Lattis  3  .o 

Bohemian   3  .o 

Croatian    222  3.7 

Magyar    742  12.2 

Slovak   930  15.3 

Roumanian    7  .1 

Ruthenian    82  1.3 

Bulgarian    25  .4 

Servian    219  3.6 

Polish    246  4.0 

Armenian   34  .5 

Dalmatian    6  .1 

Macedonian  10  .2 

Hebrew 10  .2 

Turkish  80  1.3 


Totals    61075        100.00 

This  condition  is  typical  of  steel  mills  generally  in 
the  greater  Pittsburgh  and  Middle  West  districts, 

[195] 


where  the  body  of  the  industry  is  located.  In  Clair- 
ton,  of  4,600  employees,  divided  into  39  national- 
ities, 35  per  cent,  are  Americans.  On  page  480  of 
the  report  of  the  Senate  Committee  Steel  Strike 
Hearings,  appears  a  table  covering  the  employees  of 
the  Homestead  Steel  Works,  Howard  Axle  Works, 
and  Carrie  Furnaces  (an  industrial  unit),  submitted 
by  General  Manager  J.  S.  Oursler.  It  shows  a  total 
of  14,687  employees,  of  54  nationality  divisions. 
Of  these  employees,  5,799,  or  39.45  per  cent,  are 
stated  to  be  American  whites.  But  as  Mr.  Oursler 
re-iterated  in  his  testimony  that  he  had  classed  as 
Americans  all  those  who  had  their  citizenship 
papers,  both  these  figures  should  therefore  be  con- 
siderably reduced.  Besides,  it  must  be  borne  in 
mind  that  these  several  tables  include  the  office 
forces,  bosses,  etc.,  which  are  almost  entirely  Ameri- 
can, and  which  were  not  involved  in  the  strike.  In 
the  steel  districts  in  question  it  is  exceedingly  doubt- 
ful if  over  25  per  cent,  of  the  actual  workers  are 
American-born  whites.  How,  then,  can  a  general 
strike  of  steel  workers  be  anything  else  than  largely 
a  strike  of  foreigners? 

2.  Regarding  the  alleged  non-participation  of 
Americans  in  the  movement :  Although  in  many  dis- 
tricts where  the  strike  was  practically  100  per  cent, 
effective,  the  Americans  struck  almost  to  a  man  with 
the  other  workers  and  fought  gamely  to  the  finish, 
nevertheless  it  must  be  admitted  that  in  the  main, 
when  compared  with  the  foreigners,1  they  made  a 

1  In  steel  industry  usage  (followed  in  this  book  unless  otherwise 
noted)  the  term  "foreigners"  applies  chiefly  to  the  nationalities  of 
the  later  immigrations,  including  the  Slavic  races,  Roumanians, 

[I96] 


poor  showing.  To  begin  with  they  organized  slowly ; 
then  they  struck  reluctantly  and  scatteringly;  and 
finally,  they  showed  little  tenacity  as  strikers.  But 
this  general  sluggishness  originated,  however,  not  in 
patriotic  objections  to  the  movement  or  lack  of  sym- 
pathy with  its  aims;  but  chiefly  because  the  Ameri- 
cans, as  skilled  workers,  were  naturally  slower  and 
less  determined  in  action  than  the  foreigners,  or  un- 
skilled workers. 

In  the  steel  industry  the  most  skilled  men  are  to 
be  found  in  those  trades  actually  engaged  in  the  mak- 
ing and  rolling  of  iron  and  steel  —  the  melters,  pud- 
dlers,  shearmen,  rollers,  roughers,  heaters,  Bes- 
semer blowers,  etc.  These  men  are  paid  upon  a  ton- 
nage basis  and  generally  receive  considerably  higher 
wages  than  the  mechanical  tradesmen  —  bricklayers, 
machinists,  boilermakers,  riggers,  firemen,  engineers, 
electrical  workers,  blacksmiths,  etc.,  who  build,  main- 
tain and  generally  operate  the  plants.  It  is  among 
the  favored  tonnage  trades  that  the  Americans  are 
especially  intrenched. 

In  the  old  days  these  highly  skilled  workers  took 
the  initiative  in  the  struggle  for  human  rights  in  the 
steel  industry  —  the  mechanical  trades  and  unskilled 
workers  playing  a  very  minor  part.  Homestead 
was  one  of  their  great  battles,  only  752  of  the  3800 
men  employed  being  union  members  in  good-stand- 
ing. They  were  then  bold,  militant  and  tenacious  as 

Bulgarians,  Hungarians,  Greeks,  Italians  and  others  from  Eastern 
and  Southern  Europe.  These  are  the  so-called  "  hunkies."  The 
peoples  of  the  earlier  immigrations  —  the  English,  Irish,  Scotch, 
Welsh,  Germans  and  Scandinavians  —  who  speak  our  language, 
hold  good  jobs,  and  are  generally  well  established,  are  not  exactly 
considered  Americans,  but  they  are  rarely  called  foreigners. 

[197] 


bull  dogs.  But  since  those  times  they  have  been  de- 
feated so  often,  due  to  a  weakening  of  their  propor- 
tional strength  and  strategical  position,  that  they 
have  lost  much  of  the  independent  spirit  which  once 
characterized  them.  They  now  fear  the  power  of 
the  Steel  Trust;  they  dread  its  pitiless  blacklist;  they 
hesitate  to  put  in  jeopardy  their  comparatively  good 
jobs,  which  they  secured  only  after  long  years  of 
service  in  minor  positions,  and  which,  once  lost,  are 
so  hard  to  regain.  They  want  better  conditions 
now  as  much  as  they  ever  did,  but  they  lack  the  self- 
confidence  to  fight  for  them.  All  through  the  cam- 
paign their  attitude,  barring  the  exceptions  here  and 
there,  was  to  wait  until  the  lesser  skilled  men  had  so 
far  perfected  the  organization  as  to  make  it  seem 
safe  for  them  to  join  it.  When  the  strike  came  the 
unskilled  workers  led  the  way;  then  came  the  mechan- 
ical trades;  with  the  aristocratic  steel  workers  bring- 
ing up  the  rear.  But  in  scurrying  back  to  scab  in 
the  mills,  the  order  was  just  the  reverse.  This  was 
the  experience  in  virtually  every  section  of  the  in- 
dustry. 

It  would  be  wrong,  however,  to  say  that  the  failure 
of  American  workers  to  participate  more  heartily  in 
the  movement  was  due  solely  to  their  favored  posi- 
tion in  the  industry.  To  some  extent  race  prejudice 
also  came  into  play,  especially  in  those  districts  where 
the  organization  had  not  yet  reached  far  enough  up 
into  the  plants  to  include  the  skilled  workers. 
Everywhere  American-born  workingmen,  unfortu- 
nately, are  prone  to  look  with  some  suspicion,  if  not 
contempt  and  hatred,  upon  foreigners,  whom  they 
have  been  taught  to  believe  are  injuring  their  stan- 

[198] 


dard  of  living.  The  companies  made  the  most  of 
this.  Dubbing  the  walkout  a  "  hunky  "  strike,  they 
told  the  Americans  that  if  it  succeeded  the  latter 
would  have  to  give  over  to  the  despised  foreigners 
all  the  good  jobs  and  shop  privileges  they  enjoyed. 
Their  slogan  was  "  Don't  let  the  '  hunkies  '  rule  the 
mills."  They  openly  circulated  handbills  inciting 
to  race  war.  The  following,  from  Elwood,  Pa., 
where  a  National  Tube  Company  plant  is  located, 
is  typical : 

WAKE  UP  AMERICANS!  ! 

ITALIAN  LABORERS,  organized  under  the  American 
Federation  of  Labor  are  going  to  strike  Monday  and 
are  threatening  workmen  who  want  to  continue  work- 
ing. 

These  foreigners  have  been  told  by  labor  agitators 
that  if  they  would  join  the  union  they  would  get 
Americans'  jobs. 

They  are  being  encouraged  by  ITALIAN   MER- 
CHANTS, who  are  in  sympathy  with  them. 
ARE  YOU  GOING  TO  SLEEP  AND  LET  MOB 
RULE    THREATEN    THE    PEACE    OF    OUR 
TOWN? 

In  towns  where  often  the  foreign  population  is 
three-fourths  of  the  whole,  such  propaganda  was 
most  inflammatory.  The  newspapers  did  all  they 
could  to  make  it  more  so.  They  solemnly  warned 
of  the  danger  of  a  foreign  uprising  and  advised  a 
campaign  of  militant,  100  per  cent.  Americanism; 
which  meant,  on  the  one  hand  for  the  local  author- 
ities, gunmen,  and  business  men  to  set  up  a  reign  of 
terror,  and  on  the  other,  for  the  workers  all  to  go 
back  to  work  at  once.  The  courts  and  so-called 


peace  officers  did  their  part.  They  jailed,  clubbed 
and  shot  the  foreigners  and  left  the  Americans,  even 
if  they  were  strikers,  in  comparative  immunity. 
Nothing  was  left  undone  to  create  a  race  issue,  and 
it  is  not  surprising  that  many  American  workers,  un- 
organized and  ignorant,  were  mislead  by  this  and 
inveigled  back  to  the  mills. 

It  has  been  charged  that  the  unions  neglected  the 
American  steel  workers  and  concentrated  upon  the 
organization  of  the  foreigners.  If  anything,  the  re- 
verse is  true;  for  by  far  the  weight  of  the  appeal 
made  was  to  the  English  speaking  elements.  Every 
piece  of  literature  put  out  stressed  heavily  the 
English  language.  Of  twenty-five  National  Com- 
mittee district  and  local  secretaries,  only  three  were 
born  in  Europe;  of  a  dozen  Amalgamated  Associa- 
tion organizers,  not  one  spoke  anything  but  English, 
and  of  the  crew  as  a  whole,  over  80  per  cent,  were 
American  born.  By  its  very  nature  such  an  organiz- 
ing force  had  to  make  strong  appeal  to  the  American 
workers.  In  fact,  the  foreigners  constantly  insisted 
upon  this,  because,  strangers  in  a  strange  land,  they 
always  crave  and  seek  American  co-operation  in  their 
union  movements.  That  this  co-operation  was  not 
more  in  evidence  in  the  steel  campaign  was  the 
cause  of  much  bitter  complaint  among  them. 


But  if  the  Americans  and  skilled  workers  gener- 
ally proved  indifferent  union  men  in  the  steel  cam- 
paign, the  foreign,  unskilled  workers  covered  them- 
selves with  glory.  Throughout  the  whole  affair 
they  showed  an  understanding  discipline,  courage 
and  tenacity  of  purpose  that  compared  favorably 

[200] 


with  that  shown  in  any  organized  effort  ever  put 
forth  by  workingmen  on  this  continent.  Beyond 
question  they  displayed  trade-union  qualities  of  the 
very  highest  type.  Their  solidarity  was  unbreak- 
able; their  fighting  spirit  invincible.  They  nobly 
struggled  onward  in  the  face  of  difficulties  that  would 
try  the  stoutest  hearts.  They  proved  themselves 
altogether  worthy  of  the  best  American  labor  tra- 
ditions. Thousands  of  them  were  intending  to  re- 
turn to  Europe  shortly  and  apparently  had  slight 
reason  to  establish  good  conditions  here;  but  they 
fought  on,  many  spending  their  little  savings  during 
the  strike,  and  thus  postponing  indefinitely  the  long- 
looked-for  trip  to  the  homelands. 

This  attitude  of  the  foreign  workers  is  a  bitter 
pill  for  the  Steel  Trust.  For  many  years  it  had 
scoured  the  countries  of  Eastern  and  Southern 
Europe,  and  packed  its  mills  with  poor,  dispirited, 
ignorant  immigrants  of  three  score  nationalities,  in 
the  hope  that  it  was  finally  supplanting  its  original 
crew  of  independent  American  and  Western  Europ- 
ean workmen  by  a  race  of  submissive,  unorganizable 
slaves.  And  for  a  long  time  this  shameful  policy 
worked  well.  Wages  sank  to  nowhere;  conditions 
became  unspeakably  wretched;  every  strike  of  the 
old-time,  organized  workers  was  smothered  by  an 
avalanche  of  job-hungry  immigrants.1  But  now 

1  The  brazen  frankness  with  which  this  policy  was  carried  out  is 
illustrated  by  the  following  advertisement,  which  appeared  in  the 
Pittsburgh  Gazette-Times,  July  15,  1909,  during  the  big  steel  strike 
of  that  time: 

MEN  WANTED  —  Tinners,  catchers  and  helpers  to  work  in  open 
shops.  Syrians,  Poles  and  Roumanians  preferred.  Steady 
employment  and  good  wages  to  men  willing  to  work.  Fare 
paid  and  no  fees  charged. 

[201] 


these  foreigners  are  waking  up;  in  consequence  of 
hard  economic  conditions,  a  better  acquaintance  with 
our  language  and  institutions,  an  inherent  class  soli- 
darity, the  example  of  union  men  in  other  industries, 
and  the  social  upheavals  in  Europe,  these  men  are 
opening  their  eyes;  and  they  are  fast  taking  their 
place  in  the  very  front  rank  of  the  working  class 
fighters  for  industrial  liberty.  And  now  the  Steel 
Trust,  discovering  that  its  hoped-for-scabs  are  in 
truth  highly  rebellious  workingmen,  is  making  the 
welkin  ring  with  inconsistent  denunciation  of  the 
"  revolutionary  foreigners,"  with  whom  just  a  short 
while  ago  it  was  so  anxious  to  crowd  its  plants.  The 
biter  has  been  very  badly  bitten. 

For  the  unions  the  nationality  problem  was  serious 
throughout  the  entire  campaign  —  the  employers 
had  worked  for  years  to  make  it  an  insoluble  one. 
Something  of  the  situation  may  be  gleaned  when  it 
is  recalled  that  the  steel  industry  comprises  hundreds 
of  mills,  scattered  through  a  dozen  states,  and  em- 
ploying half  a  million  workers.  These  speak  dozens 
of  widely  differing  languages,  worship  through  many 
mutually  antagonistic  religions,  and  are  moved  by 
numberless  racial  and  national  animosities.  Yet  the 
National  Committee,  with  the  skimped  resources  it 
had  in  hand,  had  to  and  did  weld  together  this  vast 
polyglot,  heterogeneous  mass  into  a  voluntary  or- 
ganization, kept  it  thinking  alike,  and  held  it  in 
strong  discipline  for  months  in  the  face  of  the  bitter 
opposition  of  the  Steel  Trust,  which  sought  in  every 
conceivable  way  to  divide  the  workers  by  playing 
upon  their  multiplicity  of  fears  and  prejudices. 

In  accomplishing  this  huge  task  the  first  requisite 
[202] 


was  to  overcome  the  language  difficulty  sufficiently 
to  permit  the  message  of  trade  unionism  to  be 
brought  forcefully  to  the  many  diverse  elements. 
Because  doing  so  would  have  rendered  the  meetings 
ruinously  cumbersome  and  unwieldy,  it  was  out  of 
the  question  to  utilize  all  the  languages  or  any  con- 
siderable number  of  them ;  so  the  plan  was  followed 
of  using  only  the  predominant  ones;  the  theory  be- 
ing that  if  the  large  bodies  of  workers  speaking  them 
could  be  reached,  they  in  turn  would  find  means  to 
influence  the  minorities  speaking  other  languages. 

As  the  various  foreign  groups  tend  strongly  to 
colonize  in  certain  districts,  the  basic  languages 
spoken  in  a  given  plant,  regardless  of  how  many 
nationalities  work  therein,  ordinarily  number  not 
more  than  four  or  five,  including  always  English, 
usually  a  couple  of  the  Slavic  tongues  (Slavish,  Pol- 
ish, Russian,  Croatian,  Lithuanian,  Serbian,  etc.), 
often  Hungarian,  and  occasionally  Italian,  Rouman- 
ian or  Greek.  For  example,  among  the  fifty-four 
nationalities  in  the  big  Homestead  plants,  the  prin- 
cipal languages  spoken  are,  in  the  order  of  their 
numerical  importance,  English,  Slavish,  Russian, 
Hungarian  and  Polish.  Move  these  predominate 
language  groups  and  you  move  the  whole  working 
force;  that  was  the  system  in  the  steel  campaign. 
Seldom  was  a  piece  of  literature  issued,  even  for 
national  circulation,  with  as  many  as  six  languages 
upon  it;  the  vitally  important  strike  call  had  but 
seven,  while  four  was  the  customary  number. 

About  twenty-five  organizers  who  spoke  these  pre- 
dominating languages  were  put  in  the  field.  Great 
care  was  taken  by  the  A.  F.  of  L.,  National  Com- 

[203] 


mittee  and  co-operating  unions  to  select  reliable, 
level-headed  men  of  influence  and  standing  among 
their  respective  peoples,  men  who  could  be  depended 
upon  to  go  along  with  the  general  program,  and  not 
to  work  upon  some  destructive  side-issue  of  their 
own.  Besides,  efforts  were  made  to  take  every  pos- 
sible advantage  of  the  fact  that  practically  all  the 
foreign  workers  have  some  slight  smattering  of 
English.  Accordingly,  the  English-speaking  organ- 
izers were  coached  to  get  rid  of  all  trade-union 
technical  expressions  and  to  confine  their  talks  to 
fundamentals;  to  speak  slowly,  distinctly,  and  in  the 
simplest,  even  "  pidjinized  "  terms,  to  illustrate  the 
whole  with  sign  language,  and  to  follow  out  a  sys- 
tem of  repetition  and  restatement  that  was  bound 
to  make  their  meaning  plain  to  the  most  unknowing. 
Such  talks,  while  not  calculated  to  stir  the  emotions, 
made  clear  the  situation  and  were  greatly  appreci- 
ated by  the  foreigners,  thousands  of  whom,  during 
the  steel  campaign,  for  the  first  time  felt  the  pleas- 
ure and  encouragement  of  understanding  the  des- 
pairingly difficult  English  spoken  from  a  platform. 
The  steel  workers'  meetings  were  schools  in  prac- 
tical Americanization.1 

With  the  language  problem  solved  in  even  this 
imperfect  way,  the  persistent  advocacy  of  labor  union 
principles,  backed  up  by  a  few  thoroughgoing,  com- 

1  During  the  great  organization  drive  in  the  Chicago  packing 
houses  in  1917-18,  this  method  -was  used  for  several  months  in  the 
large  local  union  of  car  builders  and  repairmen,  fully  90  per  cent, 
of  whom,  born  in  Eastern  Europe,  were  supposedly  non-English- 
speaking.  As  a  result  they  acquired  such  confidence  in  their  ability 
to  use  the  language  that  they  dropped  the  customary  practice  of 
translating  all  their  business  into  several  languages  and  took  to 
using  English  only. 

[204]; 


mon-sense  systems  of  organization,  did  the  rest. 
Gradually  the  great  armies  of  linguistically,  relig- 
iously, racially  divided  steel  workers  were  united 
into  the  mighty  force  which  threw  itself  against  the 
Steel  Trust.  In  the  main  the  foreign  workers  were 
simple,  sincere,  earnest  minded  folk,  naturally  dis- 
posed to  co-operative  effort.  While  the  individual- 
istic, sophisticated  American  workers  all  too  often 
attended  the  ball  games  and  filled  the  pool  rooms, 
the  foreigners  packed  the  union  meeting  halls. 
Their  worst  fault  was  a  woeful  unacquaintance  with 
trade-union  methods.  This  the  organizers  diligently 
labored  to  overcome  by  patient  instruction  and  a 
faithful  attendance  to  their  duties.  The  general  re- 
sult was  that  the  foreign  workers  developed  a  con- 
fidence in  the  organizers  and  a  loyalty  to  the  unions, 
which  not  even  the  heavy  shock  of  the  loss  of  the 
strike  has  been  able  to  destroy. 


The  indifference,  verging  often  into  open  hostility, 
with  which  negroes  generally  regard  Organized 
Labor's  activities,  manifested  itself  strongly  in  the 
steel  campaign.  Those  employed  in  the  industry 
were  extremely  resistent  to  the  trade-union  program ; 
those  on  the  outside  allowed  themselves  to  be  used 
freely  as  strike-breakers. 

According  to  the  Immigration  Commission's  Re- 
port, which  furnished  the  latest  official  figures 
(period  1907-08),  4.7  per  cent,  of  the  total  number 
of  steel  industry  employees  at  that  time  were 
negroes,  most  of  whom  were  located  in  the  Alabama 
and  Maryland  districts.  Since  then,  however,  con- 

[205] 


siderable  additions  to  their  numbers  have  been  made, 
and  in  many  northern  mills  will  be  found  groups 
of  them,  ranging  in  strength  from  i  to  20  per 
cent,  of  the  whole  working  force.  They  work  mostly 
at  hard,  rough,  unskilled  labor,  especially  in  the 
blast  furnace  department. 

Generally  speaking,  these  bodies  of  negroes  took 
small  part  in  the  movement.  In  certain  districts, 
notably  Cleveland  and  Wheeling,  it  is  true  that  they 
organized  100  per  cent,  and  struck  very  creditably; 
but  in  most  places,  and  exactly  those  where  their 
support  was  needed  the  worst,  they  made  a  wretched 
showing.  Consider  the  situation,  for  instance,  in 
the  Homestead  Steel  Works.  In  these  plants  (in- 
cluding the  Carrie  Furnaces  at  Rankin),  of  the 
14,687  employees,  1,737  are  negroes.  Making  de- 
ductions for  office  forces,  bosses,  etc.,  this  would 
make  them  from  12  to  14  per  cent,  of  the  actual 
workers,  a  most  important  factor  indeed.  During 
the  organizing  campaign,  of  all  these  men,  only  eight 
joined  the  unions.  And  of  these  but  one  struck. 
He,  however,  stayed  loyally  to  the  finish.  The  de- 
gree of  this  abstention  from  the  movement  may  be 
gauged  when  it  is  recalled  that  of  the  white  un- 
skilled workers  in  the  same  plants  at  least  75  per 
cent,  joined  the  unions,  and  90  per  cent,  struck. 

Throughout  the  immediate  Pittsburgh  district, 
where  the  unions  operated  under  such  great  handi- 
caps and  had  to  rely  so  much  on  the  initiative  of 
the  individual  workers,  the  same  condition  prevailed. 
In  Duquesne,  of  344  negroes  employed,  not  one 
struck;  in  Clairton,  of  300,  six  joined  the  unions  and 
struck  for  two  weeks.  Of  the  several  hundred  work- 

[206] 


ing  in  the  Braddock  plants,  not  one  joined  a  union 
or  went  on  strike;  and  a  dozen  would  cover  those 
from  the  large  number  employed  in  the  mills  in 
Pittsburgh  proper  who  walked  out  with  the  25,000 
whites  on  September  22.  Similar  tendencies  were 
shown  in  the  Chicago,  Youngstown,  Buffalo,  Pueblo, 
Sparrows'  Point  and  other  districts.  In  the  entire 
steel  industry,  the  negroes,  beyond  compare,  gave 
the  movement  less  co-operation  than  any  other  ele- 
ment, skilled  or  unskilled,  foreign  or  native. 

Those  on  the  outside  of  the  industry  seemed 
equally  unsympathetic.  National  Committee  secre- 
taries' reports  indicate  that  the  Steel  Trust  recruited 
and  shipped  from  30,000  to  40,000  negroes  into  the 
mills  as  strike-breakers.  Many  of  these  were  picked 
up  in  Northern  cities,  but  the  most  of  them  came 
from  the  South.  They  were  used  in  all  the  large 
districts  and  were  a  big  factor  in  breaking  the  strike. 
The  following  statement  illustrates  some  of  the 
methods  used  in  securing  and  handling  them: 

Monessen,  November  23,  1919 

Eugene   Steward  —  Age   19  —  Baltimore,   Md. 

My  native  place  is  Charleston,  South  Carolina. 

I  arrived  in  Monessen  on  Wednesday,  November  19. 
There  were  about  200  of  us  loaded  in  the  cars  at 
Baltimore ;  some  were  white ;  and  when  we  were  loaded 
in  the  cars  were  told  that  we  were  being  taken  to 
Philadelphia. 

We  were  not  told  that  a  strike  was  in  progress.  We 
were  promised  $4.00  a  day,  with  the  understanding  that 
we  should  be  boarded  at  $1.00  a  day. 

When  we  took  the  train  a  guard  locked  the  doors 
so  that  we  were  unable  to  get  out,  and  no  meals  were 
[207], 


given  us  on  the  way,  although  we  were  promised  board. 
We  were  unloaded  at  Lock  4  and  had  a  guard  placed 
over  us,  and  were  then  marched  into  the  grounds  of  the 
Pittsburgh  Steel  Products  Co.  We  were  then  told  to 
go  to  work,  and  when  I  found  out  that  there  was  a 
strike  on  I  got  out.  They  refused  to  let  me  out  at  the 
gate  when  I  protested  about  working,  and  I  climbed 
over  the  fence,  and  they  caught  me  and  compelled  me 
to  go  back  and  sign  a  paper  and  told  me  that  I  would 
have  to  go  to  work.  I  told  them  that  I  would  not  go 
to  work  if  they  kept  me  there  two  years.  I  was  placed 
on  a  boat.  There  were  about  200  other  people  there. 
The  guards  informed  me  that  if  I  made  any  attempt 
to  again  run  away  that  they  would  shoot  me.  I  got 
a  rope  and  escaped,  as  I  will  not  work  to  break  the 
strike. 

his 
Eugene    X     Steward 

mark 
Witness  Jacob  S.   McGinley 

Few,  however,  of  the  imported  negro  strike- 
breakers showed  the  splendid  spirit  of  this  unlettered 
boy.  Most  of  them  seemed  to  take  a  keen  delight 
in  stealing  the  white  men's  jobs  and  crushing  their 
strike.  They  clashed  badly  with  the  pickets,  where 
picketing  was  allowed.  And  between  them  and  the 
white  strike-breakers  many  murderous  encounters  oc- 
curred in  the  mills,  although  the  companies  were  very 
careful  to  suppress  news  of  these  outbreaks. 

So  serious  was  the  race  situation  in  the  steel  strike 
that  the  National  Committee  for  Organizing  Iron 
and  Steel  Workers  requested  President  Gompers  to 
arrange  a  conference  between  prominent  negro 
leaders  and  trade-union  officials,  to  the  end  that  the 

[208] 


proper  remedies  may  be  indicated.  The  need  for 
action  looking  towards  better  relations  between 
whites  and  blacks  in  the  industrial  field  should  be 
instantly  patent ;  for  there  can  be  no  doubt  but  that 
the  employing  class,  taking  advantage  of  the  bitter 
animosities  of  the  two  groups,  are  deliberately  at- 
tempting to  turn  the  negroes  into  a  race  of  strike- 
breakers, with  whom  to  hold  the  white  workers  in 
check;  on  much  the  same  principle  as  the  Czars 
used  the  Cossacks  to  keep  in  subjection  the  balance 
of  the  Russian  people.  Should  they  succeed  to  any 
degree  it  would  make  our  industrial  disputes  take  on 
more  and  more  the  character  of  race  wars,  a  con- 
summation that  would  be  highly  injurious  to  the 
white  workers  and  eventually  ruinous  to  the  blacks. 
For  the  tense  situation  existing  the  unions  are 
themselves  in  no  small  part  to  blame.  Many  of 
them  sharply  draw  the  color  line,  thus  feeding  the 
flames  of  race  hatred.  This  discriminatory  prac- 
tice is  in  direct  conflict  with  the  fundamental  which 
demands  that  all  the  workers  be  organized,  without 
regard  to  sex,  race,  creed,  politics  or  nationality. 
It  injures  Labor's  cause  greatly.  Company  agents 
harp  upon  it  continually,  to  prevent  negroes  from 
joining  even  the  organizations  willing  to  take  them 
in.  This  was  the  case  in  the  steel  compaign.  More- 
over these  same  company  agents  cited  this  discrim- 
inatory practice  most  effectively  to  induce  thousands 
of  outside  colored  workers  to  come  into  the  industry 
as  strike-breakers.  Such  a  condition  cannot  be  al- 
lowed to  persist.  But  to  relieve  it  the  unions  will 
have  to  meet  the  issue  honestly  and  broad-mindedly. 
They  must  open  their  ranks  to  negroes,  make  an 

[209] 


earnest  effort  to  organize  them,  and  then  give  them 
a  square  deal  when  they  do  join.  Nothing  short  of 
this  will  accomplish  the  desired  result.1 

This  action  by  the  unions  will  be  a  step  in  the 
right  direction,  but  it  alone  will  not  solve  the  vexed 
problem.  The  best  negro  leaders  must  join  heartily 
in  destroying  the  pernicious  anti-union  policies  so 
deeply  rooted  among  their  people.  It  is  a  lament- 
able fact,  well  known  to  all  organizers  who  have 
worked  in  industries  employing'considerable  numbers 
of  negroes,  that  there  is  a  large  and  influential  black 
leadership,  including  ministers,  politicians,  editors, 
doctors,  lawyers,  social  workers,  etc.,  who  as  a  mat- 
ter of  race  tactics  are  violently  opposed  to  their  peo- 
ple going  into  the  trade  unions.  They  look  upon 
strike-breaking  as  a  legitimate  and  effective  means 
of  negro  advancement.  Time  and  again,  they  have 
seen  their  people,  by  use  of  it,  readily  work  their 
way  into  trades  and  industries  previously  firmly 
sealed  against  them  by  the  white  workers'  and  white 
employers'  prejudices.  Nor  can  they  see  any  wrong 
in  thus  taking  advantage  of  the  white  man,  who  has 
so  brutally  oppressed  them  for  centuries.  On  the 
contrary,  they  consider  it  a  justified  retaliation. 
They  are  in  a  race  war.  Inasmuch  as  the  steel 
strike  resulted  in  more  negroes  being  in  the  industry 
than  was  the  case  before,  they  look  upon  the  outcome 
as  a  victory.  For  these  elements,  and  they  are 
numerous  and  powerful  among  negroes,  the  color 


Miners,  Building  Laborers  and  several  other  unions  are 
taking  the  lead  in  this  direction  and  are  getting  good  results. 
Negroes  are  joining  their  ranks  in  considerable  numbers  and  are 
proving  themselves  to  be  excellent  union  men. 

[210] 


line  clauses  in  the  union  constitutions  are  meat  and 
drink;  such  leaders  don't  want  them  abolished, — 
they  make  too  strong  an  argument  against  the  unions. 

Consider  the  situation  faced  by  the  unions  in  the 
campaign  to  organize  the  Chicago  packing  houses 
in  1917-18.  The  negroes  in  this  industry  are  a 
strong  factor  (numbering  14,000  of  a  total  of  some 
65,000  employees),  and  the  unions  were  determined 
to  organize  them.  But  no  sooner  had  organizers 
begun  the  work  than  they  met  the  firm  opposition  of 
the  negro  intelligencia  above-noted.  These  warned 
their  people  to  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  move- 
ment, as  their  interest  lay  in  working  with  the 
packers  to  defeat  the  unions.  They  said  that  was 
how  the  negroes  came  into  the  packing  industry, 
and  that  was  how  they  would  progress  in  it. 

Naturally,  they  repeated  the  accusations  about 
white  men  not  taking  negroes  in  their  unions,  a 
charge  which  was  not  true  in  the  packing  industry. 
The  organizers  replied  by  launching  a  vigorous  cam- 
paign to  get  them  into  the  unions.  Then  the  propa- 
ganda was  sent  forth  that  the  only  reason  the  whites 
were  willing  to  take  the  blacks  into  their  locals  was 
because  the  latter,  being  in  a  minority,  could  exert 
no  control;  that  the  whites  would  not  dare  to  give 
them  a  local  of  their  own,  etc.  This  was  met  by 
the  establishment  of  a  negro  local  of  miscellaneous 
workers  in  a  convenient  neighborhood.  Then  the 
Jim  Crow  cry  was  raised  that  the  whites  wanted  the 
blacks  to  herd  by  themselves.  This  the  organizers 
answered  by  insisting  that  a  free  transfer  system 
be  kept  up  between  the  white  and  black  locals. 

[2n] 


These  were  affiliated  with  the  basic  organization  of 
the  industry,  the  Amalgamated  Meat  Cutters  and 
Butcher  Workmen  of  North  America. 

But  even  this  did  not  satisfy;  the  anti-union  propa- 
ganda went  on  undiminished  and  with  tremendous 
effect.  It  is  true  that  some  far-sighted  negro  intel- 
lectuals defended  the  unions;  but  they  were  as  men 
crying  in  the  wilderness;  the  others  prevailed.  And 
although  the  unions  kept  a  crew  of  negro  organizers 
in  the  field,  and  won  many  concessions  for  the  pack- 
ing house  workers,  including  the  eight  hour  day, 
right  of  collective  bargaining,  large  increases  in 
wages,  40  hour  weekly  guarantee,  retro-active  pay, 
seniority  rights,  etc.,  they  have  never  succeeded  in 
organizing  the  negroes. 

They  know  little  of  the  race  problem  in  industry 
who  declare  that  it  can  be  settled  merely  by  the 
unions  opening  their  doors  to  the  negroes.  It  is 
much  more  complex  than  that,  and  will  require  the 
best  thought  that  conscientious  whites  and  blacks  can 
give  it.  The  negro  has  the  more  difficult  part  to 
solve,  in  resisting  the  insidious  efforts  of  unscrupu- 
lous white  employers  and  misguided  intellectuals  of 
his  own  race  to  make  a  professional  strike-breaker  of 
him.  But  I  am  confident  that  he  will  win  out  and 
will  take  his  place  where  he  belongs  in  the  industrial 
fight,  side  by  side  with  the  white  worker. 


[212] 


XII 

THE  COMMISSARIAT  — THE  STRIKE 
COST 

THE     RELIEF     ORGANIZATION  —  RATIONS  —  SYSTEM 
OF    DISTRIBUTION  —  COST    OF     COMMISSARIAT  — 

STEEL     STRIKE     RELIEF     FUND COST     OF     THE 

STRIKE  TO  THE  WORKERS,  THE  EMPLOYERS,  THE 
PUBLIC,  THE  LABOR  MOVEMENT 

IN  all  strikes  the  problem  of  keeping  the  wolf  from 
the  door  is  a  pressing  one.  Usually  it  is  met  by  the 
unions  involved  paying  regular  benefits  of  from  $5.00 
to  $15.00  per  week  to  each  striker.  But  in  the  steel 
strike  this  was  out  of  the  question.1  The  tremen- 
dous number  of  men  on  strike  and  the  scanty  funds 
available  utterly  forbade  it.  To  have  paid  such 
benefits  would  have  required  the  impossible  sum  of 
at  least  $2,000,000  per  week.  Therefore,  the  best 
that  could  be  done  was  to  assist  those  families  on  the 
brink  of  destitution  by  furnishing  them  free  that 
most  basic  of  human  necessities,  food.  Ordinarily 
in  strikes  the  main  body  of  men  are  able  to  take  care 
of  themselves  over  an  extended  period.  The 

1  Exceptions  to  this  were  the  cases  of  the  Molders'  and  Coopers' 
Unions.  These  organizations  were  compelled  by  constitutional  re- 
quirements to  pay  regular  strike  benefits.  But  they  included  only  a 
very  small  percentage  of  the  total  number  of  strikers. 

[213] 


danger  point  is  in  the  poverty-stricken  minority. 
From  them  come  the  hunger-driven  scabs  who  so 
demoralize  and  discourage  the  men  still  out. 
Hence,  to  take  care  of  this  weaker  element  was 
scientifically  to  strengthen  the  steel  strike,  and  to 
make  the  best  use  of  the  resources  available. 

The  great  mass  of  strikers  and  their  incomplete 
organization  making  it  manifestly  impossible  for 
each  union  to  segregate  and  take  care  of  its  own 
members,  the  internationals  affiliated  with  the  Na- 
tional Committee  (with  the  two  exceptions  noted) 
pooled  their  strike  funds  and  formed  a  joint  com- 
missariat.1 They  then  proceeded  to  extend  relief 
to  all  needy  strikers,  regardless  of  their  trades  or 
callings,  or  even  membership  or  non-membership  in 
the  unions.  To  get  relief  all  that  was  necessary  was 
to  be  a  steel  striker  and  in  want.  This  splendid 
solidarity  and  rapid  modification  of  trade-union  tac- 
tics and  institutions  to  meet  an  emergency  is  probably 
without  a  parallel  in  American  labor  annals. 

The  commissariat  was  entirely  under  the  super- 
vision and  direction  of  the  National  Committee.  Its 
national  headquarters  was  in  Pittsburgh,  with  a  sub- 
district  in  Chicago.  Goods  were  shipped  from  these 
two  points.  In  Pittsburgh  they  were  bought  and 
handled  through  the  Tri-State  Co-operative  Associa- 
tion, with  National  Committee  employees  making 
up  the  shipments.  In  Chicago  the  same  was  done 
through  the  National  Co-operative  Association. 
As  Bethlehem,  Birmingham,  Pueblo  and  a  few  other 

1  The  commissariat  was  suggested  by  John  Fitzpatrick,  as  a  re- 
sult of  his  experiences  in  the  Chicago  Garment  Workers'  strike  of  a 
decade  ago. 

[214] 


strike-bound  towns  lay  beyond  convenient  shipping 
distance  from  the  two  distributing  points,  the  men 
in  charge  there  were  sent  checks  and  they  bought 
their  supplies  locally. 

The  General  Director  of  the  commissariat  was 
Robert  McKechan,  business  manager  of  the  Central 
States  Wholesale  Co-operative  Association.  He 
was  paid  by  the  Illinois  Miners,  District  No.  2.  He 
was  ably  assisted  by  A.  V.  Craig  (Ass't.  Director), 
Enoch  Martin  (Auditor  —  also  paid  by  Illinois 
miners),  Wm.  Orr  (Warehouse  Manager),  and  E. 
G.  Craig.  Secretary  De  Young  was  in  charge  of  the 
Chicago  sub-district.  The  local  distributing  centres 
were  operated  altogether  by  National  Committee 
local  secretaries  and  volunteer  strike  committees, 
with  an  occasional  paid  assistant. 

All  told,  45  local  commissaries  were  set  up 
throughout  the  strike  zone.  This  elaborate  organ- 
ization was  created  and  put  in  motion  almost  over 
night.  Within  a  week  after  Mr.  McKechan  arrived 
in  Pittsburgh,  he  and  officials  of  the  National  Com- 
mittee had  devised  the  commissary  system  —  with 
hardly  a  precedent  to  go  by, —  organized  its  nation- 
wide machinery,  and  started  the  first  shipment  en  x 
route  to  the  many  strike  centres.  To  break  in  this 
machinery,  a  small  pro  rata  of  provisions,  based 
upon  the  number  of  men  on  strike,  was  sent  to  each 
place.  The  following  week  this  was  doubled,  and 
each  succeeding  week  it  was  increased  to  keep  pace 
with  the  growing  need.  It  finally  developed  into  a 
huge  affair.  Few  strikers  had  to  be  turned  away 
for  lack  of  food,  and  these  only  for  a  short  while 
until  the  necessary  additional  stuff  could  be  secured 


from  the  shipping  points.  Throughout  the  four- 
teen weeks  it  was  in  operation  the  commissariat,  des- 
pite the  tremendous  difficulties  it  had  to  contend 
with,  worked  with  remarkable  smoothness.  It  was 
one  of  the  greatest  achievements  of  the  entire  steel 
campaign. 

The  wide  extent  of  the  relief  work  made  it  neces- 
sary to  develop  the  most  rigid  simplicity  and  stand- 
ardization in  the  apportionment  of  food  to  the 
strikers.  Hence,  only  two  sizes  of  rations  could  be 
used;  one  for  families  of  five  or  less,  and  the  other 
for  families  of  six  or  more.  These  were  varied 
from  time  to  time,  always  bearing  in  mind  the  cook- 
ing facilities  of  the  strikers  and  the  many  food  likes 
and  dislikes  of  the  various  nationalities.  To  facili- 
tate the  carrying  away  of  the  food  and  to  make  it 
last  the  better,  two  commissary  days  were  held  each 
week,  in  each  locality.  The  rations  were  listed  on 
large  posters  (white  for  families  of  five  or  less,  and 
green  for  families  of  six  or  more)  which  were  prom- 
inently displayed  in  the  local  commissaries  in  order 
that  the  strikers  could  see  exactly  how  much  pro- 
visions they  were  entitled  to.  The  following  are 
typical  rations: 

FAMILIES  OF  FIVE  OR  LESS 

First  Half  Week  Second  Half  Week 

Potatoes  15  Ibs.        Bread    4  loaves 

Bread    4  loaves  Tomatoes i  can 

Tomatoes i  can        Corn   i     " 

Peas    i     "          Peas    i     " 

Navy  beans 4  Ibs.        Red  beans 4  Ibs. 

Oatmeal  i  box        Kraut   2  cans 

Bacon   I  lb.          Dry  salt  meat i  Ib. 

Coffee  i     "          Syrup i  can 

Milk   i  can 

[216] 


JOHN    FITZPATRICK 
Chairman,  National  Committee  for  Organizing  Iron  and  Steel  Workert. 


FAMILIES  OF  SIX  OR  MORE 
First  Half  Week  Second  Half  Week 

Potatoes   10  Ibs.  Potatoes   10  Ibs. 

Bread    5  loaves    Bread    5  loaves 

Tomatoes i  can  Tomatoes x  can 

Corn   i     "  Corn    i     " 

Peas    i     "  Peas    *     " 

Navy  beans 5  Ibi.  Kraut    2  cans 

Oatmeal    2  boxes  Red  beans 5  Ibs. 

Bacon  i  Ib.  Dry  salt  meat i  Ib. 

Coffee  «  i     "  Milk   i  can 

Milk  i  can  Syrup    i     " 

It  was  not  contended  that  these  rations  were 
enough  to  sustain  completely  the  recipients'  families; 
but  they  helped  mightily.  Few,  if  any,  went  hungry. 
Single  men  in  need  received  a  half  week's  rations  to 
last  the  week.  The  greatest  care  was  taken  to  have 
the  supplies  of  the  best  quality  and  in  good  condition. 
Whatever  the  unions  gave  they  wanted  the  strikers 
to  understand  was  in  the  best  spirit  of  brotherly 
solidarity.1 

The  provisions  were  distributed  strictly  according 
to  the  following  card  system: 

i.  Identification  card:  An  applicant  requesting 
relief  would  be  referred  to  a  credentialed  volunteer 
relief  committee.  If  this  committee  deemed  the 
case  a  needy  one,  it  would  issue  the  striker  an  identifi- 
cation card.  This  he  was  required  to  show  when 
dealing  at  the  commissary. 

1  In  addition  to  the  regular  commissaries,  the  local  organizations, 
grace  to  their  own  funds  or  occasional  donations  from  their  inter- 
national unions,  had  relief  enterprises  of  various  sorts,  such  as  soup 
kitchens,  milk,  clothes,  rent  and  sickness  funds.  In  Monessen  and 
Donora  the  strikers  actually  served  a  big  turkey  dinner  on  Thanks- 
giving Day.  Strikers  paid  five  cents  a  plate  for  all  they  wished  to 
eat.  Sympathizers  donated  liberally  according  to  their  means.  But 
the  commissary  system  was  the  main  source  of  strike  relief. 

[217] 


2.  Record  card:     In  addition,  the  relief  commit- 
tee would  write  out  the  data  of  the  case  upon  a 
record  card  and  turn  it  over  to  the  local  secretary 
in  charge  of  the  commissary,  who  would  keep  it 
on  file. 

3.  Commissary  card:     When  the  applicant  pre- 
sented his  identification  card  at  the  commissary,  the 
local  secretary,  referring  to  the  record  card  on  file, 
would  make  him  out  a  commissary  card,  white  or 
green,  accordingly  as  his  family  was  of  five  or  less, 
or  six  or  more  members.     This  commissary  card 
entitled  him  to  draw  supplies. 

The  commissary  card  had  a  stub  attached.  When 
a  striker  got  his  first  half  week's  supplies,  this  stub 
would  be  detached  and  retained  by  the  commissary 
clerk.  Upon  his  next  visit  the  body  of  the  card 
would  be  taken  up.  Two  important  purposes  were 
served  by  this  collection  of  the  commissary  cards  — 
rather  than  having  permanent  cards  and  merely 
punching  them.  First,  the  canceled  cards  being 
sent  to  the  commissariat  national  headquarters,  it 
proved  conclusively  that  the  strikers  had  actually  re- 
ceived the  provisions  shipped  to  the  district;  and 
second,  by  compelling  the  strikers  to  get  new  com- 
missary cards  each  week,  it  enabled  the  local  secre- 
taries to  keep  in  close  touch  with  those  on  the  relief 
roll. 

To  lighten  the  load  upon  the  many  inexperienced 
men  working  in  the  various  commissaries,  a  special 
effort  was  made  to  do  as  much  of  the  technical  work 
as  possible  in  the  main  offices  of  the  National  Com- 
mittee. Otherwise  the  commissariat  could  not  pos- 
sibly have  succeeded.  This  consideration  was  a 

[218] 


prime  factor  in  restricting  the  buying  of  provisions 
to  Pittsburgh,  Chicago  and  the  fewest  practical 
number  of  outlying  points.  It  also  caused  the  adop- 
tion of  the  package  system,  all  bulk  goods,  except 
potatoes,  being  prepared  for  delivery  before  leaving 
the  warehouses.  Likewise,  the  local  bookkeeping 
was  simplified  to  the  last  degree.  In  fact,  for  the 
most  part  the  secretaries  in  charge  of  the  commis- 
saries hardly  needed  books  at  all.  The  whole  sys- 
tem checked  itself  from  the  central  points. 

As  an  example  of  its  working,  let  us  suppose  that 
the  allotment  of  a  certain  town  was  1000  rations. 
Accordingly,  there  would  be  shipped  to  that  place 
exactly  enough  of  each  article  to  precisely  cover 
the  allotted  number  of  rations.  Then,  if  the  secre- 
tary simply  saw  to  it  that  he  got  what  he  was  charged 
with  and  issued  his  supplies  carefully  in  the  right 
proportions,  the  whole  transaction  would  balance 
to  a  pound,  with  hardly  a  scratch  of  a  pen  from 
him.  The  bookkeeping  was  all  done  at  the  general 
offices.  The  latter's  assurances  that  each  striker 
had  received  his  proper  ration  and  that  the  right 
number  of  rations  had  been  issued  were,  in  the  first 
place,  the  ration  posters  hanging  on  the  walls  of  the 
commissary;  and  in  the  second,  the  returned  can- 
celed commissary  cards.  Barring  an  occasional 
slight  disruption  from  delayed  shipments,  spoiled 
goods,  shortages,  and  a  little  carelessness  here  and 
there,  the  system  worked  very  well. 

The  commissariat  was  in  operation  from  October 
26  until  January  31,  three  weeks  after  the  strike 
had  ended.  It  was  continued  through  this  extra 
period  in  order  to  help  to  their  feet  the  destitute 

[219] 


strikers  who  had  fought  so  nobly.  Probably  noth- 
ing done  by  the  unions  in  the  entire  campaign  won 
them  so  much  good  will  with  the  steel  workers  as 
this  one  act. 

The  total  cost  of  operating  the  commissariat  was 
$348,509.42.  The  significance  of  this  figure  stands 
out  when  it  is  reduced  to  a  per  man  basis.  At  the 
strike's  start  there  were  365,600  men  out,  and  at  its 
finish  about  100,000.  Considering  that  few  serious 
breaks  occurred  until  the  eighth  to  tenth  weeks,  a  fair 
average  for  the  whole  period  would  be  about  250,- 
ooo.  Accordingly,  this  would  give  (disregarding 
the  three  weeks  after  January  8)  a  total  relief  cost 
of  a  fraction  less  than  $1.40  per  man  for  the  entire 
fifteen  weeks  of  the  strike,  or  about  one  day's  strike 
benefits  of  an  ordinary  union.  Reduced  to  a  weekly 
basis,  it  amounts  to  but  9^  cents  for  each  striker. 
Just  how  unusually  small  this  sum  is  may  be  judged 
from  the  fact  that  the  International  Molders'  Union 
paid  the  few  men  it  had  on  strike  regular  benefits 
of  $9.00  per  week  after  the  first  week.  The  fact 
is  that,  except  for  a  small,  impoverished  minority, 
the  steel  workers  made  their  long,  hard  fight  virtu- 
ally upon  their  own  resources.1 

To  help  finance  the  commissariat  the  American 
Federation  of  Labor  was  requested  to  issue  a  gen- 
eral appeal  for  funds,  which  it  did.  Then,  to  add 
force  to  this  call,  the  National  Committee  recruited 
and  put  in  the  field  a  corps  of  solicitors,  including 
among  others,  Anton  Johannson,  J.  D.  Cannon, 

1  It  is  true,  as  noted  above,  that  several  other  unions  besides  the 
Molders  and  Coopers  made  occasional  contributions  to  their  strike- 
bound locals,  but  when  measured  against  the  vast  armies  of  strikers, 
these  funds  dwindled  almost  into  insignificance. 

[220] 


J.  W.  Brown,  J.  G.  Sause,  Jennie  Matyas  and  G.  A. 
Gerber.  At  a  meeting  in  Madison  Square  Garden 
on  November  8  a  collection  of  $150,000  was  taken 
up.  Many  local  unions,  notably  those  of  Altoona, 
Pa.,  gave  half  their  local  treasuries  and  assessed 
their  members  one  day's  pay  each.  The  Marine 
Engineers,  local  33  of  New  York,  contributed 
$10,000;  the  International  Fur  Workers'  Union 
$20,000;  the  International  Ladies  Garment  Work- 
ers' Union,  $60,000;  and  the  Amalgamated  Cloth- 
ing Workers  of  America,  $100,000.  All  these 
donations  were  highly  praiseworthy,  but  especially 
the  last  one  mentioned,  because  the  organization 
making  it  is  not  affiliated  to,  nor  even  in  good  grace 
with,  the  A.  F.  of  L. 

The  total  amount  collected  and  turned  over  to 
the  National  Committee  was  $418,141.14.  This 
more  than  covered  the  entire  cost  of  the  commis- 
sariat, leaving  $69,631.42  to  be  applied  to  other 
expenses.  Thus,  taking  them  as  a  whole,  the  co- 
operating international  unions  in  the  National  Com- 
mittee were  not  required  to  pay  a  penny  to  the  feed- 
ing of  the  strikers  and  their  families.  The  com- 
missariat was  a  monument  to  the  solidarity  of  Labor 
generally  with  the  embattled  steel  workers. 

Naturally,  the  employers  bitterly  hated  the  com- 
missaries. They  sneered  at  the  quantity  and  qual- 
ity of  the  food  given  out  by  them,  and  in  many 
places  printed  handbills  in  several  languages  advis- 
ing the  strikers  to  go  at  once  to  union  headquarters 
and  demand  strike  benefits  in  cash.  And  by  the 
same  token,  the  strikers  held  the  commissaries  in 
high  esteem.  The  foreign-born  among  them  espe- 

[221] 


cially,  would  stand  around  watching  with  never-ceas- 
ing wonder  and  enthusiasm  the  stream  of  men  and 
women  coming  forth  laden  with  supplies.  To  them 
there  was  something  sacred  about  the  food.  Many 
of  them  in  desperate  circumstances  had  to  be  prac- 
tically compelled  to  accept  it;  not  because  they  felt 
themselves  objects  of  charity,  but  because  they 
thought  others  needed  help  worse  than  they.  They 
conceived  the  whole  thing  as  a  living  demonstration 
of  the  solidarity  of  labor.  The  giving  of  the  food 
produced  an  effect  upon  their  morale  far  better  than 
could  have  come  from  the  distribution  of  ten  times 
its  value  in  money.  The  commissariat  enormously 
strengthened  the  strikers.  Without  it  the  strike 
would  have  collapsed  many  weeks  before  it  did. 
Unions  in  future  great  walkouts  will  do  well  to  study 
the  steel  strike  commissary  plan. 


Strikes,  even  the  smallest,  affect  so  many  people 
in  so  many  ways  that  it  is  difficult  under  the  best 
of  circumstances  to  compile  accurate  data  upon  their 
cost.  In  the  case  of  the  steel  strike  it  is  next  to 
impossible  to  do  so.  The  great  number  of  steel 
companies  and  the  armies  of  men  involved;  the  wide 
scope  of  the  strike;  the  condition  of  outlawry  in 
many  steel  districts;  the  fact  that  the  strike  was  lost; 
the  workers'  numerous  nationalities  and  imperfec- 
tion of  organization  —  all  these  and  various  other 
factors  make  it  exceedingly  difficult,  at  least  at  this 
early  date,  to  give  more  than  a  hint  of  the  strike's 
cost. 

In  the  steel  strike,  as  in  all  others,  the  burden  of 
suffering  fell  to  the  workers'  lot.  To  win  their 

[222] 


cause  they  gave  freely  of  their  lives,  liberty,  blood 
and  treasure.  A  poll  of  the  National  Committee 
local  secretaries  yields  the  following  list  of  strike 
dead: 

Buffalo    . . 2 

Chicago i 

Cleveland I 

Farrell ....  4 

Hammond    ....... 4 

Newcastle     , 2 

Pittsburgh I 

West  Natrona 2 

Wheeling    •.  .  .  ...  .. I 

Youngstown 2 

Total  20 

The  killed  were  all  on  the  strikers'  side,  except 
two.  The  above  list  properly  includes  Mrs.  Fannie 
Sellins.  But  it  does  not  include  the  scores  of  scabs 
who,  because  of  their  own  or  other  incompetent 
workers'  ineptness,  were  roasted,  crushed  to  death, 
or  torn  to  pieces  in  the  dangerous  steel-making  pro- 
cesses during  the  strike.  Although  the  steel  com- 
panies were  exceedingly  alert  in  suppressing  the 
names  of  these  ignoble  victims  to  their  greed,  it  is 
a  well-known  fact  that  there  were  many  of  them. 
There  was  hardly  a  big  mill  anywhere  that  did  not 
have  several  to  its  account. 

How  many  hundreds  of  strikers  were  seriously  in- 
jured by  being  clubbed  and  shot  will  never  be  known, 
because  most  of  them,  especially  in  Pennsylvania, 
healed  themselves  as  best  they  might.  With  good 
grounds  they  feared  that  disclosing  their  injuries 

[223] 


to  doctors  would  lead  to  their  arrest  upon  charges 
of  rioting.  The  number  of  arrested  strikers  ran 
into  the  thousands.  But  so  orderly  were  the  strikers 
that  few  serious  charges  could  be  brought  against 
them.  They  were  jailed  in  droves  and  fined  heavily 
mostly  for  minor  "  offenses."  Except  in  Butler, 
Pa.,  where  a  score  of  strikers  were  arrested  for 
stopping  a  car  of  scabs  on  the  way  to  work  (framed- 
up  by  the  State  Police)  and  sent  to  the  penitentiary, 
no  strikers  anywhere  in  the  whole  strike  zone  re- 
ceived heavy  jail  sentences.  Considering  the  ter- 
rific provocations  offered  the  men  and  the  extreme 
eagerness  with  which  the  courts  punished  them,  this 
remarkable  record  is  an  eloquent  testimonial  to  their 
orderliness.1  Of  course,  the  companies  did  not 
neglect  to  avail  themselves  of  the  heartless  black- 
list. Just  now  hundreds  of  their  former  employees, 
denied  work  and  forced  to  break  up  their  homes  and 
leave  town,  are  criss-crossing  the  country  looking 
for  opportunities  to  make  new  starts  in  life. 

As  for  the  cost  to  the  strikers  in  wages,  the  Phila- 
delphia Public  Ledger  of  January  10,  two  days  after 
the  strike  was  called  off,  carried  a  special  telegram 
from  Pittsburgh,  stating  (authority  not  quoted)  that 
the  wage  loss  in  that  district  was  $48,005,060.35, 
specified  as  follows: 

1This  was  largely  because  the  men  were  sober.  In  fact,  prohi- 
bition helped  the  steel  campaign  in  several  important  respects;  (i) 
because  having  no  saloons  to  drown  their  troubles  in,  the  workers, 
clear-headed,  attended  the  union  meetings  and  organized  more 
readily;  (2)  when  the  strike  came  they  did  not  waste  their  few 
pennies  on  liquor  and  then  run  back  to  work  in  the  old  way;  they 
bought  food  with  them  and  stayed  on  strike;  (3)  being  sober,  they 
were  the  better  able  to  avoid  useless  violence  and  to  conduct  their 
strike  effectively. 

[224] 


Clarksburg,  W.  Va $310,000.00 

Wheeling   District    6,100,000.00 

Donora    1,200,000.00 

Steubenville  dist 2,260,000.00 

Youngstown . . .  15,500,000.00 

Monessen 2,660,000.00 

Brackenridge    450,000.00 

New   Kensington    375,000.00 

McKeesport    597,869.00 

Port    Vue    900,000.00 

Sharon-Farrell     1,250,000.00 

New    Castle    705,000.00 

Homestead     737,840.00 

Duquesne     55,030.00 

Johnstown 5,712,321.35 

Ellwood   City    35,000.00 

Butler    1,450,000.00 

Aliquippa     ,  io,OOO.oo 

Pittsburgh    5,715,000.00 

Sharpsburg,   ^tna    435,000.00 

Vandergrift     357,000.00 

Clairton 165,000.00 

Rankin     375,000.00 

Braddock     650,000.00 

To  the  above,  the  New  York  Herald  of  January 
12  editorially  adds  an  estimate  of  $39,000,000  for 
steel  districts  other  than  Pittsburgh,  making  a  grand 
total  of  $87,000,000  as  the  strikers'  wage  loss. 
But  these  figures,  bearing  the  earmarks  of  Steel 
Trust  origin,  are  too  low.  On  the  basis  of  the 
minimum  figures  of  an  average  of  250,000  strikers 
for  90  working  days  (actual  strike  length  108  days) 
at  $5.00  per  day  per  man,  we  arrive  at  a  total  of 
$112,500,000.00,  or  $450.00  per  average  striker. 

[225] 


Doubtless  these  figures  are  also  too  low,  but  they 
will  serve  to  indicate  the  tremendous  sums  of  money 
the  already  poverty-stricken  steel  workers  were 
willing  to  sacrifice  in  order  to  change  the  conditions 
which  Mr.  Gary  so  glowingly  paints  as  ideal. 

The  loss  to  the  steel  companies  must  have  been 
enormous.  Without  doubt  it  runs  into  several 
hundred  millions  of  dollars.  The  items  going  to 
make  up  this  huge  bill  are  many  and  at  this  time 
impossible  of  accurate  estimate.  There  must  have 
been  not  only  a  complete  cessation  of  profits  during 
the  strike  period,  but  also  a  vast  outlay  of  money 
to  finance  the  strike-breaking  measures,  such  as 
maintaining  scores  of  thousands  of  gunmen  to  guard 
the  plants;  paying  rich  graft  to  employment  offices 
and  detective  agencies  for  recruiting  armies  of  scabs, 
who,  receiving  high  strike  wages,  idled  for  weeks 
around  the  plants,  shooting  craps,  playing  cards, 
pitching  quoits,  and  absolutely  refusing  to  work; 
keeping  on  the  payroll  great  staffs  of  office  workers 
with  nothing  to  do,  and  high  paid  skilled  workers 
doing  the  work  of  common  laborers;  corrupting  po- 
lice and  court  officials  to  give  the  strikers  the  worst 
of  it,  etc.,  etc.  Besides,  there  should  be  added  the 
cost  of  repairing  the  great  injuries  done  the  fur- 
naces by  their  sudden  shutting  down,  this  item  alone 
amounting  to  many  millions  of  dollars.  But  a  more 
important  factor  than  all,  perhaps,  in  counting  the 
cost  of  the  strike  to  the  companies  was  the  serious 
injury  done  to  their  wonderful  producing  organiza- 
tion by  the  permanent  loss  of  thousands  of  com- 
petent men  who  have  quitted  the  industry;  the  dis- 
location of  many  thousands  more  from  jobs  for 

[226] 


which  they  were  well  fitted  and  the  substitution  in 
their  places  of  green  men;  the  lowering  of  the  men's 
morale  generally,  due  to  disappointment  and  bitter- 
ness at  the  loss  of  the  strike,  etc.  We  may  depend 
upon  it  that  the  companies,  following  out  their  policy 
of  minimizing  the  strike's  effects,  will  so  juggle  their 
financial  and  tonnage  statements  as  to  make  it  im- 
possible for  years  to  figure  out  what  it  really  cost 
them,  if  it  can  ever  be  done. 

The  cost  to  the  people  at  large  is  indicated  by 
the  New  York  Sun,  quoted  by  the  Literary  Digest, 
January  31,  1920,  as  follows: 

There  was  the  loss  to  the  railroads  not  only  in  freights 
from  the  steel  plants,  but  in  freights  from  general  mills 
and  factories  which,  failing  to  get  their  steel  supplies, 
could  not  maintain  their  production  and  fulfill  their 
own  deliveries.  There  was  the  loss  in  wages  in  such 
mills  and  factories  due  to  that  failure  to  get  their 
material  on  which  their  wage-earners  could  work. 
There  was  the  loss  in  such  communities  to  trade  folk 
whose  customers  thus  had  their  spending  power  re- 
duced by  the  steel  strike. —  Hence  this  loss  of  steel 
tonnage  begins  at  once  to  widen  until  the  loss  eventually 
could  be  figured  in  the  billions. 

For  the  privilege  of  having  an  autocracy  in  the 
steel  industry  the  American  people  pay  not  only 
huge  costs  in  unearned  dividends  each  year,  but  also, 
occasionally,  such  monster  special  charges  as  the 
above.  Garyism  is  an  expensive  luxury. 

The  foregoing  figures  and  statements  merely  serve 
to  point  out  the  immensity  of  the  steel  strike  by 
indicating  its  approximate  cost  to  the  strikers,  the 

[227] 


steel  companies,  and  the  public.  Admittedly  they 
are  but  loose  estimates,  based  upon  scanty  data. 
Absolute  accuracy  is  not  claimed  for  them.  The  ex- 
penditures of  the  labor  movement  in  the  campaign 
can  be  more  closely  calculated,  although  they,  too, 
are  far  from  definite.  They  fall  into  three  general 
classes :  ( i )  those  by  the  general  office  of  the  Na- 
tional Committee  for  Organizing  Iron  and  Steel 
Workers;  (2)  those  by  the  A.  F.  of  L.  and  co-oper- 
ating international  steel  trades  unions  not  through 
the  office  of  the  National  Committee;  (3)  those  by 
local  steel  workers'  councils  and  unions  from  their 
own  treasuries.  Of  these  the  latter  may  be  elimi- 
nated as  impossible  of  estimation,  there  being  so  many 
local  organizations  involved  and  the  after-strike  con- 
ditions so  unfavorable  to  statistics  gathering. 
They  were  a  minor  element  of  expense  compared 
to  the  other  two,  which  we  will  try  to  approximate 
as  closely  as  may  be. 

i.  From  the  beginning  of  the  steel  campaign, 
August  i,  1918,  until  January  31,  1920,  the  total 
net  disbursements  of  the  National  Committee  for  all 
purposes,  after  making  deductions  for  refunds,  trans- 
fers, etc.,  amounted  to  $525,702.72.  This  stretch 
of  time  may  be  divided  into  two  parts:  (a)  Organ- 
izing period,  from  August  i,  1918,  until  September 
22,  1919  —  during  which  time  virtually  all  the 
250,000  men  enrolled  in  the  campaign  (see  end  of 
Chapter  VII)  had  joined  the  unions;  (b),  Strike 
period,  from  September  22,  1919,  until  January  31, 
1920  —  during  which  time  the  heavy  special  strike 
expenses  were  incurred.  This  period  is  extended 

[228] 


three  weeks  past  the  date  of  the  strike's  close,  be- 
cause the  commissariat  was  still  in  operation  and 
other  important  strike  expenses  were  going  on. 

The  total  net  disbursements  made  by  the  National 
Committee  during  the  organizing  period  were 
$73,139.66,  which  amounts  to  a  small  fraction  over 
29  cents  for  each  of  the  250,000  men  organized. 
The  total  net  disbursements  of  the  National  Com- 
mittee during  the  strike  period  were  $452,563.06,  or 
$1.8 1  for  each  of  the  250,000  average  strikers. 
Adding  these  two  figures  together  gives  $2.10  as  the 
cost  to  the  National  Committee  of  organizing  each 
steel  worker  and  taking  care  of  him  during  the  whole 
strike. 

2.  The  disbursements  of  the  National  Committee 
covered  general  organizing  and  strike  expenses,  such 
as  commissary,  legal,  rent,  printing,  salaries,  etc. 
The  A.  F.  of  L.  and  the  co-operating  international 
unions  also  incurred  heavy  expenses  upon  their  own 
account,  whose  chief  items  were  for  keeping  organ- 
izers in  the  field,  paying  strike  benefits,  and  making 
lump  donations  to  strike-bound  local  unions.  At  this 
date  these  expenditures  may  be  only  approximated. 

For  the  above  bodies  almost  the  sole  expense  dur- 
ing the  organizing  period  was  for  maintaining  organ- 
izers. Forty  would  be  a  fair  average  of  the  number 
of  these  men  actually  kept  at  the  steel  industry  work. 
In  the  earlier  part  of  the  campaign  the  number  was 
far  less;  in  the  later  part,  considerably  more.  The 
cost  of  maintaining  them  per  month  may  be  set  at  not 
more  than  $400.00  each,  for  salaries  and  general 
expenses.  Thus,  for  the  13^  months  of  the  organ- 

[229] 


izing  period  the  expense  to  the  A.  F.  of  L.  and  co- 
operating unions  for  this  item  would  be  about 
$220,000,  or  88  cents  per  man  organized.  This  is 
a  top  figure. 

During  the  strike  period,  on  an  average,  75  organ- 
izers were  kept  in  the  field  by  these  bodies.  Due  to 
increases  in  wages,  etc.,  their  upkeep  should  be  calcu- 
lated at  about  $500.00  per  month  each.  For  4^4 
months,  September  22  to  January  31,  our  strike 
period,  this  would  amount  to  $i59j375-  To  this 
should  be  added  $100,000,  which  according  to  re- 
ports received  approximates  what  the  organizations 
paid  in  strike  benefits  and  donations  direct  to  their 
strikers  and  not  through  the  office  of  the  National 
Committee.  This  would  make  their  total  expendi- 
tures for  the  strike  period  $259,375,  or  slightly  less 
than  $1.04  per  striker.  Adding  together  the 
amounts  for  the  organizing  period  and  the  strike 
period,  we  arrive  at  a  grand  total  of  $479,375,  or 
$1.92  per  man,  spent  during  the  entire  campaign  by 
the  A.  F.  of  L.  and  co-operating  internationals. 

The  figures  for  the  A.  F.  of  L.  and  co-operating 
internationals  are  estimates, —  the  constant  shifting 
of  organizers  during  the  campaign,  their  widely 
varying  rates  of  pay,  etc.,  making  accuracy  impos- 
sible. But  from  my  knowledge  of  what  went  on  I 
will  venture  that  the  figures  cited  are  close  enough 
to  the  reality  to  give  a  fair  conception  of  this  class 
of  expenditures. 

Combining  the  National  Committee  expenditures 
with  those  of  the  A.  F.  of  L.  and  co-operating  unions, 
we  arrive  at  the  following  totals: 

[230] 


ORGANIZING  PERIOD: 

Expenditures  Per  Man 

By  Nat.   Com $73,139.66  $.29 

By  A.   F.  L.  &  Unions..   220,000.00  .88 


Total  cost  of  organizing  work....,    $293,139.66 

STRIKE  PERIOD: 

By  Nat.  Com $452,563.06  $1.81 

By  A.  F.  L.  &  Unions. .  259,375.00  1.04 


Total  cost  of  strike   $711,938.06  $2.85 

WHOLE  CAMPAIGN: 

Total  cost  to  Nat.  Com.,       

A.  F.  L.  &  Unions $1,005,007.72  $4.03 

In  order  to  approximate  more  closely  the  actual 
cost  of  the  campaign  to  the  A.  F.  of  L.  and  the 
twenty-four  co-operating  internationals  forming  the 
National  Committee,  the  total  of  $479,375,  figured 
in  a  previous  paragraph  as  their  independent  expend- 
itures, must  be  increased  by  $101,047.52,  the  amount 
they  contributed  directly  to  the  National  Committee 
for  organizing  and  for  strike  expenses  during  the 
course  of  the  campaign; 1  making  a  grand  total  out- 

1  This  sum  represents  the  actual  cash  given  by  these  affiliated 
organizations  directly  to  the  National  Committee  throughout  the 
entire  movement.  It  divides  itself  as  follows: 

Blacksmiths $     6,273.28 

Boilermakers    10,448.92 

Bricklayers     4,199.05 

P.  &  S.  Iron  Workers  7i335-78 

Coopers     907.76 

Electrical  Workers    6,138.80 

Engineers     100.00 

Firemen    2,395.53 

Foundry  Employees 1,030.51 

Hod   Carriers   1,350.00 

Iron,  Steel  and  Tin  Workers   11,881.81 

Machinists   16,622.33 

Mine,  Mill,  Smelter  Workers   3,583.53 


lay  for  them  of  $580,422.52.  This  in  turn  should 
be  reduced  by  $118,451.23,  the  amount  in  the  Na- 
tional Committee  treasury  on  January  31,  1920. 
Against  the  remaining  $461,971.29  must  be  checked 
off  what  the  steel  workers  paid  into  these  organiza- 
tions in  initiation  fees  and  dues. 

Inasmuch  as  the  co-operating  internationals  re- 
ceived directly  $1.00  to  $2.00  (mostly  the  latter) 
from  the  initiation  fees  of  the  approximately  250,- 
ooo  steel  workers  signed  up  during  the  campaign, 
not  to  speak  of  thousands  of  dollars  in  per  capita 
tax  from  armies  of  dues  payers  over  a  period  of 
many  months,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  their  net  outlay 
of  $461,971.29  would  be  nearly  if  not  altogether  off- 
set by  their  income.  It  is  true  that  some  of  the  or- 
ganizations, like  the  Miners  and  the  A.  F.  of  L.  it- 
self made  large  expenditures,  with  little  return;  and 
that  others,  like  the  Structural  Iron  Workers,  broke 
about  even;  while  the  Amalgamated  Association  put 
a  huge  sum  in  its  treasury.  All  things  considered, 
taking  the  twenty-four  organizations  as  a  whole,  one 
is  not  much  wrong  in  saying  that  so  far  as  their 
national  treasuries  were  concerned,  the  great  move- 
ment of  the  steel  workers,  including  the  organizing 

Mine  Workers   2,600.00 

Molders    4,199.05 

Pattern   Makers   615.52 

Plumbers    2,581.04 

Quarry  Workers 412.50 

Railway  Carmen   10,448.30 

Seamen 3,081.04 

Switchmen    4,115.52 

Sheet  Metal   Workers   100.00 

Steam  Shovelmen    627.25 


Total $101,047.52 

.[232] 


campaign  and  the  strike,  was,  financially  speaking, 
just  about  self-sustaining. 

Was  the  steel  strike,  then,  worth  the  great  suf- 
fering and  expenditure  of  effort  that  it  cost  the  steel 
workers?  I  say  yes;  even  though  it  failed  to  ac- 
complish the  immediate  objects  it  had  in  view. 
No  strike  is  ever  wholly  lost.  Even  the  least  effec- 
tive of  them  serve  the  most  useful  purpose  of  check- 
ing the  employers'  exploitation.  They  are  a  protec- 
tion to  the  workers'  standards  of  life.  Better  by 
far  a  losing  fight  than  none  at  all.  An  unresisting 
working  class  would  soon  find  itself  on  a  rice  diet. 
But  the  steel  strike  has  done  more  than  serve  merely 
as  a  warning  that  the  limit  of  exploitation  has  been 
reached;  it  has  given  the  steel  workers  a  confidence 
in  their  ability  to  organize  and  to  fight  effectively, 
which  will  eventually  inspire  them  on  to  victory. 
This  precious  result  alone  is  well  worth  all  the  hard- 
ships the  strike  cost  them. 


[233] 


LABOR'S  LACK  OF  CONFIDENCE  —  INADEQUATE 
EFFORTS  —  NEED  OF  ALLIANCE  WITH  MINERS 
AND  RAILROADERS  —  RADICAL  LEADERSHIP  AS  A 

STRIKE  ISSUE MANUFACTURING  REVOLUTIONS 

STRIKES :  RAILROAD  SHOPMEN,  BOSTON  POLICE, 

MINERS,  RAILROAD  YARD  AND  ROAD  MEN  —  DE- 
FECTION OF  AMALGAMATED  ASSOCIATION 

IN  preceding  chapters  I  have  said  much  about  the 
injustices  visited  upon  the  steel  workers  by  the  steel 
companies  and  their  minions;  the  mayors,  burgesses, 
police  magistrates,  gunmen,  State  Police,  Senate 
Committees,  etc.  But  let  there  be  no  mistake.  I 
do  not  blame  the  failure  of  the  strike  upon  these 
factors.  I  put  the  responsibility  upon  the  shoulders 
of  Organized  Labor.  Had  it  but  stirred  a  little  the 
steel  workers  would  have  won  their  battle,  despite 
all  the  Steel  Trust  could  do  to  prevent  it. 

By  this  I  mean  no  harsh  criticism.  On  the  con- 
trary, I  am  the  first  to  assert  that  the  effort  put  forth 
in  the  steel  campaign  was  wonderful,  far  surpassing 
anything  ever  done  in  the  industry  before,  and  mark- 
ing a  tremendous  advance  in  trade-union  tactics. 
Yet  it  was  not  enough,  and  it  represented  only  a 
fraction  of  the  power  the  unions  should  and  could 
have  thrown  into  the  fight.  The  organization  of 

[234] 


the  steel  industry  should  have  been  a  special  order 
of  business  for  the  whole  labor  movement.  But 
unfortunately  it  was  not.  The  big  men  of  Labor 
could  not  be  sufficiently  awakened  to  its  supreme  im- 
portance to  induce  them  to  sit  determinedly  into 
the  National  Committee  meetings  and  to  give  the 
movement  the  abundant  moral  and  financial  back- 
ing so  essential  to  its  success.  Official  pessimism, 
bred  of  thirty  years  of  trade-union  failure  in  the  steel 
industry,  hung  like  a  mill-stone  about  the  neck  of  the 
movement  in  all  its  stages. 

At  the  very  outset  this  pessimism  and  lack  of  faith 
dealt  the  movement  a  fatal  blow.  When  the 
unions  failed  to  follow  the  original  plan  of  the  cam- 
paign (outlined  in  Chapter  III)  to  throw  a  large 
crew  of  organizers  into  the  field  at  the  beginning  and 
thus  force  a  settlement  with  the  steel  companies  dur- 
ing war  time,  as  they  could  easily  have  done,  they 
made  a  monumental  blunder,  one  for  which  Organ- 
ized Labor  will  pay  dearly.  Notwithstanding  all 
their  best  efforts  in  the  long,  bitter  organizing  cam- 
paign and  the  great  strike,  the  organizers  could  not 
overcome  its  effects.  It  was  a  lost  opportunity  that 
unquestionably  cost  the  unionization  of  the  steel  in- 
dustry. 

And  the  same  pessimism  which  caused  this  original 
deadly  mistake  made  itself  felt  all  through  the  steel 
campaign,  by  so  restricting  the  resources  furnished 
the  National  Committee  as  to  practically  kill  all 
chance  of  success.  Probably  no  big  modern  trade- 
union  organizing  campaign  and  strike  has  been  con- 
ducted upon  such  slender  means.  Considering  the 
great  number  of  men  involved,  the  viciousness  of  the 

[235] 


opposition  and  the  long  duration  of  the  movement 
(18  months),  the  figure  cited  in  the  previous  chap- 
ter as  covering  the  general  expenses,  $1,005,007.72, 
is  unusually  low.  It  amounts  to  but  $4.02  per  man, 
or  hardly  a  half  week's  strike  benefits  for  each. 
Compared  to  the  sums  spent  in  other  industrial 
struggles,  it  is  proportionally  insignificant.  For  ex- 
ample, in  the  great  coal  miners'  strike  in  Colorado, 
begun  September  23,  1913,  and  ended  December  10, 
1914,  the  United  Mine  Workers  are  authoritatively 
stated  to  have  spent  about  $5,000,000.00  As  there 
were  on  an  average  about  12,000  strikers,  this  would 
make  the  cost  somewhere  about  $400.00  per  man  in- 
volved. And  in  those  days  a  dollar  was  worth  twice 
as  much  as  during  the  steel  strike.  Had  a  fraction 
of  such  amounts  been  available  to  the  steel  workers 
they  would  have  made  incomparably  a  better  fight. 

The  unions  affiliated  with  the  National  Committee 
have  at  least  two  million  members.  Even  if  they 
had  spent  outright  the  total  sum  required  to  carry 
on  the  organizing  campaign  and  strike  it  would  not 
have  strained  them  appreciably.  But  they  did  not 
spend  it,  nor  any  considerable  part  of  it.  In  the 
previous  chapter  we  have  seen  that  with  donations 
from  the  labor  movement  at  large,  and  initiation 
fees  and  dues  paid  in  by  the  steel  workers,  the  move- 
ment was  virtually  self-sustaining  as  far  as  the  co- 
operating unions  were  concerned  —  taking  them  as  a 
whole.  Now,  in  the  next  campaign,  all  that  must 
be  different.  The  unions  will  have  to  put  some  real 
money  in  the  fight.  Then  they  may  win  it. 

When  I  say  that  there  was  a  shortage  of  resources 
in  the  steel  campaign  I  include  particularly  organ- 

[236] 


izers  from  the  respective  international  unions.  Of 
these  there  were  not  half  enough.  Often  the  Na- 
tional Committee  had  to  beg  for  weeks  to  have  a 
man  sent  in  to  organize  a  local  union,  the  members 
for  which  it  had  already  enrolled.  Hundreds  of 
local  unions  suffered  and  many  a  one  perished  out- 
right for  want  of  attention.  Whole  districts  had  to 
be  neglected,  with  serious  consequences  when  the 
strike  came. 

Moreover,  the  system  used  by  many  internationals 
in  handling  their  organizers  was  wrong.  They  con- 
trolled them  from  their  several  general  headquarters, 
shifting  them  around  or  pulling  them  out  of  the  work 
without  regard  to  the  needs  of  the  campaign  as  a 
whole.  This  tended  to  create  a  loose,  disjointed, 
undisciplined,  inefficient  organizing  force.  It  was 
indefensible.  Now,  in  the  next  drive  there  are  two 
systems  which  might  be  used,  (i)  The  interna- 
tional unions  could  definitely  delegate  a  certain  num- 
ber of  organizers  to  the  campaign  and  put  them  en- 
tirely under  the  direction  of  the  National  Commit- 
tee. This  was  the  plan  followed  by  the  A.  F.  of  L., 
the  Miners,  and  the  Railway  Carmen.  It  worked 
well  and  tended  to  produce  a  homogeneous,  well- 
knit,  controllable,  efficient  organizing  force.  (2) 
The  organizers  definitely  assigned  to  the  steel  cam- 
paign by  the  internationals  could  be  formed  into 
crews,  each  crew  to  be  controlled  by  one  man  and 
charged  with  looking  after  the  needs  of  its  particu- 
lar trade.  The  Mine,  Mill  and  Smelter  Workers, 
Machinists,  and  Electrical  Workers  used  this  sys- 
tem to  some  extent.  A  series  of  such  crews,  work- 
ing vertically  along  craft  lines  while  the  National 

[237] 


Committee  men  worked  horizontally  along  indus- 
trial lines,  would  greatly  strengthen  the  general 
movement.  When  the  strike  came  it  would  not  only 
be  an  industrial  strike  but  twenty-four  intensified 
craft  strikes  as  well.  Of  the  two  systems,  the  first 
is  probably  the  better,  and  the  second,  because  of  the 
individualism  of  the  unions,  the  more  practical. 
Either  of  them  is  miles  superior  to  the  plan  of  con- 
trolling the  field  organizers  from  a  score  of  head- 
quarters knowing  very  little  of  the  real  needs  of  the 
situation. 

But  more  than  men  and  money,  the  steel  workers 
in  their  great  fight  lacked  practical  solidarity  from 
closely  related  trades.  In  their  semi-organized  con- 
dition they  were  unable  to  withstand  alone  the  ter- 
rific power  of  the  Steel  Trust,  backed  by  the  mighty 
capitalistic  organizations  which  rushed  to  its  aid. 
They  needed  from  their  organized  fellow  workers 
help  in  the  same  liberal  measure  as  Mr.  Gary  re- 
ceived from  those  on  his  side.  And  help  adequate 
to  the  task  could  have  come  only  by  extending 
the  strike  beyond  the  confines  of  the  steel  industry 
proper. 

When  the  steel  unions  end  their  present  educa- 
tional campaign  and  launch  the  next  big  drive  to  or- 
ganize the  steel  workers  (which  should  be  in  a  year 
or  two)  they  ought  to  be  prepared  to  meet  the 
formidable  employer  combinations  sure  to  be  ar- 
rayed against  them  by  opposing  to  them  still  more 
formidable  labor  combinations.  The  twenty-four 
unions  should  by  then  be  so  allied  with  the  miners' 
and  railroad  men's  organizations  that  should  it  come 
to  a  strike  these  two  powerful  groups  of  unions 

[238] 


would  rally  to  their  aid  and  paralyse  the  steel  indus- 
try completely  by  depriving  it  of  those  essentials 
without  which  it  cannot  operate,  fuel  and  rail  trans- 
portation. How  effective  such  assistance  would  be 
was  well  indicated  by  the  speedy  and  wholesale  shut- 
ting down  of  steel  mills,  first  during  the  general 
strike  of  bituminous  miners  in  November  and  Decem- 
ber of  1919,  and  then  during  the  "  outlaw  "  railroad 
strike  in  April,  1920.  With  such  a  combination  of 
allied  steel,  mine  and  railroad  workers  confronting 
them,  there  is  small  likelihood  that  the  steel  com- 
panies (or  the  public  at  large)  would  consider  the 
question  of  the  steel  workers'  right  to  organize  of 
sufficient  importance  to  fight  about.  Mr.  Gary 
might  then  be  brought  to  a  realization  that  this  is 
not  Czarist  Russia,  and  that  the  men  in  his  mills 
must  be  granted  their  human  rights. 

That  the  miners  and  railroaders  have  sufficient  in- 
terests at  stake  to  justify  their  entrance  into  such  a 
combination  no  union  man  of  heart  will  attempt  ta 
deny.  Not  to  speak  of  the  general  duty  of  all 
unionists  to  extend  help  to  brothers  in  trouble,  the 
above-mentioned  groups  have  the  most  powerful 
reasons  of  their  own  to  work  for  the  organization 
of  the  steel  industry.  The  United  States  Steel  Cor- 
poration and  so-called  "  independent "  steel  mills 
are  the  stronghold  of  industrial  autocracy  in  Amer- 
ica. Every  union  in  the  labor  movement  directly 
suffers  their  evil  effects  in  lower  wages,  longer  hours 
and  more  difficult  struggles  for  the  right  to  organize 
than  they  otherwise  would  have.  No  union  will  be 
safe  until  these  mills  are  under  the  banner  of  Or- 
ganized Labor.  Beyond  question  the  organization 

[239] 


of  the  steel  workers  would  tremendously  benefit  the 
miners  and  railroaders.  The  latter  cannot  possibly 
do  too  much  to  assist  in  bringing  it  about.  It  is  their 
own  fight. 

For  the  miners  and  railroad  men  to  join  forces 
with  the  steel  workers  would  mean  no  new  depar- 
ture in  trade-unionism.     It  would  be  merely  pro- 
ceeding in  harmony  with  the  natural  evolution  con- 
stantly taking  place  in  the  labor  movement.     For 
instance,  to  go  no  further  than  the  two  industries  in 
question,  it  is  only  a  few  years  since  the  miners  ne- 
gotiated agreements  and  struck,  district  by  district. 
Even  though  one  section  walked  out,  the  rest  would 
remain  at  work.     And  as  for  the  railroaders,  they 
followed  a  similar  plan  upon  the  basis  of  one  craft 
or  one  system.     Each  unit  of  the  two  industries  felt 
itself  to  be  virtually  a  thing  apart  from  all  the  others 
when  it  came  to  common  action  against  the   em- 
ployers.    It  was  the  heyday  of  particularism,   of 
craft  unionism  complete.     And  anyone  who  did  not 
think  the  system  represented  the  acme  of  trade-union 
methods  was  considered  a  crank.     But  both  groups 
of  organizations  are  fast  getting  away  from  such  in- 
fantile practices.     We  now  find  the  miners  striking 
all  over  the  country  simultaneously,  and  the  railroad 
men  rigging  up   such  wide-spreading  combinations 
among  themselves  that  soon  a  grievance  of  a  section 
hand  in  San  Diego,  California  will  be  the  grievance 
of  an  engineer  in  Bangor,  Maine.     The  man  who 
would  advocate  a  return  to  the  old  method  of  each 
for  himself  and  the  devil  take  the  hindmost  would  be 
looked  upon  today,  to  say  the  least,  with  grave  sus- 
picion. 


During  the  recent  steel  strike  the  National  Com- 
mittee tried  to  arrange  a  joint  meeting  with  the  of- 
ficials of  the  miners  and  railroad  brotherhoods  to  see 
if  some  assistance,  moral  if  nothing  else,  could  be 
secured  for  the  steel  workers,.  But  nothing  came  of 
it.  In  the  next  big  drive,  however,  these  powerful 
organizations  should  be  allied  with  the  steel  workers 
and  prepared  to  give  them  active  assistance  if  neces- 
sary. And  in  the  tuning  and  timing  of  movements 
to  permit  of  such  a  condition,  so  that  no  lots,  legal 
or  contractual,  need  be  cut  across,  there  are  involved 
no  technical  problems  which  a  little  initiative  and 
far-sightedness  on  the  part  of  the  labor  men  in  con- 
trol could  not  readily  overcome. 

In  order  to  cover  up  their  own  inveterate  oppo- 
sition to  Organized  Labor  in  all  its  forms  and  activi- 
ties, and  to  blind  the  workers  to  the  real  cause  of 
the  defeat,  namely  lack  of  sufficient  power  on  the 
employees'  side,  great  employing  interests  caused  to 
be  spread  over  the  whole  country  the  statement 
that  the  steel  strike  failed  because  of  radical  leader- 
ship, and  that  if  such  "  dangerous  "  men  as  John 
Fitzpatrick  and  myself  had  not  been  connected  with 
it  everything  would  have  been  lovely.  They  were 
especially  severe  against  me  for  my  "  evil  "  influence 
on  the  strike.  But  somehow  their  propaganda  did 
not  seem  to  strike  root  among  labor  men,  especially 
those  who  were  backing  the  steel  campaign.  The 
workers  are  getting  too  keen  these  days  to  let  the 
enemy  tell  them  who  shall  or  shall  not  be  their  of- 
ficials ;  and  when  they  see  one  of  these  officials  made 
the  target  of  bitter  attack  from  such  notorious  in- 
terests as  the  Steel  Trust  they  are  much  inclined  to 


feel  that  he  is  probably  giving  them  a  square  deal. 

As  for  myself,  and  I  know  John  Fitzpatrick  took 
the  same  position  regarding  himself,  I  was  willing  to 
resign  my  position  on  the  National  Committee  the 
very  instant  it  was  indicated  by  those  associated  with 
me  that  my  presence  was  injuring  the  movement.  I 
felt  that  to  be  my  duty.  But  to  the  last,  that  indi- 
cation never  came.  When  I  finally  resigned  as  Sec- 
retary-Treasurer on  January  31,  it  was  entirely  of 
my  own  volition. 

The  avalanche  of  vituperation  and  personal  abuse 
was  started  several  months  before  the  strike,  when 
a  traitor  labor  paper  in  Pittsburgh  (one  of  the 
stripe  which  lives  by  knifing  strikes  and  active 
unionists  for  the  employers)  published  articles  con- 
taining quotations  from  the  "  red  book,"  and  the 
other  stuff  later  bruited  about  in  the  daily  press.  To 
hear  this  sheet  tell  it,  the  revolution  was  at  hand. 
Immediately  after  the  articles  appeared  I  sent  copies 
to  the  presidents  of  all  the  twenty-four  co-operating 
unions,  with  the  result  that  almost  all  of  these 
officials  wrote  me,  advising  that  I  pay  no  attention 
to  these  attacks,  but  continue  with  my  work.  They 
seemed  to  consider  it  something  of  a  compliment 
to  be  so  bitterly  assailed  from  such  a  quarter. 
Again,  at  the  very  moment  when  President  Gompers 
was  dictating  his  letter  to  Judge  Gary  asking  for  a 
conference  (long  after  the  above-mentioned  attacks) 
I  stated  that  possibly  too  much  prominence  for  me  in 
the  movement  might  attract  needless  opposition  to  it 
and  I  offered  to  resign  from  the  conference  commit- 
tee which  handled  all  negotiations  concerning  the 
steel  strike.  But  my  objections  were  over-ruled  and 

[242] 


I  was  continued  on  the  committee.  Moreover,  at  any 
time  in  the  campaign  a  word  from  the  executive  offi- 
cers of  the  A.  F.  of  L.  would  have  brought  about  my 
resignation.  This  they  were  aware  of  for  months 
before  the  strike.  All  of  which  indicates  that  the 
men  responsible  for  the  organizations  in  the  move- 
ment were  satisfied  that  it  was  being  carried  on  ac- 
cording to  trade-union  principles,  and  also  that  in 
consideration  of  the  Steel  Trust's  murderous  tactics 
in  the  past  it  was  a  certainty  that  if  the  opposition 
had  not  taken  the  specific  form  it  did,  it  would  have 
manifested  itself  in  some  other  way  as  bad  or  worse. 
It  was  to  be  depended  upon  that  some  means  would 
have  been  found  to  thoroughly  discredit  the  move- 
ment. 

This  conviction  was  intensified  by  the  unexampled 
fury  with  which  each  important  move  of  Labor  dur- 
ing the  past  year  has  been  opposed,  not  only  by 
employers  but  by  governmental  officials  as  well.  All 
through  the  war  the  moneyed  interests  watched  with 
undisguised  alarm  and  hatred  the  rapid  advance  of 
the  unions;  but  they  were  powerless  to  stop  it. 
Now,  however,  they  are  getting  their  revenge.  The 
usual  method  of  defeating  such  movements  during 
this  period  of  white  terrorism  is  to  attach  some 
stigma  to  them;  to  question  the  legitimacy  of  their 
aims,  and  then,  when  the  highly  organized  and  cor- 
rupted press  has  turned  public  sentiment  against 
them,  to  crush  them  by  the  most  unscrupulous  means. 
It  makes  no  difference  how  mild  or  ordinary  the 
movement  is,  some  issue  is  always  found  to  poison 
public  opinion  against  it. 

The  first  important  body  of  workers  to  feel  the 

[243] 


weight  of  this  opposition  was  the  railroad  shop- 
men. The  Railroad  Administration  having  dilly- 
dallied along  with  their  demands  for  several  months, 
these  under-paid  workers,  goaded  on  by  the  mount- 
ing cost  of  living,  finally  broke  into  an  unauthor- 
ized strike  in  the  early  summer  of  1919.  This  al- 
most destroyed  the  organizations.  Officials  who 
ought  to  know  declared  that  at  one  time  over  200,- 
ooo  men  were  out.  Naturally  the  press  roundly  de- 
nounced them  as  Bolshevik}.  Upon  a  promise  of 
fair  treatment  they  returned  to  work.  When  the 
matter  finally  came  to  President  Wilson  for  settle- 
ment, he  declared  that  to  raise  wages  would  be  con- 
trary to  the  Government's  policy  of  reducing  the  cost 
of  living,  and  requested  that  the  demands  be  held 
in  abeyance.  This  statement  was  a  Godsend  to  all 
the  reactionary  elements,  who  used  it  to  break  up 
wage  movements  everywhere.  Thus  came  to  grief 
the  effort  of  the  shopmen.  Up  to  May,  1920,  they 
have  secured  no  relief  whatsoever. 

Next  came  the  affair  of  the  Boston  police  in  Sep- 
tember, 1919.  This  developed  from  an  effort  of 
typically  conservative  policemen  to  organize.  The 
strike  was  deliberately  forced  by  the  action  of  State 
politicians,  inspired  by  big  business,  in  cold-bloodedly 
discharging  a  number  of  the  officers  of  the  new  union 
and  stubbornly  refusing  to  re-instate  them.  When 
the  inevitable  strike  occurred  they  labelled  it  not 
merely  an  attempted  revolution,  but  a  blow  at  the 
very  foundations  of  civilization.  The  press  did  the 
rest.  The  strike  was  buried  beneath  a  deluge  o'f 
abuse,  misrepresentation  and  vilification. 

Then  came  the  coal  miners  in  November,  1919. 
[244] 


•       MM      •-      • 

>   -  >  -  — 
£«.*  —  " 

.?  S'S  • 

P5  fa  -J:  p<  «3 

e  u  ^  >  >; 

fe  -^£-e 


• 
2*    aw 


O 


U 


During  the  war  this  body  of  men  sent  fully  60,000 
members  to  the  front  in  France.  They  bought  un- 
told amounts  of  liberty  bonds  and  worked  faithfully 
to  keep  the  industries  in  operation.  But  no  sooner 
did  they  make  demand  for  some  of  the  freedom 
which  they  thought  they  had  won  in  the  war  than 
they  found  themselves  crowded  into  a  strike,  and 
their  conservative,  old-line,  trade-union  leaders 
harshly  assailed  as  revolutionists.  For  instance, 
said  Senator  Pomerene : 1 

Years  ago  the  American  spirit  was  startled  because 
a  Vanderbilt  had  said,  "  The  public  be  damned."  But 
Vanderbilt  seems  to  have  no  patent  on  the  phrase,  or  if 
he  had  it  is  being  infringed  today  by  men  who  have 
as  little  regard  for  the  public  welfare  as  he  himself 
had.  There  is  no  difference  in  kind  between  him  and  a 
Foster,  who,  aided  by  the  extreme  Socialist  and 
I.  W.  W.  classes  of  the  country,  aims  to  enlist  under 
his  leadership  all  the  iron  and  steel  workers  of  a  nation 
and  to  paralyze  industry,  or  a  Lewis  (President  of 
the  United  Mine  Workers  of  America),  who,  to 
further  his  own  ambitions,  aided  as  he  was  by  the  same 
elements,  calls  400,000  men  out  of  the  mines  and  says 
to  the  public,  "  Freeze  or  starve." 

The  Government  condemned  the  strike  as  "  un- 
justifiable and  unlawful "  and  invoked  against  it  the 
so-called  Lever  law.  This  law,  a  war  measure 
against  food  and  fuel  profiteers,  was,  when  up  for 
adoption,  distinctly  stated  by  its  author,  Representa- 
tive Lever,  and  by  Attorney  General  Gregory,  as  not 
applying  to  workers  striking  for  better  conditions.2 

1  Quoted  from  The  Coopers'  Journal  for  February,  1920. 

2  For  important  details,  see  article  entitled  "  The  Broken  Pledge," 
by  Samuel  Gompers,  in  the  American  Federationist,  January,  1920. 

{245] 


Moreover,  since  the  armistice  it  had  fallen  into  dis- 
use,—  as  far  as  employers  were  concerned;  but  upon 
the  strength  of  it  the  miners'  strike  was  outlawed, 
Federal  Judge  Anderson  issuing  an  injunction  which 
commanded  the  union  officials  to  rescind  the  strike 
order  and  to  refuse  all  moral  and  financial  assist- 
ance to  the  strikers.  Rarely  has  a  labor  union  found 
itself  in  so  difficult  a  situation.  The  only  thing  that 
saved  the  miners  from  a  crushing  defeat  was  their 
splendid  'organization  and  strategic  position  in  indus- 
try. On  November  n,  after  the  union  officials  had 
agreed  to  rescind  the  strike  order,  the  Philadelphia 
Public  Ledger  expressed  an  opinion  widely  held  when 
it  said: 

The  truth  of  the  matter  is  that  we  all  "  got  in 
wrong "  on  this  coal  situation.  This  is  the  time  to 
say  in  entire  frankness  that  the  Government  handled 
the  situation  with  the  tact,  timeliness  and  conciliatory 
spirit  of  a  German  war  governor  jack-booting  a  Bel- 
gium town  into  docility. 

And  now  we  have  the  unauthorized  strike  of  the 
Railroad  yard  and  road  men;  this  is  clearly  an  out- 
break of  workers  exasperated  on  the  one  hand  by 
a  constantly  increasing  cost  of  living,  and  on  the 
other  by  dilatory  methods  of  affording  relief.  The 
orthodox  tactics  are  being  employed  to  break  it. 
The  Lever  law,  disinterred  from  the  legislative 
graveyard  to  beat  the  miners,  has  been  galvanized 
into  life  again  and  is  being  used  to  jail  the  strike 
leaders.  This  is  not  all,  however.  Probably  there 
never  was  a  big  strike  in  this  country  more  spontane- 
ous and  unplanned  than  the  one  in  question.  But 

[246] 


that  does  not  worry  our  Department  of  Justice;  it 
has  just  announced  to  a  credulous  world  that  the 
whole  affair  is  a  highly  organized  plot  to  overthrow 
the  Government.  Within  the  hour  I  write  this  (on 
April  15  )  I  read  in  the  papers  that  I  have  been 
singled  out  by  Attorney-General  Palmer  as  one  of 
the  strike  leaders.  Eight-column  headlines  flare  out 
the  charge,  "  PALMER  BLAMES  FOSTER  FOR 
RAIL  STRIKE,"  etc.1 

To  Mr.  Palmer's  "penny  dreadful"  plot,  the 
local  newspapers  add  lying  details  of  their  own. 
The  Pittsburgh  Leader,  for  instance,  recites  in  ex- 
tenso  how  I  returned  from  the  West  in  disguise  to 
Pittsburgh  several  days  ago  —  presumably  after  a 
trip  plotting  with  Mr.  Palmer's  wonderful  revolu- 
tionaries, who  not  only  can  bring  whole  industries 
to  a  standstill  by  a  wave  of  the  hand,  but  can  do  it 
in  such  a  manner  that  although  many  thousands  of 
workers  are  "  in  the  know "  the  Department  of 
Justice  never  gets  to  hear  about  it  until  the  strikes 
have  occurred. 

Now  the  fact  is  that  I  have  been  so  busy  writing, 
this  book  that  I  have  hardly  stirred  from  the  house 
for  weeks.  Since  the  steel  strike  ended  I  have  not 
been  beyond  the  environs  of  Pittsburgh.  More- 
over, I  do  not  know  a  solitary  one  of  the  men  ad- 
vertised as  strike  leaders,  nor  has  there  been  any 
communication  whatsoever  between  us.  I  have  not 
attended  any  strike  meetings,  nor  have  I  even  seen 
a  man  whom  I  knew  to  be  a  striker.  But  of  course 
such  details  are  irrelevant  to  the  Department  of  Jus- 
tice and  the  newspapers.  The  latter  boldly  an- 

1  Pittsburgh  Post,  April  15,  1920. 

[247] 


nounce  that  it  is  officially  hoped  that  Mr.  Palmer's 
charges  will  stampede  the  men  back  to  work.1  In 
fact  th'at  is  their  aim.  These  charges  are  a  strike- 
breaking measure,  pure  and  simple,  and  have  no 
necessary  relation  to  truth.2 

Similar  instances  might  be  multiplied  to  illustrate 
the  extreme  virulence  of  the  attacks  on  Labor  in 
late  struggles  —  how  the  press  manufactured  the 
general  strikes  in  Seattle  and  Winnipeg  into  young 
revolutions ;  and  how  even  when  Mr.  Gompers  an- 
nounced some  time  back  that  the  American  Federa- 
tion of  Labor  would  continue  its  customary  political 
policy  of  "  rewarding  its  friends  and  punishing  its 

1  Pittsburgh  Chronicle-Telegraph,  April  15,  1920. 

2  In  connection  with  this  matter  I  promptly  called  Mr.  Palmer 
a  liar,  a  statement  which  was  widely  carried  by  the  press.     Our 
would-be  tyrant  swallowed  it.     In  the  situation  two  courses  were 
open  to  him:    If  his  accusations  against  me  were  true,  under  his 
own  interpretation  of  the  Lever  law  he  was  duty-bound  to  arrest 
me;  and  if  they  were  not  true,  common  justice  demanded  that  he 
admit  the  incorrectness  of  the  statements  he  had  sent  flying  through 
the  press,   attacking  me.    But  he  has   done  neither.    And   in  the 
meantime  I  have  been  subjected  to  a  storm  of  journalistic  abuse. 
For  example,   says  the   Donora,   Pa.  Herald  of  April   16:    "Wm. 
Z.    Foster  seems   determined  to   have  that   little   revolution   if  he 
has  to  get  out  and  start  one  himself.    About  the  best  remedy  for 
that  bird  would  be  one  of  those  oldfashioned  hangings." 

One  can  readily  imagine  how  quickly  the  wheels  of  justice  would 
have  whirled  and  how  speedily  the  editor  would  have  been  clapped 
into  jail  were  such  an  incitement  to  murder  printed  in  a  labor 
journal.  But  When  the  case  in  point  was  called  to  the  attention 
of  the  Pittsburgh  officials  of  the  Department  of  Justice  they  could 
do  nothing  about  it.  Nor  could  those  of  the  Rost  Office  Depart- 
ment, although  the  Donora  Herald  circulates  through  the  mails. 
Similarly  the  county  and  state  officials  could  see  no  cause  for 
action.  Finally  the  opportunities  for  relief  sifted  down  to  a 
libel  suit.  And  what  chance  has  a  workingman  in  such  a  suit 
against  a  henchman  of  the  Steel  Trust  in  the  heart  of  Pennsylvania's 
black  steel  district? 

[248] 


enemies,"  the  scheme  was  denounced  in  influential 
quarters  as  an  attempt  to  capture  the  Government 
and  set  up  a  'dictatorship  of  the  proletariat.  But 
enough.  The  steel  strike  was  a  drive  straight  at  the 
heart  of  industrial  autocracy  in  America;  it  could 
expect  to  meet  with  nothing  less  than  the  most  des- 
perate and  unscrupulous  resistance.  If  the  issue 
used  against  the  -strike  had  not  been  the  charge  of 
radical  leadership,  we  may  rest  assured  there  would 
have  been  another  "  just  as  good."  The  next  move- 
ment will  have  to  win  by  its  own  strength,  rather  than 
by  the'  vagaries  of  a  newspaper-created  public  opin- 
ion. 

But  a  far  more  pressing  problem  even  than  any 
of  those  touched  upon  in  the  foregoing  paragraphs 
is  the  one  involved  in  the  attitude  of  the  Amalga- 
mated Association  of  Iron,  Steel  and  Tin  Workers 
toward  the  steel  campaign.  This  organization 
withdrew  from  the  National  Committee  immediately 
after  the  strike  was  called  off,  and  it  has  apparently 
abandoned  trying,  at  least  for  the  time  being,  to  or- 
ganize the  big  steel  mills.  Thus  the  whole  cam- 
paign is  brought  to  the  brink  of  ruin,  because  the 
Amalgamated  Association  has  jurisdiction  over 
about  50  per  cent,  of  the  workers  in  the  mills,  in- 
cluding all  the  strategic  steel-making  trades,  with- 
out whose  support  the  remainder  cannot  possibly 
win.  Unless  it  can  be  brought  back  to  the  fold,  the 
joint  movement  of  the  trades  in  the  steel  industry 
will  almost  certainly  be  broken  up,  to  the  great  glee 
of  Mr.  Gary  and  his  associates. 

This  action  was  in  logical  sequence  to  the  position 
taken  through  the  campaign  by  several  of  the  Amal- 

[249] 


gamated  Association's  general  officers.  From  the 
beginning,  they  considered  the  movement  with  pes- 
simism, often  with  hostility.  It  received  scant  co- 
operation from  them.  As  related  in  Chapter  VI, 
they  tried  to  get  a  settlement  with  the  U.  S.  Steel 
Corporation  right  in  the  teeth  of  the  general  move- 
ment; and  their  financial  support  was  meager,  to  say 
the  least.1  For  a  few  weeks  during  the  strike  move- 
ment, when  victory  seemed  near,  they  displayed  some 
slight  enthusiasm;  but  this  soon  wore  off  and  they 
adopted  a  policy  of  "  saving  what  they  could." 
They  were  exceedingly  anxious  to  call  off  the  strike 
many  weeks  before  its  close,  and  went  about  the 
country  discouraging  the  men  and  advising  them  to 
return  to  work.  And  even  worse,  they  attempted 
to  make  separate  settlements  with  the  steel  com- 
panies. The  following  proposed  agreement,  pre- 
sented to  (and  refused  by)  the  Bethlehem  Steel  Cor- 
poration at  Sparrows'  Point  when  the  strike  was  not 
yet  two  months  old,  tells  its  own  story : 

1In  the  report  included  at  the  end  of  Chapter  VI,  the  Amalga- 
mated Association  is  shown  to  have  enrolled  70,026  members  during 
the  campaign.  But,  for  the  reasons  cited,  the  figure  is  far  too  low. 
President  Tighe  gave  a  better  idea  of  the  number  when,  testifying 
before  the  Senate  Committee,  he  said  (Hearings,  page  353)  that  the 
secretary  had  told  him  "  that  he  had  already  issued  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  150,000  dues  cards,"  and  could  not  get  them  printed  fast 
enough.  For  each  man  of  this  army  of  members,  the  national  head- 
quarters of  the  Amalgamated  Association  received  two  dollars.  Yet 
in  return  the  officials  in  charge,  throughout  the  entire  movement, 
gave  the  National  Committee  directly  only  $11,881.81  to  work  with. 
Of  this,  $3,881.81  was  for  organizing  expenses,  and  $8,000.00  was  to 
feed  and  furnish  legal  help  to  the  great  multitudes  of  strikers,  half 
of  whom  were  members  of  the  Amalgamated  Association.  What 
strike  help  was  extended  in  other  directions  was  correspondingly 
scanty.  The  balance  of  the  funds  taken  in  is  still  in  its  treasury. 

[250] 


November  igth,  1919. 

Agreement  entered  into  between  the  Bethlehem  Steel 
Company  of  Sparrows'  Point,  Maryland,  and  its  em- 
ployees, governing  wages  and  conditions  in  the  Sheet  and 
Tin  mills,  and  Tin  House  Department. 

1.  It  is  agreed  that  the  wages  and  conditions  agreed 
upon  between  the  Western  Sheet  and  Tin  Plate  Manu- 
facturers' Association  and  the  Amalgamated  Association 
of  Iron,  Steel  and  Tin  Workers,  as  agreed  upon  in  the 
Atlantic  City  Conference,  June,  1919,  will  be  the  prices 
and  conditions  paid  to  the  employees  in  the  above-men- 
tioned departments. 

2.  That  the  company  will  also  agree  to  the  re-instate- 
ment  of  all  their  former  employees,  such  as  seek  employ- 
ment without  any  discrimination. 

3.  The  above  Agreement  to  expire  June  3Oth,  1920. 

During  the  strike  the  general  officers  of  the  Amal- 
gamated Association  never  tired  of  telling  how  sa- 
cred they  considered  their  contracts  with  the  em- 
ployers, and  did  not  hesitate  to  jeopardize  the  strike 
by  living  up  to  them  most  strictly.  But  when  it  came 
to  their  obligations  to  the  other  trades  it  was  a  dif- 
ferent story.  They  well  knew,  when  they  tried 
to  make  separate  settlements  with  the  U.  S.  Steel  and 
Bethlehem  Companies,  that  they  were  violating  sol- 
emn agreements  which  they  had  entered  into  with  the 
other  trades  in  the  industry,  not  to  speak  of  funda- 
mental principles  of  labor  solidarity. 

The  national  officials  in  question  looked  with  un- 
disguised jealousy  upon  the  growth  to  importance  of 
other  unions  in  the  industry  where  their  own  organi- 
zation had  operated  alone  so  long.  They  lost  no 
love  on  the  National  Committee.  In  fact  more  than 
one  of  their  number  seemed  to  take  particular  delight 


in  placing  obstructions  in  its  way.  If  they  wanted 
to  see  the  steel  industry  organized  they  certainly 
showed  it  in  a  peculiar  manner.  A  goodly  share  of 
my  time  —  not  to  speak  of  that  of  others  —  was 
spent  plugging  the  holes  which  they  punched  through 
the  dike.  And  apparently  they  always  had  the 
hearty  support  of  their  fellow  officers.  It  is  only 
fair  to  say,  however,  that  the  lesser  officials  and  the 
rank  and  file  of  the  Amalgamated  Association 
strongly  favored  the  National  Committee  movement 
and  gave  it  their  loyal  cooperation. 

As  a  justification  for  the  Amalgamated  Associa- 
tion officials'  action  in  quitting  the  joint  campaign, 
word  is  being  sent  through  the  steel  industry  that 
henceforth  that  organization  will  insist  upon  its 
broad  jurisdictional  claims  and  become  an  industrial 
union  in  fact,  taking  into  its  ranks  and  protecting 
workers  of  all  classes  in  the  steel  industry.  But  no 
one  familiar  with  the  Amalgamated  Association  will 
take  this  seriously.  It  is  a  dyed-in-the-wool  skilled 
workers'  union,  and  has  been  such  ever  since  its  foun- 
dation forty-five  years  ago.  Its  specialty  is  the 
"tonnage  men,"  or  skilled  iron  and  steel  making  and 
rolling  trades  proper.  All  its  customs,  policies  and 
instincts  are  inspired  by  the  interests  of  this  indus- 
trial group.  It  has  never  looked  after  the  welfare 
of  the  mechanical  trades  and  the  common  laborers, 
even  though  for  the  past  few  years  it  has  claimed 
jurisdiction  over  them.  In  its  union  mills  it  is  the 
regular  thing  to  find  only  the  tonnage  men  covered 
by  the  agreements,  no  efforts  whatever  being  made 
to  take  care  of  the  other  workers.  It  is  true  that 
during  the  recent  campaign,  due  to  the  stimulus  of 

[252];    ' 


the  National  Committee,  laborers  were  taken  in; 
but  of  the  way  they  were  handled,  probably  the  less 
said  the  better.  The  incidents  related  in  Chapter 
X  are  typical. 

That  the  men  now  at  the  head  of  the  Amalga- 
mated Association  will  upset  these  craft  practices 
and  revolutionize  their  organization  into  a  bona  fide, 
vigorous  industrial  union  is  incredible  to  those  who 
have  seen  them  in  action.  But  even  if  the  miracle 
happened,  even  if  they  got  rid  of  their  mid-nineteenth 
century  ideas  and  methods,  adopted  modern  princi- 
ples and  systems,  and  put  on  the  sweeping  campaign 
necessary  to  organize  the  industry,  it  would  not 
solve  the  problem.  The  other  unions  in  the  steel  in- 
dustry are  not  prepared  to  yield  their  trade  claims 
to  the  Amalgamated  Association,  and  any  serious 
attempt  by  that  organization  to  infringe  upon  them 
would  result  in  a  jurisdictional  quarrel,  so  destructive 
as  to  wreck  all  hope  of  organizing  the  industry  for 
an  indefinite  period.  The  unions  would  be  so  busy 
fighting  among  themselves  that  they  would  have  no 
time,  energy  or  ambition  to  fight  the  Steel  Trust. 

Progress  and  organization  in  the  steel  industry 
are  to  be  achieved  not  by  splitting  the  ranks  and  di- 
viding the  forces,  but  by  consolidating  and  extending 
them.  The  only  rational  hope  in  the  situation  lies  in 
a  firm  federation  of  all  the  trades  in  the  industry, 
allied  with  the  miners  and  railroad  men  in  such 
fashion  that  they  will  extend  help  in  case  of  trouble. 
The  steel  workers  are  fast  recovering  from  their  de- 
feat. The  educational  campaign  is  getting  results, 
and  the  work  should  be  made  a  permanent  institu- 
tion until  the  industry  is  organized.  For  the  Amal- 

[253] 


gamated  Association  to  desert  the  field  now  is  suici- 
dal. It  is  worse ;  it  is  a  crime  against  the  labor  move- 
ment. It  will  break  up  the  campaign  and  throw  the 
steel  workers,  helpless,  upon  the  mercy  of  Gary  and 
his  fellow  exploiters.  Organized  Labor  should  not 
permit  it.  The  time  is  past  when  a  few  short- 
sighted union  officials  can  block  the  organization  of 
a  great  industry. 


[254] 


XIV 
IN  CONCLUSION 

THE  POINT  OF  VIEW  —  ARE  THE  TRADE  UNIONS  REV- 
OLUTIONARY —  CAMOUFLAGE  IN  SOCIAL  WARS  — 
RUINOUS  DUAL  UNIONISM  —  RADICALS  SHOULD 
STRENGTHEN  TRADE  UNIONS  —  THE  ENGLISH 

RENAISSANCE  —  TOM  MAN-N;S  WORK 

FOR  those  progressives  who  will  look  upon  the  steel 
campaign  from  an  evolutionary  standpoint  —  that  is 
by  a  comparison  with  past  experiences  —  it  will  stand 
out  in  its  true  light  as  marking  a  great  advance  in 
trade-union  methods  and  practices.  It  is  true  that 
the  unions  in  the  campaign  made  many  mistakes, 
quarreled  seriously  among  themselves,  and  put  forth 
only  a  fraction  of  their  real  strength;  but  when  one 
considers  that  they  substituted  a  group  of  tweny-four 
unions  for  individual  action  in  other  campaigns; 
established  a  standard  initiation  fee  instead  of  the 
multitude  that  existed  before;  adopted  modern 
methods  of  organizing  in  place  of  the  antiquated  sys- 
tem previously  prevailing;  organized  a  joint  com- 
missariat, carried  on  a  successful  organizing  cam- 
paign and  waged  a  great  strike  together,  one  must 
admit  that  a  tremendous  stride  forward  has  been 
made.  The  conclusion  is  bound  to  be  optimistic  and 
full  of  enthusiasm  for  the  future. 

[255] 


But  unfortunately  there  are  large  bodies  of  pro- 
gressives who  do  not  judge  from  the  evolutionary 
viewpoint  when  it  comes  to  trade  unionism.  These 
range  all  the  way  from  the  mildest  liberals  and 
friends  of  Labor  to  the  most  extreme  I.  W.  W.'s. 
They  form  an  influential  group.  Theirs  is  the  ideal- 
istic method;  more  or  less  clearly,  these  elements  hold 
in  their  mind's  eye  a  smooth-running,  intelligent, 
imaginary  "  one  big  union."  This  they  use  as  an 
inelastic  criterion  by  which  to  judge  the  trade  unions. 
And  the  natural  result  is  that,  even  in  such  cases  as 
the  steel  campaign,  the  unions  cut  a  sorry  figure. 
Their  weaknesses  are  unduly  emphasized;  their  pro- 
gressive innovations  lose  their  import  and  seem 
but  make-shift  imitations  of  the  real  thing.  The 
conclusions  are  necessarily  pessimistic.  The  true 
significance  of  the  epoch-making  movement  is  lost. 
This  viewpoint  is  so  general  and  its  consequences  so 
far-reaching  and  detrimental,  not  only  to  the  steel 
unions  but  to  the  whole  labor  movement,  that  per- 
haps a  discussion  of  it  may  not  be  amiss  at  this 
point. 

For  many  years  radicals  in  this  country  have  al- 
most universally  maintained  that  the  trade  unions  are 
fundamentally  non-revolutionary;  that  they  have  no 
real  quarrel  with  capitalism,  but  are  seeking  merely 
to  modify  its  harshness  through  a  policy  of  mild  re- 
form. They  have  been  pictured  as  lacking  both  the 
intelligence  to  want  industrial  freedom  and  the  cour- 
age to  demand  it.  And  so  often  have  these  ideas 
been  repeated,  so  slight  has  been  the  inquiry  into 
their  soundness,  that  they  have  come  to  be  accepted 
in  a  large  degree  by  virtually  the  entire  left  wing 

[256] 


of  the  labor  movement.  To  these  ideas,  more  than 
anything  else,  is  due  the  current  idealistic  labor  pes- 
simism, the  unsympathetic  attitude  toward,  and  gen- 
eral lack  of  understanding  of,  the  trade  unions. 

Yet  their  falsity  is  readily  apparent  when  one  takes 
into  consideration  the  real  situation.  It  is  an  in- 
disputable fact  that  the  trade  unions  always  act  upon 
the  policy  of  taking  all  they  can  get  from  their  ex- 
ploiters. They  even  overreach  themselves  some- 
times, as  a  thousand  lost  strikes  eloquently  testify. 
Their  program  is  directly  anti-capitalistic.  But  let 
me  quote  from  a  booklet,  written  by  myself  several 
years  ago,  entitled,  "Trade  Unionism;  The  Road 
To  Freedom,"  page  18: 

It  is  idle  to  say  that  the  trade  unions  will  rest  content 
with  anything  short  of  actual  emancipation.  For  they 
are  as  insatiable  as  the  veriest  so-called  revolutionary 
unions.  In  the  measure  that  their  strength  increases, 
so  do  their  demands.  They  have  sent  wages  up:  2,  3, 
4>  5>  6,  7,  8  dollars  per  day,  and  hours  down:  12,  u, 
10,  9,  8,  7,  6,  per  day  with  all  kinds  of  other  concessions 
sandwiched  in  between.  And  now  they  are  more  rad- 
ical in  their  demands  than  ever  before  in  their  history. 
Permanently  satisfied  trade  unions  under  capitalism 
would  be  the  eighth  wonder  of  the  world,  outrivalling 
in  interest  the  famous  hanging  gardens  of  Babylon. 
They  would  be  impossible.  With  its  growing  power, 
Organized  Labor  will  go  on  winning  greater  and 
greater  concessions,  regardless  of  how  profound  they 
may  be.  It  is  purest  assumption  to  state  that  the  trade 
unions  would  balk  at  ending  the  wages  system. 

So  far  as  the  tendency  of  their  demands  is  con- 
cerned,  there   can  be   no   question   about   that   to 

[257] 


anyone  who  will  look  at  them  squarely;  the  trade 
unions  may  be  depended  upon  always  to  check  ex- 
ploitation through  the  wages  system  as  far  as  their 
power  enables  them.  The  big  question  is  whether 
or  not  they  will  be  able  to  develop  enough  power  to 
stop  this  exploitation  altogether.  As  for  me,  I  am 
confident  that  they  will.  In  every  country  they  are 
constantly  adding  to  and  solidifying  their  ranks; 
building  ever  more  gigantic  and  militant  combina- 
tions and  throwing  them  athwart  the  exploiter's  path. 
It  is  safe  to  say  that  if  they  cannot  finally  stop  him  it 
will  be  because  it  does  not  lie  within  the  realms  of 
possibility  for  the  working  class  to  produce  a  suffi- 
ciently powerful  organization. 

Why,  then,  have  these  strongly  anti-capitalistic 
qualities  been  so  long  and  generally  ignored  and  the 
trade  unions  considered  merely  as  palliative  bodies? 
In  my  opinion  it  is  because  they,  like  various  other 
aggressive  social  movements,  have  more  or  less  in- 
stinctively surrounded  themselves  with  a  sort  of 
camouflage  or  protective  coloring,  designed  to  dis- 
guise the  movement  and  thus  to  pacify  and  disarm 
the  opposition.  This  is  the  function  of  such  expres- 
sions as,  "  A  fair  day's  pay  for  a  fair  day's  work," 
"  The  interests  of  Capital  and  Labor  are  identical," 
etc.  In  actual  practice  little  or  no  attention  is  paid 
to  them.  They  are  for  foreign  consumption.  The 
fact  that  those  who  utter  them  may  actually  believe 
what  they  say  does  not  change  the  situation  a  particle. 
Most  movements  are  blind  to  their  own  goals 
anyway.  The  important  thing  is  the  real  trend  of 
the  movement,  which  is  indisputably  as  I  have  stated 
above,  on  the  one  hand  constantly  expanding  organ- 

[258] 


ization,  and  on  the  other  constantly  increasing  de- 
mands. The  trade  unions  will  not  become  anti- 
capitalistic  through  the  conversion  of  their  members 
to  a  certain  point  of  view  or  by  the  adoption  of  cer- 
tain preambles;  they  are  that  by  their  very  makeup 
and  methods.  The  most  that  can  be  done  is  to 
clarify  their  aims  and  intensify  their  efforts  towards 
freedom. 

If  the  trade  unions  instinctively  throw  dust  in  the 
eyes  of  their  enemies,  they  do  it  for  an  altogether 
worthy  purpose,  the  elevation  of  the  standard  of 
well-being  for  the  mass  of  the  people.  In  the  case 
of  the  capitalist  class  we  see  the  same  principle  ap- 
plied to  an  utterly  vicious  end.  The  whole  trend  of 
the  great  employing  interests  is  to  set  up  an 
oligarchy  of  wealthy  parasites,  neither  toiling  nor 
spinning,  yet  for  whom  the  whole  body  of  workers 
would  be  compelled  to  labor  in  degradation  and  pov- 
erty. And  if  unopposed,  they  would  not  only  bring 
about  this  condition,  but  in  so  doing  would  rob  the 
people  of  every  right  they  have  —  free  speech,  free 
press,  free  assemblage,  legislative  representation, 
trial  by  jury,  and  all  the  rest.  But  do  they  openly 
avow  their  purpose?  Most  assuredly  not,  for  they 
know  that  powerful  though  they  are  they  would  be 
swept  away  by  a  wave  of  popular  opposition. 
Therefore,  through  their  newspapers  and  innumer- 
able other  propaganda  agencies,  they  proceed  to 
cover  up  their  nefarious  schemes  of  exploitation  and 
oppression  with  hypocritical  cloaks  of  patriotism, 
religion,  benevolence,  and  the  like.  Their  practice 
is  one  thing,  their  preaching  something  entirely  dif- 
ferent. Thus  we  have  Garys  and  Rockefellers  act- 

[259] 


ually  enslaving  their  workers  by  the  most  brutal 
methods  and  at  the  same  time  seeking  to  convince 
the  public  that  what  they  are  trying  to  do  is  to  pro- 
tect these  workers  from  union  domination,  to  pre- 
serve to  them  their  sacred  right  to  work  for  whom- 
ever they  please,  etc.  Men  such  as  these  are  knifing 
America  and  doing  it  in  the  name  of  100  per  cent. 
Americanism.  They  are  social  camouflagers  par  ex- 
cellence. 

The  quelstion  may  be  pertinently  asked,  why,  if 
camouflage  is  such  a  potent  weapon  in  social  as  well 
as  military  warfare,  should  the  true  nature  and  ten- 
dency of  the  trade  unions  be  pointed  out,  thus  strip- 
ping the  movement  of  its  philosophic  protection  and 
leaving  it  bare  before  its  enemies?  The  answer  is 
that  the  camouflage  works  both  ways;  it  deceives 
friends  as  well  as  enemies.  It  has  thus  to  a  great  ex- 
tent cost  the  unions  the  support  of  the  whole  left 
wing  of  the  labor  movement.  Its  advantages  are 
outweighed  by  its  disadvantages. 

In  what  I  have  called  the  left  wing  of  the  move- 
ment there  are  large  and  ever-increasing  numbers  of 
workers  and  sympathizers  who  refuse  to  face  the 
prospect  of  a  society  forever  based  upon  tre  wage 
system.  They  demand  an  organization  that  is  mak- 
ing for  its  abolition  and  the  substitution  therefor  of 
a  system  of  industrial  justice.  If  they  were  to  look 
sharply,  they  would  see  that  the  trade-union  move- 
ment is  traveling  faster  than  any  other  body  toward 
the  end  they  wish  to  reach.  But  unfortunately, 
looking  sharply  is  not  their  method.  They  habitu- 
ally attach  too  much  importance  to  surface  indica- 
tions and  not  enough  to  real  results.  They  go  al- 

[260] 


most  entirely  by  preambles  and  manifestoes.  Con- 
sequently, taking  the  trade-union  slogans  at  their  face 
value  and  finding  them  altogether  unsatisfactory, 
they  turn  their  backs  upon  the  trade-union  move- 
ment and  give  support  to  the  organizations  which 
have  the  sort  they  want,  the  I.  W.  W.,  the  W.  I.  I. 
U.,  etc. 

This  belief,  that  the  trade  unions  are  inherently 
conservative  bodies,  is  the  basis  of  the  strong  con- 
viction that  they  are  hopeless  and  that  they  must  be 
supplanted  by  a  new  organization,  aiming  to  abolish 
the  wage  system.  The  conception  is  found  in  some 
degree  or  other  among  virtually  all  radicals.  And 
it  has  done  incalculable  harm  to  the  unions.  It  has 
cost  them  the  support  of  thousands  of  militants,  of 
the  best  and  most  intelligent  that  the  working  class 
produces.  These  might  have  done  a  wonderful 
work;  but  their  time  and  energies  have  been  worse 
than  wasted  in  trying  to  build  up  organizations  such 
as  the  I.  W.  W.  When  one  considers  that  the  life 
of  nearly  every  labor  union  depends  upon  the  activ- 
ities of  a  very  small  fraction  of  its  membership,  it 
is  clear  that  this  constant  drain  upon  its  best  blood 
must  have  seriously  hindered  the  advance  of  the 
trade-union  movement.  Many  have  complained  at 
the  slow  progress  it  has  made;  but  the  marvel  is 
rather  that  it  has  been  able  to  progress  at  all. 

This  devitalizing  drain  must  be  stopped,  and  the 
great  body  of  progressives  and  radicals  won  over  to 
a  whole-hearted  support  of  the  trade  unions.  I 
consider  this  one  of  the  most  important  tasks  con- 
fronting the  labor  movement.  But  it  can  be  accom- 
plished only  by  driving  home  to  these  elements  the 

[261] 


patent  facts  that  the  trade  unions  are  making  straight 
for  the  abolition  of  capitalism  and  that  they  are 
going  incomparably  faster  towards  this  goal  than 
any  of  the  much  advertized,  so-called  revolutionary 
unions,  in  spite  of  the  latter' s  glittering  preambles. 
They  must  be  taught  that  the  weaknesses  of  the  trade 
unions  are  but  the  weaknesses  of  the  working  class, 
and  that  as  the  latter  gradually  improves  in  educa- 
tion and  experience,  the  unions  will  correspondingly 
take  on  higher  forms  and  clearer  aims.  You  can- 
not have  perfect  organizations  with  imperfect 
workers  to  build  upon.  In  a  word,  the  progressives 
must  be  won  over  from  the  idealistic  and  Utopian  to 
the  evolutionary  point  of  view. 

Indeed,  it  must  be  granted  that  insistence  upon 
the  real  goal  and  tendency  of  trade  unionism  will 
provoke  the  capitalist  class  into  greater  opposition 
against  the  movement.  But  this  will  be  trebly  offset 
by  the  added  support  which  the  unions  will  get  from 
the  large  numbers  of  militants  who  now  stand  apart 
from  them  because  of  lack  of  understanding.  The 
power  of  even  a  few  such  men,  proceeding  intelli- 
gently along  practical  lines,  is  one  of  the  marvels  of 
the  labor  movement.  It  may  be  confidently  ex- 
pected, therefore,  that  when  the  many  thousands  of 
these,  now  indifferent  or  hostile,  begin  to  work  to- 
gether, setting  up  their  own  press  and  systematically 
furthering  amalgamation  and  federation  projects  to 
bring  the  unions  into  closer  cooperation,  initiating 
and  prosecuting  organizing  campaigns,  retiring  to 
private  life  such  officials  as  now  find  themselves  at  the 
head  of  the  Amalgamated  Association,  etc.,  vast 

[262] 


changes  for  the  better  are  bound  to  occur  in  the  labor 
movement. 

The  trade  unions  have  cost  the  workers  untold  ef- 
forts to  build,  and  in  the  main  they  seem  loath  to 
give  them  up,  despite  the  blandishments  of  Utopian 
dual  unions.  Apparently,  it  is  through  the  old  unions 
that  the  workers  will  eventually  achieve  their  in- 
dustrial freedom,  save,  perhaps,  in  such  cases  as  the 
United  Garment  Workers,  where  conditions  in  the 
organization  were  so  utterly  hopeless  that  there  was 
nothing  to  do  but  form  a  new  body,  the  Amalga- 
mated Clothing  Workers.  But  this  was  an  excep- 
tional case.  Most  of  the  unions  are  moving  steadily 
onward  and  upward,  and  they  have  an  unshakable 
grip  upon  the  workers  in  their  respective  spheres. 
This  being  so,  the  logical  thing  to  do  is  systematically 
to  set  about  improving  and  strengthening  them.  If 
this  is  done,  then,  instead  of  the  wild,  desperate,  dual- 
istic  outbreaks  and  strikes,  which  have  characterized 
the  American  labor  movement  for  years,  and  done 
it  incalculable  harm,  the  discontented  rank  and  file 
will  find  relief  through  an  orderly  and  rapid  progress 
within  the  folds  of  the  organizations  they  already 
have.  The  sooner  these  facts  are  recognized  the 
better  for  American  Labor. 

During  the  past  few  years  much  has  been  said 
about  the  wonderful  progress  being  made  by  the  Eng- 
lish trade-union  movement.  This,  I  venture  to  as- 
sert, is  due  largely,  if  not  altogether,  to  the  absence 
among  the  radicals  of  England  of  the  idealistic, 
dualistic  attitude  towards  the  unions  which  ex- 
ists so  widely  here,  and  which  has  produced  the 

[263] 


I.  W.  W.  and  its  great  body  of  sympathizers. 
The  English  radicals  have  a  better  conception 
than  ours  of  the  trade  unions;  for,  flesh  and  blood  of 
the  labor  movement,  they  pit  their  policies  and  en- 
ergies against  the  conservatives,  and  win.  They  are 
the  ones  who  are  writing  the  highly-praised  pro- 
grams, and  driving  onward  the  great  wage  move- 
ments. They  are  practical  and  constructive.  Un- 
like so  many  of  our  radicals  they  do  not  waste  their 
time  and  strength  in  empty,  pessimistic  criticism  of 
the  trade  unions,  and  in  vain,  foolhardy  attempts 
to  tear  the  whole  labor  structure  to  pieces  and  to 
reconstruct  it  according  to  the  dream  of  Daniel  De 
Leon. 

In  England  the  turning  point  came  ten  years  ago 
when  she  felt  the  great  wave  of  sentiment  for 
revolutionary  unionism  then  sweeping  the  world. 
The  question  was  whether  this  movement  should 
realize  its  aims  through  the  old  unions  or  by  starting 
new  ones.  The  existing  unions  were  notoriously 
conservative.  Several  of  our  leading  radicals  had 
said  they  were  even  more  hopeless  than  our  own  or- 
ganizations and  strongly  urged  the  formation  of  an 
English  I.  W.  W.  But  fortunately,  Tom  Mann  and 
his  colleagues,  with  a  deeper  knowledge  of  trade 
unionism,  were  able  to  forestall  this  movement  and 
to  direct  the  strong  stream  of  progressive  thought 
and  energy  into  the  old  unions.  The  result  was 
magical.  Within  two  years  the  great  and  successful 
strikes  of  the  transport  workers,  railroaders  and 
miners  had  occurred,  and  the  renaissance  of  the  Eng- 
lish labor  movement  was  assured.  British  working- 
men  will  never  realize  the  invaluable  service  which 

[264] 


Tom  Mann  rendered  them  in  saving  England  from 
an  I.  W.  W.  dual  movement,  with  its  tremendous 
waste  of  power  and  its  weakening  effect  upon  the 
trade  unions. 

How  long  are  American  progressives  going  to 
continue  deceiving  themselves  with  the  words  of 
high-sounding  preambles?  When  are  they  going  to 
quit  chasing  rainbows  and  settle  down  to  real  work? 
These  are  important  considerations  indeed.  The 
hour  when  our  militants  generally  adopt  English 
methods,  and  turn  their  whole-hearted  attention  to 
building  up  and  developing  the  trade-union  move- 
ment,—  that  hour  will  be  the  dawn  of  a  new  day  for 
American  Labor. 


THE    END 


[265] 


m      f\r\f\          i 


